JUDGMENT Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J. – Petitioner, who was a Constable in 38th Division of Provincial Arm Constabulary (hereinafter referred to as 'PAC') has invoked jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging an order dismissing him from service, dated 28th February, 1998, as affirmed in appeal vide order dated 31st July, 1998, and in revision vide order dated 21st December, 1998. The orders have been challenged essentially on the ground that petitioner has been denied opportunity to defend himself in terms of the applicable statutory rules. 2. While serving in 38th Battalion PAC at Aligarh, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner on the grounds that while his first wife Smt. Anno Begum was alive, the petitioner, without having obtained divorce from her lawfully wedded wife and without obtaining prior permission from the Government, has solemnized a second marriage on 10.11.1996, and has thereby violated Rule 29 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. Petitioner was served with a charge sheet, on 26.1.1997, and was also accused of unauthorized absence from duty w.e.f. 2.11.1996 to 6.11.1996, in connection with solemnization of his second marriage. The charge sheet further records that petitioner had received it, and in response to a question raised, had admitted solemnization of second marriage for the reason that it is permissible in his personal law. 3. Petitioner submitted a reply to the charge sheet on 27.1.1997, wherein he has stated that he had divorced his earlier wife Smt. Anno Begum, daughter of Mohd. Israr, on 4.2.1994, in the presence of witnesses by pronouncing 'Talaq', verbally, thrice, as per the personal law governing the petitioner. It was also stated that the marriage with his first wife was not consummated, and since the petitioner came to know that his wife Smt. Anno Begum had physical relations with one Fakre Alam, prior to her marriage with petitioner, as such, he decided to divorce his first wife, and in respect of such dispute, his in-laws from the first marriage had even attacked petitioner's brother Kamrul Haq, in respect of which a sessions trial was pending. According to the petitioner, it was in these situation that petitioner moved an application for grant of leave to conduct his marriage, which was disapproved by the authorities on the ground that the petitioner is already married, and in peculiar circumstances, since petitioner's father was not well, he was compelled to marry Rukhsana Begum, daughter of Naseem Ahmad, on 10.11.1996, and he has resumed his duties on 6.12.1996. Petitioner has stated that pronouncement of triple Talaq was made in the presence of Mohd. Sayeed, son of Abdul Majid, aged about 65 years, and Mohd. Sharif, son of Abdul Majid, aged about 70 years, and many other relatives. Petitioner also stated that he shall not repeat any such act in future, and that he be forgiven. An enquiry proceeded in the matter, and statement of witnesses were recorded in the presence of petitioner, including statement of Mohd. Israr, father of petitioner's first wife Smt. Anno Begum, who categorically denied that any divorce was given by the petitioner to his first wife Anno Begum. In the cross-examination, petitioner raised two questions from Mohd. Israr. In response to the first question, it was stated that after the marriage, Anno Begum came to live with petitioner, and she actually stayed with petitioner for about an year, and in response to the second question, it was specifically denied that Anno Begum was ever divorced. Petitioner's first wife Smt. Anno Begum also appeared as a witness, and she specifically denied that she was ever divorced. All such statements have been recorded in the presence of the petitioner, and he was afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 4. An application before the enquiry officer was submitted by the petitioner on 30th July, 1997, stating that the witnesses, in whose presence, petitioner had pronounced 'Talaq' to divorce his first wife Anno Begum, namely Mohd. Sayeed and Mohd. Sharif are aged persons, who are not well, and hence cannot move easily, and therefore they cannot appear before the enquiry officer to give their statements, and a prayer accordingly was made to appoint an officer, so as to record their statements. 5. The enquiry officer examined the materials adduced before him, and found charges levelled against the petitioner to be proved. 5. The enquiry officer examined the materials adduced before him, and found charges levelled against the petitioner to be proved. It was recorded that stand of divorce to the first wife was highly doubtful, and repeated opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to prove his defence, but no evidence in that regard had been produced. So far as the prayer of petitioner to appoint an officer to record the statements of two witnesses is concerned, the enquiry officer was of the view that such a plea was raised only with an intent to delay and linger the pending enquiry, and in case petitioner wanted to adduce their evidence, he could have brought his witnesses by Car, but no such effort was made, although petitioner was informed that it is his obligation to produce evidence in support of his defence. Enquiry officer also took note of the fact that on 20th August, 1994, petitioner had filed an affidavit before the authorities while making an application for appointment in PAC, categorically stating that his wife's name is Anno Begum, and that she is alive, which contradicts his subsequent plea that he had divorced his wife on 4.2.1994. Enquiry officer also recorded that upon moving of application for grant of leave for conducting second marriage, petitioner was clearly informed that he is already married, and as such he cannot conduct a second marriage, but in reply to such communication also, the petitioner never disclosed about his divorce. The enquiry officer consequently found petitioner guilty of the charges levelled. A show cause notice was thereafter issued to the petitioner as to why petitioner be not dismissed from services, where after the order of dismissal has been passed against the petitioner. 