JUDGMENT : R.S. Chauhan, J. 1. Initially aggrieved by the Judgment dated 16-8-2010, passed by a Single Judge of this court in two writ petitions, namely W.P. No. 36955/2009 and W.P. No. 29729/2009, whereby the Learned Single Judge has dismissed both the writ petitions, the appellant has approached this court. However, with the change in events, with the auction and sale of the hotel owned by the appellant firm, the appellant has challenged the auction and the sale by the respondent No. 2, the Syndicate Bank, before this court. 2. This case has a rather checkered history: in order to construct a hotel, in 1998, the appellant-firm had borrowed Rs. 70 Lakhs from the respondent No. 2, the Syndicate Bank. For the purpose of securing the loan, the appellant-firm had mortgaged three of its properties with the Bank. However, according to the appellant, the Bank released Rs. 25 Lakhs in 1998 and another Rs. 25 Lakhs in 1999. Thus, in total, the Bank lent only an amount of Rs. 50 Lakhs to the appellant-firm. Since the entire loan amount was not paid to the appellant-firm, it could neither complete the construction of the hotel, nor earn in its business. Till 2001 the appellant-firm regularly paid the loan installments; subsequently, due to huge losses, it became a defaulter. 3. Since the appellant could not repay the loan, the Bank filed an application, namely O.A. No. 471/2002, under Section 19 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal Act, 1993, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore ('DRT' for short) for recovery of Rs. 79,25,643/-. By order dated 2-12-2004, the DRT allowed the application and directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 79,01,827/- with future interest @ 19% per annum compounded quarterly, from the date of the application, namely from 3-7-2002 till the date of the payment. The Bank was permitted to realize the amount by sale of Schedule 'A', 'B', 'C', the mortgaged property, and Schedule 'D', the hypothecated properties. Since this order was not challenged by either of the parties, it became final. 4. Despite the order dated 2-12-2004, the appellant kept on negotiating with the Bank to settle the loan account. On 8-8-2005, the Bank offered to settle the amount under its One Time Settlement Scheme. But as the appellant defaulted in making the repayment, the Bank withdrew the said One Time Settlement. 4. Despite the order dated 2-12-2004, the appellant kept on negotiating with the Bank to settle the loan account. On 8-8-2005, the Bank offered to settle the amount under its One Time Settlement Scheme. But as the appellant defaulted in making the repayment, the Bank withdrew the said One Time Settlement. Instead, on 8-4-2006, the Bank issued a Demand Notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of security Interest Act, 2002 ('the Securitization Act', for short) demanding a payment of a sum of Rs. 1,49,98,784/- within sixty days of the notice. Since the said demand could not be fulfilled, on 9-10-2006, the Bank issued a Possession Notice in respect of all the three properties forming security with the Bank. 5. Since the appellant was aggrieved by the said Possession Notice, it challenged the same before the DRT, Bangalore. By order dated 15-3-2007, the DRT granted an interim stay against the Possession Notice on the condition that the appellant should deposit a sum of Rs. 20 Lakhs with the Bank. But as the appellant defaulted in depositing the said amount, the interim stay was withdrawn. 6. Aggrieved by the said order withdrawing the interim order, the appellant filed a writ petition, namely Writ Petition No. 6894/2007 before this Court. However, during the pendency of the said writ petition, by order dated 3-9-2007, the learned DRT dismissed the appellant's application challenging the Possession Notice. Consequently, by order dated 11-11-2008, the writ petition filed by the appellant was also dismissed as having become infructuous. 7. It seems that in 2009, the appellant and the Bank went back to settling the loan dispute through the One Time Settlement Scheme. For, on 3-9-009, the Bank sent a reminder to the appellant that although it was supposed to have paid the entire loan amount by 15-7-2009, but it had failed to do so. Therefore, the date for the payment is being extended to 31-8-2009. But still the appellant failed to deposit the loan amount. Hence, on 5-9-2009, the Bank again directed the appellant to deposit the loan amount finally by 8-9-2009, failing which the benefit of the Scheme would be withdrawn. Since the appellant could not deposit the loan amount by the last date, on 22-9-2009, the Bank gave a last chance to deposit the loan amount within seven days. However, the appellant failed to do so again. 8. Since the appellant could not deposit the loan amount by the last date, on 22-9-2009, the Bank gave a last chance to deposit the loan amount within seven days. However, the appellant failed to do so again. 8. Instead the appellant filed a writ petition, namely Writ Petition No. 29729/2009 before this court. The appellant sought for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bank to furnish details as per the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India, which was binding on the Syndicate Bank and to release the properties pro-rata. 9. Meanwhile, on 13-10-2009, the Bank again issued a Possession Notice to the appellant. Since the appellant was aggrieved by the said Notice, it filed another writ petition, namely Writ Petition No. 36955/2009 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the said Possession Notice, to consider the One Time Settlement amount as Rs. 80 Lakhs, and to direct the Bank to accept the same. By order dated 11-12-2009, this court stayed the Possession Notice provided that the appellant should deposit a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- within a period of two weeks, otherwise, the interim order would stand vacated. Since the appellant could not fulfill the said condition, the stay order stood vacated. Therefore, by order dated 17-3-2010, this court clarified that since there is no stay order in favour of the appellant, the Bank is permitted to proceed with the recovery in accordance with law. Eventually, by judgment dated 16-8-2010, the learned Single Judge dismissed both the writ petitions, namely Writ Petition No. 29729/2009 and Writ Petition No. 36955/2009. The learned Single Judge directed the Bank to sell off only one of the properties at the first instance, and if the amount is insufficient for realizing the loan amount, then to proceed against the remaining two properties. The appellant was free to bring the best buyer. After the loan amount was duly paid from the sale of the property, the appellant was free to apply for the release of the remaining properties. Hence the present Writ Appeals before this Court. 10. But the story does not stop here. Just prior to the filing of the writ appeal, and during the pendency of this Writ Appeal, much water has flown from under the bridge: with the dismissal of the writ petitions, on 27-8-2010, the Bank took physical possession of the hotel (the commercial property mortgaged to the Bank). 10. But the story does not stop here. Just prior to the filing of the writ appeal, and during the pendency of this Writ Appeal, much water has flown from under the bridge: with the dismissal of the writ petitions, on 27-8-2010, the Bank took physical possession of the hotel (the commercial property mortgaged to the Bank). The Bank did not take over the other two residential properties mortgaged with it. On 21-9-2010, the Bank advertised the auction and sale of the commercial property on 5-10-2010. In order to save its commercial property from being put under the hammer, on 23-9-2010, the appellant entered into an Agreement of Lease with one Mr. N. Manjunath, to covey the commercial property in his favour for a period of fourteen years, by way of lease on monthly rental of Rs. 1 lakh, and deposit of a sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. 