JUDGMENT : Soumen Sen, J. The petitioner has filed an application for execution of a decree dated December 4, 2001 as amended on December 13, 2001. In the said proceeding this application has been filed for dismissal of the execution application, inter alia, on the grounds:- i. The decree is incapable of being executed by this Hon’ble Court as none of the properties of the judgment debtor are within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court and, hence, under Section 39(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the said application ought to be dismissed and/or be transferred to the appropriate Court. ii. The decree is barred by limitation as it has been filed 12 years after passing of the decree. 2. The execution application has been filed on December 11, 2013. 3. The fate of the application depends upon a finding being arrived at in favour of the applicant/decree-holder that the period between the date of decree and correction of the decree are to be excluded in computing the period of limitation as the decree becomes enforceable and executable only after the decree was corrected and not prior thereto. In other words, the Court would be required to decide if the time interval between the original decree and the corrected decree is to be excluded and the decree-holder would be entitled to compute the period of limitation from the date of correction of the order and not from the date when the original order was passed. The question requires to be gone into is when would the period of limitation start for execution of a decree. Is it the date of pronouncement of judgment/date of decree or when the decree is corrected and drawn up and/or signed? 4. In an application filed under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules, a decree was passed on 4th December, 2001. Since the said decree contains some errors and omissions on mentioning the said decree was corrected on 13th December, 2001. Thereafter, the decree-holder had put in requisition for drawing up and completion of the decree and to obtain a certified copy thereof. However, no further steps were taken by the plaintiff to obtain a certified copy of the decree. On 3rd May, 2013, a decree dated 4th December, 2001 was placed for signature. On 3rd May, 2013 the said decree was signed. However, no further steps were taken by the plaintiff to obtain a certified copy of the decree. On 3rd May, 2013, a decree dated 4th December, 2001 was placed for signature. On 3rd May, 2013 the said decree was signed. The order dated 3rd May, 2013 records that the learned Counsel for the plaintiff on instruction submitted that the plaintiff would forego interest granted by the decree-holder from 1st January, 2006 till date. 5. Mr. Anuj Singh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the judgment-debtor submits that the decree dated 4th December, 2001 is not executable since an application for execution was filed by the decree-holder on 11th December, 2013 which is beyond the period of 12 years within which an application is to be filed for execution of a decree. It is submitted that in terms of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the said execution application ought to have been filed by 5th of December, 2001. It is submitted that the decree became executable immediately when the said decree was passed. 6. The judgment-debtor asserts that the correction made by the order dated 13th December, 2001 has to be read into the original order dated 4th December, 2001 and as such the wheel of limitation began to roll from 4th December, 2001 itself and not from 13th December, 2001 being the date which the decree-holder chose to approach this Hon’ble Court seeking correction in the original order dated 4th December, 2001. It is submitted that by order dated 13th December, 2001 various clerical, arithmetical and/or accidental errors that had occurred in the order dated 4th December, 2001 by reason of accidental slip and/or omission by the Hon’ble Judge, were rectified. 7. In view of the aforesaid, the subject money decree became enforceable on 4th December, 2001 itself. The said decree did not provide for any pre-condition or happening of any event before which the said decree could have become enforceable. It is submitted that in view of the bar contained in Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the application for execution of decree dated 4th December, 2001 ought to have been filed within 12 years from the date it became enforceable. The decree-holder having failed to approach this Hon’ble Court within the stipulated time has given a right to the judgment-debtor to pray for dismissal of the proceedings. 8. The decree-holder having failed to approach this Hon’ble Court within the stipulated time has given a right to the judgment-debtor to pray for dismissal of the proceedings. 8. The nature of correction that was made by order dated 13th December, 2001 was one under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is confined to something initially intended by the Court but left out inadvertently. It is submitted that the correction ordered by order dated 13th December, 2001 clearly falls within Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this regard the petitioner relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jayalakshmi Coelho Vs. Oswald Joseph Coelho reported at AIR 2001 SC 1084 (Paragraph 15) where the Hon’ble Supreme Court while discussing the scope of Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure has held that in a matter where it is clear that something which the court intended to do, but the same was omitted by reason of accidental slip or any mistake creeps in due to clerical or arithmetical mistake, the Court would be justified in rectifying such mistake. In the case at hand, the errors were so obvious that the same were immediately corrected by the Hon’ble Court without even calling for the judgment debtor to be served. 