JUDGMENT Rajan Roy, J. – Heard. 2. The petitioner herein challenges the order dated 21.9.2015 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) rejecting his application for revocation of suspension. 3. The facts of the case, in brief, are : the petitioner was employed in the U.P. Jal Nigam. On a complaint made against him an inquiry was conducted by the Anti Corruption Department of the State Government regarding acquisition of assets, disproportionate to his known sources of income. 4. In the inquiry/investigation conducted by the Anti Corruption Department oral and documentary evidence was collected and a report was submitted on 13.12.2010 wherein it was stated that during the period from 1.1.1994 till 30.4.1999 the petitioner had earned Rs. 542082/-, against which he had spent an amount of Rs. 731962/-, thus there was over spending of Rs. 189880/-, hence it found a case for prosecution for accumulating assets disproportionate to his income thereby attracting Section 13(1)(e), read with Section 30(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The matter was accordingly recommended for registration of a criminal case at the concerned police station under the aforesaid provisions. Sanction for prosecution was granted and F.I.R. was lodged. 5. After lodging of the F.I.R. investigation was conducted in the matter by the police wherein the petitioner was found to have accumulated wealth to the tune of Rs. 337835.30, disproportionate to his known sources of income i.e. in excess thereof. The petitioner was arrested by the police on 3.6.2015 and remained in jail till he was enlarged on bail on 9.6.2015. On account of his incarceration for more than 48 hours the petitioner was deemed to be under suspension under Rule 4(3) (a) of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1999 (for short “Rules of 1999”). After being enlarged on bail the petitioner submitted an application on 11.6.2015 before the General Manager for revocation of his deemed suspension and for being allowed to resume his duties. In pursuance to some directions in the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner the said application was considered and has been rejected by means of the impugned order dated 21.9.2015 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition). 6. The contention of the petitioner is that the impugned order has been passed under Rule 4(3)(a) of the Rules of 1999, which is not attracted and the relevant provision is Rule 4(3)(b). 6. The contention of the petitioner is that the impugned order has been passed under Rule 4(3)(a) of the Rules of 1999, which is not attracted and the relevant provision is Rule 4(3)(b). The facts of the case have not been considered and the application for revocation of his deemed suspension has been rejected mechanically. The work and conduct of the petitioner has been very good throughout. The disciplinary proceedings initiated by the impugned order have also not commenced and no charge sheet has been served upon him as yet. The allegations and evidence forming basis for the disciplinary proceedings are the same on which criminal prosecution has been ordered, therefore, in keeping with the dictum in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Cold Mines Ltd. & anr., (1999)3 SCC 679 , as well as Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. v. Girish V., (2014)3 SCC 636 , both the proceedings cannot go on simultaneously, as complicated questions of facts and law are involved. 7. The learned Standing Counsel has opposed the writ petition. 8. Mere mentioning of a wrong provision of law does not by itself invalidate an order which is otherwise sustainable and referable to an existing provision of law, as in this case. Rule 4(3)(a) and Rule 4(3)(b) of the aforesaid Rules read as under: “Rule 4(3)(a) – A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed or, as the case may be, continued to be placed under suspension by an order of the authority competent to suspend, with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether the detention is on criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours. Rule 4(3)(b) – The aforesaid Government servant shall, after the release from the custody, inform in writing to the competent authority about his detention and may also make representation against the deemed suspension. Rule 4(3)(b) – The aforesaid Government servant shall, after the release from the custody, inform in writing to the competent authority about his detention and may also make representation against the deemed suspension. The competent authority shall after considering the representation in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the provision contained in this rule, pass appropriate order continuing continuing the deemed suspension from, the date of release from custody or revoking or modifying it.” Rule 4(7) and (8) of the Rules of 1999 read as under: “Rule 4(7) – Where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise) and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to under suspension till the termination of all or any of such proceedings. Rule 4(8) – Any suspension ordered or deemed to have been ordered or to have continued in force under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the competent authority.” 9. A Government servant who has been detained for more than 48 hours is deemed to be placed under suspension under Rule 4(3)(a). On his enlargement on bail such deemed suspension does not automatically cease to operate. At this stage, Rule 4(3)(b) of the Rules of 1999 comes into play. Such Government servant is required, after the release from custody, to inform in writing to the competent authority about his detention and he may also make a representation against the deemed suspension. The competent authority shall after considering the representation in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the provision contained in this Rule pass appropriate order continuing the deemed suspension from the date of release from custody or revoking or modifying it. 10. After being enlarged on bail the petitioner moved an application for revocation of his suspension on 11.6.2015, which was forwarded to the competent authority. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 29.1.2015 has been passed. 10. After being enlarged on bail the petitioner moved an application for revocation of his suspension on 11.6.2015, which was forwarded to the competent authority. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 29.1.2015 has been passed. Though the said order refers to Rule 4(3)(a) of the Rules of 1999, but obviously the stage at which it has been passed attracts the provision of Rule 4(3)(b), but mere error in narrating a wrong provision does not help the petitioner’s cause. By means of the impugned order the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner and veritably his deemed suspension has been continued, though the order may not be so happily worded. 11. Considering the allegations levelled against the petitioner which relate to amassing of wealth disproportionate to his known sources of income, the seriousness of allegations hardly needs to be emphasized. Therefore, considering the facts of the case, even if the impugned order does not discuss the facts and circumstances of the case, the gravity of the allegations is self evident and the consequences of allowing such a person to resume his official duties are fraught with serious consequences which may involve misuse of official position for committing such actions further, therefore, it is not in the interest of the institution to revoke his suspension. 12. The legal position is now very well settled by the Supreme Court vide judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar, 2003(6) SCC 516 , wherein it has been held that enlargement of an accused on bail does not lead to automatic cessation of his deemed suspension and the Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Chandra Shekhar Saxena v. Director of Education (Basic), 1997 All LJ 963, has been over-ruled on this point. 13. The next contention of Sri Ghaus Beg, learned counsel for the petitioner that the facts and evidence of disciplinary proceedings and the criminal case being the same and complicated questions of facts and law being involved, both the proceedings cannot go on simultaneously can also not be accepted at this stage for the reason admittedly the charge sheet has not been issued in the departmental proceedings and there is nothing to show that the same has been filed in the criminal case and the pleadings are silent as regards the filing of such charge sheet in the criminal case. It is only after the aforesaid eventuality takes place that it will be possible for the court to consider this issue. For the moment disciplinary proceedings have been initiated and inquiry officer has been appointed and suspension of the petitioner is continuing which is referable to Rule 4(3)(b) of the Rules of 1999, therefore, there is no reason to interfere in the matter on this ground also at this stage. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ petition is dismissed. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to approach this court again, if the cause-of-action arises in future after filing of the chargesheets referred herein above or if such chargesheets are not filed/issued within next three months, as the case may be.