11. On 27-9-2010, the appellant filed the present Writ Appeals before this Court; by order dated 30-9-2010, this Court granted an ex-parte Interim Order staying the sale proposed on 5-10-2010, on the condition that the appellant should deposit a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- immediately, and another sum of Rs. 30,00,000/- by 20-10-2010. The Bank was directed to produce the statement of accounts. Meanwhile, although the appellant did deposit the amount of Rs. 20,00,000/- with the Bank, it failed to deposit the sum of Rs. 30,00,000/- on 20-10-2010. Thus, by order dated 21-10-2010, this Court vacated the Interim Order dated 30-9-2010. 12. Immediately, on 22-10-2010, the Bank issued an advertisement in the vernacular newspaper, 'Udayavani', for the auction and sale of the hotel on 3-11-2010. A similar advertisement was also published in the English daily, 'The Hindu' on 24-10-2010. But on the other hand, the appellant filed an application, namely Misc. W. 10402/10, for extension of time for depositing the amount of Rs. 30,00,000/- as directed by this Court by order dated 30-9-2010. According to the Order Sheet dated 2-11-2010, this Court passed the following order: "In view of the non-deposit of the amount as directed by this Court on 30-9-2010, the interim order granted earlier stands vacated. The Interim order granted earlier stand vacated and wherefore, there is no interim order as on today. Misc. W. 10404/2010 for extension of time is disposed of by separate order. Appellant is permitted to deposit Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs) in the Bank before 04.11.2010. The Interim order granted earlier stand vacated and wherefore, there is no interim order as on today. Misc. W. 10404/2010 for extension of time is disposed of by separate order. Appellant is permitted to deposit Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs) in the Bank before 04.11.2010. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that in view of the fact that the interim order has stood vacated as per the order of this Court dated 21-10-2010, auction is being held tomorrow. It is made dear that auction will be subject to the result of these writ appeals. Post the writ appeals for the purpose of hearing the main matter itself as per the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the parties on 2-12-2010." 13. On 3-11-2010, the tenders were received, the inter-se bid amongst the bidders took place, and the hotel was sold to C.A. Vasudev Gupta, the Chairman of M/s. Mannars Building Complex Pvt. Ltd. for a sum of Rs. 4.26 Crores. 14. With the sale of the hotel, the focus of the writ appeal shifted from challenging the impugned judgment dated 16-8-2010, to challenging the auction and sale of the hotel. 15. By order dated 1-12-2010, this Court observed that "Amount of Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs Only) as directed by this court, is now deposited. In the meanwhile the property has been sold, confirmed, possession delivered to the purchaser. In those circumstances before any further order is passed in this case, it is necessary to hear the purchaser, who is affected by such order. The appellant to implead the auction purchaser as a party to the proceedings. It is submitted to show their bona fide they shall deposit another Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs only). The appellant shall deposit Rs. 50,00,000/- within one month and in the meanwhile to take steps to serve on the purchaser." 16. By order dated 28-9-2011, this court permitted the appellant to bring on record the purchaser as respondent No. 14, namely C.A. Vasudev Gupta, the Chairman of M/s. Mannars Building Complex Pvt. Ltd. 17. Further, the appellant filed an Interim Application, namely Interim Application No. 3/12 for setting aside of the auction and sale of the hotel on 3-11-2010. Both the Bank and the Purchaser filed their objections to the said Interim Application. Further, the appellant filed an Interim Application, namely Interim Application No. 3/12 for setting aside of the auction and sale of the hotel on 3-11-2010. Both the Bank and the Purchaser filed their objections to the said Interim Application. Other Interim Applications were also filed by both the sides, but by order dated 14-8-2012, this Court directed that "the Interim Applications shall be heard along with the main matter." Meanwhile during the pendency of the Writ Appeal, the appellant Mr. M.R. Ramesh expired on 11-7-2013. Since the appeals were preferred by a partnership firm, since Respondent Nos. 8 to 11 were the other partners of the firm, they moved an application, namely IA 1/15, before this Court for transporting them as the appellants and for permitting them to pursue the Writ Appeals in place of Mr. M.R. Ramesh. By order dated 29-8-2013, this Court allowed the said application. 18. Subsequently, Respondent Nos. 8, 9, and 10 also filed Interim Application, namely I.A. 2/15, for setting aside the auction/sale and confirmation of sale in favour of Respondent No. 14. Both the Bank and the Respondent No. 14 filed their objections to the said Interim Application. 19. At the time of final hearing, the learned counsels for the parties are ad idem that they wish to argue only about the legality of the auction and sale of the hotel held on 3-11-2010. Thus, this judgment is confined only to their arguments with regard to the said auction and sale. Both Mr. Radesha Prabhu, the learned Counsel for the Bank, and Mr. A. Keshav Bhat, the learned Counsel for the purchaser, have raised two preliminary objections about the maintenance of the application for setting aside the auction and sale: firstly, the writ petition and the present writ appeals have been filed by the firm, whereas the Bank had sold of the property which belonged to the guarantors. Thus, only the guarantors could have challenged the auction and the sale, and not the firm. Secondly, the appellant has the availability of the alternative remedy in challenging the said auction and sale before the DRT by filing an appeal before it. Thus, the challenge to the said auction/sale should not be entertained by this Court. In order to support this contention, the learned counsels have relied upon the case of Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev and Ors v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. Thus, the challenge to the said auction/sale should not be entertained by this Court. In order to support this contention, the learned counsels have relied upon the case of Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev and Ors v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [ (2011) 2 SCC 782 ]. 