JUDGMENT : Arindam Sinha, J. This application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India contains a challenge to a judgment dated 29th September, 2011 delivered by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) whereby, the appeals of the opposite parties were held to have succeeded and was allowed. The Appellate Tribunal found the opposite party no.1 was entitled to realise a sum of Rs.26,86,24,937.68 from the petitioner as well as the opposite party no.2. 2. The relevant facts are that Stock Holding Corporation of India Limited the petitioner, hereinafter referred to as SHCIL, carries on business, inter alia, as a depository participant. SHCIL acts as an agent of its clients for the purpose of collection of sale proceeds of shares sold through the Calcutta Stock Exchange under a scheme framed by it. SHCIL has its own procedure for verification of the transactions entered into by its clients after which it issues post dated cheques to the extent of the expected proceeds of the sales, in favour of its clients. Such cheques are to be presented for payment on the next day of pay out of rolling settlement of the Calcutta Stock Exchange in respect of the transactions. 3. The opposite party no.2 as a client of SHCIL approached it in respect of sale of 7,20,000 shares held by him of a company known as DSQ Industries Limited, to be sold through the Calcutta Stock Exchange at the price of Rs.340/- per share through stock broker Biyani Securities Limited. The said sale was made through the Calcutta Stock Exchange on 2nd March, 2001 and the proceeds were to be paid out in the Rolling Market Settlement no.2001519 of the aggregate sum of approximately Rs.24.45 crores. SHCIL on 2nd March, 2001, after deducting its brokerage and service charges, issued three post dated crossed and account payee cheques all dated 14th March, 2001 for the aggregate sum of approximately Rs.24.40 crores drawn in favour of the opposite party no.2 on United Bank of India, Calcutta Stock Exchange Branch. The opposite party no.2 got those cheques discounted by IndusInd Bank Limited, the opposite party no.1. The said cheques being dishonoured on presentation, the opposite party no.1 filed Original Application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal seeking to recover, inter alia, the aggregate value of the said cheques from SHCIL and the opposite party no.2. The opposite party no.2 got those cheques discounted by IndusInd Bank Limited, the opposite party no.1. The said cheques being dishonoured on presentation, the opposite party no.1 filed Original Application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal seeking to recover, inter alia, the aggregate value of the said cheques from SHCIL and the opposite party no.2. The Tribunal by its judgment and order dated 15th October, 2009 granted certificate for recovery as against the opposite party no.2 only. The opposite party no.1 appealed before the Appellate Tribunal, which returned the judgment and order impugned herein. 4. The controversy between the parties is with regard to the discounting of the said cheques. In this regard two letters both dated 2nd March, 2001 issued by SHCIL to the opposite party no.1 are of importance for the purpose of adjudicating such controversy. Those two letters were tendered in evidence before the Tribunal and marked exhibits A1 and D8. The said letters are reproduced below:- "Date 2/3/2001 To Stock Holding IndusInd Bank Ltd. 24 Park Street Kolkata 700016 Corporation of India Limited. Dear Sirs, We enclose a post dated cheque no.824701-703 dated 14/3/2001 for an amount of Rs.24,40,58,400/- in favour of IndusInd Bank Ltd. A/c Harish Chandra Biyani drawn on U.B.I Calcutta Stock Exch. Br. which represent payment of our dues of Harish Chandra Biyani against tradings executed by the said company in the depository segment. We state that the cheque represents normal trade settlement and irrevocably undertake that: 1. The cheques will be honoured on presentation at the drawee bank on the date mentioned or within three months of the date mentioned. The cheque will be presented for payment on the next day of payout of Rolling Settlement no. 2001519 of the Calcutta Stock Exchange for the settlement of trades executed on 02/03/2001. 2. We shall not stop payment of the cheque. 3. Any change in our signatories of constitution shall not render the cheque invalid for payment. 4. The cheque has been issued in terms of a valid resolution passed in our Board of Directors. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, For STOCK HOLDING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. Sd/ (This letter was marked Exhibit A1). "2/3/2001 Stock Holding To Corporation of India IndusInd Bank Ltd. Limited. 4. The cheque has been issued in terms of a valid resolution passed in our Board of Directors. