JUDGMENT Ashwani Kumar Mishra,J. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Moradabad, through its Regional Manager has filed the present writ petition, challenging an award passed by the Labour Court, U.P. Bareilly, dated 25th August, 2004, in Adjudication Case No. 100 of 1997. By the award, Labour Court has held the termination of services of worker Sri Hafiz Khan, with effect from 30th June, 1994, to be illegal and he is held entitled to be reinstated in service, alongwith 1/3rd back-wages. 2. The respondent-workman, Hafiz Khan, is a permanent driver with the petitioner since 1972, and is also the Vice President of the Roadways Employees Union, Nazibabad Branch. He was terminated from service by the petitioner vide order dated 30th June, 1994. A reference under Section 4-K of the Industrial Disputes Act was made by the appropriate govt. for adjudication by the Labour Court, on the question as to whether the termination of service of the workman concerned w.e.f. 30th June, 1994, was legal and proper, and If it is not, then to what relief is he entitled? 3. Written statements were filed by the worker and the employer. Parties have led their oral and documentary evidence in support of their case. 4. The order of termination dated 30th June, 1994 has been brought on record, which shows that following allegations were leveled against the workman: (i) That a vehicle was allotted to driver, Karan Singh on 26th November, 1991 for going from Moradabad to Nazibabad and while the driver was taking the vehicle out of the depot, the respondent workman stopped the vehicle and abused the driver. Upon being asked by the Senior Depot In-charge, the charge-sheeted worker stated that he would not allow any vehicle coming from Moradabad to ply, otherwise, he will lie in front of the bus, so far as to ensure that the buses do not ply. It is alleged that a lot of unrest was caused and all the drivers refused to ply the vehicle, which had come from Moradabad. The worker being Vice President of Employees Union of the Corporation, accordingly, caused financial loss, indulging in anti-management activity and refusing to comply with the official directions. (ii) On 9th December, 1991, driver Mool Chandra Sharma was to drive bus no. The worker being Vice President of Employees Union of the Corporation, accordingly, caused financial loss, indulging in anti-management activity and refusing to comply with the official directions. (ii) On 9th December, 1991, driver Mool Chandra Sharma was to drive bus no. 978 and when the Station In-charge instructed the driver to take the vehicle, then the concerned driver misbehaved with the Depot In-charge and the respondent workman also supported erring driver Mool Chandra Sharma and were even ready to beat the Depot In-charge, and faced with such a situation, the Depot In-charge left. In such circumstance, the respondent workman was accused of supporting the erring driver, Mool Chandra Sharma in unsuccessfully trying to physical assault the Depot In-charge. By a separate letter, three additional charges were leveled, which were as under: - (iii) On 20th March, 1992, the respondent workman came to Depot in Bus No. 8179 at about 9.00 p.m.. The vehicle was inspected by one Sri Husnain Khan, Electrical Cleaner, who on inspection, found the vehicle to be in order. However, the respondent workman himself started installing pressure horn, as a result of which the bearing caught fire, causing loss of Rs. 380/- to the employer. (iv) After the electrical cleaner was taking back his equipments, the respondent workman abused all the employee of the Depot, and threw light. (v) On 2nd April, 1992, the respondent workman alongwith other employee in respect of grievance relating to grant of leave, surrounded the Junior Foreman and used filthy language against him. However, as the Traffic Inspector and another official came on spot, as a result a possible mishapping could be avoided. 5. It was in respect of the aforesaid charges, the order of dismissal was passed after holding the departmental inquiry. The charges were denied by the workman by contesting that he has been falsely implicated as he was Vice President of the Employees Union, and the officials with a view to vitimize him issued charge-sheet by leveling concocted, vague and frivolous allegations, which were not substantiated. The respondent workman also submitted that he was appointed as driver in the Depot in 1972, and his work and conduct was of utmost satisfaction, but he is being harassed only because he has remained an active member of the Union, and has been espousing the cause of other employees, who were harassed and victimized by the management. The respondent workman also submitted that he was appointed as driver in the Depot in 1972, and his work and conduct was of utmost satisfaction, but he is being harassed only because he has remained an active member of the Union, and has been espousing the cause of other employees, who were harassed and victimized by the management. The Labour Court found that the order of dismissal passed against the workman, was after due opportunity of submitting reply and contest to the workman and therefore, the domestic inquiry was held to be fair and proper. The Labour Court, however, has examined the charges as well as the material brought on record in support there off to conclude that the charges against the workman are not made out on merits. It was found that none of the charges could be established against the workman, on the basis of material brought on record. 6. Briefly stated, the Labour Court found that ill treatment of Karan Singh was not supported by any complaint made by him to the superiors. Workman, Karan Singh himself had appeared before the Labour Court as witness and denied the allegations of respondent workman of stopping him from taking the vehicle. The employer's witness, Kamaldeep Singh has admitted that no written complaint was made by Karan Singh. The Labour Court found substance in the plea set up by the workman that vehicle no. 787 had developed some fault and therefore, an alternative vehicle no. 1277 was actually operated by Karan Singh on the same date and therefore, the entire charges in this regard were wholly non existent and baseless. Sri Karan Singh also stated that no threat was given by the respondent workman that he would lie in front of the bus and would not allow its movement. The Labour Court, therefore, held that the allegation itself was not proved. 