ORDER : S.C. SHARMA, J. 1. The petitioner before this Court, a Society registered under the Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973 registered in the name and style of 'Devi Shakuntala Thakral Charitable Foundation' has filed this present writ petition seeking the following reliefs: "That in view of the aforesaid facts and grounds, the petitioner pray for issuance of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the respondents to either acquire the said land by paying proper compensation prescribed under the prevailing laws or to delete the designated land use under the Master Plan and permit the petitioner to use of the said land for the purposes as claimed by the petitioner. This Writ Petition may kindly be allowed with costs and any other relief which may be deemed just and expedient be also granted". Further contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner is owner of land admeasuring 29.778 Hectare situated at Village Jakhya, Tehsil Sanwer and District Indore including land bearing Survey No. 81/1, 98, 99, 100 and 181 admeasuring 5.347 hectares. 2. Contention of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 1 - State, in exercise of the powers conferred under the M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 has issued a Master Plan known as Indore Development Plan 2021 and as per the Indore Development Plan 2021, popularly known as Master Plan, the land use in respect of the land in question is prescribed as "Mandi". The grievance of the petitioner is that he cannot establish a Mandi, being a Society registered under the provisions of the Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam that too being Charitable in nature and, therefore, the land belonging to the petitioner - Society is going waste. Learned counsel for the petitioner - Society has drawn attention of this Court towards section 34 and section 35 of the M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 and contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the State Government has to decide the petitioner's notice (Annexure P/4) dt. 4-10-2013 on merits either by acquiring the land of the petitioner or by changing the land use. It has also been stated that by some mechanical order dt. 16-1-2014 the notice has been turned down by the respondents. 3. 4-10-2013 on merits either by acquiring the land of the petitioner or by changing the land use. It has also been stated that by some mechanical order dt. 16-1-2014 the notice has been turned down by the respondents. 3. A detailed reply has been filed by the State Government and the stand of the State Government is that the area in question, keeping in view the Master Plan 2021 is ear-marked for Public-Semi Public Purposes and Mandi. It has also been stated that as the land has been notified for the purpose of establishing a Mandi, it can be used only for the purpose of establishing a Mandi and nothing else. The respondents have also stated that the Writ Petition is not maintainable and the notice enclosed along with the Writ Petition cannot be said to be an application under section 23A(b) of the Act. The respondents have also enclosed extract of the Master Plan. 4. A reply has been filed by the respondent No. 6 also and the stand taken by the respondent No. 6 is of technical nature opposing the Writ Petition on the ground of maintainability. It has been stated that no resolution has been passed by the Society for prosecuting the matter and, therefore, the Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. The matter is being disposed of at the admission stage itself with the consent of the parties. 6. In the present case, the admitted facts establish that as per the Master Plan notified by the respondents, the land use of the land in question owned by the petitioner, is Mandi. It is again an admitted fact that the petitioner Society cannot establish a Mandi. It is only the respondent No. 5 and 6 who can establish a Mandi. A categoric query was raised to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 and 6 whether they intent to establish any Mandi or not. It has been stated in the open Court by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 that the land has to be acquired by the State Government and not by them. The fact remains that the petitioner cannot establish a Mandi and valuable land of the petitioner is lying unutilised as it has been reserved for establishing a Mandi under the Master Plan 2021. 7. 5 and 6 that the land has to be acquired by the State Government and not by them. The fact remains that the petitioner cannot establish a Mandi and valuable land of the petitioner is lying unutilised as it has been reserved for establishing a Mandi under the Master Plan 2021. 