JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Ranjana Pandya, J.—Heard Shri Manish Tiwary, learned counsel for the revisionist and Shri Anurag Khanna, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the CBI. 2. This revision has been preferred against the order dated 2.2.2015 passed by the Special Judge, Anti Corruption, CBI, Ghaziabad in Special Case No. 21 of 2013 (CBI v. Raghuveer Singh and others) arising out of RC No. 1202011A0004, under Sections 120-B, 409, 420 IPC and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act and substantive offence under Sections 409, 420 IPC and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, PS CBI, District Ghaziabad. 3. It has been contended on behalf of the revisionist that sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. has not been obtained and the proceedings cannot continue in the absence of sanction. Thus, the learned lower Court has wrongly rejected the discharge application filed by the accused. 4. Learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon the judgment in Smt. Neera Yadav v. CBI (Bharat Sangh), (2006) 2 ACC 123, in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the question of sanction would not arise in the case of prosecution under Acts 1947 or 1988, for the reason that, as compared to Section 197 Cr.P.C., the scope of protection to public servants under Section 6 of the Act of 1947 and Section 19 of Act of 1988 is very wide. Section 197 of Cr.P.C. read with Section 21 IPC may not cover all the public servants. Sections 6 and 19 of Acts 1947 and 1988 respectively however include a wider range of public servants, i.e., all public servants as defined under Section 21 IPC, in case of Section 6 of Act of 1947 and even wider under Section 19 of Act of 1988. The definition of public servants under Act of 1988 is much wider than Section 21 IPC. 5. Learned counsel for the revisionist has further argued that sanction is a condition pre-requisite for trying a person under the provision of Anti-Corruption Act. 6. The definition of public servants under Act of 1988 is much wider than Section 21 IPC. 5. Learned counsel for the revisionist has further argued that sanction is a condition pre-requisite for trying a person under the provision of Anti-Corruption Act. 6. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the revisionist has placed reliance upon the judgment in P.K. Choudhury v. Commander, 48 BRTF (GREF), (2008) 13 SCC 229 , in which it has been held that Section 197 of the Code unlike the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act postulates obtaining of an order of sanction even in a case where public servant has ceased to hold office. The requirements to obtain a valid order of sanction have been highlighted by this Court in a large number of cases. In S.K. Zutshi v. Bimal Debnath, (2004) 8 SCC 31 , this Apex Court held : “11. The correct legal position, therefore, is that an accused facing prosecution for offences under the old Act or the new Act cannot claim any immunity on the ground of want of Court took cognizance of the said offences. But the position is different in cases where Section 197 of the Code has application.” 7. It has been reiterated that in the absence of sanction, the trial cannot proceed. Hence, the application rejecting the discharge application was wrongly dismissed due to which revision is liable to be allowed. 8. Shri Anurag Khanna, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the CBI has opposed the application while supporting the order of the trial Court and has submitted that in Chandan Kumar Basu v. State of Bihar, decided on 7.7.2004, the Apex Court in paragraph No. 9 has observed as under : “9. The above discussion will now require the Court to consider the question as to whether the acts giving rise to the alleged offences had been committed by the accused in the actual or purported discharge of his official duties. In a series of pronouncements commencing with Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab; Harihar Prasad v. State of Bihar and Prakash Singh Badal and another v. State of Punjab and others, it has been consistently held that it can be no part of the duty of a public servant or acting in the discharge of his official duties to commit any of the offences covered by Section 406, 409, 420 etc. and the official status of the public servant can, at best, only provide an opportunity for commission of the offences. Therefore, no sanction for prosecution of the public servant for such offences would be required under Section 197 of the Code. Notwithstanding the above, the High Court had granted liberty to the appellant to raise the issue of sanction, if so required, depending on the evidence that may come on record in the course of the trial. Despite the view taken by this Court in the series of pronouncements referred to above, the opportunity that has been provided by the High Court to the benefit of the appellant need not be foreclosed by us inasmuch as in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim and Prakash Singh Badal (supra) this Court had consistently held that the question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised at any time after cognizance had been taken and may have to be determined at different stages of the proceeding/trial. The observations of this Court in this regard may be usefully extracted below. Matajob Dobey v. H.C. Bhari (para 21) “The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case.” P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim (para 15) “It is well-settled that question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised any time after the cognizance: may be immediately after cognizance of framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. But there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty. But there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty. In order to come to the conclusion whether claim of the accused, that the act that he did was in course of the performance of his duty was reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial.” Prakash Singh Badal and another v. State of Punjab and others (para27) “The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. ..............” 