JUDGMENT Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J. – Original suit no. 314/2004 (Veer Pal Singh v. Munni Devi @ Mamta Agarwal) was filed for relief of specific performance of contract. The plaint case in brief was that owner of disputed property, the defendant had executed the power of attorney in favour of Radhe Shyam for management etc. of the said property, in which she had authorised power of attorney holder to execute even sale-deed of said land. Under the authority of said power of attorney the Radhe Shyam had executed the registered agreement to sell the disputed property of plaintiff for sale in favour of plaintiff for consideration of Rs. 40,000/- and received advance consideration of Rs. 30,000/-. The plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform his part of contract but defendant had not executed the sale-deed, therefore, plaintiff had given notice firstly to power of attorney holder and then to defendant, and when they had not executed the sale-deed, then plaintiff had filed suit for specific performance of aforesaid contract of sale. 2. The defendant had filed written-statement in original suit by which she had admitted the execution of power of attorney dated 26.12.2001 in favour of Radhe Shyam, but stated that Radhe Shyam had connived with plaintiff and got the executed aforesaid registered agreement to sell, for which no consideration was received by defendant. The said contract was executed without consent or knowledge to defendant. The defendant had also pleaded that by registered deed dated 18.12.2003, she had cancelled her power of attorney executed in favour of Radhe Shyam. The plaintiff cannot claim any right on the basis of aforesaid agreement to sell executed between him and Radhe Shyam, therefore, his suit is liable to be dismissed. 3. The trial court had framed issues, accepted adduced evidences and then Additional Civil Judge (S.D.) Court No.4, Etawah had decreed the original suit by its judgment dated 17.12.2013, in which main relief of specific performance was granted and defendant was directed to execute the sale-deed after receiving remaining consideration of Rs. 10,000/-, and trial court had also directed that if legally decreed is found inexecutable then in that case the defendant shall return amount of Rs. 30,000/-, the plaintiff with interest from 26.02.2003. 4. Against the judgment of trial court the defendant had preferred Civil Appeal no. 10,000/-, and trial court had also directed that if legally decreed is found inexecutable then in that case the defendant shall return amount of Rs. 30,000/-, the plaintiff with interest from 26.02.2003. 4. Against the judgment of trial court the defendant had preferred Civil Appeal no. 3/2014 (Smt. Munni Devi @ Mamta Agarwal v. Veer Pal Singh), which was heard and dismissed by the judgment dated 07.09.2015 of the Court of District Judge, Etawah; by which judgment dated 17.12.2013 of trial court was confirmed. Aggrieved by the judgments of trial court as well first appellate court, this second appeal has been preferred. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that since the defendant-appellant was deceived by power of attorney holder Radhe Shyam, therefore he would be prejudiced if the agreement to sell between Radhe Shyam and respondent is executed and specifically enforced. He contended that in any case, the appellant is ready to pay back the advance consideration mentioned in the agreement and plaint, and in the order of trial court. For these reasons, appeal should be admitted for being allowed. 6. It is admitted fact that defendant-appellant had executed the registered power of attorney dated 26.12.2001 in favour of Radhe Shyam and authorised the him to manage the property in suit and had also authorised in power of attorney to sell the said property. It is also admitted fact that before cancellation of said power of attorney, the power of attorney holder had executed the registered agreement to sell for the disputed property on behalf of the appellant, in favour of respondent-plaintiff. When such execution of power of attorney is admitted, then defendant-appellant is estopped for denying its legal consequences. Whether she had original intention of authorisation the power of attorney holder to execute the deed regarding transfer of disputed property or not is immaterial. When she had authorised power of attorney holder to execute such document and she is admitting such execution, then she cannot dispute the acts done by power of attorney holder under the authority obtained from her. So far as the argument of learned counsel for the appellant regarding alleged fraud committed by power of attorney holder Radhe Shyam is concerned, the same is a matter between the appellant and Radhe Shyam which has not legal bearing on merits of this appeal. 7. So far as the argument of learned counsel for the appellant regarding alleged fraud committed by power of attorney holder Radhe Shyam is concerned, the same is a matter between the appellant and Radhe Shyam which has not legal bearing on merits of this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that appellant is ready to pay back amount of advance consideration received by power of attorney holder Radhe Shyam on her behalf. This argument is unacceptable at this stage when this plea was raised for the first time before this Court during oral arguments. Such plea was neither taken by the appellant in her written-statement nor in memo of first appeal under Order-41, Rule-2 CPC. The rights of respondent-plaintiff should not be prejudiced due to oral plea raised directly in Second Appeal without any mention in the trial court or in the first appeal. Therefore, such contention is unacceptable. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there is no evidence of the fact that disputed property has been partitioned between its original share holders, therefore, respondent/plaintiff cannot get possession of such property. This contention is also unacceptable. In the power of attorney executed by her in favour of Radhe Shyam she had mentioned the details of disputed property in her possession and appointed the Radhey Shyam as power of attorney holder for maintenance and security of said property. Now she is estopped from denying such facts. In any case it is a matter to be seen at the time of execution. Whole share of appellant in disputed property is subject matter of dispute, therefore after the execution of sale-deed in compliance of the decree of court below, any right of appellant would not be adversely affected regarding any other property. 9. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant regarding inconvenience to other co-sharer holders of property is also unacceptable as those co-sharers are neither party to this proceeding nor their rights etc. has to be determined in this appeal. The appellant has no right to plead cause of other persons. 10. In the present case, admittedly power of attorney holder of appellant had executed the registered agreement to sell on the basis of authority of power of attorney granted by the appellant and received consideration in accordance with authority granted to him. This has been a legal contract which has to be specifically enforced. 10. In the present case, admittedly power of attorney holder of appellant had executed the registered agreement to sell on the basis of authority of power of attorney granted by the appellant and received consideration in accordance with authority granted to him. This has been a legal contract which has to be specifically enforced. Every question relating to present appeal relates to facts and no question of law involved. The two courts below had given specifically findings of facts on the pleadings, after framing issues and after affording opportunity of hearing and their judgments are based on apparently acceptable concurrent finding of fact. 11. On examination of the reasoning recorded by the trial court, which are affirmed by the learned first appellate court in first appeal, I am of the view that the judgments of the trial court as well as the first appellate court are well reasoned and based upon proper appreciation of the entire evidence on record. No perversity or infirmity is found in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court that has been affirmed by the first appellate court to warrant interference in this appeal. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, was involved in the case before the High Court. None of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiffs can be sustained. 12. In view of the above, this Court finds that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The second appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.