7. Sections 34 and 35 of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 reads as under: 34. Obligation to acquire land. -- (1) Where any land is designated by a development plan as subject to compulsory acquisition-- (a) for development for the purpose of town expansion or town improvement, or (b) for development for the purpose of the Union or State Government or a Local Authority or a special authority constituted under this Act, or (c) for development as a highway or a public utility service, and the owner of the land claims that-- (i) the land has become incapable of reasonably beneficial has in its existing State or (ii) where permission to develop land is given subject to conditions, that the land cannot be rendered capable of reasonable beneficial use by carrying out the permitted development in accordance with the conditions; (iii) the sale value of the land has diminished because of the designation of the land for acquisition or development, the owner may serve on the State Government within such time, in such manner and together with such documents as may be prescribed, a notice requiring the appropriate authority to purchase the interest in land in accordance with the provision of this Act. (2) On receipt of a notice under sub-section (1), the State Government shall, forthwith call from the Director and the appropriate authority such report or records or both, as may be necessary, which those authorities shall forward to the State Government as soon as possible but not later than thirty days from the date of their requisition. (2) On receipt of a notice under sub-section (1), the State Government shall, forthwith call from the Director and the appropriate authority such report or records or both, as may be necessary, which those authorities shall forward to the State Government as soon as possible but not later than thirty days from the date of their requisition. (3) On receiving such records or reports, the State Government may-- (a) if it is satisfied that the conditions specified in sub-section (1) are fulfilled, and that the order or decision for permission was not duly made on the ground that the applicant did not comply with any of the provisions of this Act or the rules made there under, confirm the notice or direct that the permission be granted without conditions as will make the land capable or reasonably beneficial use; (b) if any other case, refuse to conform the notice but in that case, the applicant shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (4) If within a period of one year from the date of which the notice is served, the State Government does not pass any final order thereon, the notice shall be deemed to have been confirmed at the expiration of that period. (5) Upon confirmation of the notice, the State Government shall, within a period of one year of such confirmation, proceed to acquire the land or that part of any land regarding which the notice has been confirmed, in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 35. Deletion of reservation of designated land from draft or final development plan. -- (1) The appropriate authority, if it is satisfied that the land is not or is no longer required for the public purpose for which it is designated or reserved or allocated in the draft development plan of zoning plan, or the final development plan, or the final development plan of zoning plan may request-- (a) the Director to sanction the deletion of such designation or reservation or allocation from the draft development plan or zoning plan; or (b) the State Government to sanction the deletion of such designation or reservation or allocation from the final development plan or zoning plan. (2) On receipt of such request from the appropriate authority, the Director or, as the case may be, the State Government may make an order sanctioning the deletion of such designation or reservation or allocation from the relevant plans; Provided that, the Director or, as the case may be, the State Government may, before making any order, make such inquiry as he/it may consider necessary and satisfy himself/itself that such reservation or designation or allocation is no longer necessary in the public interest. (3) Upon an order sub-section (2) being made, the land shall be deemed to be released from such designation, reservation or, as the case may be, allocation and shall become available to the owner for the purpose of development as otherwise permissible in the case of adjacent land under the relevant plan." 8. The aforesaid statutory provision of law permits a land owner to notice the State Government to pass necessary orders in case a land is subject to compulsory acquisition, it cannot be used by the land owner and in those circumstances, the land owner has been given a liberty to file appropriate application and the Authorities are required either to acquire the land or to pass necessary orders for changing the land use. 9. Respondent-State has not passed any order in respect of the acquisition of the land and the petitioner's limited prayer is that either the State Government should pass necessary orders for acquiring the land or for changing the land use. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 111 . Paragraphs 27, 32, 33, 34 and 40 of the aforesaid judgment, reads as under: 27. An owner of a property, subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the Legislature, is entitled to enjoy the property in any manner he likes. A right to use a property in a particular manner or in other words a restriction imposed on user thereof except in the mode and manner laid down under statute would not be presumed. 32. A right to use a property in a particular manner or in other words a restriction imposed on user thereof except in the mode and manner laid down under statute would not be presumed. 