9. The correction as indicated in the order dated 13th December, 2001, therefore, cannot be said to be an amendment of decree, as sought to be contended by the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor further relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa & Anr. reported at AIR 1966 SC 1047 (Paragraph 7) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while discussing another statute dwelled upon the scope of powers to correct arithmetical and/or clerical mistake. In the said judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court while discussing Rule 83 or Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947 pari materia to Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure has observed as follows:- “An error arising out of or occurring from an accidental slip or omission is an error due to a careless mistake or omission unintentionally made. There is an another qualification, namely, such an error shall be apparent on the face of the record, that is to say, it is not an error which depends for its discovery, on (sic) elaborate arguments on the question of fact or law. There is an another qualification, namely, such an error shall be apparent on the face of the record, that is to say, it is not an error which depends for its discovery, on (sic) elaborate arguments on the question of fact or law. The accidental slip or omission is an accidental slip or omission made by the Court. The obvious instance is a slip or omission to embody in the order something which the court, in fact, ordered to be done. This is sometimes described as a decreetal order not being in accordance with the judgment. But the slip or omission may be attributed to the Judge himself. He may say something or omit to say something which he did not intend to say or omit. This is described as a slip or omission in the judgment itself. The cause for such a slip or omission may be Judge’s inadvertence or the advocate’s mistake. But, however, wide the said expressions are construed they cannot countenance a re-argument on merits on questions of fact or law or permit a party to raise new argument which he has not advanced at the first instance”. 10. On the scope of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the learned Counsel has referred to the following decisions:- 1. West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Vs. Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. reported at AIR 1999 SC 3421 Paragraph 8; 2. Biswapati Dey Vs. Kennsington Stores & Ors. reported at AIR 1972 Cal 172 ; 3. Hameed Joharan & Ors. Vs. Abdul Salam by Lrs. & Ors. reported at AIR 2001 SC 3404 . 11. It is submitted that although the decree was corrected on 13th December, 2001 but for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the time would start from the date when the decree was passed and not from the date when the decree was amended. It is a simple money decree. It is submitted that such amendment and/or correction to the decree would relate back to the date of pronouncement of the original decree. It is submitted that any other interpretation would lead to absurd result and against the spirit of the Limitation Act. 12. Per contra, Mr. Reetobroto Mitra, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the decree-holder submits that Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is clear and unambiguous. It is submitted that any other interpretation would lead to absurd result and against the spirit of the Limitation Act. 12. Per contra, Mr. Reetobroto Mitra, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the decree-holder submits that Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is clear and unambiguous. The said article restricts the period of execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court to 12 years from the date “when the decree or order becomes enforceable or any subsequent order directs any payment of money……”. 13. In the instant case, it is absolutely clear that the judgment as on December 4, 2001 did not direct any payment of money nor was the decree on the basis of such judgment enforceable. By no stretch of imagination could the decree of December 4, 2001 be enforced in any manner whatsoever. Hence, the said judgment and decree of December 4, 2001 was not enforceable. 14. Even on a very restrictive interpretation, it cannot be denied that the judgment and decree was corrected and/or amended on December 13, 2001. 15. Without the amendment of December 13, 2001, there is actually no decree in the judgment of December 4, 2001 which could be enforced or executed. 16. Hence, the date on which the decree becomes “enforceable” as envisaged under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in the instant case, without an iota of doubt, is December 13, 2001. 17. It is submitted that the nature of the correction in the original decree is such that it amended the original order and decree dated 4th December, 2001. Although the learned Single Judge intended to pass a decree in favour of the defendant No.1 but the sentence that “there will be a decree for a sum of Rs.28,48,787.86/- against the defendant No.1” has been erroneously omitted. In fact, by the order dated 4th December, 2001, no decree was passed against the defendant No.1 although from a reading of the said order dated 4th December, 2001, it would appear that the learned Single Judge intended to pass a decree against the defendant No.1. The learned Counsel relying upon the decisions in Laxmibai Hareshwar Joshi & Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported at AIR 1977 Bombay 168; Fatimunnisa Begum Vs. Mohammed Zainulabuddin Saheb & Ors. reported at AIR 1986 Andhra Pradesh 355; West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Vs. The learned Counsel relying upon the decisions in Laxmibai Hareshwar Joshi & Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported at AIR 1977 Bombay 168; Fatimunnisa Begum Vs. Mohammed Zainulabuddin Saheb & Ors. reported at AIR 1986 Andhra Pradesh 355; West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Vs. Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage Pvt. Ltd. & anr. reported at AIR 1999 SC 3421 ; Hameed Joharan & Ors. Vs. Abdul Salam by L.Rs. & Ors. reported at AIR 2001 SC 3404 submitted that the date of enforceability of the decree has to be reckoned from the date of amendment of the decree and not from the original decree. 18. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Akkayanaicker Vs. A.A.A. Kotchadainaidu & Anr. reported at 2004 (12) SCC 469 held that in view of the words “when the decree or order becomes enforceable” occurring in Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the starting point of limitation would the date on which the decree becomes capable of execution. It is argued that in the instant case, a comparative reading of December 4, 2001 and December 13, 2001 will clearly show that December 4, 2001 has no existence of its own, without December 13, 2001. Hence the date of the amended decree, i.e., December 13, 2001 makes the decree executable and, hence, the application for execution filed on December 11, 2013 is within the period of limitation. 19. In computing the period of 12 years for filing the execution application, the date of decree which according to Section 9 of the General Causes Act is the date of judgment has to be excluded. Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act applies to execution petition. The said Section is required to be read with Article 136 of the Limitation Act. 20. In order to appreciate the argument of the respective Counsels it would be fruitful to refer to Section 12(1), Article 136 of the Limitation Act and Chapter XVII Rule 10 of the Rules of High Court at Calcutta, Original Side, 1914:- “S.12(1). In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.” “Art 136. For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any Civil Court. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.” “Art 136. For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any Civil Court. Twelve years [When] the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place: Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. “Ch.XVII R.10. Application for execution Form. – The application for execution, whether the provisions of O.XXI, r. 22 of the Code, apply or not, shall be in Form No.1, and shall be on a sheet of durable paper of good quality foolscap size, and shall, in addition to the particulars mentioned in O.XXI, r. 11(2) of the Code, contain the following:- Contents (a) (Under column 6)-The date and nature of any writ issued before or after judgment. (b) (By way of schedule)- The description of the property and the interest of the judgment-debtor therein as required by O.XXI, r.13 of the Code. (c) A state of the estimated value of the property sought to be attached, or, if such property is incumbered, the value thereof after providing for the satisfaction of the incumbrances. Copy decree to accompany in all cases In all cases, the application shall be accompanied by a duly certified copy of the decree.” 21. Under the present Article 136 the period of limitation for execution of any decree or order or any Civil Court (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction is 12 years. 22. In the instant case, decree is covered by first limb of Article 136, that is to say, “when the decree or order becomes enforceable”. The concept of enforceability and executability of the decree under Article 136 of the Limitation Act has been elaborately discussed in Hameed Joharan (supra) in which it is stated that:- “1. Availability of the plea of limitation in the matter of execution of decree has been the key issue in this appeal. The concept of enforceability and executability of the decree under Article 136 of the Limitation Act has been elaborately discussed in Hameed Joharan (supra) in which it is stated that:- “1. Availability of the plea of limitation in the matter of execution of decree has been the key issue in this appeal. The word ‘execution’ stands derived from the Latin “ex sequi,” meaning, to follow out, follow to the end, or perform, and equivalent to the French “executor,” so that, when used in their proper sense, all three convey the meaning of carrying out some act or course of conduct to its completion (vide vol.33 – Corpus Juris Secundum). 2. Lord Denning in Re Overseas Aviation Engineering (G.B.) Ltd.: (L.R. 1963: Ch.24) has attributed a meaning to the word ‘execution’ as the process for enforcing or giving effect to the judgment of the court and stated:- “The word “execution” is not defined in the Act. It is, of course, a word familiar to lawyers. “Execution” means, quite simply, the process for enforcing or giving effect to the judgment of the court: and it is “completed” when the judgment creditor gets the money or other thing awarded to him by the judgment. That this is the meaning is seen by reference to that valuable old book Rastill Terms De la Ley, where it is stated: “Execution is, “where judgment is given in any Action, that the plaintiff shall “recover the land, debt, or damages, as the case: and when any “Writ is awarded to put him in Possession, or to do any other “thing whereby the plaintiff should the better be satisfied his debt “or damages, that is called a writ of execution; and when he hath “the possession of the land, or is paid the debt or damages, or “hath the body of the defendant awarded to prison, then he hath “execution”. And the same meaning is to be found in Blackman V. Fysh (1892) 3 Ch. 209, when Kekewich, J. said that execution means the “process of law for the right”. In cases when execution was had by means of a common law writ, such as fieri facias or elegit, it was legal execution: when it was had by means of an execution equitable remedy, such as the appointment of a receiver, then it was equitable execution. In cases when execution was had by means of a common law writ, such as fieri facias or elegit, it was legal execution: when it was had by means of an execution equitable remedy, such as the appointment of a receiver, then it was equitable execution. But in either case it was “execution” because it was the process for enforcing or giving effect to the judgment of the court.” 