JUDGMENT N. Kotiswar Singh, J. 1. Heard Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This criminal revision petition arises out of an order taking cognisance by the learned CJM, Bishnupur and issuance of warrant of arrest against the accused persons. Following is the order in issue. "ORDER 6-12-2012 This is an application filed by the complainants against the accused persons. Shri Langpoklakpam Suranjay Singh s/o L. Manihar Singh is examined u/s. 200 of Cr.P.C. Register it as Cril.(C) Case No. 18 of 2012. After examination of the complainant, I find reasonable grounds to proceed against the accused persons. Hence, issue W/A against the accused persons returnable on 15.12.2012. The complainant is to take step. Sd/- (....) CJM/BPR" 3. The aforesaid order was challenged by the petitioners/accused before the learned Sessions Judge, Bishnupur by filing a revision petition u/s. 397 Cr.P.C. The revision petition was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge on the ground that the aforesaid order is an interlocutory order and not subject to revision u/s. 397 Cr.P.C., in view of the bar placed under sub-section (2) thereof, vide order dated 10.10.2013 passed in the aforesaid Cril. Revision Case No. 3 of 2013/5/13. It is against this order of dismissal dated 10.10.2013 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bishnupur that the present criminal revision petition has been preferred. 4. Before we proceed to deal with the issues involved, a brief reference to the relevant facts of the case may be made. Of the petitioners, the petitioner No. 1 is claiming to be absolute owner in possession of certain agricultural land. The said land was claimed to have purchased by one Laishram Iboyaima Singh, the elder brother of the petitioner No. 1 from one L. Manihar Singh, who is the father of the present four respondents on 02.6.1977 by executing a registered sale deed with delivery of possession thereof. Later, on 25.01.2001, the elder brother of the petitioner No. 1 handed over possession of the land to the petitioner No. 1 for cultivation and subsequently gifted the said land to the petitioner No. 1 by executing a registered gift deed on 20.4.2012 and accordingly, the name of the petitioner No. 1 was mutated in the land records as owner of the said land. The petitioner No. 2 is the son of the petitioner No. 1 and other petitioners are men/agents of petitioner No. 1. It is the case of the petitioner No. 1 that while the said land was under cultivation, the former owner, Shri L. Manihar Singh and his sons, the present respondents, tried to disturb peaceful possession and cultivation because of which the petitioner No. 1 filed an original suit being O.S. No. 10 of 2012 before the Court of Civil Judge (Sr.Divn.) Bishnupur for permanent injunction. The learned Civil Judge (Sr.Divn.) Bishnupur passed a temporary injunction order on 7.6.2012 restraining the defendants including the present respondents from entering the said land. Inspite of the said temporary injunction order, the respondents and their men trespassed the land and harvested the paddy crops which led to the filing of the Cril.(C) Case No. 16 of 2012 by the petitioners against them on 27.11.2012 before the Court of CJM, Bishnupur, who took cognisance of the case and issued warrant of arrest against the respondents. As a counter case, the present respondents filed Cril.(C) Case No. 18 of 2012 on 6.12.2012 against the petitioners alleging theft of paddy crops from the said suit-land before the same court of CJM, Bishnupur and the learned CJM took cognisance of it and issued warrant of arrest against the present petitioners, vide above quoted order dated 6.12.2012, out of which the present criminal revision petition has arisen. 5. The petitioners challenged the aforesaid order dated 6.12.2012 passed by the learned CJM by filing Criminal revision petition u/s. 397 Cr.P.C. before the learned Sessions Judge, Bishnupur. Two issues were framed by the learned Sessions Judge as follows:- "1. Whether issue of process under section 204 Cr.P.C. is an interlocutory order? 2. Whether the present revision petition is maintainable or not?" The learned Sessions Judge, Bishnupur, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, AIR 1992 SC 2206 and in Uttam v. State of Maharashtra decided by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court, 1995 CRIL.L.J. 562 held that the order issuing the process u/s. 304 Cr.P.C. being only a step towards trial is an interlocutory order. As regards the second issue, the learned Sessions Judge held that since the order of the Magistrate issuing process u/s. 204 Cr.P.C. is an interlocutory order, same is not subject to revision u/s. 397Cr.P.C., as sub-section (2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. clearly bars revision in respect of interlocutory order. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge, Bishnupur dismissed the criminal revision petition as mentioned above. 6. Before this Court, the petitioners have contended that the aforesaid order dated 6.12.2012 taking cognisance and issuing process is not an interlocutory order and as such, revision would lie against such an order and hence the decision of the learned Sessions Judge is incorrect. Mr. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel for the petitioners relying on the decision of Amar Nath and others -Vs- State of Haryana and Anr., (1977) 4 SCC 137 , has submitted that any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order. Learned senior counsel relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 which also considered the meaning of the words "interlocutory orders" which invoking the test laid down in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, (1947 FCR 180: AIR 1949 FC 1) that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye (supra) held that there may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final, yet it may not be an interlocutory order, pure and simple, and the bar of sub section (2) of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. will not be attracted to such kind of intermediate order. Mr. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel for the petitioners also relied on the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in support of his contention. "1. V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., 1980 Supp. SCC 92, 2. K.K. Patel and another v. State of Gujarat and another, (2000) 6 SCC 195 , 3. Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd. and others, (2001) 7 SCC 401 , 4. "1. V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., 1980 Supp. SCC 92, 2. K.K. Patel and another v. State of Gujarat and another, (2000) 6 SCC 195 , 3. Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd. and others, (2001) 7 SCC 401 , 4. Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited and others v. State of Maharashtra and another: (2009) 2 SCC 370 , 5. Mohit alias Sonu and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2013) 7 SCC 789 ," Accordingly, Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel has submitted that the aforesaid order taking cognisance and issuing warrant of arrest to the petitioner does not amount to an interlocutory order. Hence, the bar imposed by sub-section 2 of Section 397 Cr.P.C. would not be applicable in the present case. 7. Per contra, Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that it has been specifically held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2004) 13 SCC 324 that order issuing process could be challenged by filing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devendra Kishanlal Dagalia v. Dwarkesh Diamonds Pvt. Ltd., and Others, AIR 2014 SC 655 in which it has been held that the remedy against an order of issuing summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C. lies before the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and others, (2004) 7 SCC 338 , it has been submitted that the remedy against an order of issue of summons under Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. lies by invoking provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel also relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Prof. Manjunatha, B.P. v. Prof. V.J. Pyati & Anr., (2009) Cril.L.J. 209 has submitted that an order issuing summons/warrant of arrest cannot be said to be an order which substantially touches the right of the accused and as such, no revision petition is maintainable against such an order. The Honb'le Karnataka High Court had relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subramanium Sethuraman (supra). 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The Honb'le Karnataka High Court had relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subramanium Sethuraman (supra). 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that by applying the test that if by upholding the objection raised by a party it would result in culminating the proceeding, such an order would not be an interlocutory order as envisaged under Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. Further, an order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order as contemplated under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. On the other hand, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that since the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases referred has held that the only remedy available to an aggrieved person against the issue of order of process is by way of filing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the present criminal revision petition by filing petition under section 397 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by him have clearly held that the only course available against an order of issuance of summons is by way of filing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as such all other options are foreclosed, which includes filing of revision petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C. 9. As regards what amounts to an "interlocutory order" has been discussed and decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases. The Supreme Court in Amar Nath's case (supra) has observed that the term "interlocutory order" under section 397(2) Cr.P.C., 1973 has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes order of a purely interim or temporary nature which does not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against the order, because that would be against the very object which form the basis for insertion of this particular provision under section 397 of the Code. The Hon'ble Supreme Court gave the examples of the orders of summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for records and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding to be an interlocutory order against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. However, it observed that orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, as held in para 6 thereof which is reproduced as follows. "6. Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of Section 397 against the historical background of these facts. Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code may be extracted thus: "The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding." The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." (emphasis added). Thereafter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said Amarnath 's case (supra) proceeded to examine the issue as mentioned in para 10 thereof and held that passing of an order summoning the appellants putting the appellants on trial is not an interlocutory order. It was observed that as long as the Magistrate had not passed the order, no procedure was started against the appellants nor were any such proceeding pending against them and it was only with the passing of the order that the proceedings started and the question of appellants being put up for trial arose for the first time which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held was undoubtedly a valuable right which the appellants possessed and which was being denied to them by the order. It was also observed that it cannot be held that the appellants were not at all prejudiced or that any right of their's was not involved by the orders or summons. It was also observed that it cannot be held that the appellants were not at all prejudiced or that any right of their's was not involved by the orders or summons. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the order of Judicial Magistrate in the circumstances of the case was undoubtedly a matter of moment and a valuable right of the appellants had been taken away by the Magistrate's passing an order in a mechanical fashion and accordingly, held to be not an interlocutory order as it decided the serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial as mentioned in para 10 thereof which is reproduced herein below:- "10. Applying the aforesaid tests, let us now see whether the order impugned in the instant case can be said to be an interlocutory order as held by the High Court. In the first place, so far as the appellants are concerned, the police had submitted its final report against them and they were released by the Judicial Magistrate. A revision against that order to the Additional Sessions Judge preferred by the complainant had failed. Thus the appellants, by virtue of the order of the Judicial Magistrate as affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge acquired a valuable right of not being put on trial unless a proper order was made against them. Then came the complaint by Respondent 2 before the Judicial Magistrate which was also dismissed on merits. The Sessions Judge in revision, however, set aside the order dismissing the complaint and ordered further inquiry. The Magistrate on receiving the order of the Sessions Judge summoned the appellants straightaway which meant that the appellants were to be put on trial. So long as the Judicial Magistrate had not passed this order, no proceedings were started against the appellants, nor were any such proceedings pending against them. It was only with the passing of the impugned order that the proceedings started and the question of the appellants being put up for trial arose for the first time. This was undoubtedly a valuable right which the appellants possessed and which was being denied to them by the impugned order. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants were not at all prejudiced, or that any right of their's was not involved by the impugned order. This was undoubtedly a valuable right which the appellants possessed and which was being denied to them by the impugned order. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants were not at all prejudiced, or that any right of their's was not involved by the impugned order. It is difficult to hold that the impugned order summoning the appellants straightaway was merely an interlocutory order which could not be revised by the High Court under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code. The order of the Judicial Magistrate summoning the appellants in the circumstances of the present case, particularly having regard to what had preceded, was undoubtedly a matter of moment, and a valuable right of the appellants had been taken away by the Magistrate's passing an order prima facie in a mechanical fashion without applying his mind. We are, therefore, satisfied that the order impugned was one which was a matter of moment and which did involve a decision regarding the rights of the appellants. If the appellants were not summoned, then they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellants to face a trial without proper application of mind cannot be held to be an interlocutory matter but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial." This decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath's case (supra) was made on the premise that issue of summons by which the criminal process was initiated against the accused certainly affected the valuable rights of the appellants to be put on trial. It is only after summons is issued that the accused can be put on trial before which the question of the accused being put on trial does not arise. Therefore, the criteria adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case was not as to whether an order decided finally affects the right of the accused but whether such order was matter of moment which affects or adjudicates right of the accused to be put on trial. It is not a mere adjudication or rights which is decisive, but whether it also affects the rights of the persons to ascertain whether such an order is not an interlocutory order or not. 10. It is not a mere adjudication or rights which is decisive, but whether it also affects the rights of the persons to ascertain whether such an order is not an interlocutory order or not. 10. In K.K. Patel's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in deciding whether an order challenged is an interlocutory or not under section 397(2) Cr.P.C., the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings. If so, any order passed on such objection would not be merely interlocutory order under Section 397(2) of the Code as observed in para 11 thereof which is reproduced herein below. "11. That apart, the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that no revision was maintainable on account of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Code, is clearly erroneous. It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC(Cri) 10, V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, 1980 Supp SCC 92: 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : (1980) 2 SCR 380 and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam, (1999) 3 SCC 134 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 393). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable." (emphasis added). 11. Similarly, in Bhaskar Industries Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that whether an order is interlocutory or not cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable." (emphasis added). 11. Similarly, in Bhaskar Industries Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that whether an order is interlocutory or not cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the safe test laid down by the Court through a series of decisions is this: if the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If they would, then the order is not an interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during an interlocutory stage. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhaskar Industries Ltd.'s case (supra) has also relied in the decision in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 where it was held that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2) Cr.P.C. as observed in para Nos. 8 and 9 thereof. "8. The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: if the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If they would, then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage. 9. If they would, then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage. 9. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 : AIR 1978 SC 47 laid down the following test: (SCC p. 560, para 15) "(A)n order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2)." This was upheld by the four-Judge Bench of this Court in V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695: AIR 1980 SC 962 . (emphasis added) 12. In Mohit's case (supra) also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the decision of the Court in Amar Nath's case observing that an order which substantially affects the rights of the accused cannot be held to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court as contemplated under Section 397(2)of the Cr.P.C. 13. Therefore, in the present case, by applying the aforesaid tests/principles if it is found that if the objection to the aforesaid order of taking cognisance and issue of the process, is upheld and leads to culmination of the proceeding, the aforesaid order cannot be said to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2) Cr.P.C. Further, if it is found that the said order passed by the Ld. Magistrate, Bishnupur was a matter of moment or which affects the rights of the accused, it is not to be treated as an interlocutory order. In the present case, it has been contended by the petitioner that in the aforesaid Cril.(C) Case No. 18 of 2012 in which the order dated 6.12.2012 was passed by the learned CJM, the respondents complainants have themselves mentioned about the pendency of a title suit in respect of the same disputed land in O.S. No. 10 of 2012 before the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division, Bishnupur without disclosing that the petitioner No. 1 had become owner of the land by virtue of a gift deed and the trial Court also passed a temporary injunction on 7.6.2012 in Judicial Misc. Case No. 54/2012 restraining the respondents and other defendants from entering into and making any disturbance to the peaceful possession of the land by the petitioner No. 1. According to the petitioners, since the dispute about the ownership and title of the land was pending before the Civil Court, and the respondents/complainants are yet to establish their right and title over the disputed land, the question of theft alleged by the respondents without first establishing their title and ownership of the land or property did not arise and as such filing of complaint for an offence under section 397/34 IPC was not at all maintainable. It was also contended that the statements made under Section 200 Cr.P.C. nowhere disclose how the land was cultivated by the respondents nor disclose any ingredient of the offence alleged, and thus the order dated 6.12.2012 is void. It was, accordingly, submitted that the complaint filed by the present respondents against the present petitioners in Crl.(C) Case No. 18 of 2012 could have culminated if the objection raised by the present petitioners is upheld. That apart, the said order of cognisance and issue of warrant of arrest against the petitioners had adversely affected the interest of the petitioners. Accordingly, Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in view of the above, the order taking cognisance and issuing summons/warrant of arrest by the learned CJM, Bishnupur cannot be said to be an interlocutory order by applying the aforesaid tests/principles. The submission of Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel cannot be lightly brushed aside which ought to have been considered by the learned Sessions Judge. However, the argument advanced by Mr. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents, also merits consideration. 14. We will now proceed to examine the case laws cited by the counsel for the respondents. As mentioned above, Mr. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Subramanium Sethuraman (supra), Devendra Kishanlal Dagalia (supra), Adalat Prasad (supra) has submitted that the only option open to an accused to challenge the issue of process would be by way of filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 15. In Subramanium Sethuraman (supra), the facts were that a complaint was lodged for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the appellant therein and others which included the company and its directors. In Subramanium Sethuraman (supra), the facts were that a complaint was lodged for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the appellant therein and others which included the company and its directors. On receipt of the complaint and summons, the company/accused challenged it before the same Magistrate on the ground that the Magistrate could not have taken cognisance of the complaint because of the defective statutory notice and sought for its discharge. The said application was rejected. Thereafter, a second application for discharge was filed by the company on the same very ground which was allowed by the Magistrate by relying on the judgment in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and another, AIR 1992 SC 217 which held that it was open to the Magistrate taking cognisance and issuing process to recall the process if the summoned accused could show to the Court that the issue of process was legally impermissible. In that particular case, the learned Magistrate had held that the statutory notice issued by the complainant was not in conformity with the requirements of law. Being aggrieved by the order of discharge made by the learned Magistrate, a revision was filed before the learned Sessions Judge on the ground that the Magistrate had no power to review his order because of the bar placed by section 362 of the Cr.P.C., which contention was accepted by the learned Sessions Judge. Against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, a criminal writ petition was filed under Article227 of the Constitution before the Hon'ble Bombay High Court. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that once the Magistrate records the plea of the accused there is no provision under the Cr.P.C. enabling the Magistrate to recall the process and discharge the accused. The matter went up to the Supreme Court in which the issue arose whether the decision of the K.M. Mathew (supra) is a good law. In the meantime, said decision of K.M. Mathew (supra) was overruled by a three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and others, (2004) 7 SCC 338 . The matter went up to the Supreme Court in which the issue arose whether the decision of the K.M. Mathew (supra) is a good law. In the meantime, said decision of K.M. Mathew (supra) was overruled by a three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and others, (2004) 7 SCC 338 . In Adalat Prasad (supra) case, it was held that once the Magistrate takes cognisance of offence, issues process, even if the order of the Magistrate is vitiated, the relief of an aggrieved accused cannot be obtained by invoking section 203 of the Code as the Code does not contemplate a review of the order. It was held that in absence of power of review or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code. It may be apposite to reproduce the relevant paragraphs in Adalat Prasad (supra) case as the decision in Adalat Prasad (supra) case had been the basis of the other judgments relied on by the respondents. Relevant paras No. 10, 14, 15, 16 & 17 of Adalat Prasad (supra) read as follows: "10. If we analyse the reasons given by this Court in the said 1 case of Mathew then we notice that the said view is based on the following facts: (a) The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to issue process arises only if the complaint contains the allegations involving the commission of a crime. (b) If the process is issued without there being an allegation in the complaint involving the accused in the commission of a crime it is open to the summoned accused to approach the court issuing summons and convince the court that there is no such allegation in the complaint which requires his summoning. (c) For so recalling the order of summons no specific provision of law is required. (d) The order of issuing process is an interim order and not a judgment hence it can be varied or recalled. 11. .... 12. .... 13. .... 14. But after taking cognizance of the complaint and examining the complainant and the witnesses if he is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint he can issue process by way of summons under Section 204 of the Code. 11. .... 12. .... 13. .... 14. But after taking cognizance of the complaint and examining the complainant and the witnesses if he is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint he can issue process by way of summons under Section 204 of the Code. Therefore, what is necessary or a condition precedent for issuing process under Section 204 is the satisfaction of the Magistrate either by examination of the complainant and the witnesses or by the inquiry contemplated under Section202 that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint hence issue the process under Section 204 of the Code. In none of these stages the Code has provided for hearing the summoned accused, for obvious reasons because this is only a preliminary stage and the stage of hearing of the accused would only arise at a subsequent stage provided for in the latter provision in the Code. It is true 1 as held by this Court in Mathew case that before issuance of summons the Magistrate should be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint but that satisfaction is to be arrived at by the inquiry conducted by him as contemplated under Sections 200 and 202, and the only stage of dismissal of the complaint arises under Section 203 of the Code at which stage the accused has no role to play, therefore, the question of the accused on receipt of summons approaching the court and making an application for dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Code on a reconsideration of the material available on record is impermissible because by then Section 203 is already over and the Magistrate has proceeded further to Section 204 stage. 15. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused or any material implicating the accused or in contravention of provisions of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is not by invoking Section 203 of the Code because the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code. 16. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code. 16. Therefore, in our opinion the observation of this Court in (1992) 1 SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 88 the case of Mathew that for recalling an erroneous order of issuance of process, no specific provision of law is required, would run counter to the scheme of the Code which has not provided for review and prohibits interference at interlocutory stages. Therefore, we are of the opinion, that the view of this Court in Mathew (1992) 1 SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 88 case that no specific provision is required for recalling an erroneous order, amounting to one without jurisdiction, does not lay down the correct law. 17. In view of our above conclusion, it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether order issuing a process amounts to an interim order or not." (emphasis added). 16. It may be noted that in the aforesaid case of Adalat Prasad (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reconsidered the decision in K.M. Mathew (supra) and held that it does not lay down the correct law. The law laid down earlier in K.M. Mathew (supra) relating to power of the Magistrate to recall its order, was held to be not a good law by holding that Magistrate does not possess such power. It may be also mentioned that in Adalat Prasad's case (supra), the accused/appellant being aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate in taking cognisance of a complaint, issue of summons/process filed an application before the Magistrate under section 203 Cr.P.C. as directed by the High Court of Delhi to move the trial Court against the order of summoning. The trial Court after hearing the parties, recalled the said summons which was again challenged before the High Court on the ground that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to recall a summons issued under section 204 of the Code. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court agreed with the said submission and held that the trial Court could not have recalled summons issued as the trial Court did not have power to review its own order. It was against the order of the Delhi High Court that the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the matter in Adalat Prasad (supra) case. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court agreed with the said submission and held that the trial Court could not have recalled summons issued as the trial Court did not have power to review its own order. It was against the order of the Delhi High Court that the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the matter in Adalat Prasad (supra) case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad (supra) case after discussing the law laid down in K.M. Mathew (supra) held it not to be the correct law as mentioned above. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after discussing the provisions of the Cr.P.C., more particularly, by referring to sections 200, 202, 203 and 204 gave the findings as mentioned in para 14, 15, 16 and 17 quoted above. A careful study of Adalat Prasad's case (supra), would indicate that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the issue whether the trial Court after having once taken cognisance and issued process, could review its own order for discharging an accused. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once the trial Court/Magistrate had taken cognisance and issued process, he did not have any power to review or recall the order and accordingly, held that the remedy available before any such aggrieved person is by way of invoking section 482 of the Cr.P.C. It is to be noted that in Adalat Prasad's case (supra), the question as to whether the order in taking cognisance of a complaint and issue of process/of warrant of arrest amounts to an "interlocutory order" or not was not raised at all. In other words, the issue relating to "interlocutory order" was never raised, discussed and hence, no decision was made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as to whether the order of taking cognisance and issue of summons/warrant is an interlocutory order or not. 17. In other words, the issue relating to "interlocutory order" was never raised, discussed and hence, no decision was made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as to whether the order of taking cognisance and issue of summons/warrant is an interlocutory order or not. 17. When we examine in detail the facts of the case in Devendra Kishanlal Dagalia 's case (supra) relied on by the respondents, we also see that the issue involved in the said case too was whether summons issued under section 204 Cr.P.C. could be recalled or not by the Magistrate exercising the power under section 201 Cr.P.C. In the aforesaid case of Devendra Kishanlal Dagalia (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court by relying on the decision of Adalat Prasad case (supra) held that in absence of any power or review or recall of order or issue of summons, the Magistrate cannot recall the summons in exercise of its powers as observed in paras 15 and 16 in Devendra Kishanlal Dagalia's case (supra), which are reproduced hereinbelow:- "15. The issue with regard to the power of the Magistrate to recall process of summons fell for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004) 7 SCC 338 : AIR 2004 SC 4674. Therein the following observation was made by this Court: "15. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused or any material implicating the accused or in contravention of provisions of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is not by invoking Section 203 of the Code because the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code." 16. Section 201 Cr.P.C., as noticed earlier, can be applied immediately on receipt of a complaint, if the Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance of the offence. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code." 16. Section 201 Cr.P.C., as noticed earlier, can be applied immediately on receipt of a complaint, if the Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance of the offence. Once the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence forms his opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding and issues summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C., there is no question of going back following the procedure under Section 201 Cr.P.C. In absence of any power of review or recall the order of issuance of summons, the Magistrate cannot recall the summons in exercise of power under Section 201 CrPC. The first question is thus answered in the negative and in favour of the appellant." (emphasis added). In Devendra Kishanlal Dagalia's case (supra) also, there was no discussion or decision whether the order taking cognisance and issue of summons is an interlocutory order or not. 18. It is only in the case of Prof. Manjunatha (supra) decided by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court that this issue was raised and decided by the Hon'ble High Court. The petitioner therein specifically raised the issue that the order passed by the Magistrate in taking cognisance and issue of summons under section204 Cr.P.C. is an interlocutory order and hence, not amendable to jurisdiction of the revisional court and the only remedy available is under Section 482 Cr.P.C. On the other hand, it was argued by the respondents in the said case that if the interlocutory order touches the rights of the parties, the revisional Court has jurisdiction to entertain a revision petition. It was argued that such orders cannot be term as interlocutory orders as these substantially affect the rights of the parties and in such situation, the revisional court can exercise power under Section 397 Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court however, did not agree with the contention of the respondents and decided the issue as follows: "7. The only point that arises for consideration in this revision petition is: "As to whether issue of process in exercise of power under Section204 of Cr.P.C. by the learned Magistrate is amenable to the jurisdiction of the revisional Court"? 8. The only point that arises for consideration in this revision petition is: "As to whether issue of process in exercise of power under Section204 of Cr.P.C. by the learned Magistrate is amenable to the jurisdiction of the revisional Court"? 8. Interlocutory order if substantially touches the rights of the parties and has an effect of final decision against the party, certainly such orders cannot be termed as interlocutory orders. However, the issuance of process under Section 204 of Cr.P.C. cannot be termed as an order substantially touches the rights of the accused and partake the character of the final decision. Inasmuch as the accused, has a right to participate in the proceedings and has a right to question the issuance of process under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The Apex Court in the Mathew's case ( AIR 1992 SC 2206 ) has held that, the Magistrate can recall the issuance of summons after the appearance of the accused. This view was accepted in the case of Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande ( AIR 1999 SC 1028 ).However, the Apex Court in the matter of Subramanium Sethuraman's case ( AIR 2004 SC 4711 ) considered the Mathew's case and the Adalat Prasad's case (AIR 2004 SC 4674) and found that, the view expressed in. Mathew's case is not accepted by the Apex Court in Adalat Prasad's case. In the decision of the Subramanium's case, the Apex Court accepted the view taken by the Adalat Prasad's case and held that, the learned Magistrate has no power to recall the order of issuance of summons. At para 19 of the Subramanium's case, the Apex Court has observed as under: "Therefore, legitimately the appellant should raise this issue to be decided at the trial. Be that as it may, we cannot prevent an accused person from taking recourse to a remedy which is available in law. In Adalat Prasad's case we have held that for an aggrieved person the only course available to challenge the issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code is by way of a petition under Section 482 of the Code. Hence, while we do not grant any permission to the appellant to file a petition under Section 482, we cannot also deny him the statutory right available to him in law". 9. Hence, while we do not grant any permission to the appellant to file a petition under Section 482, we cannot also deny him the statutory right available to him in law". 9. The Apex Court has clearly observed that, in case of issuance of summons, the only remedy available is by way of filing a petition under Section 482. If that is so, revision entertained by the revisional Court, in my opinion is not proper." The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court took the view that if the interlocutory order substantially touches the rights of the parties and has an effect of final decision against the party, certainly such orders cannot be termed as in interlocutory orders. However, it was held that issuance of process under Section 204 of Cr.P.C. cannot be termed as an order which substantially touches the rights of the accused and partakes the character of the final decision in as much as the accused has a right to participate in the proceedings and has a right to question the issuance of process under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court thereafter relying on the decision in Adalat Prasad (supra) case as well as Subramanium Sethuraman (supra), case held that the option before such an aggrieved person is by way of filing a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court thus held that issue of process under section 204 Cr.P.C. is an interlocutory order as it did not substantially touch the right of the accused to partake the character of the final decision as the accused has a right to participate in the proceedings. 19. In this regard, it may be observed that, as to what constitutes an interlocutory order has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and it has to be understood in the light of the various judicial pronouncements. One of the criteria evolved by the Courts to ascertain as to whether an order is interlocutory or not is to find out whether such an order substantially touches the right of the accused which partakes the character of the decision. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court adopted the said criteria to hold that the order of issue of summons is not an interlocutory order. This Court with great respect is not able to subscribe to the view taken by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court adopted the said criteria to hold that the order of issue of summons is not an interlocutory order. This Court with great respect is not able to subscribe to the view taken by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court has not considered the other tests evolved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of K.K. Patel (supra), Madhu Limaye (supra) etc., to examine whether the order is an interlocutory or not. The other test is, if the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceeding as whole culminate? If they would, then the order is not interlocutory. 