32. Sub-section (2) of section 20, however, carves out an exception to the exercise of powers by the State as regards acquisition of the land for the purpose of carrying out the development of the area in the manner provided for therein; a bare reading whereof leaves no manner of doubt that in the event the land referred to under sub-section (1) of section 20 thereof is not acquired or proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced and further in the event an owner or a person interested in the land serves a notice in the manner specified therein, certain consequences ensue, namely, the designation of the land shall be deemed to have lapsed. A legal fiction, therefore, has been created in the said provision. 33. The purpose and object of creating a legal fiction in the statute is well-known. When a legal fiction is created, it must be given its full effect. In East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. vs. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2 All. E.R. 587, Lord Asquith, J. stated the law in the following terms:-- "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." 34. The relevant provisions of the Act are absolutely clear, unambiguous and implicit. A plain meaning of the said provisions, in our considered view, would lead to only one conclusion, namely, that in the event a notice is issued by the owner of the land or other person interested therein asking the authority to acquire the land upon expiry of the period specified therein viz. A plain meaning of the said provisions, in our considered view, would lead to only one conclusion, namely, that in the event a notice is issued by the owner of the land or other person interested therein asking the authority to acquire the land upon expiry of the period specified therein viz. ten years from the date of issuance of final development plan and in the event pursuant to or in furtherance thereof no action for acquisition thereof is taken, the designation shall lapse. 40. The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property must be strictly construed. It is well-settled that when a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The State and other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature of statute. They must act within the four-corners thereof. 11. The aforesaid judgment makes it very clear that if the land is not acquired for designated/reserved purpose and notice to acquire the land is given by the owner, the designation shall lapse. It has been further held in the aforesaid case that owner of the land, subject to reasonable restrictions of statute, is entitled to use his land according to his choice. Restrictions thereof must be strictly construed. 12. The Apex Court in the case of Girnar Traders Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2007) 7 SCC 555 , in paragraphs 32, 38, 39, 43, 54, 55 and 56 has held as under: 32. If no proceedings as provided under section 127 are taken and as a result thereof the reservation of the land lapses, the land shall be released from reservation, allotment or designation and shall be available to the owner for the purpose of development. The availability of the land to the owner for the development would only be for the purpose which is permissible in the case of adjacent land under the relevant plan. Thus, even after the release, the owner cannot utilize the land in whatever manner he deems fit and proper, but its utilisation has to be in conformity with the relevant plan for which the adjacent lands are permitted to be utilized. 38. Giving a plain meaning to the words used in the statute would not be resorted to when there is a sense of possible injustice. 38. Giving a plain meaning to the words used in the statute would not be resorted to when there is a sense of possible injustice. In such a case, the simple application of the words in their primary and unqualified sense is not always sufficient and will sometimes fail to carry out the manifest intention of law-giver as collected from the statute itself and the nature of subject-matter and the mis-chiefs to be remedied. If the plain words lead apparently to do some injustice or absurdity and at variance with, or not required by, the scope and object of the legislation, it would be necessary to examine further and to test, by certain settled rules of interpretation, what was the real and true intention of the legislature and thereafter apply the words if they are capable of being so applied so as to give effect to that intention. Where the plain literal interpretation of statutory provision were to manifestly result in injustice never intended by the legislature, the Court is entitled to modify the language used by the legislature so as to achieve the intention of the legislature and to produce a rational construction. 39. Where the legislature has used words in an Act which if generally construed, must lead to palpable injustice and consequences revolting to the mind of any reasonable man, the Court will always endeavour to place on such words a reasonable limitation, on the ground that the legislature could not have intended such consequence to ensue, unless the express language in the Act or binding authority prevents such limitation being interpolated into the Act. In construing an Act, a construction ought not be put that would work injustice, or even hardship or inconvenience, unless it is clear that such was the intention of the legislature. It is also settled that where the language of the legislature admits of two constructions and if construction in one way would lead to obvious injustice, the Courts act upon the view that such a result could not have been intended, unless the intention had been manifested in express words. Out of the two interpretations, that language of the