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, For STOCK HOLDING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. Sd/ (This letter was marked Exhibit A1). "2/3/2001 Stock Holding To Corporation of India IndusInd Bank Ltd. Limited. 24 Park Street Kolkata 700016 Dear Sirs, We enclose a post dated cheque no.824701-703 dated 14/03/2001 for an amount of Rs.24,40,58,400/- in favour of IndusInd Bank Ltd A/c Harish Chandra Biyani drawn on U.B.I. Calcutta Stock Exch. Br. which represent payment of our dues to Harish Chandra Biyani against tradings executed by the said company in the depository segment. We state that the cheque represents normal trade settlement and irrevocably undertake that: 1. The cheque will be honoured on presentation at the drawee bank on the date mentioned or within three months of the date mentioned. The cheque will be presented for payment only after payment of funds are made by the stock exchange. 2. We shall not stop payment of the cheque. 3. Any change in our signatories of constitution shall not render the cheque invalid for payment. 4. The cheque has been issued in terms of a valid resolution passed in our Board of Directors. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, For STOCK HOLDING CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. Sd/ 2/3/01" (This letter was marked Exhibit D8). 5. Mr. Kapoor, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of SHCIL argued that the impugned judgment must be set aside as it was made without considering the case of fraud, did not contain reasons in support of the finding and was in any event perverse. 6. On the case of fraud Mr. Kapoor relied on a "Master Circular-Loans and Advances-Statutory and other Restrictions" dated 1st November, 2000 issued by the Reserve Bank of India to the Chief Executives of all Scheduled Commercial Banks. He pointed out by that circular the Reserve Bank of India had, inter alia, imposed restrictions on discounting/re-discounting of bills by banks. The relevant restrictions are reproduced below;- "3.11 Discounting/Rediscounting of Bills by Banks Only bills covering purchase of raw material/inventory for production purpose and sale of goods should be discounted by banks. Bills covering payments of electricity charges, customs duty, hire-purchase/lease rental instalments, sale of securities and other type of financial accommodation should not be discounted by banks. ....." 7. The relevant restrictions are reproduced below;- "3.11 Discounting/Rediscounting of Bills by Banks Only bills covering purchase of raw material/inventory for production purpose and sale of goods should be discounted by banks. Bills covering payments of electricity charges, customs duty, hire-purchase/lease rental instalments, sale of securities and other type of financial accommodation should not be discounted by banks. ....." 7. He submitted bills covering payment of sale of securities were not to be discounted by banks as per the restriction imposed by that circular. The opposite party no.1, however, fraudulently purported to discount the said cheques as would appear from its sanction letter dated 5th March, 2001. The sanction was made in violation of the restriction and in the face of SHCIL having had made it clear that the said cheques issued by it could only be presented after SHCIL had received payment in respect of the shares sold by the opposite party no.2. The sanction granted by the opposite party no.1 to the opposite party no.2 of the huge sum of Rs.24.40 crores was to be availed on the date of sanction itself i.e. 5th March, 2001 for which the opposite party no.1 had not obtained any security at all as would appear from the letter of sanction itself. According to him there was a clear practice of fraud in the matter of grant of such sanction disentitling the opposite party no.1 of any right to relief based on the same. Such case of SHCIL was not considered by the Appellate Tribunal. He relied on the decision in the case of Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI reported in (2009) 8 SCC 1 wherein the Supreme Court had held, inter alia, that :- "RBI in terms of Section 21 of the 1949 Act is empowered to control advances by banking companies and issue necessary directions in this behalf. RBI, therefore, has the requisite power to issue direction to banks in relation to discounting and rediscounting of bills of exchange and those directions issued by RBI have statutory force and, thus, can be termed as law in force. Accused 1, 2 and 8 being public servants, they were bound by circulars having been issued by RBI." "Whether a circular letter issued by a statutory authority would be binding or not or whether the same has a statutory force, would depend upon nature of the statute. Accused 1, 2 and 8 being public servants, they were bound by circulars having been issued by RBI." "Whether