3. Presently, Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes a period of twelve years for the execution of a decree other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction or order of any civil court. As regards the time from which the period of twelve years ought to commence, the statute has been rather specific in recording that the period would commence from the date of the decree or order when the same becomes enforceable. We need not go into the other situations as envisaged in the statute for the present purpose, save what is noticed above. To put it shortly, it, therefore, appears that a twelve year period certain has been the legislative choice in the matter of execution of a decree. Be it noted that corresponding provisions in the Act of 1908 were in Articles 182 and 183 as regards the statute of 1871 and 1877, the corresponding provisions were contained in Articles 167, 168, 169 and 179, 180 respectively. Significantly, Article 182 of the Limitation Act of 1908 provided a period of three years for the execution of decree. Be it clarified that since the reference to the 1908 Act would be merely academic, we refrain ourselves from recording the details pertaining to Article 182 save what is noted hereinafter. It is in this context, however, the Report of the Law Commission on the Act of 1963 assumes some importance, as regards the question of limitation and true purport of Article 136. Before elaborating any further, it would be convenient to note the Report of the Law Commission which reads as below: “170. Article 182 has been a very fruitful source of litigation and is a weapon in the hands of both the dishonest decree-holder and the dishonest-judgment debtor. It has given rise to innumerable decisions. The commentary in Rustomji’s Limitation Act (5th Edn.) on this article itself covers nearly 200 pages. Article 182 has been a very fruitful source of litigation and is a weapon in the hands of both the dishonest decree-holder and the dishonest-judgment debtor. It has given rise to innumerable decisions. The commentary in Rustomji’s Limitation Act (5th Edn.) on this article itself covers nearly 200 pages. In our opinion the maximum period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order of any civil court should be 12 years from the date when the decree or order became enforceable (which is usually the date of the decree) or where the decree or subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree. There is, therefore, no need for a provision compelling the decree-holder to keep the decree alive by making an application every three years. There exists a provision already in Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code that a decree ceases to be enforceable after a period of 12 years. In England also, the time fixed for enforcing a judgment is 12 years. Either the decree-holder succeeds in realising his decree within this period or he fails and there should be no provision enabling the execution of a decree after that period. To this provision an exception will have to be made to the effect that the court may order the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the period of 12 years, where the judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at some time within the twelve years immediately proceeding the date of the application. Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code may be deleted and its provisions, may be incorporated in this Act. Article 183 should be deleted.” In pursuance of the aforesaid recommendation the present article has enacted in place of articles 182 and 183 of the 1908 Act. Section 48, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 has been repealed”. 9. As noticed earlier in this judgment, Article 136 of the Limitation Act 1963 being the governing statutory provision, prescribes a period of twelve years when the decree or order becomes enforceable. Section 48, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 has been repealed”. 9. As noticed earlier in this judgment, Article 136 of the Limitation Act 1963 being the governing statutory provision, prescribes a period of twelve years when the decree or order becomes enforceable. The word enforce in common acceptation means and implies compel observance of (vide Concise Oxford Dictionary) and in Black’s Law Dictionary ‘enforce’ has been attributed a meaning to give force or effect to compel obedience to and ‘enforcement has been defined as ‘the act or process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate or command’. In ordinary parlance ‘enforce’ means and implies ‘compel observance of’. Corpus Juris Secundum attributes the following for the word ‘enforce’: “Enforce. In general, to cause to be executed or performed, to cause to take effect, or to compel obedience to, as to enforce laws or rules; to control; to execute with vigour; to put in execution; to put in force; also to exact, or to obtain authoritatively. The word is used in a multiplicity of ways and is given many shades of meaning and applicability, but it does not necessarily imply actual force or coercion. As applied to process, the term implies execution and embraces all the legal means of collecting a judgment, including proceedings supplemental to execution. The past tense or past participle “enforced” has been said to have the same primary meaning as “compelled”. 