20. In the light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, what emerges is that an accused if aggrieved by the issue of process by the Magistrate can certainly avail the remedy available under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as held in Adalat Prasad (supra), Subramanium Sethuraman (supra), Devendra Kishanlal Dagalia (supra) etc. However, since the revisional jurisdiction of the superior Courts is not barred in respect of order which is not "interlocutory order", if the order issuing summons/warrants by taking cognisance of complaints is held to be not an "interlocutory order", such an order would be certainly amenable to revisional jurisdiction also. By applying the tests/principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Amar Nath, Madhu Limaye (supra), V.C. Shukla (supra), K.K. Patel (supra), Bhaskar Industries Ltd. (supra), Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited, Mohit (supra) etc. referred to and discussed above, the order dated 6.12.2012 passed by the learned CJM in taking cognisance and issuing warrant of arrest against the petitioners can be said to be a matter of moment which affects the rights of the petitioners. By taking cognisance of the complaint and issuing warrant of arrest, the Learned CJM by order dated 6.12.2012 has set into motion the criminal justice system against the petitioners, which is certainly a stricter legal regime than the civil proceedings. Hence, passing of such an order is a matter of moment for the petitioners who have to face the criminal trial. Hence, passing of such an order is a matter of moment for the petitioners who have to face the criminal trial. It may be also mentioned that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 that the Magistrates should not issue warrant of arrest in complaint cases at the first instance, but must issue a normal process initially. It is only when the accused does not respond to such summons that bailable warrant of arrest should be issued and thereafter, non-bailable, if there is no response to the bailable warrant, as observed in para 55 of the said judgment as reproduced below: "55. In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court should direct serving of the summons along with the copy of the complaint. If the accused seem to be avoiding the summons, the court, in the second instance should issue bailable warrant. In the third instance, when the court is fully satisfied that the accused is avoiding the court's proceeding intentionally, the process of issuance of the non-bailable warrant should be resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we caution courts at the first and second instance to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants. In the present case, the ld. CJM however, instead of issuing a summons, has issued warrant of arrest in the first instance which is impermissible in law. Therefore, by issuing warrant of arrest against the petitioners contrary to law, their valuable right had been adversely affected. Hence, this order of the learned CJM cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. Further, if the objection of the petitioners that the complaint filed by the respondents alleging theft without first establishing ownership over the property is vexatious or that no offence of theft is made out, is upheld, it would result in the culmination of the complaint proceeding and as such, the order dated 6.12.2012 passed by the learned CJM cannot be considered to be an interlocutory order (Ref: K.K. Patel (supra), Bhaskar Industries Ltd. (supra), Madhu Limaye (supra)). Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, this Court holds that the order dated 6.12.2012 passed by the learned CJM in Cril. (C) No. 18 of 2012 issuing warrant of arrest against the petitioners after taking cognisance of the complaint filed by the respondents is not an "interlocutory order". Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, this Court holds that the order dated 6.12.2012 passed by the learned CJM in Cril. (C) No. 18 of 2012 issuing warrant of arrest against the petitioners after taking cognisance of the complaint filed by the respondents is not an "interlocutory order". Hence, the bar imposed by Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. will not applicable making such an order revisable. 21. This Court, however, would like to clarify that every order taking cognisance and issuing summons may not necessary be an order which is not interlocutory in nature. It would depend on the facts of each case. Unless the Court comes to a finding that the order taking cognisance and issuing summons/warrant in a particular case, is not an interlocutory order, the revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked. Only when such an order is found to be not an interlocutory order by applying the tests evolved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above, that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked and not otherwise. Thus, whether a revision would lie or not against an order would therefore, depend on the facts of each case which has to be considered and decided by the Court in the light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as discussed above. This remedy of revision available is in addition to what is already available to the accused u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed above. This Court is thus, holds that even though the remedy is always available to an aggrieved person under Section 482 Cr.P.C. against an order of taking cognisance and issue of process, if such an order is also found to be not an interlocutory order, as discussed above, the aggrieved person/accused cannot be denied the remedy of revision. 22. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, the present criminal revision petition is allowed by holding that the impugned order dated 6.12.2012 issued by the learned CJM, Bishnupur is not an interlocutory order. Accordingly, the order dated 10.10.2013 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bishnupur in Cril. Revision No. 3 of 2013/5/13 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Sessions Judge, Bishnupur for reconsidering the legality and validity of the order dated 6.12.2012 passed by the learned JCM, Bishnupur in Cril. Accordingly, the order dated 10.10.2013 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bishnupur in Cril. Revision No. 3 of 2013/5/13 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Sessions Judge, Bishnupur for reconsidering the legality and validity of the order dated 6.12.2012 passed by the learned JCM, Bishnupur in Cril. (C) Case No. 18 of 2012 in accordance with law by exercising his revisional jurisdiction. Ordered accordingly.