a circular letter issued by a statutory authority would be binding or not or whether the same has a statutory force, would depend upon nature of the statute. Having regard to the fact that RBI exercises control over banking companies, the said circular letter was binding on the banking companies. The officials of UCO Bank were, therefore, bound by the said circular. UCO Bank could only have discounted bills of exchange out of bona fide commercial transactions as had been provided under the RBI circulars which were statutorily binding on UCO Bank." 8. A fraudulent sanction was made by the opposite party no.1 in favour of the opposite party no.2 who afterword was absconding. Mr. Kapoor submitted that fraud vitiated everything. Copies of judgments of the Supreme Court of India and the Court of Appeal in England on such point were enclosed in a compilation handed up by him but not specifically cited. 9. He went on to argue the impugned judgment was bereft of reason. He submitted a perusal thereof would reveal that it was a reproduction of the submissions made on behalf of the parties and a conclusion. Such would be apparent from what according to him could be said to be the reasoning portion of the impugned judgment which is reproduced below:- "I find it difficult to brush aside the submission made by Ld. Sr. Counsel Mr. Mitra on behalf of the appellant bank that the allegation of negligence could be of little relevance nor it could have any co-relation as regards non-payment of the cheques. There is no pleading of negligence either. It was contended that even the Ld. Tribunal did not find merit in the allegation of conspiracy and did not accept conspiracy angle. According to Mr. Mitra, there could be no material to construe conspiracy. Ld. Counsel Mr. Mitra referring to Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act submitted that a contract of guarantee is a contract to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third person in case of his default. Inviting attention of this Tribunal to the amended plaint, it was categorically asserted by Ld. Counsel Mr. Mitra that respondent No.1 and 2 with mala fide intention to induce the appellant to part with Rs.24.40 crores had attacked the scheme. Inviting attention of this Tribunal to the amended plaint, it was categorically asserted by Ld. Counsel Mr. Mitra that respondent No.1 and 2 with mala fide intention to induce the appellant to part with Rs.24.40 crores had attacked the scheme. The appellant bank parted with the amount in bona fide belief and in reliance upon the assurance of the respondent No.1 contended in its letter dated 2.3.2001 that the post dated cheques would be honoured on the due date of repayment. He further submitted that there was a mala fide arrangement between two respondents to induce the appellant bank to discount the post dated cheques by giving an assurance and thereafter to get the said amount transferred from respondent No.2 to respondent No.1 by a circuitous process and thereafter, to dishonour the post dated cheques. It had been claimed on behalf of the appellant bank that such respondents conspired to defraud the appellant bank to the tune of Rs.24.40 crores and they are jointly and severally liable to compensate the appellant bank for the said amount. Having regard to the submission made by Ld. Counsel for the parties and after due consideration of the facts and materials on record, I find there is merit in such stand as taken the appellant bank. Accordingly, I find it difficult to accept the views of the Ld. DRT-1, Kolkata. The impugned judgment and order dated 15.10.2009 passed in O.A. No.218 of 2001 suffers inherent illegality and mis-appreciation of facts and accordingly, the same cannot be sustained. Consequently, the two appeals, being Appeal No.37 of 2010 and Appeal No.86 of 2010, succeed and be allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Ld. DRT-1, Kolkata in O.A.No.218 of 2001 be set aside. Appellant bank namely IndusInd Bank Limited is thus entitled to realise a sum of Rs. 26,86,24,937.68 from both the respondents i.e. Stock Holding Corporation of India Limited and Harish Chandra Biyani. The said amount would carry compound interest from 1st August, 2001 at the rate of 19% per annum with quarterly rests till realisation. Properties of the respondent No.1 charged with the appellant bank shall remain charged till recovery of the certified amount along with the aforesaid interest. Appellant bank is entitled to recover the certified amount along with interest by way of sale of the property of respondent No.2 charged with the appellant bank." 10. Mr. Properties of the respondent No.1 charged with the appellant bank shall remain charged till recovery of the certified amount along with the aforesaid interest. Appellant bank is entitled to recover the certified amount