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2015 DIGILAW 385 (ORI)

Kalia Hati v. State of Odisha

2015-06-30

A.K.RATH, BISWAJIT MOHANTY, P.K.MOHANTY

body2015
JUDGMENT : PRADIP MOHANTY, J. This Full Bench has been constituted on the basis of a reference made by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 05.05.2015 to answer the following question: "Whether in the background of the entire Scheme of OIIDCO Act, 1980 would it be proper to say that as per the said Act, IDCO can cause acquisition of land only for the purpose of establishing industrial estate/industrial area and for no other purpose?" 2. The above reference has been made in view of the conflicting views expressed on the aforesaid issue by the two Division Benches of this Court in Rajkumar Gunawant & another v. State of Orissa & others, 2012 (Sup-II) OLR 349 and Sachalabala Sethy & others v. Chief Secretary & Chief Development Commission, Odisha & others, 2014 (II) ILR -CUT- 64. 3. In Rajkumar Gunawant (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that on a reading of the objects and reasons of the preamble of the Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act 1980") and definitions of "Industrial Area" and "Industrial Estate" as defined in Sections 2(h) and 2(i) and provision of Sections 14, 15 and 31 of the said Act, the Corporation has to acquire land for any "industrial area" to form "industrial estate". Thus the Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa (hereinafter referred to as "the IDCO") can only cause acquisition of land for an "industrial area" in which an "industrial estate" can be established. In Sachalabala Sethy (supra) a coordinate Bench of this Court without referring to Rajkumar Gunawant came to hold that subsection (i) of Section 14 of "the Act 1980" is independent and in no manner limited by the illustrations contained in sub-section (ii) of Section 14. 4. At this stage, it is apposite to glance through the relevant provisions of "the Act 1980", which was enacted by the State Legislature to provide for the establishment of a Corporation for the development of industrial infrastructure in the State of Odisha. 4. At this stage, it is apposite to glance through the relevant provisions of "the Act 1980", which was enacted by the State Legislature to provide for the establishment of a Corporation for the development of industrial infrastructure in the State of Odisha. Section 2(h) of "the Act 1980" defines "industrial area" to mean- "(h) "industrial area" means any area declared to be an industrial area by the State Government by notification, which is to be developed and where industries, industrial housing and related services are to be accommodated" "Industrial estate" is defined by Section 2(i) to mean "(i) "industrial estate" means any site selected by the State Government where the Corporation builds factories and other buildings, services and amenities and makes them available for any industry or class of industries" 5. Sections 14, 15 and 31 of "the Act 1980", which are hub of the issue, are quoted below; "14. Functions. - The functions of the Corporation shall be – (i) generally to promote and assist in the rapid and orderly establishment, growth and development -of industries, trade and commerce in the State; and (ii) in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of Clause (i) to- (a) establish and manage industrial estates at places notified by the State Government; (b) develop industrial areas notified by the State Government for the purpose and make them available for undertakings to establish themselves; (c) undertake schemes or works, either jointly with other corporate bodies or institutions, or with Government or local authorities, or on an agency basis, in furtherance of the purposes for. which the Corporation is established and all matters connected therewith; (d) provide or cause to be provided amenities and common facilities in industrial estates and industrial areas and construct and maintain or cause to be maintained works and buildings thereof; (e) make available buildings on hire or sale to industrialists or persons intending to start industrial undertakings; (f) construct buildings for the housing of the employees of such industries and employees of the Corporation. 15. General powers of the Corporation. 15. General powers of the Corporation. - Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Corporation shall have power: (a) to acquire and hold such property, both movable and immovable, as the Corporation may deem necessary for the performance of any of its activities, and to lease, sell, exchange or otherwise transfer any property held by it on such conditions as may be deemed proper by the Corporation; (b) to purchase by agreement or to take on lease or under any form of tenancy any land to erect such buildings and to execute such other works as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out its duties and functions; (c) to allot plots, factory sheds or buildings or part of buildings, including residential tenements, to suitable persons in the industrial estates established or developed by the-Corporation; (d) to modify or rescind such allotments, including the right and power to evict the allottees concerned on breach of any of the terms or conditions of the allotment; (e) to constitute advisory committees to advise the Corporation; (f) to engage suitable consultants or persons having special knowledge or skill to assist the Corporation in the performance of its functions; (g) to enter into and perform all such contracts as it may consider necessary or expedient for carrying out any of its functions; and (h) to do such other things and perform such acts as it may think necessary or expedient for the proper conduct of its functions and the carrying into effect the purposes of this Act. . xxx xxx xxx 31. Acquisition of land. - (1) Whenever any land is required, by the Corporation for any purpose of furtherance of the objects of this Act, but the Corporation is unable to acquire it by agreement, the State Government may, upon an application of the Corporation in that behalf, order proceedings to be taken under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) for acquiring the same on behalf of the Corporation as if such lands were needed for a public purpose within the meaning of that Act. . (2) The amount of compensation awarded and all other charges incurred in the acquisition of any such land shall be forthwith paid by the Corporation and thereupon, the land shall vest in the Corporation." 6. . (2) The amount of compensation awarded and all other charges incurred in the acquisition of any such land shall be forthwith paid by the Corporation and thereupon, the land shall vest in the Corporation." 