13. Article 136 of the Act of 1963 prescribes as noticed above, a twelve years period certain and what is relevant for Article 136 is, as to when the decree became enforceable and not when the decree became executable. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Biswapati’s case (supra) has dealt with the issue very succinctly and laid down that the word ‘enforceable’ should be read in its literal sense. In the contextual facts, the final decree upon acceptable of the report of the Commissioner was passed on 20.11.1970, while it is true that notice to furnish stamp paper was issued on 28.2.1972 and the time granted as up to 17.3.1972 but that by itself will not take it out o the purview of Article 136 as regards the enforceability of the decree. Furnishing of stamped paper was an act entirely within the domain and control of the appellant and any delay in the matter of furnishing of the same cannot possibly be said to be putting a stop to the period of limitation being run – no one can take advantage of his own wrong: As a matter of fact, in the contextual facts no stamp paper was filed until 26.3.1984 – Does that mean and imply that the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 136 stands extended for a period of twelve years from 16th March, 1984? The answer if it be stated to be in the affirmative, would lead to an utter absurdity and a mockery of the provisions of the statute. Suspension of the period of limitation by reason of one’s own failure cannot but be said to be a fallacious argument, though however suspension can be had when the decree is a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous events have to happen on the fulfillment of which alone it could be enforced – furnishing of stamped paper was entirely in the domain and power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him formatting in terms therewith and thus it cannot but be said that the decree was capable of being enforced on and from 20th November, 1970 and the twelve years period ought to be counted therefrom. It is more or less in identical situation, this Court even five-decades ago in the case of Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari MANU/SC/0033/1950: [1950] 1 SCR 852 has stated: “…The decree was not a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous event was to happen on the fulfilment of which alone it could be executed. The payment of court fees on the amount found due was entirely in the power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of execution from the very date it was passed. 15. The payment of court fees on the amount found due was entirely in the power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of execution from the very date it was passed. 15. Recently this Court in W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corporation v. Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage Pvt. Ltd. and Another MANU/SC/0568/1999: AIR 1999 SC 3421 had the occasion to consider the question of limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963 and upon consideration of the decision in the case of Yeswant Deorao (supra) held that under the scheme of the Limitation Act, execution applications like plaints have to be presented in court within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act. A decree-holder, this court when on to record does not have the benefit of exclusion of the time taken for obtaining even the certified copy of the decree like the appellant who prefers an appeal, much less can he claim to deduct time taken by the court in drawing up and signing the decree. In fine, this Court observed that if the time is reckoned not from the date of the decree but from the date when it is prepared, it would amount to doing violence to the provision of the Limitation Act as well as of Order 20 and Order 21 Rule 11 C.P.C. which is clearly impermissible. 16. The observation thus in W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. (supra) lends concurrence to the view expressed above pertaining to the question of enforceability of the decree as laid down in Article 136 of the Limitation Act.” 23. In W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. (supra) it was held that in case of a money decree the petitioner becomes enforceable immediately on the pronouncement of the judgments as there has been a delay decree comes into existence. Accordingly, it cannot be contended that delay in drawing up of the decree returned unenforceable from the date of the judgment. In Biswapati Dey (supra) it was held that Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963 has set a new deadline and beyond which no application for execution of the decree could be made. Accordingly, it cannot be contended that delay in drawing up of the decree returned unenforceable from the date of the judgment. In Biswapati Dey (supra) it was held that Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963 has set a new deadline and beyond which no application for execution of the decree could be made. The period of 12 years is long enough to execute a decree when it is enforceable and the intention of the legislature is quite apparent from the date language used therein that the time to make the execution application is 12 years from the time when the decree or order becomes enforceable. Chapter XVII Rule 10 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court comes into play actually at the time of executing the decree through an execution application before the Original Side of Calcutta High Court and not before that although the decree might be enforceable on the day it is passed. There lies the distinction between the said two expressions, that is, “to execute” and “to enforce”. Accordingly, Chapter XVII Rule 10 cannot stand in the way of the language used in the third column of Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963. 