20. On the other hand, Mr. Uday Holla, the learned Senior Counsel, has pleaded that according to the Partnership Deed dated 26-6-1995, five persons had entered into a partnership. They had brought their individual properties into the partnership corpus. Although these same persons had stood as guarantors for the loan, but the properties mortgaged with the Bank, as a security, were the properties of the firm, and not of the individuals. Therefore, when the Bank has sold off the hotel-a property of the firm-the firm is justified in challenging the auction, and the sale of its property. Secondly, the writ appeals are a continuation of the original writ petitions filed by the appellant. Since subsequent developments have occurred during the pendency of the writ appeals, the said development should not only be brought to the notice of this Court, but can also be challenged before this Court. Moreover, the availability of an alternative remedy cannot prevent a litigant from approaching this Court especially when injustice is caused and rule of law is violated. In order to buttress this contention the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the case of Union of India and Ors. V. Tantia Construction Private Ltd. [ (2011) 5 SCC 697 ]. The learned Senior Counsel has harped on the facts that the Bank has undervalued the property in question, has flouted the mandatory provisions of Section 13 of the Securitization Act, and of Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (henceforth to be referred to as 'the Rules of 2002', for short), and has sold the property even after the appellant had deposited Rupees One Crore at the direction of this Court. Hence, according to the learned Senior Counsel the Bank has not only caused a grave injustice to the appellant, but has also violated the rule of law. Thus, the plea of alternative remedy is misplaced. 21. Heard the learned counsels for the parties on the preliminary objections, and perused the case law cited at the Bar. 22. Hence, according to the learned Senior Counsel the Bank has not only caused a grave injustice to the appellant, but has also violated the rule of law. Thus, the plea of alternative remedy is misplaced. 21. Heard the learned counsels for the parties on the preliminary objections, and perused the case law cited at the Bar. 22. A bare perusal of the Partnership Deed dated 26-6-1995 clearly reveals that the partnership was formed between Mr. Ramachandrachar S/o. Mr. Puttasomachar, Mrs. Sharadamma W/o. Mr. Ramachandrachar, Mr. M.R. Ramesh S/o. Mr. Ramachandrachar, Mr. M.R. Lokesh S/o. Ramachandrachar, and Mrs. M.R. Vasantha W/o. Mr. P. Siddaraju. Moreover, the aforesaid parties intended to carry on the business of hotel and restaurant at N. Site No. 24/1. 1459/1, New No. 17, 17/1, 17/1 A, Kotwal Ramaiah Street, Mysore, under the name and style of Hotel Sharadha Paradise in partnership. According to the said partnership deed, the parties of the First, Second, Third and Sixth Part contributed their individual properties and shares to the corpus of the partnership. Thus, obviously, the land on which the hotel was constructed was a property belonging to the partnership, and not to the individual partners. Moreover, even if the above mentioned persons had stood as guarantors of the loan taken by the partnership from the Bank, the property in question did not belong to them as individuals. Instead, the property clearly belonged to the partnership firm. Thus, the firm is legally justified in filing the writ petitions and the present writ appeals. Since it is the property of the partnership firm which has gone under the hammer, the firm is legally justified in challenging the auction and the sale of the property before this court. Hence, the first preliminary objection raised by the learned counsels for the Bank, and for the purchaser is unacceptable. 23. The very raison d'etre of the courts is to do complete justice with the parties. Under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is armed with extraordinary powers to chase injustice. While chasing injustice, the sky is said to be the limit. 23. The very raison d'etre of the courts is to do complete justice with the parties. Under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is armed with extraordinary powers to chase injustice. While chasing injustice, the sky is said to be the limit. In the case of Harbanslal Sahnia v Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. [ (2003) 2 SCC 107 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court had opined that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy, was a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and there could be contingencies in which the High Court exercised its jurisdiction in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Similarly, in the case of Tantia Construction (P) Ltd. (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that "it is now well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court and that without exhausting such alternative remedy, a writ petition would not be maintainable. The various decisions cited by Mr. Chakraborty would clearly indicate that the constitutional powers vested in the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot be fettered by any alternative remedy available to the authorities. Injustice, whenever and wherever it takes place, has to be struck down as an anathema to the rule of law and the provisions of the Constitution." [Ref. to Modern Steel Industries v State of U. P. (2001) 10 SCC 491 ; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1 ; NSSO v. Champa Properties Ltd., (2009) 14 SCC 451 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Super Highway Services, (2010) 3 SCC 321 ]. 24. As would be discussed here-in-under the Bank has not only committed injustice with the appellant, but has also violated the mandatory provisions of the law. Therefore, the Bank and the purchaser cannot be permitted to hide behind the fig leaf of availability of alternative remedy in order to oust the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy under Section 17 of the Securitization Act, this Court has the power to hear the challenge of the auction/sale of the commercial property belonging to the appellant. Thus, the second preliminary objection raised by the learned counsels for the Bank and the Purchaser is over ruled. 25. Mr. Hence, notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy under Section 17 of the Securitization Act, this Court has the power to hear the challenge of the auction/sale of the commercial property belonging to the appellant. Thus, the second preliminary objection raised by the learned counsels for the Bank and the Purchaser is over ruled. 25. Mr. Holla, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, has pleaded that both the Securitization Act and the Rules of 2002 provide a complete procedure for auction/sale of the security property by the Bank. Since the law provides the procedure, it has to be followed scrupulously. Relying on the case of Mathew Varghese v M. Amritha Kumar and Ors. [ (2014) 5 SCC 610 ], the learned Senior Counsel has pleaded that in case the mandatory provisions of Section 13 of the Securitization Act, and of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 2002 are flouted, then the entire sale would have to be declared as invalid. Further according to the learned Senior Counsel, on 26-7-2007, the appellant had gotten the hotel valued. According to the Valuation Report dated 26-7-2007, the property was worth Rs. 6.10 Crores. Although the Bank had gotten the property valuated in 2010, the property was said to be worth only slightly over Rs. 3 Crores. Yet according to the advertisement issued by the Bank in the national daily 'The Hindu', the reserved price was kept only at Rs. 2.5 crores. The Bank has not offered any cogent reason for undervaluing the property, and for keeping the reserved price at such a dismal level. It has thus failed to act as a trustee or a custodian of the property. It has failed to exercise good faith towards the appellant. It has deprived the appellant of his rightful due from the sale of the property. It has played into the hands of the purchaser. 