7. So far as the second charge was concerned, it was found that the charge of ill treatment alongwith Mool Chandra Sharma was wholly misconceived, as the said workman Mool Chandra Sharma was actually on medical leave and the question of his being present at the Depot on 9th December, 1991 as well as the allegation of the respondent workman, ill treating with Station In-charge in support of Mool Chand Sharma was not made out. The Labour Court further found that no F.I.R. etc. The Labour Court further found that no F.I.R. etc. in respect of any such incident was lodged on 9th December, 1991. The Labour Court further found from the employers evidence that the only allegation leveled was that tone of the respondent workman was disrespectful and it was not specified to what kind of abusive language was used by him. In such circumstance, the Labour Court found that second charge was also not made out. 8. Similarly, with respect to the other charges, the Labour Court found that the allegation made against the worker could not be substantiated on merits. The detail reasons have been mentioned in support of the findings. Reliance was placed upon the statement of employer witness Naresh Kumar Rajpoot, who admitted that the respondent workman had never abused him. The Labour Court was of the view that since the respondent workman was an active union member, and was representing the cause of the workers before the employer, therefore, allegation of his false implication also cannot be ruled out. In such circumstance, the Labour Court has held that the charges against the workers are not made out and he was allowed reinstatement alongwith 1/3rd back wages. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that once the Labour Court found no procedural defect in the domestic inquiry proceedings, it was not open for the Labour Court to act as an appellate authority and reappraise evidence so as to come to a different conclusion. 10. For the aforesaid proposition, learned counsel has relied upon the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others reported in 1995 (6) SCC 749 , as well as on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of U.P.S.R.T.C.Vs. Mitthu Singh reported in 2006 (7) SCC 180 and case of New Shorrock Mills Vs. Maheshbhai T. Rao reported in 1996 (6) SCC 590 . It is also submitted that the grant of back wages has been allowed as a routine, which was impermissible. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand, submits that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it was apparent on the basis of material brought on record that none of the charges were made out against the workman and the anxiety on the part of the management was only to punish worker for his union activities. 12. 12. In view of the submissions made above, this Court has proceeded to examine the claim of the parties on merits. It is not disputed that action of termination was taken after holding an inquiry, in which the respondent workman had participated. The Labour Court has not found the inquiry to be vitiated on any count. In such circumstance, the Labour Court could examine the validity of the orders passed by the employer within the limited scope of review, which is permissible under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 13. This Court finds that the charges, which have been leveled against the respondent workman were examined in detail by the Labour Court. The Labour Court applied its mind to the specific evidence, led on each and every question before it and came to a finding that none of the charges were made out against the respondent workman. So far as the first charge with regard to stopping of workman Karan Singh from taking the bus out of the Depot was concerned, workman Karan Singh appeared as witness before the Labour Court and has denied any such incident having occurred. It was also found that the workman Karan Singh had in fact driven another vehicle on the same date from the same Depot. It was also admitted that no written complaint was made by Karan Singh previously. So far as the second charge of ill treatment with the Station In-charge was concerned, it was found that the allegation against the respondent workman was of stopping another driver Mool Chandra Sharma, who was found to be on leave on the relevant date and therefore, the Labour Court disbelieved the entire allegation against the workman concerned of having supported Mool Chandra Sharma in misbehaving with the Depot In-Charge. The employer witness had also stated that the tone of the workman was aggressive, but it was not specified as to whether any abusive words were used. In view of the fact that Mool Chandra Sharma himself was found to be on leave, the Labour Court after considering the attending circumstances came to the finding that none of the charges were made out against the worker. With regard to the third charge against the workman of causing loss of Rs. 380/-to the Corporation, by himself installing pressure horn and thereafter abusing the employees of the Depot also could not be substantiated with any evidence. With regard to the third charge against the workman of causing loss of Rs. 380/-to the Corporation, by himself installing pressure horn and thereafter abusing the employees of the Depot also could not be substantiated with any evidence. The Labour Court has found that the last charge was also not substantiated in view of the fact that charge was specifically denied and no evidence of use of filthy language and misbehaviour was placed. As the workman was an active union member and was at the relevant point of time holding office of the Vice President of the Workers Union, in such circumstance, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that possibility of victimization cannot be ruled out. 14. The judgement of the Apex Court in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi (supra), which has been relied upon would not be of much help in the facts and circumstances of the present case, inasmuch as the Hon'ble Apex Court in B.C.Chaturvedi's case (supra) dealt with a cause arising out of order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal and the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act were not under consideration. The law laid down in paragraph 18 of the B.C. Chaturvedi's case (supra) judgement is as under: - "18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinaryppellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. " 15. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds that the Labour Court was invested with the jurisdiction to examine the question by virtue of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. " 15. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds that the Labour Court was invested with the jurisdiction to examine the question by virtue of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The ambit and scope of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act has been subject matter of consideration by the Apex Court and has been examined by the Apex Court in the case of Mavji C. Lakum Vs. Central Bank of India reported in 2008 (12) SCC 726 . Paragraphs 22, 24 and 27 of the said judgement are reproduced as under: - "22. In our opinion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act the Tribunal was quite justified in using its discretion. The scope of Section 11-A has been explained by this Court from time to time in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. R. Dhandapani [ (2006) 13 SCC 613 ; Mahindra Ltd. V. N.B.Narawade [ (2005) 3 SCC 134 ] and M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma [ (2005) 3 SCC 401 ]. Lastly, this Court has held in L and T Komatsu Ltd. V. N. Uadayakumar [ (2008) 1 SCC 224 ] that assaulting or giving abuses to the superior would justify the dismissal. We have carefully examined the facts in all the above cases and find that the appellant's case nowhere comes near the one described in all the above four cases. After all the Tribunal has to judge on the basis of the proved misbehaviour. In this case we have already recorded that the Tribunal was firstly correct in holding that the misbehaviour was not wholly proved and whatever misconduct was proved, did not deserve the extreme punishment of discharge. 24. In our opinion the reasons given by the Tribunal were correct and the treatment given by the Tribunal to the evidence was perfectly justified. The Tribunal committed no error in observing that for good long 30 years there was no complaint against the work of the appellant and that such a complaint suddenly surfaced only in the year 1982. The Tribunal was justified in appreciating the fact that the charges were only trivial and were not so serious as to entail the extreme punishment of discharge. Here was the typical example where the evidence was of a most general nature and the charges were also not such as would have invited the extreme punishment. The Tribunal was justified in appreciating the fact that the charges were only trivial and were not so serious as to entail the extreme punishment of discharge. Here was the typical example where the evidence was of a most general nature and the charges were also not such as would have invited the extreme punishment. It was not as if the appellant had abused or had done any physical altercation with his superiors or colleagues. What was complained of was his absence on some days and his argumentative nature. 27. On the other hand the Tribunal, in our opinion has correctly appreciated the evidence and has also correctly substituted the punishment. In whole of the judgment, the learned Single Judge has not referred to any of the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal. In our opinion the judgment of the learned Single Judge was wholly incorrect in so far as it dubbed the Tribunal's judgment as wrong. We approve of the judgment of the Tribunal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge." 16. In Davalsab Husainsab Mulla Vs. Karnataka R.T.C. (2013) 10 SCC 185 , the Apex Court again considered the scope of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 17. Examining the question in the context of the aforesaid proposition of law, this Court finds that the Labour Court has examined the matter in detail and finding has been returned, based upon evidence, to hold that charges against the worker were not made out on merits. The observation and findings of the Labour Court are not found to be casual in nature are not on account of any misplaced sympathy. The petitioner has also not annexed entire evidence, which was on record before the Labour Court to prove that the conclusion drawn by the Labour Court was perverse or erroneous. In such circumstances, this Court would not be justified in interfering with the order passed by the Labour Court. 18. This Court further finds that the respondent workman had been appointed as driver in 1972 and there is nothing on record to show that apart from the impugned action, any other allegation of misconduct was leveled against him. The respondent workman was an active Union member, which fact has not been disputed. Even otherwise during the pendency of the present writ petition he must have attained the age of superannuation. The respondent workman was an active Union member, which fact has not been disputed. Even otherwise during the pendency of the present writ petition he must have attained the age of superannuation. In such circumstance, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the finding returned by the Labour Court that the charges against the workman are not established. 19. So far as the issue with regard to grant of back wages is concerned, this Court finds substance in the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that no reasons have assigned by the Labour Court in this regard. The Apex Court after examining various judgements on the question relating to grant of back wages, summed up the law in following words in paragraph 16 of the judgement in the case of U.P.S.R.T.C.Vs. Mitthu Singh, 2006 (7) SCC 180 : - "16. Thus, entitlement of a workman to get reinstatement does not necessarily result in payment of back wages which would be independent of reinstatement. While dealing with the prayer of back wages, factual scenario and the principles of justice, equity and good conscience have to be kept in view by an appropriate court/tribunal." 20. In the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the Labour Court has only awarded 1/3rd back wages. The Labour Court has otherwise found that the charges against the workers have not been proved on merits. There is nothing on record to show that the worker was gainfully employed elsewhere. It is also not denied that the respondent workman was a permanent employee, who was working since 1972 with the petitioner. The workman has otherwise attained the age of superannuation. In such circumstances, the grant of 1/3rd back wages to the respondent workman cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary and this Court finds no good ground to interfere with the relief of 1/3rd back wages, awarded by the Labour Court. 21. In view of the discussions and observations made above, this Court finds no good ground to interfere with the order passed by the Labour Court in the present writ petition. The writ petition, consequently fails and is dismissed. No order is passed as to costs.