9. It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the CBI that the revisionist has exceeded his official duty. The allegations in the FIR as well as in the charge-sheet make out a clear case against the revisionist, which have to be considered by the trial Court for framing of charges. 10. The term “official” has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as under: “official.—(1) Of or relating to an office or position of trust or authority.” The term “office” is defined in the same dictionary as under: “office”—(1) A position of duty, trust, or authority, especially one conferred by a Governmental authority for a public purpose 11. Law Lexicon also gives a similar meaning to the expressions “official” and “office” as under: “Official.—.... As adjective, belonging to an officer: of a public officer; in relation to the duties of office.” “Office.—...The word ‘office’ refers to the place where business is transacted....” 12. The term “duty” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary in the following words: “duty.—(1) A legal obligation that is owned or due to another and that needs to be satisfied; an obligation for which somebody else has a corresponding right.” 13. The term “duty” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary in the following words: “duty.—(1) A legal obligation that is owned or due to another and that needs to be satisfied; an obligation for which somebody else has a corresponding right.” 13. The expression “official duty” would in the absence of any statutory definition, therefore, denote a duty that arises by reason of an office or position of trust or authority held by a person. It follows that in every case where the question whether the accused was acting in discharge of his official duty or purporting to act in the discharge of such a duty arises for consideration, the Court will first examine whether the accused was holding an office and, if so, what was the nature of duties cast upon him as holder of any such office. It is only when there is a direct and reasonable nexus between the nature of the duties cast upon the public servant and the act constituting an offence that the protection under Section 197 CrPC may be available and not otherwise. Just because the accused is a public servant is not enough. A reasonable connection between his duties as a public servant and the acts complained of is what will determine whether he was acting in discharge of his official duties or purporting to do so, even if the acts were in excess of what was enjoined upon him as a public servant within the meaning of that expression under Section 197 of the Code. 14. We are supported in that view by the decision of this Court in P Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1976 SC 776, where a three Judge Bench of this Court held: “6. .... It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. .... It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable.” 15. .... It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable.” 15. The legal position was further elaborated and explained by another three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 , wherein this Court held that while Section 197 CrPC was capable of both liberal and narrow interpretations, a moderate and balanced approach was the correct way to interpret that provision to avoid an unfair advantage or disadvantage to the accused. This Court, therefore, evolved the test of a “direct and reasonable” connection between the official duty of the accused and the acts constituting the commission of offence. The Court observed: “17. The words ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’ employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, ‘it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be’. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197 (1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution and the said provision.” (emphasis supplied) 16. The law was reviewed once again by this Court in Army Headquarters v. CBI, (2012) 6 SCC 228 , wherein this Court relying upon the decisions in P. Arulswami and B. Saha cases summed up the legal position in the following words: “42. The protection given under Section 197 CrPC is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The protection given under Section 197 CrPC is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. Use of the expression ‘official duty’ implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in the course of his service and that it should have been done in discharge of his duty. The section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty, then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 CrPC cannot be disputed.” 17. Thus, the test of “direct and reasonable” connection between the official duty of the accused and the acts, allegedly committed by them is therefore to be applied while deciding whether protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. is available to a public servant because of the commission of an offence. 18. During investigation it was revealed that the revisionist Dinesh Chandra Shukla was posted and functioning as District Magistrate, Mainpuri during the period 9.10.2007 to 29.1.2009 as a public servant. He has retired from Government service w.e.f. 31.12.2011. 