along with interest by way of sale of the property of respondent No.2 charged with the appellant bank." 10. Mr. Kapoor's analysis of such reasons in the impugned judgment was that - (a) the Appellate Tribunal had difficulty to brush aside the submission made by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the opposite party no.1 that the allegation of negligence could be of little relevance; (b) there was no pleading of negligence; (c) the opposite party no.1 parted with the amount in bona fide belief and in reliance upon the assurance of SHCIL contended in its letter dated 2nd March, 2001 that the post dated cheques would be honoured on the due date of repayment; and (d) that the Appellate Tribunal found merit in the stand taken by the opposite party no.1. 11. He submitted those were no reasons at all. He relied on the case of Board of Trustees of Martyrs Memorial Trust v. UOI and Anr. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 734 wherein the Supreme Court had held, inter alia, - "Brevity in judgment writing has not lost its virtue. All long judgments or orders are not great nor are brief orders always bad. What is required of any judicial decision is due application of mind, clarity of reasoning and focused consideration. A slipshod consideration or cryptic order or decision without due reflection on the issues raised in a matter may render such decision unsustainable. Hasty adjudication must be avoided. Each and every matter that comes to the court must be examined with the seriousness it deserves." 12. He also relied on the case of State of Uttaranchal Anr. v. Sunil Kr. Vaish and Ors. reported in (2011) 8 SCC 670 wherein Supreme Court had held:- "Judicial determination has to be seen as an outcome of a reasoned process of adjudication initiated and documented by a party based mainly on events which happened in the past. Courts' clear reasoning and analysis are basic requirements in a judicial determination when parties demand it so that they can administer justice justly and correctly, in relation to the findings on law and facts. Courts' clear reasoning and analysis are basic requirements in a judicial determination when parties demand it so that they can administer justice justly and correctly, in relation to the findings on law and facts. Judicial decision must be perceived by the parties and by the society at large, as being the result of a correct and proper application of legal rules, proper evaluation of the evidence adduced and application of legal procedure. The parties should be convinced that their case has been properly considered and decided. Judicial decisions must in principle be reasoned and the quality of a judicial decision depends principally on the quality of its reasoning. Proper reasoning is an imperative necessity which should not be sacrificed for expediency. The statement of reasons not only makes the decision easier for the parties to understand and many a times such decisions would be accepted with respect. The requirement of providing reasons obliges the Judge to respond to the parties' submissions and to specify the points that justify the decision and make it lawful and it enables the society to understand the functioning of the judicial system and it also enhances the faith and confidence of the people in the judicial system." 13. The last point taken by Mr. Kapoor was, that the impugned judgment was perverse. He argued the point on the basis of four letters. They are the aforesaid two letters issued by SHCIL to the opposite party no.1, both dated 2nd March, 2011 being exhibits A1 and D8, a letter dated 13th March, 2001 written by SHCIL to the said opposite party and the reply thereto on the same date. Mr. Kapoor submitted that no reasonable or prudent person could conclude from the reading of the four letters that the conditions on which SHCIL had undertaken to honour the said cheques had been fulfilled. On a cogent reading of both the letters of 2nd March 2001 it would be clear the said cheques were to be presented for payment only after payment of funds were made by the Calcutta Stock Exchange. SHCIL having understood that there was a payment crisis in the Calcutta Stock Exchange and that the payment may not take place as scheduled, had by its letter dated 13th March, 2001 duly notified the opposite party no.1 that the said cheques would not be honoured if presented as they would not have received the funds. SHCIL having understood that there was a payment crisis in the Calcutta Stock Exchange and that the payment may not take place as scheduled, had by its letter dated 13th March, 2001 duly notified the opposite party no.1 that the said cheques would not be honoured if presented as they would not have received the funds. The contention of the opposite party no.1 in reply that the receipt of funds by SHCIL after settlement was not a condition or a part of the undertaking given was clearly wrong and in accepting the same the impugned judgment was perverse. 