26. Furthermore, despite the requirement of the law to give a notice of thirty days to the borrower, no such notice for thirty days was given to the appellant. Thus, the appellant was prevented from participating in the auction held on 3-11-2010. Even the public notice-published both in the 'Udayavani', the vernacular newspaper, and in 'The Hindu'-did not give a notice of thirty days. The public notices were published on 22-10-2010 and 24-10-2010 respectively, and the auction was held on 3-11-2010. Thus, the appellant was prevented from participating in the auction held on 3-11-2010. Even the public notice-published both in the 'Udayavani', the vernacular newspaper, and in 'The Hindu'-did not give a notice of thirty days. The public notices were published on 22-10-2010 and 24-10-2010 respectively, and the auction was held on 3-11-2010. Therefore, the appellant was prevented from securing a better and higher bidder for the auction. Thus, the mandatory provisions under Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 2002 have been flouted. Hence, the sale deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. 27. Moreover, the proceedings of the auction and the sale would reveal that it is a collusive bidding made by the bidders and the Bank. By keeping the reserved price abysmally low, the secured asset has been sold for a song. 28. Per contra, Mr. Prabhu, the learned counsel for the Bank, has vehemently argued that the appellant is a chronic defaulter who had waived his rights under the law. The waiver of its rights is evident from the fact that the appellant is challenging the auction/sale nineteen months after the auction had taken place. Thus, the appellant is estopped from challenging the auction/sale of the property. Secondly, the Bank had meticulously followed the requirements of the Securitization Act, and of the Rules of 2002. The Bank got the property valued by Mr. H.T. Vasudev, a Government Approved Valuer. According to his report dated 22-4-2010, the property was worth Rs. 3, 47, 16, 635/-. The reserved price of the property was fixed on the basis of the valuation report. Thirdly, on various occasions, the Bank had issued notice to the appellant, such as the sale notice dated 7-11-2009, which was duly served upon the appellant. According to the said notice the auction was to take place on 23-6-10. Thus, a notice of over thirty days was sent to the appellant. However, each time the Bank tried to auction of the property, the appellant managed to get an interim order either from the DRT, or from High Court. Therefore, the appellant cannot take the benefit of his own dubious actions. Moreover, even the Public Notices dated 22/24-10-2010, are a continuation of the earlier Public Notice issued by the Bank. However, each time the Bank tried to auction of the property, the appellant managed to get an interim order either from the DRT, or from High Court. Therefore, the appellant cannot take the benefit of his own dubious actions. Moreover, even the Public Notices dated 22/24-10-2010, are a continuation of the earlier Public Notice issued by the Bank. There is no requirement of allowing thirty days period from each of the advertisement, when the earliest of the advertisements and the Sale Notice also clearly allowed more than thirty days time. Thus, the Bank has religiously adhered to the requirements of the law. Fourthly, in pursuance of the Public Notice published in the two newspapers, on 2-11-2010 the Bank had received three closed quotations. The three bids were for Rs. 2. 50 Crores, Rs. 2. 51 Crores, and Rs. 4.0816032 Crores. Inter-se bidding was permitted, and two of the parties, namely Mr. Manoj Kumar Chowta and Others, and M/s. Mannar Building Complex (P) Ltd. remained. The final bid was for Rs. 4.26 Crores by the respondent No. 14. Thus, the Bank was justified in accepting the highest bid of the latter. 29. On the other hand, Mr. A. Keshav Bhat, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 14, has claimed that his party was a bona fide purchaser of the property. After successfully bidding the highest bid at Rs. 4.26 Crores, the respondent No. 14 deposited the entire consideration price on 18-11-2010. Consequently, the Bank issued a Certificate of Sale in its favour. On 4-12-2010, the said Certificate of Sale was registered in the name of the said respondent. However, as certain inadvertent mistake had crept into the Certificate of Sale, a Rectification Deed was executed on 21-12-2010, and it was duly registered on 24-12-2010. Thereafter, the said respondent requested the Mysore Mahanagar Palike to enter its name in the Khata. By order dated 29-12-2010, the name of M/s. Mannar Building Complex (P) Ltd. was duly entered in the Khata. Since the hotel building was incomplete, since the respondent wanted to earn well from the hotel business, therefore the respondent have invested more than a Crore rupees in the hotel. Relying on the case of Janak Raj v Furdial Singh and Anr. Since the hotel building was incomplete, since the respondent wanted to earn well from the hotel business, therefore the respondent have invested more than a Crore rupees in the hotel. Relying on the case of Janak Raj v Furdial Singh and Anr. [ AIR 1967 SC 608 ] the learned counsel has argued that even if decree were to be set aside, even then the property cannot be handed over to the appellant or to the Bank. For, the title of the purchaser relates back to the date of the sale, and not to the date of confirmation of the sale. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the interest of the bona fide purchaser is paramount. Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the record as produced by the parties. 30. Although right to property is not a fundamental right, but it is protected under Art.300A of the Constitution of India. Moreover, it is considered to be part of human right of an individual. In order to balance the conflicting interests of the borrower and the creditor, the Securitization Act was enacted. Section 13 deals with Enforcement of Security interest. It is as under: "Section 13 : Enforcement of security interest (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or section 69Aof the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any instalment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as on- performing asset, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under Sub-section (4). (3) The notice referred to in Sub-section (2) shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower and the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non- payment of secured debts by the borrower. (3) The notice referred to in Sub-section (2) shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower and the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non- payment of secured debts by the borrower. (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in Sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely:-- (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; (b) take over the management of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale and realise the secured asset; (c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt. (5) Any payment made by any person referred to in clause (d) of Sub-section (4) to the secured creditor shall give such person a valid discharge as if he has made payment to the borrower. (6) Any transfer of secured asset after taking possession thereof or take over of management under Sub-section (4), by the secured creditor or by the manager on behalf of the secured creditor shall vest in the transferee all rights in, or in relation to, the secured asset transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of such secured asset. (7) Where any action has been taken against a borrower under the provisions of Sub-section (4), all costs, charges and expenses which, in the opinion of the secured creditor, have been properly incurred by him or any expenses incidental thereto, shall be recoverable from the borrower and the money which is received by the secured creditor shall, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, be held by him