JUDGMENT Suneet Kumar,J. The tenant-applicant is assailing the judgment and decree dated 5 May 2015 passed by the Revisional Court arising from the order of Small Causes Court at Saharanpur in proceedings for eviction and arrears of rent. 2. The respondent-plaintiff instituted a suit being SCC Suit No.532 of 2008 (Smt. Kamlesh Jain vs. Avanish Kumar Mittal) for eviction, arrears of rent and damages. The defendant-applicant contested the suit by filing written statement. The trial court framed six issues and issue no. 2 pertains to whether the provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is applicable to the disputed premises, the issue was decided against the applicant-tenant and in favour of the respondent-landlord holding that the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 is not applicable on the disputed premises. The suit was decreed on 9 February 2011. Aggrieved, the applicant preferred a revision which was dismissed on 5 May 2015. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant has confined his submission to the finding returned by the courts below on issue no. 2 i.e. as to whether the provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is applicable on the disputed premises. It is contended on behalf of the applicant that the provision of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is applicable to the disputed premises as the building being an old building, further, it is sought to be urged that Explanation 1 to Section 2 of the Act of 1972 provides that the assessment is of the building as a whole, sub-clause (c) of explanation 1 would provide that where such substantial addition is made to an existing building only then the existing building becomes a minor part of the whole building, therefore, the existing building shall be deemed to have been constructed on the date of completion of the said addition. It is, therefore, contended that the building in which the tenanted shop is situated was assessed prior to 1984, in view of the provisions, mere minor construction raised/constructed subsequent to 26 April 1985 would not mean the building was outside the purview of the Act of 1972. 4. In rebuttal, it is contended that the construction of the shop under tenancy was not constructed in the existing building rather a new shops were got constructed which was assessed for the first time in the assessment for the period 1994 to 1999. 5. 4. In rebuttal, it is contended that the construction of the shop under tenancy was not constructed in the existing building rather a new shops were got constructed which was assessed for the first time in the assessment for the period 1994 to 1999. 5. For ascertaining the date of construction of the building, for the purpose of applicability of the Act of 1972, Clause-A of Explanation-1 of Section 2(2) would provide different dates for determining the completion of building, namely-- (1) When the completion of the building is reported to the local authority. (2) When the completion of the building is otherwise recorded by the local authority. (3) When the first assessment of the building comes into effect. (4) When it is actually occupied. The explanation further clarifies that in case for the first three categories the dates are available then earliest of three dates will be the date of completion of the building and in case the first three dates are not available, it is only then the fourth date will be the date on which construction of the building shall be taken to have been completed. In the facts of the instant case, admittedly, it is the first date of assessment which was placed before the court below and no other dates were available for the purpose of determining the date of completion of the building. The court below upon appreciating the material and the assessment document (Paper No.24-Ga) for 1994-1999 arrived at a conclusion that the shop in question, for the first time was assessed by the municipal authorities in 1994, therefore, held that the provisions of the Act of 1972 would not apply on the premises in question. The case set up by the applicant before the court below was that the building for the first time was let out in 1983 which was supported by the statement of D.W.-1. Before the revisional court, the applicant adduced additional evidence being an extract of assessment for 1 April 1981 to 31 March 1984 (Paper No.62-Ga) setting up a new plea that there were four rooms in the building, one room was let out in 1981 for a shop to show that the disputed premises was constructed in 1981. Before the revisional court, the applicant adduced additional evidence being an extract of assessment for 1 April 1981 to 31 March 1984 (Paper No.62-Ga) setting up a new plea that there were four rooms in the building, one room was let out in 1981 for a shop to show that the disputed premises was constructed in 1981. The contention of the tenant-applicant was repelled by the revisional court upon appreciation of material and evidence available on record, noting that the four shops as alleged in the assessment year 1981-1984 were not shops, rather four rooms which were in occupation of Irrigation Department as tenant which was duly recorded in the municipal record, therefore, the revisional court relying upon the assessment document for the period 1994 to 1999 assessing the shops in dispute were taken to be the date of construction in terms of Section 2(2). It was sought to be urged by the learned counsel for the applicant that the word "building" used under Section 2(2) would not confine to the tenanted portion alone but would be referable to the entire building as a single unit. This Court in Ajay Kumar Jaiswal vs. Smt. Shanti Singh and others, 1998 (2) ARC 14 , while referring clause (g) of Section 2(2) observed that the only possible and reasonable construction on the language used in Clause (g) "would be that this Clause applies to a building in occupation of the concerned tenant or in other words to that tenament which is the subject matter of dispute and not to the whole building complex which may be having several separate and independent tenaments. A ''building' under the Act means an independent allotable accommodation, whether signally situated or is part of a building complex. In the same sense of word ''building' has been used in all other provisions of the Act. Under the scheme of the Act every single separate and independent tenament in occupation of a tenant or unauthorized occupant is a ''building' and if any other interpretation is give to Clause (g) it would lead to absurdity which had never been intended by the legislature". 6. Under the scheme of the Act every single separate and independent tenament in occupation of a tenant or unauthorized occupant is a ''building' and if any other interpretation is give to Clause (g) it would lead to absurdity which had never been intended by the legislature". 6. The Supreme Court in Smt. Sudha Rani Garg v. Jagdish Kumar (d), 2004 (8) SSC 329 while dealing with the provisions of Section 2(2) of the Act, 1972, observed that Explanation-I is a deeming provision, sometimes it is used to impose for the purpose of a statute an artificial construction of a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be uncertain. Therefore, in case the first three dates are available then the modality for working out the date of completion is provided in the Explanation. As the records would show that first assessment of the premises came to be assessed in 1994, that is, the third date provided in the Explanation. That date would be the date of completion of the building, it is only when the first three dates are not available, then the fourth date will the date on which construction of the building would have been deemed completed. Learned counsel for the applicant failed to point out or show any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the concurrent finding recorded by the court below. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not inclined to disturb the concurrent finding of fact returned by the Courts. 8. The petition being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. 9. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. 10. However, it is provided that in case the applicant gives an undertaking on oath before the court below that he shall vacate the premises in question and hand over the possession of the same peacefully to the respondent-landlord on or before 30 May 2016. 9. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. 10. However, it is provided that in case the applicant gives an undertaking on oath before the court below that he shall vacate the premises in question and hand over the possession of the same peacefully to the respondent-landlord on or before 30 May 2016. The aforesaid undertaking on oath shall be given by the applicant-tenant before the Court below within four weeks from today and the applicant shall deposit the monthly rent of the premises in question before the Court below, as per the current rent fixed and shall continue to deposit the same by 7th of the each calendar month till the vacation of the premises in question, which amount may be permitted to be withdrawn by the respondent-landlord after due verification by the Court concerned. 11. It is made clear that in the event of default committed by the petitioner/tenant in any of the conditions, the order shall stand automatically vacated without reference to the Court.