14. On behalf of the opposite party no.1 Mr. Anindya Mitra, learned Senior Advocate in opposing the challenge posed by the petitioner, submitted the case of fraud was not urged before the Appellate Tribunal. He submitted the case of fraud was not urged at all as opposed to such case having been urged but not answered. There was no ground taken in the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to the effect that the purported case of fraud argued was made out but not considered by the Appellate Tribunal. He submitted that the circular of the Reserve Bank of India sought to be relied upon by the petitioner was not even tendered in evidence. 15. Next he submitted the thrust of the argument of the petitioner made before the DRAT was that his client, the opposite party no.1, had failed to establish that the pay out was in fact made in Rolling Settlement no.2001519 of the Calcutta Stock Exchange in respect of the transaction in question. He submitted the argument of the petitioner was duly recorded by the learned DRAT as would appear, inter alia, from the portion of the impugned judgment set out below:- "Mr. Saha further submitted that the two letters were written by the respondent no.1 on 2.3.2001. The claim that the second letter supplemented the first letter was accepted by the Ld. Tribunal. It was then submitted that the appellant has failed to establish that the payout was in fact made in Rolling Settlement no.2001519 in respect of the transaction in question. It was claimed that no payout in the said Rolling Settlement was made in respect of the transaction for which the three post dated cheques were issued by the respondent no. 1. It was claimed that no payout in the said Rolling Settlement was made in respect of the transaction for which the three post dated cheques were issued by the respondent no. 1. This was asserted by respondent no.1 in the written statement and admitted by the respondent no.2. Reference was made to evidence in cross examination of the second witness of the appellant bank while submitting that in the FIR filed against the appellant bank and its officers by the respondent no.1 it was clearly stated that although Stock Exchange had made payout in respect of the Rolling Market Settlement no.2001519 on 13.3.2010, no fund payout was received against the sale of the said 7,20,000 shares of DSQ Industries. Mr. Saha further submitted that for the purpose of creating an obligation an undertaking must be given in connection with a contract and in the instant case there was no contract of any nature between the appellant and the respondent no.1. It was emphatically submitted that respondent no.1 had never requested the appellant to discount the three cheques. Mr. Saha further submitted that although initially it had been contended by the appellant that it was the holder in due course of the said cheques, the said case was not argued by the appellant in course of hearing of the appeal. The claim of the appellant bank that it was the holder in due course of the three post dated cheques was denied and controverted by the respondent no.1 and the Ld. Tribunal after taking into consideration various judgments, as referred to on behalf of such respondent no.1, accepted the stand of such respondent no.1. Mr. Saha also submitted a contract guarantee not supported by consideration is a void contract. According to Mr. Saha there can be no question of respondent no.1 undertaking to make payment on the interest of payout of the Rolling Settlement even in the absence of Rolling Settlement taking place or in the absence of payout being made in the same. It was also submitted that by a meaningful reading of the letter dated 2.3.2001, there can be no doubt that respondent no.1 had merely consented to payment being made to the appellant bank subject to payout of the Stock Exchange Rolling Settlement Date." 16. Such arguments were dealt with by the DRAT as would, according to Mr. It was also submitted that by a meaningful reading of the letter dated 2.3.2001, there can be no doubt that respondent no.1 had merely consented to payment being made to the appellant bank subject to payout of the Stock Exchange Rolling Settlement Date." 16. Such arguments were dealt with by the DRAT as would, according to Mr. Mitra, appear from the following portion in the impugned judgment read with the portions set out earlier in this judgment:- "Shri Sanjiv Sinha, DW1 in his evidence in cross examination submitted that Mr. Harish Chandra Biyani, their customer, asked them that a particular form should be filled in and then given to him for showing genuineness of the issuing of the cheques. He deposed that Mr. Harish Chandra Biyani came back with this letter to the