JUDGMENT : Sanjib Banerjee, J. There are two parts to this petition: a facile challenge without much passion as to the applicability of the 2009 Rules pertaining to development officers in the Life Insurance Corporation; and, the termination of the petitioner's services. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a development officer by LIC on July 14, 2012. The letter clearly stipulated that the petitioner would be governed by the "Life Insurance Corporation Of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 now in force as may be amended from time to time and as per the provisions of Life Insurance Corporation Of India Development Officers (Revision of Certain Terms & Conditions Of Service) Rules, 1989 as amended from time to time". The petitioner was served a notice on June 24, 2014 that the petitioner's cost ratio for the appraisal year was 107.97% and that the petitioner's annual remuneration for the appraisal year exceeded 38% of the eligible premium for the year. The petitioner was also informed that the figures for the preceding year were equally discouraging. The said notice was issued under Rule 6(8) read with Rule 7 of the Life Insurance Corporation Of India Development Officers (Revision of Certain Terms & Conditions of Service) Rules, 2009. 3. The petitioner responded to the notice by issuing a reply that was received by the employer on July 14, 2014. In the second paragraph of the reply, the petitioner alleged that the letter of appointment issued to the petitioner did not indicate that the petitioner's services were liable to be terminated on the basis of non-performance or failure to achieve of the cost ratio as indicated in the show-cause notice. The petitioner also argued that if the petitioner had been made acquainted with the said Rules of 2009, "I would never apply for the post and never join in the post " As to his performance, the petitioner cited reasons that ranged from the change of syllabus for recruiting agents to the Panchayat election and floods in the petitioner's field area. It is of some solace that solar flares were not blamed for the petitioner not being able to achieve his targets. The petitioner also referred to his perceived illness and his visit to a hospital for a check-up. It is of some solace that solar flares were not blamed for the petitioner not being able to achieve his targets. The petitioner also referred to his perceived illness and his visit to a hospital for a check-up. A copy of a prescription has been appended to the petition where the two major medicines prescribed were Librium and Pantocid and, on the petitioner's representation that he suffered from arrythmia, he was advised to avoid riding bicycles and motorcycles. 4. The petitioner's reply was considered by the zonal manager and by an order of February 17, 2015 the petitioner's services were terminated. 5. Since the petitioner did not question the figures as to his performance as cited in the show cause notice, the zonal manager was under no obligation to specifically refer to such matters. However, the zonal manager referred to the records of the petitioner's performance in the light of the said Rules of 2009 and offered the petitioner three months' salary in lieu of notice while terminating his services. 6. The petitioner says that since the petitioner is employed by a statutory body, the petitioner's services cannot be terminated on the ipse dixit of any superior officer and the petitioner's employment is protected by the Constitution. The petitioner contends that since the Regulations of 1960 referred to in his letter of appointment of July 14, 2012 contemplate disciplinary proceedings being initiated against an LIC employee by an appropriate authority by engaging an inquiry officer and conducting a two-tier process, the petitioner could not have been removed by the issuance of a solitary notice and on the basis of the petitioner's reply thereto. 7. A somewhat muted submission is made to the effect that the letter of appointment referred to the 1989 Rules and not to the 2009 Rules by which the petitioner has been sought to be assessed. It is submitted that such objection was canvassed in the petitioner's reply to the show-cause notice. 8. The first limb of the petitioner's argument is devoid of merit, but since it has been made it has to be dealt with. The Regulations of 1960 deal with the general conditions of service of LIC staff and the Rules of 1989, as substituted by the Rules of 2009, deal with certain conditions of service of development officers. 8. The first limb of the petitioner's argument is devoid of merit, but since it has been made it has to be dealt with. The Regulations of 1960 deal with the general conditions of service of LIC staff and the Rules of 1989, as substituted by the Rules of 2009, deal with certain conditions of service of development officers. It cannot be said that because the special conditions in the 1989 Rules or the 2009 Rules are not incorporated in the 1960 Regulations, the rules may not be applicable. The Regulations and the Rules can co-exist in absolute harmony. Indeed, both the Rules of 1989 and those of 2009 refer to Section 48(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 as being the source of authority for the rules. Neither the propriety of the rules nor the authority to formulate the rules has been questioned by the petitioner herein. 