in trust, to be applied, firstly, in payment of such costs, charges and expenses and secondly, in discharge of the dues of the secured creditor and the residue of the money so received shall be paid to the person entitled thereto in accordance with his rights and interests. (8) If the dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him are tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer, the secured asset shall not be sold or transferred by the s cured creditor, and no further step shall be taken by him for transfer or sale of that secured asset. (9) In the case of financing of a financial asset by more than one secured creditors or joint financing of a financial asset by secured creditors, no secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise any or all of the rights conferred on him under or pursuant to Sub-section (4) unless exercise of such right is agreed upon by the secured creditors representing not less than three- fourth in value of the amount outstanding as on a record date and such action shall be binding on all the secured creditors: Provided that in the case of a company in liquidation, the amount realised from the sale of secured assets shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956): Provided further that in the case of a company being wound up on or after the commencement of this Act, the secured creditor of such company, who opts to realise his security instead of relinquishing his security and proving his debt under proviso to Sub-section (1) of section 529 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), may retain the sale proceeds of his secured assets after depositing the workmen' s dues with the liquidator in accordance with the provisions of section529A of that Act: Provided also that liquidator referred to in the second proviso shall intimate the secured creditor the workmen' s dues in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and in case such workmen' s dues cannot be ascertained, the liquidator shall intimate the estimated amount of workmen' s dues under that section to the secured creditor and in such case the secured creditor may retain the sale proceeds of the secured assets after depositing the amount of such estimate dues with the liquidator: Provided also that in case the secured creditor deposits the estimated amount of workmen' s dues, such creditor shall be liable to pay the balance of the workmen' s dues or entitled to receive the excess amount, if any, deposited by the secured creditor with the liquidator: Provided also that the secured creditor shall furnish an undertaking to the liquidator to pay the balance of the workmen' s dues, if any. Explanation.--For the purposes of this subsection,- (a) "record date" means the date agreed upon by the secured creditors representing not less than three- fourth in value of the amount outstanding on such date; (b) "amount outstanding" shall include principal, interest and any other dues payable by the borrower to the secured creditor in respect of secured asset as per the books of account of the secured creditor. (10) Where dues of the secured creditor are not fully satisfied with the sale proceeds of the secured assets, the secured creditor may file an application in the form and manner as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery tribunal having jurisdiction or a competent court, as the case may be, for recovery of the balance amount from the borrower. (11) Without prejudice to the rights conferred on the secured creditor under or by this section, the secured creditor shall be entitled to proceed against the guarantors or sell the pledged assets without first taking any of the measures specified in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (4) in relation to the secured assets under this Act. (12) The rights of a secured creditor under this Act may be exercised by one or more of his officers authorized in this behalf in such manner as may be prescribed. (13) No borrower shall, after receipt of notice referred to in sub-section (2), transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the ordinary course of his business) any of his secured assets referred to in the notice, without prior written consent of the secured creditor." While Section 13(4) empowers the Bank to take over the secured assets of the borrower, the Rules of 2002 prescribe the procedure for transferring by way of lease, assignment or sale for realizing the secured assets. Rule 8 of the Rules of 2002 is as under: "Rule 8 : Sale of immovable secured assets.--(1) Where the secured asset is an immovable property, the authorized officer shall take or cause to be taken possession, by delivering a possession notice prepared as nearly as possible in Appendix IV to these rules, to the borrower and by affixing the possession notice on the outer door or at such conspicuous place of the property. (2) The possession notice as referred to in sub-rule (1) shall also be published, as soon as possible but in any case not later than seven days from the date of taking possession, in two leading newspapers, one in vernacular language having sufficient circulation in that locality, by the authorized officer. (3) In the event of possession of immovable property is actually taken by the authorized officer, such property shall be kept in his own custody or in the custody of any person authorized or appointed by him, who shall take as much care of the property in his custody as a owner of ordinary prudence would, under the similar circumstances, take of such property. (4) The authorized officer shall take steps for preservation and protection of secured assets and insure them, if necessary, till they are sold or otherwise disposed of. (5) Before effecting sale of the immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 9, the authorized officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods:-- (a) by obtaining quotations from the persons dealing with similar secured assets or otherwise interested in buying the such assets; or (b) by inviting tenders from the public; (c) by holding public auction; or (d) by private treaty. (6) The authorized officer shall serve to the borrower a notice of thirty days for sale of the immovable secured assets, under sub-rule (5): Provided that if the sale of such secured asset is being effected by either inviting tenders from the public or by holding public auction, the secured creditor shall cause a public notice in two leading newspapers one in vernacular language having sufficient circulation in the locality by setting out the terms of sale, which shall include,- (a) The description of the immovable property to be sold, including the details of the encumbrances known to the secured creditor; (b) the secured debt for recovery of which the property is to be sold; (c) reserve price, below which the property may not be sold; (d) time and place of public auction or the time after which sale by any other mode shall be completed; (e) depositing earnest money as may be stipulated by the secured creditor; (f) any other thing which the authorized officer considers it material for a purchaser to know in order to judge the nature and value of the property. (7) Every notice of sale shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the immovable property and may, if the authorized officer deems if fit, put on the web-site of the secured creditor on the Internet. (8) Sale by any method other than public auction or public tender, shall be on such terms as may be settled between the parties in writing." Rule 9 of the Rules of 2002 is as follows: "Rule 9 : Time of sale, issues of sale certificate and delivery of possession, etc- (1) No sale of immovable property under these rules shall take place before