defendant no.1 and wanted addition of details as to settled principles and second signature. He wanted additional information which was given by the defendant no.1. He wanted amendment in the letter and the second signature on the letter. It was categorically stated by the said witness that the second letter (Exbt. A-1) of Bank's evidence is the final letter given by the defendant no.1 to Mr. Harish Chandra Biyani. Having regard to such evidence of 'DW1', I find little scope for any further controversy. Mr. Mitra laying emphasis on the case "came back" in such evidence submitted that it leads to the irresistible conclusion that the first letter was returned. In fact, in the backdrop of such evidence, I am inclined to hold that there can be no case for co-existence of the two letters dated 2.3.2001. On behalf of the appellant bank attention of this Tribunal was drawn to the letter dated March 13, 2001 addressed to the appellant bank. Ld. Sr. Counsel Mr. Mitra while establishing the claim of the appellant bank further referred to the additional evidence one Mr. B.K. Rout. The same reads:- "The defendant no.2 had initially procured a letter from the defendant no.1 making the honouring of the post dated cheques conditional upon the defendant no.1 receiving the payment by CSE on settlement. This letter was also signed by one signatory of the defendant no.1 only. B.K. Rout. The same reads:- "The defendant no.2 had initially procured a letter from the defendant no.1 making the honouring of the post dated cheques conditional upon the defendant no.1 receiving the payment by CSE on settlement. This letter was also signed by one signatory of the defendant no.1 only. This initially proposed letter dated 2.3.2001 is already on record being Exhibit "D-8" of the Evidence on Affidavit of Sanjiv Sinha, the DW1 shown to be affirmed on an unspecified date of an unspecified month in 2003. We did not agree to such letter. Within a few hours, another letter of the defendant no.1 was made over to the Bank withdrawing that condition and containing instructions to present the post dated cheques one day after the Rolling Settlement payout date and also containing the assurance of the defendant no.1 that they will not stop payment of the cheques. On the basis of this assurance, we discounted the post dated cheques and paid a sum of Rs.24.29 crores to Harish Chandra Biyani." 17. Mr. Mitra submitted the learned DRAT was the Appellate Forum which had gone into the evidence and decided the questions of fact. Even if there was an error of fact to be ascertained by examining the evidence and re-appreciating it, the High Court could not, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, interfere with such finding of fact as its function was limited to see that the Tribunal had acted within the limits of its authority. The right of appeal was statutory which the petitioner could not purport to exercise by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this court. In this regard he relied on the case of Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta and Anr. reported in (1975)1 SCC 858 . He also relied on the case of Sugarbai M. Siddiq and Ors. v. Ramesh S. Hankare reported in (2001) 8 SCC 477 wherein the Supreme Court said, inter alia, :- "There can be little doubt that in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to see whether the lower court/tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with the matter and if so, whether the impugned order is vitiated by procedural irregularity; in other words, the Court is concerned not with the decision but with the decision-making process." 18. He submitted that in any event it was apparent from the said letters being exhibits A1 and D8 that the opposite party no.1 had required specific and clear undertaking to be given by the petitioner before it discounted the cheques. The necessity of issuance of two letters, the evidence on appreciation of which the DRAT had found that the letter exhibit A1 was the subsequent letter and the two letters therefore could not co-exist, was of the effect that the petitioner had irrevocably undertaken to honour the cheques on presentation on the date mentioned being the next day of pay out of Rolling Settlement no.2001519 of the Calcutta Stock Exchange for the settlement of trades executed on 2nd March, 2001. The petitioner had itself by its letter dated 16th August, 2001 addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, Park Street Police Station stated that on 13th March, 2001 the Calcutta Stock Exchange had made pay out in respect of Rolling Market Settlement no.2001519. According to him the second letter being exhibit A1 having eclipsed the earlier letter being exhibit D8, there was no scope for the petitioner to seek to resist its liability to pay on the cheques having been duly presented for