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2015 DIGILAW 3950 (ALL)

Om Prakash v. Hazi Mukhtar Waseem

2015-12-11

PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

body2015
JUDGMENT Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J. – In original suit no. 432/2009 (Hazi Mukhtar Waseem v. Om Prakash) plaint case was that plaintiff is owner in possession of property situated in premises no. 338, Mohalla Beharipur Qurollan. In this property the defendant was inducted on basis of rent deed on 06.12.2002 as tenant in a portion of said premises for open land and tin roof structure, as described in plaint, for 11 months on monthly rent of L 500/-. The said rent-deed was further renewed through power of attorney of plaintiff from time to time till 5.10.2008, and in the meantime the rent was enhanced from L 500/to L 600/- per month exclusive taxes. After the said extended period, tenancy of defendant expired and the same was not renewed. Then on request of plaintiff, the defendant had not vacated the said premises. Therefore, plaintiff had filed suit for decree of eviction of defendant, and recovery of possession and also for recovery of arrears of rent and damages from defendant for unauthorized occupation. 2. In written statement filed in original suit, the defendant pleaded to be the tenant of one Pyare Khan and stated that he had regularly paid rent to Pyare Khan,and the plaintiff has no right, title or interest in that property. The defendant has never executed any rent-deed dated 06.12.2002, nor executed any further rent-deed as stated in plaint. No notice was ever reached from plaintiff to defendant. The plaintiff's suit should be dismissed. 3. The trial court framed issues, accepted adduced evidences and thereafter Additional Civil Judge (S.D.) 2nd, Bareilly had passed the judgment dated 30.11.2011 by which suit was partly decreed and defendant was directed to vacate the possession of disputed property no. 338, Mohalla Biharipur, Quarran, handove it to plaintiff and to pay the rent and damages to plaintiff @ 600/- per month. In its judgment, trial court had given finding of fact to the effect that earlier land-lord of defendant was Pyare Lal, but later on the plaintiff became its owner who had filed original suit no. 119/2003, in which parties had compromised and said suit was decreed on the basis of compromise. In its judgment, trial court had given finding of fact to the effect that earlier land-lord of defendant was Pyare Lal, but later on the plaintiff became its owner who had filed original suit no. 119/2003, in which parties had compromised and said suit was decreed on the basis of compromise. The trial court had also appreciated the oral and documentary evidences and gave specific finding of fact that defendant had became tenant of plaintiff and executed the registered rent-deed before Sub-Registrar which was extended from time to time; and even the defendant had given evidence and had proved the execution of rent-deed admitting the plaintiff to be owner and landlord. The trial court had also given specific finding that disputed property was not occupied by defendant in performance of any agreement to sell as pleaded in his written statement and his pleadings of written statement are not proved. 4. Against the judgment dated 30.11.2011 of trial court Civil Appeal no. 15/2012 (Om Prakash v. Hazi Mukhtar Waseem) was preferred by defendant of original suit which was heard and dismissed by the judgment dated 06.08.2015 of the Additional District Judge, Court No.-5/Special Judge (Gangster Act), Bareilly. In this judgment the first appellate court had considered the pleadings, evidences of the parties as well as the judgments of trial court and gave specific finding of fact that by the judgment dated 25.05.2003 passed in original suit no. 119/2003 the ownership of plaintiff was admitted by earlier owner and land-lord Pyare Khan, and it was also mentioned in the compromise filed between the parties that tenant Om Prakash would pay future rent to Hazi Mukhtar Waseem (plaintiff/respondent). The first appellate court had also given finding that since the status of defendant/appellant was that of tenant from the very beginning, therefore, he cannot challenge the status and right of his landlord. In its conclusion, the first appellate court had also held that there had been agreement of tenancy between the parties to present appeal, by which defendant came in tenancy of plaintiff/respondent for open land with a portion of it being tin shed, and tenancy was not of any shop; and said rented portion was not 'building' for attracting Rent Control Act. The first appellate court had also held that since the defendant-tenant had denied the land-lordship of plaintiff land-lord, therefore, he cannot get the benefit of his alleged acts even after deposition of rent. With these findings, first appellate court had dismissed the first appeal with cost. Aggrieved by the judgment of trial court as well as the first appellate court, present Second Appeal has been preferred by defendant of original suit. 5. Inter alia, learned counsel for the appellant contended that in this matter U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, commonly known as Rent Control Act, is applicable because the tin shed alleged by plaintiff comes within definition of 'building' under this Act. Therefore, the judgment of two courts below are erroneous and perverse. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent refuted the contentions of appellant's side and contended that respondent has purchased only land from earlier owner and decree was passed in original suit no. 119/2003 for the portion of land and not for the shops as claimed by the defendant/appellant. He also drew attention of the Court on averment of plaint and relief claim in it which according to him is not for any 'building' or shop, but for premises in question of open land and one tin structure in a portion of it. He further contended that for the first time, in second appeal, defendant had taken plea of shop, which was not raised by him earlier so he is estopped to raise such plea under Order 41, Rule 2 CPC. He also contended that Pyare Khan had sold only open land to plaintiff/respondent and not the shops. Therefore, there is no error in the judgment of courts below. He also contended that registered agreement deed executed between the parties are binding on them, therefore the defendant/appellant is estopped from denying its admission made in registered rent deeds and cannot get any benefit on basis of any argument because he had denied the title of his land-lord. Therefore, appeal should be dismissed. 7. It is admitted fact that defendant had been tenant of shops of Pyare Khank which was situated in open land in premises no. 338, Mohalla Beharipur, Quarollan. From the evidence it is proved, and not denied by appellant/defendant, that said rented property are in premises no. 338 Beharipur, Quarollan was sold by earlier owner Pyare Khan to plaintiff. 7. It is admitted fact that defendant had been tenant of shops of Pyare Khank which was situated in open land in premises no. 338, Mohalla Beharipur, Quarollan. From the evidence it is proved, and not denied by appellant/defendant, that said rented property are in premises no. 338 Beharipur, Quarollan was sold by earlier owner Pyare Khan to plaintiff. Then a decree was passed by which present plaintiff/respondent Hazi Mukhtar Waseem was declared owner and disputed property and had also admitted that in future, the defendant/appellant would pay rent of said property to plaintiff/respondent Hazi Mukhtar Waseem. It is also proved that after that parties of present appeal had entered into registered agreement of tenancy, by which open land which is disputed in original suit, was given in tenancy of defendant/appellant, and after periodical renewal of tenancy through rent deeds, said tenancy continued till year 2008, after which it had come to an end. Therefore the status of plaintiff over disputed property had become that of a trespasser. This finding of lower court is correct that since defendant/appellant had denied the right, title and land-lordship of real owner and landlord of disputed property, namely plaintiff, therefore he cannot get benefit of his avements and he is estopped from denying the facts of his tenancy of rented portion which he had earlier admitted in deed of tenancy. Since defendant/appellant had earlier admitted through the registered agreement deed that he is coming in tenancy of land and not of 'building', therefore, he cannot deny the said facts and plead otherwise. 8. The only pleading in written-statement of defendant/appellant, which is to be determined in this case is whether the defendant/appellant is tenant of Pyare Khan or not. This fact has been believably proved by the two courts below on the basis of evidences, which included the admission of defendant; and also there is concurrent finding of fact of two lower courts on this point. Such dispute was relating to facts only that could have been decided by the evidences, as has been shown by the two courts below. There is no point of law to be decided in this disputed. Such concurrent and apparently acceptable finding of the trial court as well as of the first appellate court cannot be interfered by this Court by re-appreciating of evidences of facts. 9. There is no point of law to be decided in this disputed. Such concurrent and apparently acceptable finding of the trial court as well as of the first appellate court cannot be interfered by this Court by re-appreciating of evidences of facts. 9. On examination of the reasoning recorded by the trial court, which are affirmed by the learned first appellate court in first appeal, I am of the view that the judgments of the two lower courts are well reasoned, and based upon proper appreciation of the entire evidence on record. No perversity or infirmity is found in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court that has been affirmed by the first appellate court to warrant interference in this appeal. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, was involved in the case before this Court. None of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant can be sustained. 10. In view of the above, this Court finds that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The second appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.