statute should be preferred to that interpretation which would frustrate it. Out of the two interpretations, that language of the statute should be preferred to that interpretation which would frustrate it. It is a cardinal rule governing the interpretation of the statutes that when the language of the legislature admits of two constructions, the Court should not adopt the construction which would lead to an absurdity or obvious injustice. It is equally well settled that within two constructions that alternative is to be chosen which would be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purported to be regulating and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion with the working of the system. [See The Collector of Customs, Baroda Vs. Digvijaysinhji Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1549 , at page 899 and His His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 . The Court must always lean to the interpretation which is a reasonable one, and discard the literal interpretation which does not fit in with the scheme of the Act under consideration. 43. Many a times, it becomes necessary to look into the true intention of the legislature in order to give a proper effect to the statutory provisions and in order to achieve the actual intended goal behind the legislation. In the case of Tirath Singh Vs. Bachittar Singh and Others, AIR 1955 SC 830 : (1955) 2 SCR 457 , it was held by the Court that: Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. The same has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore Vs. J.H. Gotla, Yadagiri, (1985) 4 SCC 343 and in Andhra Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Sri Lakshmi Ganesh Cotton Ginning Mill, (1996) 1 ALT 537 . Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. The same has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore Vs. J.H. Gotla, Yadagiri, (1985) 4 SCC 343 and in Andhra Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Sri Lakshmi Ganesh Cotton Ginning Mill, (1996) 1 ALT 537 . Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Leela Jain, AIR 1965 SC 1296 : (1965) 1 SCR 276 , it was held that: Unless the words are unmeaning or absurd, it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice 54. When we conjointly read sections 126 and 127 of the MRTP Act, it is apparent that the legislative intent is to expeditiously acquire the land reserved under the Town Planning Scheme and, therefore, various periods have been prescribed for acquisition of the owners property. The intent and purpose of the provisions of sections 126 and 127 has been well explained in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Case (supra). If the acquisition is left for a time immemorial in the hands of the concerned authority by simply making an application to the State Government for acquiring such land under the LA Act, 1894, then the authority will simply move such an application and if no such notification is issued by the State Government for one year of the publication of the draft regional plan under section 126(2) read with section 6 of the LA Act, wait for the notification to be issued by the State Government by exercising suo motu power under sub-section (4) of section 126; and till then no declaration could be made under section 127 as regards lapsing of reservation and contemplated declaration of land being released and available for the land owner for his utilization as permitted under section 127. Section 127 permitted inaction on the part of the acquisition authorities for a period of 10 years for de-reservation of the land. Not only that, it gives a further time for either to acquire the land or to take steps for acquisition of the land within a period of six months from the date of service of notice by the land owner for de-reservation. Not only that, it gives a further time for either to acquire the land or to take steps for acquisition of the land within a period of six months from the date of service of notice by the land owner for de-reservation. The steps towards commencement of the acquisition in such a situation would necessarily be the steps for acquisition and not a step which may not result into acquisition and merely for the purpose of seeking time so that section 127 does not come into operation. 55. Providing the period of six months after the service of notice clearly indicates the intention of the legislature of an urgency where nothing has been done in regard to the land reserved under the plan for a period of 10 years and the owner is deprived of the utilization of his land as per the user permissible under the plan. When mandate is given in a section requiring compliance within a particular period, the strict compliance is required thereof as introduction of this section is with legislative intent to balance the power of the State of eminent domain. The State possessed the power to take or control the property of the owner for the benefit of public cause, but when the State so acted, it was obliged to compensate the injured upon making just compensation. Compensation provided to the owner is the release of the land for keeping the land under reservation for 10 years without taking any steps for acquisition of the same. 56. The underlying principle envisaged in section 127 of the MRTP Act is either to utilize the land for the purpose it is reserved in the plan in a given time or let the owner utilize the land for the purpose it is permissible