JUDGMENT U.C. Dhyani, J. (Oral) There is delay of 1917 days in filing the Restoration Application. Hence, an application for condoning the delay in filing the Restoration Application was moved on behalf of the appellant. Objections were filed on behalf of the respondent on the same. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposed such delay in filing the restoration application. He argued that if a delay of 1917 days is condoned, then what is the objective of Section 5 of the Limitation Act? 2. The second Appeal was dismissed in default of the appellant on 10.07.2007 and the restoration application has been moved on behalf of the appellant on 09.11.2012.Thus, there is more than five years’ delay in filing the restoration application. The reasons assigned for the delay are reproduced herein thus: 1. That as per contract clause 9 (iii) of the agreement no. THDC/ND/CD-145/AG, dated 24.01.1997, for construction of Tehri Dam and Associated works, THDC, started deduction of Sales Tax on Machinery rental and deducted sales Tax amount to Rs. 5,53,360/- from the Running Account Bill No. 27 and Rs. 2,76,680/- from the Running Account Bill No. 28 totaling to Rs. 8,30,040/-. 2. That aggrieved by this action of the THDC, respondent filed a Civil Suit (Suit No. 24 of 1998) before Civil Judge (J.D.), Tehri for restraining THDC from recovering Sales Tax on the said Machinery Rentals. The court vide its order dated 21.12.2000 decided the matter in respondent’s favour and directed the THDC not to deduct any Sales Tax from R/A Bills. 3. That against the said order dated 21.12.2000, passed by the Civil Judge (J.D.), Tehri, THDC filed an appeal (as Civil Appeal No. 01 of 2001) before the District Judge. The District Judge, Tehri also vide its order dated 13.12.2002 dismissed the appeal of THDC. 4. That the THDC, thereafter, filed above mentioned appeal before this Hon’ble Court which was registered as Second Appeal No. 18 of 2005. 5. That the above mentioned Second Appeal was dismissed on 10.07.2007 and the dismissal of the above captioned second appeal was not the knowledge of the Applicants and it seems that the same was also not in the knowledge of the respondent. 6. 5. That the above mentioned Second Appeal was dismissed on 10.07.2007 and the dismissal of the above captioned second appeal was not the knowledge of the Applicants and it seems that the same was also not in the knowledge of the respondent. 6. That the applicants for the very first time came to know of the dismissal of the above mentioned second appeal on 01.10.2012 when the same was communicated by the respondent through it’s letter dated 21.09.2012, received in the office of applicants on 01.10.2012. 7. That immediately, thereafter, applicants contracted it’s counsel at Nainital and enquired about the case and on enquiry being made it came to light that the above mentioned case has been dismissed for want of prosecution on 10.07.2007. 8. That immediately, thereafter, application for obtaining certified copy of the order dated 10.07.2007 was made on 15.10.2012 and after obtaining the same, present Restoration Application alnong with Delay Condonation Application is being filed without any thereafter delay. 9. That listing of the case on 10.07.2007 and its dismissal was neither in the knowledge of the applicants nor the counsel. 10. That non-appearance of the counsel was not deliberate or intentional and the counsel also tenders his apology for his non-appearance. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that, firstly, the appellants wrongly pursued the revision, and, thereafter, when the Second Appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution, the same was not in the knowledge of the appellants till such time the Restoration Application was moved. The dispute relates to deduction of Trade Tax from the Bills of the Contractor. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant (applicant herein) relied upon a decision of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and others, reported in (1996) 3 Supreme Court Cases 132, para 11 of which is reproduced herein below for reference: “It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in Condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the cours or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.” 5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, cited a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court, Balwant Singh (dead) vs. Jagdish Singh & others, reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 3043, paras 13,14 and 16 of which are excerpted herein below for convenience : “13. ———————————————————————————————————————————————We may state that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. The application filed by the applicants lack in details. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. The application filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex-facie lack bona fide. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements, then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application is bona fide and based upon true and plausible explanations, as well as reflect normal behaviour of a common prudent person on the part of the applicant, the Court would normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party. In the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh [ (2000) 9 SCC 94 ], this Court had taken a liberal approach for condoning the delay in cases of the Government, to do substantial justice. ——————————— But what we are impressing upon is that delay should be condoned to do substantial justice without resulting in injustice to the other party. This balance has to be kept in mind by the Court while deciding such applications. 14. —————————————————————————————————————————————————Thus, it is evident that it is difficult to state any straight-jacket formula which can uniformly be applied to all cases without reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly. Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. —————————————————————————————————————————-Liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the Court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect ‘sufficient cause’ as understood in law. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, 1997] The expression ‘sufficient cause’ implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word ‘sufficient’ means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]. 16. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]. 16. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications.” 6. Learned counsel for the respondent further relied upon a decision rendered by Hon’ble High Court of Uttarakhand in State of Uttarakhand vs. M/s Jai Prakash Associates Ltd., reported in 2012 (2) U.D., 47, and argued that casual and deliberate attempt to file the appeals beyond limitation is not a ground to condone the delay. 7. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ has not been defined. It means a cause which is beyond control of the party invoking the aid of the Act. The test, whether or not a case is sufficient, is to see whether it is a bona fide cause, inasmuch as, nothing shall be taken to be done bona fide or in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. Subject to the above test, the words ‘sufficient cause’ should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Subject to the above test, the words ‘sufficient cause’ should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. When no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to a party for the delay in filing a remedy, it would constitute a sufficient cause. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Refusing to condone the delay can result in a meritorious mater being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when the delay is condoned, at the most what can happen is that the case would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. A pedantic approach should not be there. It should be applied pragmatically. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in justice being denied to him because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that the delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs serious risk in the same. It must be understood that this institution is respected not on account of its authority to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing the injustice. 8. In view of the above discussion, delay of 1917 days in filing the restoration application is condoned in the interest of justice. Being satisfied with the sufficiency of reasons thus furnished in support of the restoration application, the same is also allowed. The Second Appeal is restored to it’s original number. [All other pending applications also stand disposed of.]