the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the public notice of sale is published in newspapers as referred to in the proviso to sub-rule (6) or notice of sale has been served to the borrower. (2) The sale shall be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who has offered the highest sale price in his bid or tender or quotation or offer to the authorized officer and shall be subject to confirmation by the secured creditor: Provided further that if the authorized officer fails to obtain a price higher than the reserve price, he may, with the consent of the borrower and the secured creditor effect the sale at such price. (3) On every sale of immovable property, the purchaser shall immediately pay a deposit of twenty-five per cent of the amount of the sale price, to the authorized officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be sold again. (4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period as may be agreed upon in writing between the parties. (5) In default of payment within the period mentioned in sub-rule (4), the deposit shall be forfeited and the property shall be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claim to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may be subsequently sold. (6) On confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and if the terms of payment have been complied with, the authorized officer exercising the power of sale shall issue a certificate of sale of the immovable property in favour of the purchaser in the form given in Appendix V to these rules. (7) Where the immovable property sold is subject to any encumbrances, the authorized officer may, if he thinks fit, allow the purchaser to deposit with him the money required to discharge the encumbrances and any interest due thereon together with such additional amount that may be sufficient to meet the contingencies or further cost, expenses and interest as may be determined by him: Provided that if after meeting the cost of removing encumbrances and contingencies there is any surplus available out of the money deposited by the purchaser such surplus shall be paid to the purchaser within fifteen days from the date of finalization of the sale. (8) On such deposit of money for discharge of the encumbrances, the authorized officer shall issue or cause the purchaser to issue notices to the persons interested in or entitled to the money deposited with him and take steps to make the payment accordingly. (9) The authorized officer shall deliver the property to the purchaser free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of money as specified in sub-rule (7) above. (9) The authorized officer shall deliver the property to the purchaser free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of money as specified in sub-rule (7) above. (10) The certificate of sale issued under sub-rule (6) shall specifically mention that whether the purchaser has purchased the immovable secured asset free from any encumbrances known to the secured creditor or not. In the case of Mathew Varghese (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has elaborately dealt with the scope and ambit of Section 13 of the Securitization Act, and its interrelationship with Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 2002. It would be apposite to quote extensively from the said judgment as under: "A plain reading of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 would show that a borrower can tender to the secured creditor the dues together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer. In the event of such tender once made as stipulated in section 13(8), the mandate is that the secured asset should not be sold or transferred by the secured creditor. It is further reinforced to the effect that no further step should also be taken by the secured creditor for transfer or sale of the secured asset. When the stipulations contained in section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are analysed in depth, it is found that there is a valuable right recognized and asserted in favour of the borrower, who is the owner of the secured asset and who is extended an opportunity to take all efforts to stop the sale or transfer till the last minute before which the said sale or transfer is to be effected. Having regard to such a valuable right of a debtor having been embedded in Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, it will have to be stated in uncontroverted terms that the said provision has been engrafted in the SARFAESI Act, 2002 primarily with a view to protect the rights of a borrower, inasmuch as, such an ownership right is a constitutional right protected under Article 300-A of the Constitution, which mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Therefore, by virtue of the stipulations contained under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, in particular, Section 13(8), any sale or transfer of a secured asset, cannot take place without duly informing the borrower of the time and date of such sale or transfer in order to enable the borrower to tender the dues of the secured creditor with all costs, charges and expenses and any such sale or transfer effected without complying with the said statutory requirement would be a constitutional violation and nullify the ultimate sale. Reading Rule 8(6) and Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules together, the service of individual notice to the borrower, specifying clear 30 days' time-gap for effecting any sale of immovable secured asset is a statutory mandate. It is also stipulated that no sale should be affected before the expiry of 30 days from the date on which the public notice of sale is published in the newspapers. Therefore, the requirement under Rule 8(6) and Rule 9(1) of 2002 Rules contemplates a clear 30 days' individual notice to the borrower and also a public notice by way of publication in the newspapers. In other words, not only should the publication in newspaper provide for 30 days' clear notice, but since Rule 9(1) also states that such notice of sale is to be in accordance with the proviso to Rule 8(6), 30 days' clear notice to the borrower should also be ensured as stipulated under Rule 8(6) as well. Therefore, the use of the expression "or" in Rule 9(1) should be read as "and" as that alone would be inconsonance with Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Such a detailed procedure while resorting to a sale of an immovable secured asset is prescribed under Rules 8 and 9(1) of the 2002 Rules which has got a twin objective to be achieved. In the first place, by virtue of the stipulation contained in Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 read along with Rules 8(6) and 9(1) of 2002 Rules, the owner/borrower should have clear notice of 30 days before the date and time when the sale or transfer of the secured asset would be made, as that alone would enable the owner/borrower to take all efforts to retain his or her ownership by tendering the dues of the secured creditor before that date and time. Secondly, when such a secured asset is brought for sale, the intending purchasers should know the nature of the property, the extent of liability pertaining to the said property, any other encumbrances pertaining to the said property, the minimum price below which one cannot make a bid and the total liability of the borrower to the secured creditor. Since the proviso to Rule 8(6) of 2002 Rules also mentions that any other material aspect should also be made known when effecting the publication, it would only mean that the intending purchaser should have entire details about the property brought for sale in order to rule out any possibility of the bidders later on to express ignorance about the factors connected with the asset in question. The paramount objective is to provide sufficient time and opportunity to the borrower to take all efforts to safeguard his right of ownership either by tendering the dues to the creditor before the date and time of the sale or transfer or ensure that the secured asset derives the maximum price and no one is allowed to exploit the vulnerable situation in which the borrower is placed. Therefore, the secured creditor should ensure that the borrower was clearly put on notice of the date and time by which either the sale or transfer will be effected. Therefore, de hors the extent of borrowing made and whatever costs, charges were incurred by the secured creditor in respect of such borrowings, when it comes to the question of realizing the dues by bringing the property entrusted with the secured creditor for sale to realize money advanced without approaching any court or tribunal, the secured creditor as a trustee cannot deal with the said property in any manner it likes and same can be disposed of only in the manner prescribed in the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the 2002 rules. Further, Rule 8(3) of the 2002 Rules really casts a much more onerous responsibility on the secured creditor once possession is actually taken by its authorized officer. Further, Rule 8(3) of the 2002 Rules really casts a much more onerous responsibility on the secured creditor once possession is actually taken by its authorized officer. Under Rule 8(3), the property taken possession of by the secured creditor should be kept in its custody or in the custody of a person authorized or appointed by it and it is stipulated that such person holding possession should take as much care of the property in its custody as an owner of ordinary prudence would under similar circumstances take care of such property. The underlying purport of such a requirement is to ensure that under no circumstances, the rights of the owner till such right is transferred in the manner known to law is infringed. Merely because the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the 2002 Rules enable the secured creditor to take possession of such an immovable property belonging to the owner and also empowers the secured creditor to deal with it by way of sale or transfer for the purpose of realizing the secured debt of the borrower, it does not mean that such wide power can be exercised arbitrarily or whimsically to the utter disadvantage of the borrower. Rule 8(4) of the 2002 Rules, governs all secured assets, movable or immovable and a further responsibility is created on the authorized officer to take steps for the preservation and protection of secured assets and for that purpose can even insure such assets, until they are sold or otherwise disposed of. Therefore, a reading of Rules 8 and 9 of 2002 Rules, in particular, Rule 8(1) to (4) and (6) and Rule 9(1) makes it clear that simply because a secured interest in a secured asset is created by the borrower in favour of the secured creditor, the said asset in the event of the same having become a non-performing asset cannot be dealt with in a light-hearted manner by way of sale or transfer or disposed of in a casual manner or by not adhering to the prescriptions contained under the SARFAESI act, 2002 and the abovesaid 2002 Rules." Thus, while deciding this case, the above principles established by the Apex Court would necessarily have to be kept in mind. 31. According to Mr. Prabhu, the learned counsel for the Bank, by notice dated 7-11-2009, the appellant was informed about the sale scheduled to be held on 23-6-2010. 31. According to Mr. Prabhu, the learned counsel for the Bank, by notice dated 7-11-2009, the appellant was informed about the sale scheduled to be held on 23-6-2010. Therefore, the Bank had given a notice of more than thirty days. But the said contention is highly misplaced. For, admittedly the hotel was sold on 3-11-2010. The learned counsel has not been able to show any notice issued to the appellant thirty days prior to 3-11-2010. Thus, the mandatory requirement of Rules 8 (6) of Rules of 2002, has been flouted. 32. Likewise, the learned counsel has argued that since the public notices dated 22-10-2010 and 24-10-2010 were in continuation of the earlier public notices published by the Bank, therefore there was no need to give a thirty day' notice. However, even this contention is repelled by the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mathew Varghese (supra). Both under Rule 8 and Rule 9 of the Rules of 2002, the creditor is required to give a clear thirty days notice both to the borrower and to the public. Merely because on an earlier occasion a public notice was issued, this would not absolve the creditor of its responsibility of giving a thirty days notice on each occasion. Therefore, the public notices dated 22-10-2010 and 24-10-2010 do not fulfill the requirement of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 2002. Thus, the mandatory rules have not been followed. Hence, the sale is illegal. 33. Moreover, as quoted above, the paramount reason for giving a notice of thirty days is to enable the borrower to redeem his mortgage, or to give him sufficient time to locate a party who can offer the best bid at the proposed auction. However, by not giving the required time, obviously, the appellant has been deprived of his rights under Section 13(8)of the Securitization Act, and under Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 2002. Thus, the Bank has been most unfair with the appellant. 34. Further, according Mr. Prabhu the secured property was valued at over Rs. 3 Crores. According to him, the reserved price was based on the Valuation Report of the property. Yet, the learned counsel has failed to explain the reason for keeping the reserved price at a dismal level of Rs. 2. 5 Crores. 34. Further, according Mr. Prabhu the secured property was valued at over Rs. 3 Crores. According to him, the reserved price was based on the Valuation Report of the property. Yet, the learned counsel has failed to explain the reason for keeping the reserved price at a dismal level of Rs. 2. 5 Crores. Needless to say, as a trustee of the secured asset, it was the legal duty of the Bank to fetch the best price of the secured asset. The duty of the Bank is not only to recover the loan amount, but to realize as near the market price as possible the value of the secured property. For the Bank acts not only in its own interest, but most importantly it acts in the interest of the borrower. However, in the present case, the Bank has failed to explain the reason for keeping the reserved price less than the valuation price. Thus, the Bank has not acted as a bona fide trustee. It has, in fact, betrayed the interest of the appellant for reasons best known to it. If, indeed, the value of the property was about Rs. 6 Crores in 2007, there is no justifiable reason to keep the reserved price for Rs. 2.5 Crores in 2010. Hence, the Bank had failed to realize the actual value of the property. Thus, it has deprived the appellant of its rightful dues. In the case of J. Rajiv Subramaniyan and Anr.. v Paniyas and Ors. [ (2014) 5 SCC 651 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "Generally, proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 against the borrowers are initiated only when the borrower is in dire straits. The provisions of the SARGAESI Act, 2002 and the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 have been enacted to ensure that the secured asset is not sold for a song. It is expected that all the banks and financial institutions which resort to the extreme measures under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 for sale of the secured assets to ensure