24. It is not correct to say that a decree does not become enforceable till a certified copy is obtained. Where the nature of the decree is such that it is immediately executable the starting point of limitation would be the date of passing of the decree and not when the certified copy of the decree as is required by Chapter XVII, Rule 10 (Original Side Rules) of the High Court was obtained. The language of Section 12 or Article 136 does not warrant the exclusion of the period required for obtaining a certified copy. ( AIR 1976 Cal 471 ) 25. Under Rule 10 of Chapter XVII of the Calcutta High Court Original Side Rules production of a certified copy of the decree and essential requirement of an application for execution made to the High Court is on the Original Side. A decree-holder would not be entitled to present an application for execution for production of a duly certified copy. It was held in Satyendra Nath Bose v. Bibhuti Bhusan Bhar & Ors. reported at AIR 1963 Cal 104 (Paragraphs 16, 19). 26. A decree-holder would not be entitled to present an application for execution for production of a duly certified copy. It was held in Satyendra Nath Bose v. Bibhuti Bhusan Bhar & Ors. reported at AIR 1963 Cal 104 (Paragraphs 16, 19). 26. Execution is the enforcement of decrees and orders by process of Court so as to enable the judgment-creditor to recover the fruits of the judgment (1882) 9 Cal 773 at Page 776. If a decree is not in a form capable of execution Article 136 does not apply and time does not run under the said Article. The Article makes it clear that the time runs from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable. The starting point for computation of limitation for execution of decree is the date of decree and not date on which decree is actually drawn and signed. In terms of Article 136, the decree becomes enforceable in normal and usual circumstances, unless the contrary intention is indicated in the decree itself. Where, however, by mistake of the Court, a decree bears a date which from the date of the judgment, and being misled thereby the decree-holder applies for execution within the prescribed period from the date as found in the decree, the execution application would be regarded as being in time on the principle of maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit – an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. An unintentional mistake or inadvertent error in the order which may cause prejudice to a party needs to be rectified. (Jayalakshmi Coelho Vs. Oswald Joseph; 2001 (4) SCC 181 ). 27. In Jayalakshmi Coelho (supra) in interpreting Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was held that the principle behind the provision is that no party should suffer due to a mistake of the Court and whatever is intended by the Court while passing the order or decree must be properly reflected therein, otherwise it would only be destructive to the principle of advancing the cause of justice. 28. Similarly, in a situation like this where the Court although intended to pass a decree against the defendant No.1 but by mistake omitted to pass a decree in favour of the defendant No.1. The question of enforceability of the decree as against the defendant No.1 could not and does not arise so long as the mistake is not rectified. 28. Similarly, in a situation like this where the Court although intended to pass a decree against the defendant No.1 but by mistake omitted to pass a decree in favour of the defendant No.1. The question of enforceability of the decree as against the defendant No.1 could not and does not arise so long as the mistake is not rectified. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge corrected the order dated 4th December, 2001 on 13th December, 2001. The nature of correction would show that there was substantial change in the original order. In order to ascertain the nature of correction it would be necessary to set out the corrected order:- “Before The Hon’ble Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose Date : 13th December, 2001 Dictated Order The Court: Mr. Utpal Bose, Advocate mentions the matter and submitted that there are some typographical errors in my dictated order dated 4.12.2001. It appears that in the second para, 3rd line at page 2 of the said order “No.1” has been wrongly typed as “No.2”. Further in the 5th line of 2nd para of the said page after the words “in this application”, the sentence “There will be a decree for a sum of Rs.28,48,787.86 against the defendant No.1” has been erroneously omitted. In the 7th line of para 2 at page 2 of the said order, after the words “to have a decree”, the words “against the defendant No.2” has been erroneously omitted, and the words “to the said extent” as appearing in the 7th line at 2nd para of the same page has been erroneously typed and the same be deleted. The said dictated order dated 4th December, 2001 is corrected in the manner as indicated above, and the said 2nd paragraph of page 2 of the said order be read as follows:- “Accordingly, in my opinion, no decree can be passed under Chapter XIIIA against the defendant No.2. So far as the defendant No.1 is concerned, he has not filed any affidavit-in-opposition before this Court nor opposed the prayer made by the plaintiff/petitioner in this application. There will be a decree for a sum of Rs.28,48,787.86 against the defendant No.1. In my further opinion the claim of the plaintiff/petitioner as put forward before me by way of this application to have a decree against the defendant No.2 is relegated to the suit. There will be a decree for a sum of Rs.28,48,787.86 against the defendant No.1. In my further opinion the claim of the plaintiff/petitioner as put forward before me by way of this application to have a decree against the defendant No.2 is relegated to the suit. Written Statement is to be filed within a fortnight from date. Cross order for discovery within three weeks thereafter. Inspection forthwith and the suit will appear in the prospective list eight weeks hence.” Let this order be incorporated in the order dated 4th December, 2001. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.” 29. In view of such substantial change in the original order the plaintiff also could not have given a requisition for drawing up and completion of the original order since by the said order no decree, in fact, was passed against the defendant No.1 although intended and the said order is not enforceable against the defendant No.1. In my view, the Article 136 should receive a fair and liberal interpretation and not too technical a construction so as to enable the decree-holder to obtain fruits of its decree. Its language ought not to be strained in favour of the judgment-debtor who has failed to pay his debt. There cannot be any doubt that the order dated 13th December, 2001 virtually replaced the material part of the order dated 4th December, 2001 in so far as defendant No.1 is concerned. The decision cited on behalf of the judgment-debtors on this score is clearly distinguishable. 30. In fact, by the order dated 13th December, 2001 by way of rectification and/or correction, the learned Single Judge has included the matters that were originally intended to be included but erroneously left out. 31. In so far as the objection with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court under Section 39(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned, I am of the view that if during examination of the judgment-debtors, it is found that the judgment-debtors did not hold any property within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court then only the said decree could be transferred and/or transmitted to the appropriate Court for execution. This view finds supports from the Division Bench judgment of our Hon’ble Court in D.V.M. Construction & Ors. Vs. This view finds supports from the Division Bench judgment of our Hon’ble Court in D.V.M. Construction & Ors. Vs. Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd. reported at AIR 2009 Cal 227 in which in paragraph 4 it is stated:- “4. A perusal of the aforesaid rule would clearly show that where there was a decree for payment of the money, the decree holder may apply to Court for an order that judgment-debtor be orally examined as to whether any or what debt are owing to the judgment-debtor and whether the judgment-debtor has any and what other property or means of satisfying the decree. The Court may make an order for attendance and examination of the said judgment-debtor and for production of any books or documents. In our opinion, the impugned orders passed by the trial Court for examination of the appellant No.2 cannot be said to be either illegal or without jurisdiction. The question of transferring the execution proceeding would only arise upon examination of the appellant in Court on the question as to whether she holds any property within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and as to whether she has any further debts within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Without this question being answered in favour of the appellants i.e. to the effect that the entire property of the appellants is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the question of transferring the decree may not even arise at this stage. I may also be noted that learned Counsel for the appellants has also relied on a single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Uma Kanoria v. Pradip Kumar Daga, AIR 2003 Cal 162 for the proposition that as soon as the objection with regard tot he jurisdiction is taken, further orders cannot be issued by the executing Court till the objection is decided. We are of the considered opinion that this judgment is also of no assistance to the learned counsel. A perusal of the observation made by the trial Court in paragraph 11 of the judgment clearly indicates that the Executing Court would not be entitled to proceed against the properties which are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In the present case, no material has been presented to this Court to show that the entire properties of the judgment-debtor/appellant are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In the present case, no material has been presented to this Court to show that the entire properties of the judgment-debtor/appellant are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It was for this purpose that the trial Court had issued direction for the examination of the appellant No.2. Had the appellant No.2 appeared and satisfied the Executing Court that all the properties sought to be proceeded against were outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Executing Court, the appellants would perhaps fall within the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court as also the ratio of the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court.” 32. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the decree becomes executable only after 13th December, 2001. Hence, the application for execution is saved by three days and held to be maintainable. G.A. No. 3532 of 2014 stands dismissed. 33. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking.