Order 1. Heard both sides. 2. The common facts that arose for consideration in W.P(MD)Nos.9223 of 2014 and W.P(MD)No.10377 of 2014, are stated thus: 2.1. The petitioner was initially appointed as P.G.Assistant at the fifth respondent School in the year 1980, which is a linguistic minority institution. He was subsequently posted as Headmaster (in-charge). On 09.05.2014. The fourth respondent has placed the petitioner under suspension on the ground that an enquiry into grave charge against him is contemplated. The fourth respondent invoked Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, for passing the order of suspension. Thereafter, the very same fourth respondent issued the charge memo dated 09.06.2014. 2.2. The crux of the charges levelled against the petitioner is that there was a reduction in pass percentage at the fifth respondent School for which the petitioner is held liable. The petitioner challenged both proceedings in the above writ petitions mainly on the ground that the fourth respondent is not having any jurisdiction to pass the impugned proceedings against the petitioner who is working in the fifth respondent School which is a linguistic minority institution. 2.3. It is the further contention of the petitioner that the disciplinary action, if any, can be taken only by the management of the School and not by the educational authorities, moreover, when the fact remains that the fifth respondent School is a minority institution protected by Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. 2.4. Apart from challenging the impugned orders on the ground of want of jurisdiction, the petitioner submitted that the allegations made against him in the impugned proceedings are also not factually correct and even assuming that such allegations are correct, that cannot be a ground to initiate the disciplinary proceedings warranting suspension and issuance of charge memo, as has been done in this case. 2.5. The fourth respondent filed the counter affidavits in both the writ petitions separately. In the counter affidavit, it is contended that since the School is under direct payment, the fourth respondent is having every right to initiate disciplinary proceedings and the post of fifth respondent is not all in existence and therefore there is no illegality or infirmity in passing the impugned orders. 3. In the counter affidavit, it is contended that since the School is under direct payment, the fourth respondent is having every right to initiate disciplinary proceedings and the post of fifth respondent is not all in existence and therefore there is no illegality or infirmity in passing the impugned orders. 3. Mr.Ajmal Khan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in both the writ petitions submitted that the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside solely on the ground of want of jurisdiction, as the fourth respondent is not the competent authority to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. He invited the attention of this Court to Sections 34 and 36 of the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and submitted that for taking over the management of the Private School, the Government should be satisfied that suspension of management under Section 18(A) will not be sufficient and further submitted that even such exercise can be done only in respect of the non-minority Private School and not in respect of the minority School like that of fifth respondent School. To that effect the learned Senior Counsel invited the attention of this Court to Section 36 of the above said Act, which contemplates that the minority School shall not be taken over by the Government under Section 34. 4. Therefore, he submitted that initiation of disciplinary action would only arise when the management is taken over by the educational authorities and when the same has not been done and could not be done in this case, the impugned proceedings is totally without jurisdiction and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 5. Even on merits, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the reduction in pass percentage cannot be a ground to take disciplinary action against the petitioner and in support of such contention, he relied upon the decision of this Court in P.Shaheen and others -vs- State of Tamil Nadu rep. by its Secretary, Department of Higher Education, Fort.St.George, Chennai-9 and others reported in 2014 (5) CTC 444 . Insofar as the right to administer the minority institution, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Secy., Malakara Syrian Catholic College -vs- T.Jose and Others reported in (2007) 1 SCC 386 . 6. by its Secretary, Department of Higher Education, Fort.St.George, Chennai-9 and others reported in 2014 (5) CTC 444 . Insofar as the right to administer the minority institution, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Secy., Malakara Syrian Catholic College -vs- T.Jose and Others reported in (2007) 1 SCC 386 . 6. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents 1 to 4 submitted that since the School is under direct payment, the fourth respondent is entitled to take disciplinary action and therefore, there is no infirmity or illegality in passing the impugned order proceedings. 7. Heard the learned Counsel on either side and perused the materials available on records. 8. The petitioner was working as Headmaster in-charge of the fifth respondent's School and was placed under suspension on 09.05.2014 by the fourth respondent. There is no dispute to the fact that the fifth respondent School is a minority institution. When that being the undisputed fact, the statutory protection given to such minority institution as against the taking over of the management is clearly speltout in Section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973, which reads as follows:- "36. Minority School not to be taken over.-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, the Government shall not take over the management of any minority school under Section 34." 9. Therefore, the question of taking over the management of the fifth respondent School does not arise at all. The only reason stated by the fourth respondent for having the jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders is that the School is under direct payment. 10. A perusal of the order passed for direct payment dated 05.09.2008 issued by the District Educational Officer, Kuzhithurai, would show that such order is passed only for the purpose of paying salary to the teacher without conferring any other right on the fourth respondent. Needless to say that exercising the power of direct payment does not automatically mean that other powers of the management were also conferred unless those powers are specifically conferred by an order issued by the competent authority. Even otherwise such power cannot be conferred in respect of minority institution. 11. Needless to say that exercising the power of direct payment does not automatically mean that other powers of the management were also conferred unless those powers are specifically conferred by an order issued by the competent authority. Even otherwise such power cannot be conferred in respect of minority institution. 11. Therefore, it is clear that the order dated 05.09.2008, issued for direct payment is not conferring any authority on the fourth respondent to interfere with the administration of the management of the fifth respondent School or usurp the power of such management. Hence, this Court is of the view that the fourth respondent had exceeded his jurisdiction and issued the impugned order of suspension and consequential issuance of charge memo. The right of the minority educational institution and the right to administer such educational institutions by the minorities are well settled by various decisions and that need not be reiterated once again. The decision relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is one of such decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court in Secy., Malakara Syrian Catholic College -vs- T.Jose and Others reported in (2007) 1 SCC 386 . 12. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel that even on merits, the poor pass percentage among the students cannot be a ground to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the teachers, as the same would not amount to misconduct. The recent decision of this Court in P.Shaheen and others -vs- State of Tamil Nadu rep. by its Secretary, Department of Higher Education, Fort.St.George, Chennai-9 and others reported in 2014 (5) CTC 444 , has dealt with such issue and in paragraphs, 11 to 13 the learned Judge has observed as follows: "11. The above Judgments are squarely applicable to the present facts of the case. Even if an Employee is found wanting in ability or negligent, the same would not amount ot "misconduct". 12. This Court is of the view that even negligence cannot be attributed towards the petitioners in the instant case. The petitioners have clearly stated in their reply that the students who failed in the Model Examinations were irregular in attending special classes despite counselling. This shows that the Petitioners had also spoken to the concerned students. 13. In all these cases, by attending the classes of the Petitioners, not less than 60% of the students have passed out successfully. The petitioners have clearly stated in their reply that the students who failed in the Model Examinations were irregular in attending special classes despite counselling. This shows that the Petitioners had also spoken to the concerned students. 13. In all these cases, by attending the classes of the Petitioners, not less than 60% of the students have passed out successfully. Even if the students attend the classes regularly, what that matters is what they write in their answer sheet. The petitioners have also raised the issue of tough Syllabus and different key answers. It is not the case of the Respondents that the Petitioners abstained from conducting classes or were irregular in conducting classes." 13. Therefore, even on merits, this Court is of the view that the fourth respondent is not justified in issuing the impugned proceedings. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned proceedings are set aside on the ground of want of jurisdiction as well as on merits. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.