under the Town Planning Scheme. The step taken under the section within the time stipulated should be towards acquisition of land. It is a step of acquisition of land and not step for acquisition of land. It is trite that failure of authorities to take steps which result in actual commencement of acquisition of land cannot be permitted to defeat the purpose and object of the scheme of acquisition under the MRTP Act by merely moving an application requesting the Government to acquire the land, which Government may or may not accept. It is trite that failure of authorities to take steps which result in actual commencement of acquisition of land cannot be permitted to defeat the purpose and object of the scheme of acquisition under the MRTP Act by merely moving an application requesting the Government to acquire the land, which Government may or may not accept. Any step which may or may not culminate in the step for acquisition cannot be said to be a step towards acquisition. 13. In the aforesaid case it has been held that the acquisition of land for designated/reserved purpose cannot be left for the time immemorial and if the land is not acquired for the purpose it is reserved in the plan, it has to be de-reserved. 14. The Apex Court, again in the case of Shrirampur Municipal Council, Shrirampur Vs. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher and Others, (2013) 5 SCC 627 , in paragraphs 36, 42 and 43, has held as under: 36. The question, however, is as to whether only because the provision of section 20 has been referred to therein; would it mean that thereby the Legislature contemplated that the time of ten years specified by the Legislature for the purpose of acquisition of the land would get automatically extended? The answer to the said question must be rendered in the negative. Following the principle of interpretation that all words must be given its full effect, we must also give full effect to the words "so far as may be" applied to such revision. 42. We are not oblivious of the law that when a public functionary is required to do a certain thing within a specified time, the same is ordinarily directory but it is equally well settled that when consequence for inaction on the part of the Statutory authorities within such specified time is expressly provided, it must be held to be imperative. 43. In Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd edition, Vol. 3 at p. 102 the law is stated as follows:-- "unless the nature of the act to be performed, or the phraseology of the statute is such that the designation of time must be considered a limitation of the power of the Officer." At p. 107 it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private individuals should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p. 109, it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow non-compliance with the provision. At p. 1111 it is stated as follows: "As a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means conclusive." [See also Crawford on Statutory Construction, Article 269 at p. 535]. 15. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court for a restriction on the use of land by the owner cannot be used/interpreted in a manner to deprive the owner of his right. The Apex Court, again in the case of Hasmukhrai V. Mehta Vs. State of Maharashtra, in paragraphs 3, 7, 15 and 18 has held as under: 3. However, on 14-1-1999 the appellant was informed by the respondent No. 4 that a fresh development scheme of Khopoli town has been prepared which includes appellant's Survey Nos. 16/3 and 18/4 as a part of land reserved for Agriculture Produce Market Yard (for short "APM Yard") and for Truck Terminal. Reacting to it, on 17-8-2000 the appellant served a purchase notice under section 49 of the MRTP Act as the land in question was already in the sanctioned plan left in 1977 for residential purposes. In reply to this, Director, Town Planning, vide his communication dated 16-3-2001, though confirmed receiving of the purchase notice, but directed the appellant to contact APMC, Khopoli. The Director, Town Planning wrote separate letter to Chief Officer of Municipal Council of Khopoli that the proceedings of land acquisition for APM Yard be initiated within one year from 16-3-2001 failing which it would amount to release of the land from the reservation for APM Yard. 7. Before further discussion, we think it just and proper to quote the relevant provisions of law applicable to this case. Section 49 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 reads as under:-- "49. Obligation to acquire land on refusal of permission or on grant of permission in certain cases. 