that such sale of the asset provides maximum benefit to the borrower by the sale of such asset. Therefore, the secured creditors are expected to take bona fide measures to ensure that there is maximum yield from such secured assets for the borrowers." But the said principle has not been followed in the present case. 35. Therefore, the secured creditors are expected to take bona fide measures to ensure that there is maximum yield from such secured assets for the borrowers." But the said principle has not been followed in the present case. 35. Moreover, a bare perusal of the auction proceedings clearly reveals that the auction was a collusive one. For, according to the auction proceedings, three parties had appeared for bidding on 3-11-2010, namely Mrs. Monica Chouta, C.S. Chandrashekhara, and C.A. Vasudeva Gupta of M/s. Mannars Building Complex Ltd. However, Mrs. Monica Chouta happens to be the wife of Mr. Manoj Chouta, who is none other than a partner of C.S. Chandrashekhara, the other bidder. Thus, the first two bidders are practically one and the same party. This is more obvious from the fact that Mrs. Monica Chouta had bid for Rs. 2.5 Crores, Mr. Chandrashekhara and Mr. Manoj Chouta had bid for Rs. 2.51 Crores, and Mr. Gupta for Rs. 4. 081 Crores. Even when the inter-se bids were called, the difference between the bids offered by Mr. Chandrashekhara and Mr. Manoj Chouta on the one hand, and by Mr. Gupta on the other hand, is merely Rs. 1 lac. Thus, intentionally, the parties were keeping the bid as low as possible. Hence, there seems to be an element of collusion between the three bidders and the Bank. 36. Mr. Prabhu's last contention is that the appellant has waived his right to challenge the auction and the sale. But the said contention is equally unacceptable. Although Mr. Holla has argued that there cannot be a waiver of a fundamental right or constitutional right, but in light of the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Vasu P. Shetty v Hotel Vandana Palace and Ors. [ (2014) 5 SCC 660 ], the said plea is untenable. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a similar case as the present one where the property had been auctioned under the Securitization Act and under the Rules of 2002. Although the issue of waiver was not raised before the High Court, but it was argued before the Apex Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the contention of waiver can be raised. But whether there is waiver or not is a question of fact. Although the issue of waiver was not raised before the High Court, but it was argued before the Apex Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the contention of waiver can be raised. But whether there is waiver or not is a question of fact. "Inaction in every case does not lead to an inference of implied consent and acquiescence." According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, "Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right. It involves conscious abandonment of an existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such a waiver, a party could have enjoyed. In fact, it is an agreement not to assert a right. There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived, is fully informed as to his rights and with full knowledge about the same, he intentionally abandons them." 37. In the present case the question of waiver would not arise. For, since the very beginning the appellant is trying its very best to prevent the sale of the property by the Bank. Even when the property was under sale, it entered into a lease deed with a party so that the loan amount could be cleared. Moreover, at the direction of this court, in order to prove its bona fide, the appellant had deposited Rs. 1 Crore with the Bank. Thus, the appellant's conduct proves his intention to challenge the auction and the sale by the Bank. Thus, the contention raised by the Bank is unacceptable. 38. Mr. Keshava Bhat, the learned Counsel for the Purchaser, has stressed on the fact that respondent No. 14 is an innocent and bona fide purchaser. However, this plea too is unacceptable. Firstly, the purchaser was well aware of the fact that the Bank was auctioning the hotel as the borrower had failed to discharge the debt. Secondly, the buyer is supposed to be aware of the facts of the case before buying a product or property. The purchaser could not have blindly walked into the auction without first verifying the title, the value of the property. Thirdly, there seems to be some collusion between the bidders. Fourthly, since the property was undervalued by the Bank, as discussed above, there could be a distinct possibility that the Bank and the respondent No. 14 have colluded for selling and buying the property much below the market rate. Thirdly, there seems to be some collusion between the bidders. Fourthly, since the property was undervalued by the Bank, as discussed above, there could be a distinct possibility that the Bank and the respondent No. 14 have colluded for selling and buying the property much below the market rate. Hence, the respondent No. 14 is not as innocent as it makes itself out to be. 39. Most importantly, in a series of judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where there is violation of the mandatory provisions of law while auctioning and selling the property by the Bank, the court would be justified in holding the sale as illegal. [Ref. to J. Rajiv Subramaniyan and Anr. (supra); Mathew Varghese (supra), and Vasu P. Shetty (supra)]. Since in the present case the mandatory provisions have been flouted the sale is null and void. In the result, the sale conducted by the Bank in respect of Hotel Sharda Paradise situated in Mysore pursuant to the sale proceedings dated 3-11-2010 is hereby set aside. The Bank shall re-auction the property by following the provisions of the Securitization Act and the Rules of 2002 by giving paper publications, and Possession Notice to the appellant as required under the provisions of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 2002. The Bank shall further refund the amount paid by Respondent No. 14 along with the cost incurred by the respondent in getting the sale certificates. Since the respondent No. 14 has enjoyed the property, it is not entitled to any interest or damages. The Respondent No. 14 is granted four weeks time to hand over the possession of the premises to the Bank. The Bank shall take possession of the property within four weeks as granted by this Court and take action in accordance with law to sell the property and recover the dues payable by the appellant to the Bank. As mentioned above, these appeals have been filed against the dismissal of two writ petitions, filed by the appellant, by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated 16.8.2010. However, as mentioned above, with the sale of the hotel, the entire focus of the writ appeals has shifted from challenging the dismissal of the two writ petitions by the impugned judgment dated 16.8.2010, to challenging the sale of the said hotel. However, as mentioned above, with the sale of the hotel, the entire focus of the writ appeals has shifted from challenging the dismissal of the two writ petitions by the impugned judgment dated 16.8.2010, to challenging the sale of the said hotel. Thus, this Court need not go into the merits and demerits of the judgment dated 16.8.2010. For, with the change of circumstances, and the subsequent development, the dismissal of the two appeals by the impugned judgment has lost its relevance. But in case the Bank still has One Time Settlement scheme available, it is directed to consider the case of the appellant for repayment of the outstanding loan amount under the said scheme. Accordingly, these Appeals are disposed of.