6. Sri. J.J. Munir, learned counsel for the petitioner, has challenged the orders impugned, on following two grounds: - (i). While initiating disciplinary proceedings and serving a charge sheet, statement of petitioner could not have been recorded on the charge sheet itself, and even otherwise, grant of 24 hours' time to submit his reply was insufficient for the petitioner to submit a valid reply, and all consequential proceedings are liable to fail on this ground alone. (ii). While initiating disciplinary proceedings and serving a charge sheet, statement of petitioner could not have been recorded on the charge sheet itself, and even otherwise, grant of 24 hours' time to submit his reply was insufficient for the petitioner to submit a valid reply, and all consequential proceedings are liable to fail on this ground alone. (ii). It is then contended that disciplinary enquiry was to be conducted, in accordance with Rule 14 of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules of 1991'), readwith Appendix-I thereto, which clearly recognised right in charged police officer to have such witnesses called, as he may wish, and by virtue of proviso, the enquiry officer for refusing such a request had to record sufficient reasons, which had not been done, violating the statute. 7. Reliance has also been placed upon Section 4(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Departmental Inquiries (Enforcement of Attendance of Witness and Production of Documents) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1976'), in order to contend that the enquiry officer was vested with the powers of a civil court to summon and enforce the attendance of any witnesses and examining him on oath, which the enquiry officer failed to exercise regarding the impugned action vitiated on account of failure to exercise jurisdiction, vested in him. 8. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, has produced the original records, and it has been stated that on the basis of materials available on record, the charges against the petitioner were clearly made out, and the order of dismissal suffers from no infirmity in the eyes of law. It is also stated that onus was upon the petitioner to prove his defence, and in case the witnesses could not come, their affidavit could have been filed, and petitioner could not insist upon appointment of an officer to record statements of petitioner's witnesses. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondent State at length, and have considered the submissions raised with reference to the materials available on record. 10. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondent State at length, and have considered the submissions raised with reference to the materials available on record. 10. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to record that no challenge has been made to the finding returned by the enquiry officer that the petitioner while seeking appointment in PAC had submitted an affidavit on 20.8.1994, in which he had categorically mentioned name of his wife as Smt. Anno Begum. Although various grounds have been urged in the writ petition, but no challenge has been laid to the statement of fact recorded in the enquiry report about petitioner submitting an affidavit admitting existence of Smt. Anno Begum, as being his wife on 20th August, 1994. If that be so, the subsequent stand of the petitioner that he had divorced Smt. Anno Begum on 4.2.1994 is self contradictory. The categorical statement amounting to admission stairs at the face of the petitioner, which has not been explained at any stage of the proceedings. The conclusion drawn by the enquiry officer, based upon petitioner's affidavit, dated 20th August, 1994, is clearly borne out from the record. 11. Coming to the first submission raised by Sri. Munir, with regard to denial of opportunity in recording statement of petitioner on the charge sheet itself, and granting only 24 hours' time for filing reply, it is to be noticed that petitioner in fact had submitted his detailed reply on 27.1.1997. No application had been filed by the petitioner for grant of further opportunity to file a reply. Once a reply on merits has been filed by the petitioner, within the time allowed, petitioner cannot be permitted to say that he was in any manner prejudiced by providing of a short opportunity to submit his reply. No prejudice has otherwise been shown. So far as recording of statement of petitioner while serving the charge sheet is concerned, it is to be noticed that such reply of the petitioner is not the only material relied upon against him, as has already been noticed above. No prejudice has otherwise been shown. So far as recording of statement of petitioner while serving the charge sheet is concerned, it is to be noticed that such reply of the petitioner is not the only material relied upon against him, as has already been noticed above. A detailed enquiry has been conducted into the charges levelled against the petitioner, and a categorical act of admission on part of the petitioner acknowledging Smt. Anno Begum as his wife much after the date of alleged divorce exists on record, and therefore, not much will turn on account of recording of petitioner's statement, while serving the charge sheet. The first ground of challenge to the impugned proceedings, consequently, is liable to fail. 12. Coming to the second limb of submission, advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be appropriate to reproduce Rule 14 as well as Appendix-I of the Rules of 1991: - “14. Procedure for conducting departmental proceedings- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in these rules, the departmental proceedings in the cases referred to in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 against the Police Officers may be conducted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Appendix 1. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-rule (1) punishments in cases referred to in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 may be imposed after informing the Police Officer in writing of the action proposed to be taken against him and of the imputations of act or omission on which it is proposed to be taken and giving him a reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal. (3) The charged Police Officer shall not be represented by counsel in any proceedings instituted under these rules.” “Appendix-1 Procedure relating to the conduct of departmental proceedings against Police Officer. (See Rule 14 (1)] Upon institution of a formal enquiry such Police Officer against whom the inquiry has been instituted shall be informed in writing of the grounds on which was proposed to take action and shall be afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. (See Rule 14 (1)] Upon institution of a formal enquiry such Police Officer against whom the inquiry has been instituted shall be informed in writing of the grounds on which was proposed to take action and shall be afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be used in the form of a definite charge or charges as in Form 1 appended to these Rules which shall be communicated to the charged Police Officer and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Police Officer of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in, in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the