7. Before further discussion, we think it just and proper to quote the relevant provisions of law applicable to this case. Section 49 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 reads as under:-- "49. Obligation to acquire land on refusal of permission or on grant of permission in certain cases. -- (1) Where-- (a) any land is designated by a plan as subject to compulsory acquisition, or (b) any land is allotted by a plan for the purpose of any functions of a Government or local authority or statutory body, or is land designated in such plan as a site proposed to be developed for the purposes of any functions of any such Government, authority or body, or (c) any land is indicated in any plan as land on which a highway is proposed to be constructed or included, or (d) any land for the development of which permission is refused or is granted subject to conditions, and any owner of land referred to in clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) claims-- (i) that the land has become incapable of reasonably beneficial use in its existing state, or (ii) (where planning permission is given subject to conditions) that the land cannot be rendered capable of reasonably beneficial use by the carrying out of the permitted development in accordance with the conditions; or (e) the owner of the land because of its designation or allocation in any plan claims that he is unable to sell it except at a lower price than that at which he might reasonably have been expected to sell if it were not so designated or allocated, the owner or person affected may serve on the State Government within such time and in such manner, as is prescribed by regulations, a notice (hereinafter referred to as "the purchase notice") requiring the Appropriate Authority to purchase the interest in the land in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) The purchase notice shall be accompanied by a copy of any application made by the applicant to the Planning Authority, and of any order or decision of that Authority and of the State Government, if any, in respect of which the notice is given. (2) The purchase notice shall be accompanied by a copy of any application made by the applicant to the Planning Authority, and of any order or decision of that Authority and of the State Government, if any, in respect of which the notice is given. (3) On receipt of a purchase notice, the State Government shall forthwith call from the Planning Authority and the Appropriate Authority such report or records or both, as may be necessary, which those authorities shall forward to the State Government as soon as possible but not later than thirty days from the date of their requisition. (4) On receiving such records or reports, if the State Government is satisfied that the conditions specified in sub-section (1) are fulfilled, and that order or decision for permission was not duly made on the ground that the applicant did not comply with any of the provisions of this Act or rules or regulations, it may confirm the purchase notice, or direct that planning permission be granted without condition or subject to such conditions as will make the land capable of reasonably beneficial use. In any other case, it may refuse to confirm the purchase notice, but in that case, it shall give the applicant a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (5) If within a period of six months from the date on which a purchase notice is served the State Government does not pass any final order thereon, the notice shall be deemed to have been confirmed at the expiration of that period. (6) ******* (deleted by Mah. Act 6 of 1976) (7) If within one year from the date of confirmation of the notice, the Appropriate Authority fails to make an application to acquire the land in respect of which the purchase notice has been confirmed as required under section 126, the reservation, designation, allotment, indication or restriction on development of the land shall be deemed to have lapsed; and thereupon, the land shall be deemed to be released from the reservation, designation, or, as the case may be, allotment, indication or restriction and shall become available to the owner for the purpose of development otherwise permissible in the case of adjacent land, under the relevant plan." 15. In view of the principle of law laid down by this Court, as above, we are of the view that in the present case since neither steps have been taken by the authorities concerned for acquisition of the land, nor the land of the appellant is purchased under purchase notice, nor he is allowed to use the land for last more than twenty years, the land will have to be released as the appellant cannot be deprived from utilizing his property for an indefinite period. 18. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court. Since no steps appear to have been taken till date for last more than twenty years either for acquisition or for purchase of the land under MRTP Act, 1966 by the authorities concerned, as such, the land in question stands released from reservation under section 127 of the MRTP Act. 16. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case has held that the land owner cannot be deprived of use of his land for an indefinite period. If the authorities are neither utilising nor acquiring the land for the purpose designated under the plan, the land is to be released. 17. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments delivered by the Apex Court, the respondents are directed to pass appropriate order in respect of either acquiring the land by paying proper compensation to the petitioner under the prevailing laws or to delete the designated land use under the Master Plan and to permit the petitioner to use his said land for the purpose as claimed by the petitioner. Petitioner by no stretch of imagination can establish a Mandi as a Mandi has to be established under the provisions of M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 only by the State of Madhya Pradesh and, therefore, the respondents are directed to pass appropriate order and to take appropriate action as aforesaid within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. With the aforesaid, the Writ Petition stands allowed. No order as to costs.