ORDER Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J. 1. The present appeals have been filed by the appellants-accused against the judgment and order of conviction dated 3-8-2012 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Amreli in Sessions Case No. 69 of 2011, whereby the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused persons as under: (A) In Criminal Appeal No. 1398/2012: (1) For the appellants herein-original accused Nos. 1 and 4, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 498(A) read with 114of the IPC; (2) For the appellants herein-original accused Nos. 1 and 4, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months for the offence under Sections 306 and 114 of the IPC; (3) For the appellants herein-original accused Nos. 1 and 4, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years with fine of Rs. 15,000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. (B) In Criminal Appeal No. 1396/2012: (1) For the appellants herein-original accused Nos. 2 and 3, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 498(A) read with 114of the IPC; (2) For the appellant No. 2 herein-original accused No. 3, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months or the offence under Sections 306 and 114 of the IPC; The common brief facts of the prosecution case are that Reshmaben wife of the original accused No. 1 - Alfta was hailing from Sihor and they got married six months prior to the incident. The marriage took place in a mass marriage ceremony held at Bhavnagar. It is further case of the prosecution that after Reshmaben joined the matrimonial home, the mental harassment under the guise of not bringing proper and adequate dowry was started. It was also alleged in the FIR by the informant, who happens to be the father of Reshmaben, that when his daughter requested her-in-law to permit her to go to Bhadia to attend the Urs Ceremony, original accused Nos. It was also alleged in the FIR by the informant, who happens to be the father of Reshmaben, that when his daughter requested her-in-law to permit her to go to Bhadia to attend the Urs Ceremony, original accused Nos. 1 and 4 had told her to go to graveyard instead. Ultimately on 14-6-2011, the first information received telephonic message from Amreli that his daughter Reshmaben has consumed poison and was admitted to Civil Hospital, Amreli. Thereafter, the first information received the message regarding the death of his daughter. Thereafter, a complaint was lodged against the accused persons. 2. After completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the learned Magistrate Court. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Session, learned Magistrate Court under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C.") committed the said case to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Amreli, which was, thereafter, numbered as Sessions Case No. 69 of 2011. 3. At the time of trial, in order to bring home the charges levelled against the original accused, the prosecution examined witnesses as well as the prosecution also produced 19 documentary evidences. 4. At the end of the Trial and after recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and hearing the arguments on behalf of the prosecution and the defence, the learned Sessions Jude, Amreli convicted the accused of the charges for the offence under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the IPC and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. On completion of the trial, the Sessions Court passed the judgment and order convicting the accused for the aforesaid alleged offences. 5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court, the appellant-accused has preferred the present Criminal Appeal. 6. Learned advocate for the appellants-original accused submitted that the judgment of the learned Trial Court is quite erroneous on facts as well as on law. He further submitted that as the parties have settled the disputes and have entered into compromise, without entering into the merits of the matter, these appeals may be allowed by reducing the sentence of the period already undergone. He also submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has not appreciated the evidence on record according to the well settled principles of Criminal Jurisprudence. He also submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has not appreciated the evidence on record according to the well settled principles of Criminal Jurisprudence. He further submitted that the allegations levelled against the original accused Nos. 1 and 4 qua Section 306 read with Section114 of IPC are baseless and unacceptable in the eye of law. He further submitted that the appellants crave leave to reply upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, where uttering the words like "GO AND DIE" is not sufficient to hold someone responsible for abatement of suicide. Here, in the given case also, it is undisputed that the so-called words uttered by original accused Nos. 1 and 4 that "GO TO KABRASTAN" does not have a direct link with the death, as there was a big time gap between such so-called uttering and the suicide committed by the deceased. He further submitted that the prosecution has failed to examine any independent witness to corroborate the story concocted by the complainant. He further submitted that the serious allegations are against original accused No. 3, who was Jethani of the deceased and it was alleged that original accused No. 3 being a widow wanted to marry to original accused No. 1. Upon such allegation stand original accused No. 3 was arraigned as an accused and is not inflicted the sentence as per the operative part of the judgment. It requires to be noted that original accused No. 3 widowed prior to the marriage of original accused No. 1. Had there been any wish on the part of original accused No. 3 to get marry to original accused No. 1, the marriage between the deceased and the original accused No. 1 would not have taken place. He further submitted that the Court below has failed to appreciate that there were many glaring and serious infirmities in the case of prosecution which have been very lightly brushed aside by the learned Trial Judge which has caused failure of justice. He also submitted that the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Trial Judge is contrary to law, against the express provisions of statute and against the evidence on record. He also submitted that