payment. He submitted the impugned judgment did not contain any finding that could be said to be perverse. However the directions in the impugned judgment regarding properties of the opposite party no.2 as charged with his client were made by mistake, and such could not and would not be pressed by his client. He concluded by relying on the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakesh Chandra Jain reported in AIR 1969 Supreme Court 983 to submit that the Supreme Court had held the test of perversity to be that the finding may not be supported by any legal evidence at all or was a finding arrived at which no reasonable person could have arrived on the material considered. He reiterated the DRAT had duly considered the evidence which evidence could not be said to be illegal and the view taken thereon was eminently possible. 19. He reiterated the DRAT had duly considered the evidence which evidence could not be said to be illegal and the view taken thereon was eminently possible. 19. On perusal of the grounds in the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the first contention of the petitioner that fraud had been practised by allegedly discounting the said cheques in violation of the restriction imposed by the Reserve Bank of India on Scheduled Commercial Banks was not considered by the Appellate Tribunal, does not appear to have been taken. Therefore it can safely be concluded that the Appellate Tribunal did not have occasion to adjudicate on such issue as not raised. In the circumstances, there is no procedural lapse in the decision-making process resorted to by the Appellate Tribunal warranting interference. It is thus not necessary for this court to go into the merits of the contention regarding whether or not the restriction relied upon by the petitioner would operate to cause the discounting of the said cheques by the opposite party no.1 to be declared illegal. However, in any event the petitioner could not overcome the distinction between a bill covering sale of securities and a cheque. The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 separately defines a cheque to be a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker as opposed to a certain person. Thus the discounting of the said cheques, prima facie, do not appear to be hit by the said restriction on discounting of bills covering sale of the securities. This court is unable to presume that the Reserve Bank of India imposed the said restriction on 'cheques' as covered by the expression 'bills'. Therefore in view of the petitioner's conduct in giving the required undertakings thus facilitating the discounting of the said cheques, it cannot thereafter be heard to say the same were discounted fraudulently as estopped from doing so. 20. In the matter of findings and reasons therefor on the basis of the evidence on record, from the portions of the impugned judgment set out above there does not appear to be any error apparent. The Appellate Tribunal has found on facts regarding the letters referred to above. On the two letters both dated 2nd March, 2001, the Appellate Tribunal has held, in appreciating the evidence before it, the letter being exhibit A1 was issued subsequently and that the two letters could not co-exist. The Appellate Tribunal has found on facts regarding the letters referred to above. On the two letters both dated 2nd March, 2001, the Appellate Tribunal has held, in appreciating the evidence before it, the letter being exhibit A1 was issued subsequently and that the two letters could not co-exist. In applying the authorities cited by the petitioner to ascertain whether the impugned judgment does or does not contain reasons, a perusal of the same reveals that the controversy between the parties was duly recorded, the evidence considered and findings arrived at on the basis thereof. The facts found being, inter alia, that the opposite party no.1 had required the second letter being exhibit A1 to be issued by which the words 'presented for payment only after payment of funds are made by the Stock Exchange' contained in the letter being exhibit D8 issued earlier, were replaced by the words 'presented for payment on the next day of pay out of Rolling Settlement no.2001519..', the cheques were duly presented and that according to the petitioner on 13th March 2001 the Calcutta Stock Exchange had made pay out in respect of the Rolling Market Settlement no.2001519, would lead a reasonable and prudent person to the conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal. Such conclusion cannot, therefore, by any stretch of imagination be said to be perverse. 21. For the reasons aforesaid the application of the petitioner is found to be without merit and is accordingly dismissed. 22. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on the usual undertakings. Application dismissed.