inquiry Officer so directs an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted. At that enquiry such oral evidence will be recorded, as the Inquiry Officer considers necessary. The charged Police Officer shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish: Provided that the Inquiry Officer may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the finding and the ground thereof. The Inquiry Officer may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Police Officer.” Section 4(1) of the Act of 1976 is also reproduced: - “4. Power of authorised inquiring authority to enforce attendance of witnesses and production of document. The Inquiry Officer may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Police Officer.” Section 4(1) of the Act of 1976 is also reproduced: - “4. Power of authorised inquiring authority to enforce attendance of witnesses and production of document. -(1) Every inquiring authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely: - (a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document or other material which is producible as evidence; (c) subject to any claim of privilege [in respect of which Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act (1) of 1872), shall mutatis mutandis apply but Section 162 thereof shall not apply], the requisitioning of any public record from any Court or office.” 13. From the provisions, aforesaid, it is abundantly clear that in proceedings initiated against the charged police officer, procedural safeguards provided in Appendix-I will have to be complied with. In the facts of the present case, petitioner had been charged of violating Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956, which reads as under: - “29. Bigamous marriages- (1) No Government servant who has a wife living shall contract another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Govt. notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under the personal law for the time being applicable to him. (2) No female Govt. servant shall marry any person who has a wife living without first obtaining the permission of the Government.” 14. Petitioner faced with the charge of having conducted a second marriage, without obtaining permission of the Government, was required to adduce his evidence in support of his plea that he had divorced his first wife on 4.2.1994. In the reply submitted by the petitioner, he has stated that there were number of witnesses present at the time of pronouncing the triple Talaq to his wife Smt. Anno Begum, including two persons, referred to above, who were stated to be old and sick. In the reply submitted by the petitioner, he has stated that there were number of witnesses present at the time of pronouncing the triple Talaq to his wife Smt. Anno Begum, including two persons, referred to above, who were stated to be old and sick. In case the petitioner intended to rely upon the testimony of these two persons, it was open for petitioner to have adduced their statement by way of an affidavit to discharge onus to prove his evidence, where after the enquiry officer, in order to verify it, could have considered the question of summoning them, or to have their statements recorded through an officer appointed for the purpose. No statement by way of such an affidavit was filed. Although, according to the petitioner, there were other witnesses, but no other witness was adduced either. The provisions of Appendix-I, conferring the right to the charged police officer to have his witnesses called, as he may wish, cannot be construed as enabling the charged officer to indicate the manner also, in which evidence would be adduced. Primary responsibility is always upon the charged officer to produce his evidence before the enquiry officer, in the manner known to law, which petitioner failed to produce. Although, authority in the enquiry officer to summon witnesses by virtue of Section 4 of the Act of 1976, cannot be doubted, but in the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that such a course was rightly not resorted to by the enquiry officer for the following reasons: - (a) It was open for the charged officer to produce evidence of his witnesses on affidavit, which was clearly permissible, but was not availed. (b) Enquiry officer, as recorded above, had noticed the clear admission of the petitioner, made subsequent to the alleged act of pronouncing Talaq, about Anno Begum being his wife, which had not been explained. This clear admission was a sufficient circumstance for the enquiry officer to have discarded the claim of divorce set up by the petitioner. (c) The enquiry officer had also recorded in his order that petitioner was informed during the course of enquiry that it was for the petitioner to produce his witnesses, in support of alleged plea of divorce. This statement recorded in the report of the enquiry officer has not been denied. (c) The enquiry officer had also recorded in his order that petitioner was informed during the course of enquiry that it was for the petitioner to produce his witnesses, in support of alleged plea of divorce. This statement recorded in the report of the enquiry officer has not been denied. Although, such a fact has been noticed only in the enquiry report, and not in the proceedings of enquiry, but in absence of there being any challenge to such statement of the enquiry officer, this Court is of the opinion that adequate opportunity had been granted to the petitioner to adduce his evidence, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioner had failed to avail it. 15. In view of the discussions, made above, I have no hesitation in holding that the defence of alleged divorce set up by pronouncing triple Talaq to petitioner's first wife Smt. Anno Begum, on 4.2.1994, was rightly disbelieved by the enquiry officer, particularly in view of the petitioner's own admission, contained in his affidavit dated 20.8.1994, that Smt. Anno Begum was his wife. Since the factum of second marriage and non-obtaining of permission from the Government before solemnizing the second marriage are not disputed, as such, the charge of violating Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 is clearly made out against the petitioner, and the punishment meted out to him suffers from no infirmity in the eyes of law. I am of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances, as have been noticed above, petitioner had been afforded adequate opportunity of putting up his defence, in terms of relevant statutory provisions regulating petitioner's services, and as per the principles of natural justice. 16. No ground has been pressed. The writ petition, consequently, fails, and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.