JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Akhilesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ajai Kumar Mishra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents. 2. This writ petition has been filed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 11.8.2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Bulandshahar in Case No. 53/2013 (State v. Paramveer), order dated 16.10.2014 passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut in Appeal No. 81 of 2013-14 (Paramveer v. State of U.P.) and order dated 23.7.2015 passed by the same appellate authority rejecting the restoration application filed by the petitioner in the appeal. 3. vide order dated 11.8.2014, the petitioner’s licence was cancelled by the Licencing Authority/District Magistrate, Bulandshahar; whereas by the order dated 16.10.2014, the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 11.8.2014 has been dismissed in default and vide order dated 23.7.2015, the petitioner’s application seeking recall of the order dated 16.10.2014 has been rejected by the appellate authority holding it to be barred by time and not maintainable. 4. While assailing these orders, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there was no valid reason for cancelling the fire-arm licence of the petitioner; even then, the same was cancelled and the appeal filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order was dismissed in default on 16.10.2014 because of non-appearance of the counsel. When the petitioner came to know about the dismissal of the appeal in default, he filed restoration application, but that has been rejected on the ground that neither day-to-day delay has been explained, nor any evidence has been produced. It is also recorded that under the Arms Act, there is no provision for entertaining the restoration application. 5. It is not in dispute that against the order of cancellation, appeal can be filed within a period of 30 days before the appellate authority, i.e., the Divisional Commissioner of the Division, and in case, for any reason, the appeal could not be preferred within 30 days, there is a provision for entertaining the appeal even thereafter, provided the appellant satisfies that there was sufficient cause not to file the appeal within time, meaning thereby, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been made available for extending the period of limitation. 6. 6. The dismissal of the appeal in default is just an incident otherwise, there must have been provision under the statute providing that in case on the date fixed in appeal if appellant makes himself absent, the appeal would be decided on merit. In absence of such provision, in case for any compelling reason may be due to accident, serious illness otherwise because of any natural calamities etc. a person could not appear in the Court and the appeal is dismissed in default, would it mean that because of any kind of inadvertent absence, the door of justice be closed, obviously it will not, as the purpose of establishment of the Court is to provide justice to the parties and not to scuttle the justice on technicalities. The Court, which has power to dismiss the case in default, has also power to recall the same for good reason to the satisfaction of the appellate authority and in case, it is not done, the people will lose faith in the judicial administration of justice and the purpose of the establishment of the Court for advancement of justice would be frustrated. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the Divisional Commissioner has erred in holding that the recall application is not maintainable as there is no such provision under the Act. 7. So far as delay in filing the restoration application is concerned, the application filed by the petitioner seeking condonation of delay has been rejected on the ground that day-to-day delay has not been explained. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537 : 1987 (2) SCR 387 , has made following observations : ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. Apart above, other guideline has also been issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which reads as under : “Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 8. Following the above guidelines, the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court in number of cases, has held that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court must be sympathetic and it has to see the merit of the case also as the law of limitation is not meant to take away the right of Appeal. The Courts are meant for imparting justice and not to scuttle the justice on technicalities. The length of delay is also not very much material if there is a substance on merit. It has also been held that if there was some slackness on the part of applicant and that has caused inconvenience to the other side that can be compensated in terms of money instead of closing the door of justice for ever. 9. Reference may be had to the judgments of the Apex Court in State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and others, JT 2000 (5) 389, Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. Jagdalpur, 2008 14 SCC 445 , V.M. Salgaocara and Bros. 9. Reference may be had to the judgments of the Apex Court in State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and others, JT 2000 (5) 389, Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. Jagdalpur, 2008 14 SCC 445 , V.M. Salgaocara and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and another, 2005 (4) SCC 613 , Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup and others, 2009 (6) SCC 194 and Ragho Singh v. Mohan Singh, 2001 (9) SCC 717 , Jeet Narain and another v. Govind Prasad and others, 2010(3) ADJ SC 470, as well as this Court in Smt. Prem Wati and another v. Smt. Munni Devi alias Minakshi and another, 2009 (2) AWC 1099 , Ramesh and another v. Collector Jalaun and others, 2013(7) ADJ 376 and Mukesh and another v. Additional D.M. (F & R) Mathura and others, 2015(8) ADJ 73 . 10. Here in this case, the petitioner’s fire-arm licence has been cancelled, in the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, fire-arm licences are being issued for safety and security of a person and it is the fundamental right of a person to keep himself to be secured from any apprehended danger to his life and the statute under which the fire-arm licence is issued, also takes care of it and that is why, the fire-arm licences are issued to the persons, who are in genuine need of the same in the opinion of the Licensing Authority. The opinion is also formed after due inquiry made by the various authorities on the instance of the Licensing Authority and once the fire-arm licence has been issued, it should not be cancelled arbitrarily without there being any valid reason. The statute has also provided a remedy of appeal in case fire-arm licence of a person is cancelled. Since the right of appeal has been conferred upon the parties under the statute, therefore, it has to be decided on merit after giving a careful thought. 11. Here in this case, the restoration application has been rejected for two reason, (1) there is no provision for filing the restoration application and (2) day-to-day delay has not been explained. Since the right of appeal has been conferred upon the parties under the statute, therefore, it has to be decided on merit after giving a careful thought. 11. Here in this case, the restoration application has been rejected for two reason, (1) there is no provision for filing the restoration application and (2) day-to-day delay has not been explained. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra), it is not necessary to explain day-to-day delay, but what is required to be seen is whether explanation furnished is satisfactory or not for condonation of delay. Here the explanation furnished by the petitioner has escaped from the mind of the appellate authority while considering the delay condonation application. 12. In view of the foregoing discussions, I find that the appellate authority has erred in rejecting the restoration application filed by the petitioner holding it to be barred by time and not maintainable. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. The restoration application filed in Appeal No. 81 of 2013-14 (Paramveer v. State of U.P.) is allowed. The order dated 16.10.2014 passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut in Appeal No. 81 of 2013-14 (Paramveer v. State of U.P.) dismissing the appeal in default is hereby recalled by setting aside the orders dated 16.10.2014 and 23.7.2015 passed by the Divisional Commissioner. The appeal is restored to its original number. Learned Commissioner is directed to decide the aforesaid appeal on merit in accordance with law. 13. It may be clarified that I have not addressed myself on the merit of the appeal and the authority concerned is free to pass an independent order in accordance with law. 14. With the aforesaid observations/directions, this writ petition is disposed of. ——————