the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Trial Judge is contrary to law, against the express provisions of statute and against the evidence on record. He also submitted that the learned Trial Judge ought to have considered the fact that the prosecution has failed to prove the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Sections 498(A) and 306 of the IPC and he, therefore, ought to have acquitted the accused. He further submitted that the learned Trial Judge ought to have appreciated the fact that taking the prosecution case to be true and correct. He further submitted that the learned trial Judge ought to have appreciated that there is no intentional aiding or instigation so as to constitute the offence of abetment. He further submitted that merely because a sensitive lady has committed suicide, the accused cannot be held liable for the offence under Section 306 of IPC. He also submitted that the learned Judge ought to have considered the fact that the accused had no intention to drive the deceased to commit suicide and the accused could not have anticipated the same. Intention and mens rea are the main ingredients of the offence of abetment and they are lacking in the present case. He also submitted that the learned Judge has materially erred in law in relying upon the evidence of highly interested witnesses. Therefore the learned Judge ought not to have relied upon the evidence. Therefore, in that view also there is lacuna in proving the case against the accused under Sections 498(A) and 306 of IPC and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. He further submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt. He further submitted that in view of above, these appeals may be allowed and the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court may be reversed, in support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the following authoritative pronouncements. (I) Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2010) 1 SCC 750 : ( AIR 2010 SC 327 ); (II) S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and another (2010) 12 SCC 190 : (2010 AIR SCW 4938). 7. (I) Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2010) 1 SCC 750 : ( AIR 2010 SC 327 ); (II) S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and another (2010) 12 SCC 190 : (2010 AIR SCW 4938). 7. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has taken this Court through the evidence and has submitted that the judgment of the learned Trial Judge is not such which calls for interference on the facts and the conviction of the accused should not be interfered with. She has submitted that the judgments cited by learned counsel for the appellants-accused would not apply to the facts of this. She further submitted that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the nexus between the cruelty and the suicide. She further submitted that the learned Trial Judge has rightly convicted the accused persons. She, therefore, submitted that the present appeals are required to be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned advocate for the appellants-accused and the learned APP for the State and perused the material on record. 9. The original complainant-father of the deceased has filed affidavits dated 26-3-2015 which are taken on record. Looking to the facts and circumstances mentioned in the affidavits and during the pendency of the proceedings, the relation between the appellants herein-all the original accused and the family members of complainant have become cordial and normal. Now, the parties have settled the disputes. 10. Before considering the case on merits, it is necessary to reproduce Sections 498(A) and 306 of the IPC which read as under:-- "498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty:--Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine." "306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." 11. In the case of S.S. Chheena (2010 AIR SCW 4938) (supra), the Apex Court observed as under: "19. "Abetment" has been defined under Section 107 of the Code. We deem it appropriate to reproduce Section 107, which reads as under: "107. In the case of S.S. Chheena (2010 AIR SCW 4938) (supra), the Apex Court observed as under: "19. "Abetment" has been defined under Section 107 of the Code. We deem it appropriate to reproduce Section 107, which reads as under: "107. Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing." 20. Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with Section 107 reads as under: "Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." 21. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P., 1995 Supp (3) SCC 731 : (1995 AIR SCW 4570, p. 4570, para 1). In Mahendra Singh, the allegations levelled were as under: (SCC p. 731, para 1) 1....My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-law. Because of these reasons and being harassed I want to die by burning." The Court on the aforementioned allegations came to a definite conclusion that by no stretch the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased. According to the appellant, the conviction of the appellant under Section 306, IPC merely on the basis of the aforementioned allegation of harassment of the deceased is unsustainable in law. 22. The learned counsel also placed reliance on another judgment of this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3837 , pp. 3844-3845, para 20). In this case, a three-Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with a case of a similar nature. 22. The learned counsel also placed reliance on another judgment of this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3837 , pp. 3844-3845, para 20). In this case, a three-Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with a case of a similar nature. In a dispute between the husband and wife, the appellant husband uttered "you are free to do whatever you wish and go wherever you like". Thereafter, the wife of the appellant Ramesh Kumar committed suicide. The Court in para 20 has examined different shades of the meaning of "instigation". Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629) "20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." In this case, the court came to the conclusion that there is no evidence and material available on record wherefrom an inference of the appellant-accused having abetted commission of suicide by Seema may necessarily be drawn. 23. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73 : ( AIR 1994 SC 1418 ), this Court has cautioned that: 17.... The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. 24. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC 605 : ( AIR 2010 SC 1446 ) had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the words "instigation" and "goading". The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any strait-jacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306, IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. 26. In the instant case, the deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day life. Human sensitivity of each individual differs from the other. 26. In the instant case, the deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day life. Human sensitivity of each individual differs from the other. Different people behave differently in the same situation. 27. When we carefully scrutinize and critically examine the facts of this case in the light of the settled legal position the conclusion becomes obvious that no conviction can be legally sustained without any credible evidence or material on record against the appellant. The order of framing a charge under Section 306, IPC against the appellant is palpably erroneous and unsustainable. It would be travesty of justice to compel the appellant to face a criminal trial without any credible material whatsoever. Consequently, the order of framing charge under Section 306, IPC against the appellant is quashed and all proceedings pending against him are also set aside. 12. From the material on record, it is clear that the conviction of the accused is based on dying declaration of the deceased and there is no other evidence, except alleged dying declaration that the accused was giving mental and physical harassment to the deceased. The question of reliability of the dying declaration is considered by Honour-able Supreme Court in the case of Gopal v. State of M.P., reported in (2009 (2) GLH 489 : AIR 2009 SC 2111 ). While deciding the said case, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "8. Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying declarations is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration they should be consistent. (See : Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P. [ (1993) 2 SCC 684 ] : (1993 AIR SCW 1321). However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. (See : Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P. [ (1993) 2 SCC 684 ] : (1993 AIR SCW 1321). However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinizing the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances. 9. It is to be noted that the High Court had itself observed that the dying declaration (Exh.P11) scribed by the Executive Officer, (PW9) at about 04:35 hours in the same night was not in conformity with the FIR and the earlier dying declaration (Exh.P3) scribed by ASI Balram (PW 8) as different motives have been described. That is not the only variation. Several other discrepancies, even as regards the manner in which she is supposed to have been sprinkled with kerosene and thereafter set on fire. 10. Therefore, the discrepancies make the last declaration doubtful. The nature of the inconsistencies is such that they are certainly material. That being so, it would be unsafe to convict the appellant. The conviction is set aside and appellant is acquitted of the charges. He be set at liberty forthwith." 13. From the above observations, it is clear that if a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, then only it can be relied upon without any corroboration. In the present case, all the nearest relatives of the deceased have specifically and clearly stated that the deceased was unconscious and was unable to speak from the time of the incident till her death, therefore, the learned Trial Judge ought not to have relied upon dying declaration. From the evidence on record, it also cannot be said that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make any declaration. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or that ingredients of Section 306 of the IPC are satisfied. Not only that, the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused has abetted the offence. 14. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or that ingredients of Section 306 of the IPC are satisfied. Not only that, the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused has abetted the offence. 14. From the observations of the Apex Court in S.S. Chheena (2010 AIR SCW 4938) (supra), it is clear that without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Apex Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306, IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that she committed suicide. Therefore, even on the touchstone of the latest decision of the Apex Court and the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the accused, the prosecution has not brought home the charge that the action of the accused was such which perpetrated and fastened the death of the deceased. The deceased was not staying with the accused. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused was responsible for the suicide committed by the deceased. 15. The Apex Court in the case of Kuldeep Kaur v. State of Uttarakhand, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 584 : (AIR 2015 SC (Cri)30) has observed as under:-- "11. Mr. Ahmadi contended that the finding of the trial court holding the petitioner guilty under Section 306, IPC is on the basis of surmises and conjectures. The trial court in its judgment pertaining to the appellant has reproduced a line from the diary of the deceased, which reads as still she wants me to work till late. It is contended that the trial court erred in presuming that when the deceased writes the above line in her diary she is referring to the appellant. It is further contended that conviction of the appellant deserves to be set aside as both the courts below failed to appreciate that the prosecution did not led any evidence on record to show that there was direct reasonable nexus between suicide and alleged cruelty. It is further contended that conviction of the appellant deserves to be set aside as both the courts below failed to appreciate that the prosecution did not led any evidence on record to show that there was direct reasonable nexus between suicide and alleged cruelty. As both the courts below gave findings that there was no demand of dowry or any cruelty committed with the deceased in connection with demand of dowry and acquitted the appellant from charge under Sections 304B, 498A, IPC and under Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the courts below could not have come to a contradictory view that the deceased committed suicide due to cruelty committed by the appellant. Even in the diary, deceased has not written even a single word against the appellant. Perusal of the diary only shows, as also observed by the trial court in its decision in the trial of other accused persons including deceased's husband, that the deceased was depressed and has left no interest in life. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the State has not disputed that although against the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court acquitting the husband, father-in-law, brother-in-law and two sisters-in-law, the State preferred appeal but the same was dismissed by the High Court. However, no further appeal has been filed by the State before this Court. Learned counsel submitted that the conviction of the appellant under Section 306, IPC is fully justified. 13. We have perused the judgment passed by the trial court as also by the High Court. We have also gone through the judgments by which the husband, father-in-law, brother-in-law and two sisters-in-law have been acquitted by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. So far this appellant is concerned, she has also been acquitted against the charges of dowry harassment but she has been convicted under Section 306, IPC. 14. A perusal of trial court judgment pertaining to deceased's husband would show that PW1, father of the deceased, in his cross-examination stated that no dowry was demanded by the accused persons from the day of alliance till solemnization of marriage. Whatever stridhan was given was as per the custom and as per his will in the form of gift to his daughter. Whatever stridhan was given was as per the custom and as per his will in the form of gift to his daughter. He further stated that his daughter had not told him that in the absence of Upkar Singh she remained dejected in her matrimonial house because of her mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law and husband and elder brother-in-law on the issue of dowry. Witness himself stated that only God knows why her daughter committed suicide without any reason. This witness has stated that it is true to say that neither the accused persons abetted his daughter to commit suicide nor they harassed her. 15. We have given our anxious consideration in the matter and analyzed the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. In our considered opinion, the evidence adduced as against the appellant does not establish the case under Section 306 of the Code. On the basis of evidence of the prosecution witnesses, conviction of the appellant only cannot be sustained. Having regard to the fact of the case and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court acquitted all the accused persons except the present appellant and the said judgment was affirmed by the High Court. We do not find any strong reason to agree with the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court as against the appellant." 16. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court and the factual scenario which emerges from record, it cannot be said that the accused perpetrated cruelty so as to see that the deceased commits suicide. In light of aforesaid observations of the Apex Court and considering the evidence on record, the prosecution has failed to prove an offence under Sections 498(A) and 306 of IPC against the accused, therefore, I am persuaded to hold that the judgment passed by the trial Court is required to be interfered with. 17. Having considered evidence threadbare and the judgments on which reliance is placed hereinabove, the accused could not have been convicted for the offence as alleged because it cannot be said that the physical and mental torture by the accused resulted in the death of the deceased. It appears that learned Trial Judge has convicted the accused on conjecture and surmises and the judgment is not based on evidence, which is borne out from record. It appears that learned Trial Judge has convicted the accused on conjecture and surmises and the judgment is not based on evidence, which is borne out from record. Therefore, the appeals are required to be allowed by reversing the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Judge. No case is made out against original accused Nos. 2 and 3. Therefore, they deserve to be acquitted. From the jail remarks/reports and in view of the above observations and discussions, original accused Nos. 1 and 4 have already undergone sufficient sentence which is just and proper. In view of the above, the following order is passed: As far as Criminal Appeal No. 1398/2012 is concerned, this appeal is partly allowed. The conviction imposed upon the appellants-original accused No. 1-Altafbhai (Abdus) Sattarbhai Deraiya and No. 4-Zubaida wife of (Abdus) Sattarbhai Deraiya for the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 read with 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is confirmed. However, the sentence imposed upon the appellants-original accused Nos. 1 and 4 for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is reduced from 5 years to 3 years and 9 months. The fine is maintained. The appellants herein are directed to pay the fine within a period of 4 weeks failing which they shall undergo 1 year simple imprisonment. The impugned judgment and order is modified to the aforesaid extent. As far as Criminal Appeal No. 1396/2012 is concerned, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 3-8-2012 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Amreli in Sessions Case No. 69/2011 is quashed and set aside. The original accused No. 2-Firoz (Abdus) Sattarbhai Deraiya and No. 3-Mumtaz wife of Arif Deraiya-appellants herein are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The bail and bail bond stands cancelled. Surety, if any, shall stand discharged. The appellants herein-original accused Nos. 2 and 3 are ordered to be released forthwith and they shall be set free forthwith if not required in any other case. Fine, if any, paid by the appellants herein-original accused Nos. 2 and 3 shall be refunded to them by the respondent-State. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the Trial Court concerned forthwith. Appeal Partly Allowed