JUDGMENT Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J. – Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. In original suit no. 278/2005, (Ramesh Chandra Gupta v. Smt. Mamta Gupta), it was pleaded that the mother of the plaintiff had not executed any will-deed in favour of any person, but defendant Mamta Gupta (wife of brother of plaintiff) had got executed one forged registered will dated 18.01.2000, allegedly executed by Smt. Tulsa Devi in her favour by impersonating any woman in place of Smt. Tulsa Devi. The plaintiff is co-owner of the property mentioned in the alleged will-deed due to his inheritance from mother Tulsa Devi, therefore he has filed a suit for cancellation of aforesaid will-deed dated 18.01.2000. 3. In original suit the defendant had filed written statement with averment that plaintiff had filed suit on basis of incorrect facts. Smt. Tulsa Devi had executed will-deed in question in favour of defendant, as such the suit should be dismissed. 4. After framing issues, accepting the evidences and affording an opportunity of hearing, the Civil Judge (S.D.) Kanpur Dehat had decreed the suit. Then the defendant had preferred Civil Appeal No. 152/2008, (Smt. Mamta Gupta v. Ramesh Chandra Gupta), which was heard and dismissed by the judgment dated 04.06.2010 of Additional District Judge, Court No. 02, Kanpur Dehat. Aggrieved by the judgments of trial court as well as the first appellate court, this Second Appeal has been preferred by the defendant of the original suit. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant was not afforded any opportunity of hearing by the two courts below to adduce the evidences and to prove the genuineness of will-deed in question. He further contended that the two courts below had erroneously appreciated the evidences of the parties and even discarded the evidences of marginal witness. Therefore the findings of the lower courts are perverse. He also contended that no point of determination was framed by the first appellate court at the time of passing of the judgment. Therefore, the said judgement is erroneous and the appeal should be allowed. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that it was proved from adduced evidences that forged will-deed was executed on behalf of Smt. Tulsa Devi, and genuine signature of Smt. Tulsa Devi had no resemblance with the disputed signature on will-deed. Therefore, the said judgement is erroneous and the appeal should be allowed. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that it was proved from adduced evidences that forged will-deed was executed on behalf of Smt. Tulsa Devi, and genuine signature of Smt. Tulsa Devi had no resemblance with the disputed signature on will-deed. Therefore, there is no error in the judgments of the lower courts and the appeal should be dismissed. 7. This contention of learned counsel for the appellant is not acceptable that opportunity of hearing and opportunity for adducing evidence were not afforded to appellant. In fact perusal of the original records reveal that such opportunities were given but only plaintiff side had adduced evidences of expert. So far the contention of allegedly non affording such opportunity is concerned, it is not acceptable because the same has also not been taken either before the trial court or before the first appellate court. Even in memo of appeal, no such plea was raised so appellant is estopped from raising such averment. Such plea cannot be raised directly in second appeal to the prejudice of respondent/plaintiff. 8. Second contention of allegedly non appreciation of evidence properly and discarding the evidence of marginal witness is concerned, it is also apparently unacceptable in the light of other findings. The two courts below had discussed the evidence of witnesses even that part of the statement of PW-2 which reflects the presence of photo of Tulsa Devi on disputed documents. The the judgments of the two courts, which had been filed after appreciating the evidences and are apparently not perverse. Both the courts had discussed the evidences regarding the thumb impressions of Tulsa Devi on admitted document and on disputed will-deed and then gave specific finding that disputed thumb impression are different from the admitted thumb impression of Tulsa Devi. Apart from confirming the findings of trial court, the first appellate court had gone to the extent of analysing itself the disputed and admitted thumb impressions, and gave specific finding that both are different. Therefore, argument relating to improper appreciation of evidence or perverse finding is not acceptable. 9. So far as the main contention of non framing of point of determination in first appeal in Order-41 Rule-31 CPC is concerned, in this regard it is a fact that such point of determination was not formally framed by first appellate court. Therefore, argument relating to improper appreciation of evidence or perverse finding is not acceptable. 9. So far as the main contention of non framing of point of determination in first appeal in Order-41 Rule-31 CPC is concerned, in this regard it is a fact that such point of determination was not formally framed by first appellate court. But in this particular case, this will not prejudice the rights of appellant because the only point of determination between the parties was as to whether Tulsa Devi had executed will deed in question or not; and this point was properly discussed by the first appellate court and specific finding was given in that regard. 10. In Ruling In G. Amalorpavam v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai, (2006) 3 SCC 224 , the Apex Court has held as under: "The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC." 11. Therefore, since the only point of determination has been discussed and decided by the first appellate court, so far above mentioned contention of learned counsel for the appellant is found unacceptable. 12. On examination of the reasoning recorded by the trial court, which are affirmed by the learned first appellate court in first appeal, I am of the view that the judgments of the trial court as well as the first appellate court are well reasoned and based upon proper appreciation of the entire evidences on record. No perversity or infirmity is found in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court that has been affirmed by the first appellate court to warrant interference in this appeal. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, was involved in the case before the High Court. None of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiffs can be sustained. 13. In view of the above, this Court finds that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The second appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.