18. During investigation it was revealed that the revisionist Dinesh Chandra Shukla was posted and functioning as District Magistrate, Mainpuri during the period 9.10.2007 to 29.1.2009 as a public servant. He has retired from Government service w.e.f. 31.12.2011. As District Magistrate, Mainpuri the revisionist was awarded work of serving Mid Day Meal in Primary and Upper Primary Schools of 6 blocks and urban area of Mainpuri to M/s SEARCH, sanctioned payment of conversion cost to M/s SEARCH and was Nodal Officer for Mid Day Meal Scheme in Mainpuri. The revisionist alongwith other co-accused with dishonest intention of committing the offences of cheating, misappropriated funds causing pecuniary wrongful loss to the Government Exchequer to the tune of Rs. 6.38 crores approximate as payment of excess conversion cost and released excess food grains weighing about 41691.94 qt approximate to M/s SEARCH and corresponding gain to themselves and others. As per Government Order No. 1429/79-6-04-1(6)/2000 TC-3 dated 25.6.2004 provided that District Magistrate will function as Chairman of the District Level Committee for supervision of Mid Day Meal Scheme and would hold minimum one meeting every month in this regard. The appointment of District Magistrate as Nodal Officer for Mid Day Meal Scheme was reconfirm. 19. Investigation further revealed that in pursuance of aforesaid criminal conspiracy, revisionist the then District Magistrate, Mainpuri dishonestly and fraudulently reassigned the task of distribution of Mid Day Meals in three Blocks of Mainpuri District w.e.f. March, 2008, despite being aware that performance of the NGO was not satisfactory during its earlier assignment in the District and without obtaining mandatory unwillingness from concerned Village Pradhans and also without making any wide publicity in this regard and violated circulars. 20. He further submitted that the proposal of M/s SEARCH for providing Mid Day Meal in Mainpuri District was processed by Shri Vishun Dayal Rajput, Senior Clerk and was recommended by the then CDO, Shri Hirday Shankar Chaturvedi and approved by the revisionist on 1.3.2008. 21. Thus, revisionist in pursuance of the aforesaid criminal conspiracy, dishonestly and fraudulently by abusing his official position awarded contract to M/s SEARCH in 2008 for serving Mid Day Meal in 6 Blocks and city area of Mainpuri. He also sanctioned Rs. 13,64,627/- to M/s SEARCH regarding service of Mid Day Meal. 21. Thus, revisionist in pursuance of the aforesaid criminal conspiracy, dishonestly and fraudulently by abusing his official position awarded contract to M/s SEARCH in 2008 for serving Mid Day Meal in 6 Blocks and city area of Mainpuri. He also sanctioned Rs. 13,64,627/- to M/s SEARCH regarding service of Mid Day Meal. The revisionist being District Magistrate was entrusted with domain over the budgetary allocation dishonestly and fraudulently made payment of conversion cost to the tune of Rs. 46096003/- to M/s SEARCH without observing the basic norms of payment. Thus, there was sufficient evidence before the trial Court to frame charges against the revisionist and learned lower Court has rightly rejected the discharge application. 22. As far as discharge is concerned, the grounds on which an accused can be discharged are as follows: (i) If upon consideration that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused for which he is required to record his reasons for so doing. No reasons are required to be recorded when the charges are framed against the accused persons. (ii) Where it is shown that the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence cannot show that the accused committed the crime, then and then alone the Court can discharge the accused. The Court is not required to enter into meticulous consideration of evidence and material placed before it at this stage. 23. In Santosh Kumar Yadav and others v. State of U.P. and another, 2011 (72) ACC 770, it has been laid down that if there is ingredients of offence against the accused, charge should be framed. The Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and another, 2010(1) ACR (SC), has laid down that whether the materials at the hands of the prosecution are sufficient or not are matters for trial. At the stage of charge, it cannot be claimed that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and discharge is the only remedy. Whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal is absolutely immaterial. 24. At the stage of charge, it cannot be claimed that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and discharge is the only remedy. Whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal is absolutely immaterial. 24. The learned lower Court while referring the case of R.N. Mishra v. State of U.P., Crl.L.J. 2011 has specifically stated that if a Government Servant during the performance of his duties commits any illegal act, shall be liable under Prevention of Corruption Act and there is no need for sanction in this regard at all. 25. Under the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court is required to exercise its powers where there is material irregularity or manifest error of law or procedure, or there is misconception or misreading of evidence or where the Court below has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or has exercised the jurisdiction wrongly and perversely or where the facts admitted or proved do not discloses any offence. 26. As a broad proposition, the interference of revisional Court may be justified in cases (i) where the decision is grossly erroneous (ii) where there is no compliance with the provision of law (iii) where the finding of fact affecting the decision is not based on evidence on record (iv) where the material evidence of parties has not been considered (v) where the Court below has misread or mis-appreciated the evidence on record (vi) where the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or perversely. 27. In the case of Jagannath Chaudhary v. Ramayan Singh, AIR 2002 SC 2229 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “revisional jurisdiction is normally to be exercised only in exceptional cases where there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law resulting in miscarriage of justice”. 28. The order is well reasoned and based on material on record. The order under revision does not need any interference. 29. Accordingly, the revision is dismissed. ——————