9. The conditions of service as to the conduct of disciplinary proceedings would not apply to the conditions for retaining the position of a development officer. If the petitioner had been sought to be removed from service on disciplinary grounds, the Regulations of 1960 may have been applicable; but the petitioner was charged with non-performance in accordance with the Rules of 2009 as applicable to him and his termination is under such Rules of 2009. There is neither any anomaly nor any contradiction in the operation of the Regulations of 1960 and the Rules of 2009 simultaneously on a development officer appointed by the LIC. 10. As to the procedure adopted by the respondents under the said Rules of 2009, the petitioner refers to Rule 3 to suggest that an opportunity has to be afforded to a development officer to improve his performance as Rule 3 envisages such opportunity to be given under Rule 6 of the said Rules. 10. As to the procedure adopted by the respondents under the said Rules of 2009, the petitioner refers to Rule 3 to suggest that an opportunity has to be afforded to a development officer to improve his performance as Rule 3 envisages such opportunity to be given under Rule 6 of the said Rules. However, the petitioner seems to gloss over or overlook sub-rule (8) of Rule 6 of the said Rules of 2009 that stipulates as follows: "(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub rules (1) to (7) where the annual remuneration of a Development Officer in any preceding year (hereafter in this sub-rule referred to as a "relevant year") exceeds 38% of the eligible premium of that year and the aggregate of the annual remuneration in the relevant year and the appraisal year immediately preceding the relevant year exceeds 38% of the aggregate of the eligible premium in those two years, his services shall be liable to be terminated in accordance with rule 7." 11. The order impugned dated August 27, 2014 is appropriate and perfectly justified and read the relevant provision as it ought to be. The further contention of the petitioner that he was not accommodated in some other post is fallacious as Rule 15 of the said Rules of 2009 speaks of re-appointment and the petitioner was, in any event, not eligible thereunder. 12. Rule 7 of the said Rules of 2009 deals with the termination of service in certain cases and provides for the steps to be taken in case a development officer failed to conform to the expense limit "and where no opportunity to conform to such limit could be given" under Rule 6 of the said Rules. In other words, Rule 7 contemplates a situation where the opportunity to be afforded to a development officer to improve his performance under Rule 6 may not be possible. Clearly, Rule 7 is the corresponding provision of Rule 6(8) which dispenses with the operation of sub-rules (1) to (7) of Rule 6 in certain cases. 13. As would be evident from sub-rule (8) of Rule 6 of the Rules of 2009, if the expenses on account of a development officer exceeds 38% of the eligible premium, the opportunity to the development officer to correct himself and improve his performance is not to be given. 13. As would be evident from sub-rule (8) of Rule 6 of the Rules of 2009, if the expenses on account of a development officer exceeds 38% of the eligible premium, the opportunity to the development officer to correct himself and improve his performance is not to be given. The notice of June 24, 2014 clearly set out the expense limit, the eligible premium and annual premium for the relevant appraisal year. The notice also referred to the petitioner's cost ratio for the preceding appraisal year. The notice was issued in accordance with sub-rule (8) of Rule 6 of the said Rules of 2009 and it is not even the petitioner's case that such notice did not conform to the relevant provisions. The petitioner's refrain is that since the petitioner was unwell and had sought to be transferred to some other post, the respondents ought to have considered the same. There is no mandate in the Rules of 2009 to hide a non-performing development officer of two years' experience in some other post. 14. The petitioner also refers to a Single Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Writ-A No.53292 of 2010 (Vivek Anand v. LIC) rendered on December 6, 2012. Paragraph 35 of the unreported judgment that has been placed by the petitioner reveals that no reasons were given in the impugned order of termination in that case. 15. In the present case, the order of termination gives adequate reasons. In any event, the particulars referred to in the show-cause notice of June 24, 2014 were not dealt with by the petitioner in his reply. As to the health of the petitioner, the concerned zonal manager was of the opinion that it was not a relevant consideration. It does not appear that health is seriously an issue and the petitioner had cited the same more to seek sympathy than to justify his dismal performance in the concerned years. 16. Since it is evident that the petitioner's case was covered by the exception envisaged in sub-rule (8) of Rule 6 of the said Rules of 2009 and the petitioner was given due notice and his reply assessed while passing the order of termination, there does not appear to be any unreasonableness or arbitrariness on the part of the respondent authorities in terminating the services of the petitioner for his poor performance in the two concerned appraisal years. Since the petitioner's acceptance of his appointment bound him to the Rules relating to development officers as amended and the 2009 Rules replaced the 1989 Rules, the petitioner cannot be heard to complain than the process introduced by the 2009 Rules would not be applicable to him. 17. W.P. 6520 (W) of 2015 is dismissed as utterly unmeritorious. The petitioner will pay costs assessed at Rs. 2000/-. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.