6. The basic approach to the interpretation of a statute has been succinctly put in the case of Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 SC 1454 . Paragraph-9 of the judgment is quoted hereunder: "... ... ..A statute is 'best understood "if we know, the reason for it. The reason for a statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a statute take their colour from the reason for it. How do we discover the reas6n for a statute? There are external and internal aids. The external aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill is presented to Parliament, the reports of Committees which preceded the Bill and the reports of Parliamentary Committees. Occasional excursions into the debates of Parliament are permitted. Internal aids are, the preamble, the scheme and the provisions of the Act. Having discovered the reason for the statute and so having set the sail to the wind, the interpreter may proceed ahead. No provision in the statute and no word of the statute may be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally before any provision or word is attempted to be construed. The setting and the pattern are important. It is again important to remember that Parliament does not waste its breath unnecessarily. Just as Parliament is not expected to use unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also not expected to express itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any word without meaning something, Parliament does not legislate where no legislation is called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for the sake of legislation; nor can it be assumed to make pointless legislation." 7. All provisions of a statute-have to be read harmoniously and any interpretation has to be ex visceribus actus. In Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, AIR; 1978 SC 995, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the immortal words of Lord Coke that "it is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth meaning of the makers'. 8. In Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, AIR; 1978 SC 995, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the immortal words of Lord Coke that "it is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth meaning of the makers'. 8. A Full Bench of this Court in Laxminarayan Sahu v. State of Orissa and others, 'OLR' Full Bench (1990) 628 observed that it is a cardinal rule of construction of statute that the construction must be put from the bare words of the Act itself, if the language used is clear and unambiguous. In the construction of a statute, the words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless there be something in the context or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances with reference to which they are used to show that they are used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical meaning. 9. In the backdrop of the aforesaid well settled principles with regard to the statutory interpretation, the provisions of "the Act 1980" quoted supra may be examined. 10. Section 14(i) of "the Act 1980" deals with functions of the Corporation. It provides that the functions of the Corporation shall be generally to promote and assist in the rapid and orderly establishment, growth and development of industries, trade and commerce in the State. Section 14(ii) starts with "in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of Clause (i)". Thereafter it provides various particular purposes for which acquisition can be made. 11. What is the meaning of the expression "In particular, and without prejudice to the generality" appearing in Section 14(ii) of "the Act 1980"? In Shiv Kirpal Singh v. Shri V. V. Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097 , the Supreme Court relying on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, AIR 1945 PC 156 held that when the expression "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions" is used anything contained in the provisions following the said expression is not intended to cut down the generality of the meaning of the preceding provision. For better appreciation, paragraphs 39 and 41 of the judgment are quoted hereunder: "39. For better appreciation, paragraphs 39 and 41 of the judgment are quoted hereunder: "39. Chapter IXA of the Penal Code which deals with offences relating to elections was introduced in the Code by the Indian Election Offences and Inquiries Act (XXXIX of 1920). Section 171A defines 'candidate' and 'electoral right'. An electoral right means the right of a person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being, a candidate or to vote or refrain from voting at an election. Section 171 C, which deals with the offences of undue influence reads asunder: "(1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right commits the offence of undue influence at an election. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), whoever (a) threatens any candidate or voter, or any person in whom a candidate or voter is interested, with injury of any kind, or (b) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or voter to believe that he or any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate• or voter, within the meaning of sub- section(1 )." Sub-section (3) lays down that "A declaration of public policy or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this section." Section 171 F provides for the penalty for the offence of undue influence which is either imprisonment upto one year or with fine or both. Section 171G provides: "Whoever with intent to affect the result of an election makes or publishes any statement purporting to be a statement of fact which is false and which he either, knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true in relation' to the personal character or conduct of any candidate shall be punished with fine." xxx xxx xxx 41. We do not think that the Legislature, while framing Chapter IXA of the Code ever contemplated such a dichotomy or intended to give such a narrow meaning to the freedom of franchise essential in a representative system of government. We do not think that the Legislature, while framing Chapter IXA of the Code ever contemplated such a dichotomy or intended to give such a narrow meaning to the freedom of franchise essential in a representative system of government. In our opinion the argument mentioned above is fallacious. It completely disregards the structure and the provisions of Section 171 C. Section 171 C is enacted in three parts. The first sub-section contains the definition of "undue influence". This is in wide terms and renders a person voluntarily interfering or attempting to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right guilty of committing undue influence. That this is very wide is indicated by the opening sentence of sub-so (2), i.e. "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1 )." It is well-settled that when this expression is used anything contained in the provisions following, this expression is not intended to cut down the generality of the meaning of the preceding provision. This was so held by the Privy Council in King-Emperor V. Sibnath Banerji, 1945 FCR 195 = (AIR 1545 PC 156)." 12. From the aforesaid, the conclusion is irresistible that subsection (i) of Section 14 of "the Act 1980", is independent and is couched in broad terms. The same cannot be in any manner whittled down by the language of sub-section (ii) of Section 14 of "the Act 1980". 13. Thus, the observation made in Rajkumar Gunawant (supra) that the IDCO can only cause acquisition of land for an "Industrial Area" in which an "Industrial Estate" can be established is per incuriam. The functions and general powers of the Corporation as enumerated in Sections 14 and 15 of "the Act 1980" cannot be cabined, cribbed or confined by the language used in Section 14(ii) of "the Act 1980". 14. The reference is answered accordingly. The Registry is directed to place the matter before the assigned Bench. I agree. Reference answered.