JUDGMENT Anil Kumar, J. 1. Heard Sri Vijay Bahadur Verma, learned counsel for petitioner and perused the record. 2. Facts in brief of the present case are that the petitioner/Ram Pyare Verma has filed a suit for injunction against Sri Bans Raj Singh registered as Regular Suit No. 406 of 1984 (Ram Pyare Vs. Banshraj), during the pendency of the same, Sri Bas Raj Singh has died, as such an application has been moved in order to bring his legal representatives on record, allowed by order dated 07.08.2010. 3. Thereafter, Sri Balram Singh/O.P. No. 4 moved an application before the court below/Small Cause Courts Act to be made a party in Regular Suit No. 406 of 1984 on the ground that the land in dispute has been purchased by him by way of a sale deed to which the petitioner has filed objection, allowed by order dated 03.11.2000 passed by O.P. No. 2. 4. Aggrieved by the same, he filed an appeal (Civil Appeal No. 77 of 2000, Ram Pyare Verma Vs. Balram Singh and others), dismissed by order dated 28.01.2002 passed by the appellate court/3rd Additional District Judge, Faizabad with a direction that Balram Singh is a necessary and property for adjudication of the dispute involved in the suit with an observation that defendant No. 1/1-Sri Ram Narain Singh has already been made as party/defendant in the suit by the plaintiff himself. Aggrieved by the order dated 03.11.2000 and 28.02.2002 passed by O.P. Nos. 2 and 1 respectively, present writ petition has been filed. 5. After hearing learned counsel for parties and going through the record, in order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, it will be appropriate to go through the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, quoted as under: - "52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto. 5. After hearing learned counsel for parties and going through the record, in order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, it will be appropriate to go through the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, quoted as under: - "52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto. - During the [pendency] in any Court having authority [within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir] or established beyond such limits] by [the Central Government] [***] of [any] suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. [Explanation - For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force." 6. Further, Doctrine of lis pendens is expressed in the maxim "ut lite pendente nihil innovetur". It imposes a prohibition on transfer or otherwise dealing of any property, during the pendency of a suit, provided the conditions laid down in Section 52 of the Act are satisfied. 7. The principle of lis pendens, it is said, owe its origin to the maxim of Roman Law "Rem de qua controversia prohib mur in acrum dedicate", which means, where the subject in dispute owing to contest passes into the custody of the judiciary, parties to it are under an obligation not to withdraw it from the protection of the Judge. 8. The Apex Court in Jagan Singh Vs. 8. The Apex Court in Jagan Singh Vs. Dhanwanti, : 2012(2) SCC 628 has favoured to apply principle of lis pendens irrespective of the fact, whether there was any stay order passed by Court or not. The Court said: "If such a view is not taken, it would plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail. The explanation to this section lays down that the pendency of a suit or a proceeding shall be deemed to continue until the suit or a proceeding is disposed of by final decree or order, and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force. In the present case, it would be canvassed on behalf of the respondent and the applicant that the sale has taken place in favour of the applicant at a time when there was no stay operating against such sale, and in fact when the second appeal had not been filed. We would however, prefer to follow the dicta in Krishanaji Pandharinath (supra) to cover the present situation under the principle of lis-pendens since the sale was executed at a time when the second appeal had not been filed but which came to be filed afterwards within the period of limitation. The doctrine of lis-pendens is founded in public policy and equity, and if it has to be read meaningfully such a sale as in the present case until the period of limitation for second appeal is over will have to be held as covered under section 52 of the T.P. Act." 9. So, the doctrine of lis pendens is a doctrine based on the ground that it is necessary for the administration of justice that the decision of a court in a suit should be binding not only on the litigating parties but on those who derive title pendente lite. The provision of this Section does not indeed annul the conveyance or the transfer otherwise, but to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to a litigation. Discussing the principles of lis pendens, the Privy Council in the case of Gouri Dutt Maharaj v. Sukur Mohammed & Ors. The provision of this Section does not indeed annul the conveyance or the transfer otherwise, but to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to a litigation. Discussing the principles of lis pendens, the Privy Council in the case of Gouri Dutt Maharaj v. Sukur Mohammed & Ors. : AIR (35) 1948, observed as under: "The broad purpose of Section 52 is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination. The applicability of the section cannot depend on matters of proof or the strength or weakness of the case on one side or the other in bona fide proceedings. To apply any such test is to misconceive the object of the enactment and in the view of the Board, the learned Subordinate Judge was in error in this respect in laying stress, as he did, on the fact that the agreement of 8.6.1932, had not been registered." 10. Thus, it is true that a purchaser who purchased the property during the pendency of the suit is bound by the decree in the suit and such purchaser cannot be considered as a necessary party to the suit. But, he certainly can be considered as a proper party to the suit, looking into the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, particularly so when he comes up with a plea that the plaintiff and the defendant had collude to harm his interest. Failure to implead him would lead to multiplicity of litigation. 11. In addition to the abovesaid facts, the next provision which is to be considered to resolve the controversy in the instant matter is Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC, reads as under: - "Court may strike out or add parties.--The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. " 12. " 12. From the perusal of order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC, it covers two types of cases: - (a) of a party who ought to have been joined but not joined and is a necessary party, and (b) of a party without whose presence the question involved in the case cannot be completely decided. 13. The former is called a necessary party and the latter a proper party. Sub-R. (2) of O.1, R.10, therefore, is attracted when the question is covered by one of the above. A party seeking such a joinder as a proper party will have to prima facie establish that such a party has interest in the subject-matter of the litigation and as such should be before the Court. 14. The simple test in such controversy would be as to whether the presence of such a party is appropriate in view of the subject-matter in adjudication. If the answer be in the affirmative, joinder can be permitted. By reason of direct interest in the subject-matter or even by reason of eventual reliefs sought, such a test would be answered. Power being there, it is all a matter of appreciation of the controversy in issue and its possible ramifications. 15. O. 1, R. 10(2), C.P. Code gives a very wide discretion to the Court to deal with any such situation which may result in prejudicing the interest of affected party if not impleaded in the suit and where the impleadment of the said party is necessary and vital for the decision of the suit. It is true that the discretion has to be exercised judicially but at the same time the concerned civil or appellate court where the suit on appeal is pending has also to take into consideration that the party which is necessary to be impleaded will be put to a greater difficulty if not impleaded by the plaintiff who may have ulterior motives of not impleading such party and if the decision is given which may affect the interest of the said party greater prejudice would be caused to the said party as a result of not impleading while no prejudice or loss would be caused to the plaintiff because he will have full opportunity to defend his rights and interest as against aggrieved party who has been impleaded as a party to the suit. 16. 16. The important aspect which should be looked into by the Civil Courts while deciding the applications under O.1, R.10(2), C.P. Code is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and also conflicting decisions being passed in different suits which will be safeguarded as a result of allowing necessary party to be impleaded in the suit (See Baijnath v. Ganga Devi : A.I.R. 1998 Raj. 125). 17. The expression "to settle all questions involved" used in O.1, R.10(2), is susceptive of liberal and wide interpretation so as to adjudicate all the questions pertaining to the subject-matter thereof. 18. The Parliament in its wisdom while framing this rule must have thought that all the material questions common to the parties to the suit and to the third parties should be tried once for all and the Court is clothed with the power to secure the aforesaid result with judicious discretion to add parties, including third parties (See Abdul Jaleel v. Aishabi : A.I.R. 1992 Karn. 380). 19. The word "At any stage" in Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC means that there is no requirement of law that an application for addition of a party as defendant must be made at any particular stage of the trial though in a given case delay in moving an application might be one of the considerations for the decision (See. Gurmauj Saran v. Joyce C. Salim : A.I.R. 1990 Del. 13 (D.B.). 20. The use of the expression "at any stage of proceedings" in O.1, R.10(2) shows that the power vested in the Court under it can be exercised only when the proceedings before it are alive and still pending. Once the adjudication itself of all the disputes in the case is over, this provision cannot be made use of by any party (See Sardar Ali Khan v. Special Deputy Collector : A.I.R. 1973 Andh. Pra. 298 (D.B.). 21. Under Order 1 Rule 10(2) C.P.C., the power to add a party to add a party to a proceeding cannot depend solely on the question whether he has interest in the suit property. The question is whether the right of a person may be affected if he is not added as a party. Such right, however, will include necessarily an enforceable legal right. 22. The question is whether the right of a person may be affected if he is not added as a party. Such right, however, will include necessarily an enforceable legal right. 22. O.1, R.10(2) empowers the Court to implead any person as party suo motu, who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. True, the plaintiff is dominus litis, but a Court has to guard against the obtaining of a collusive decree against the real owner or interested person without impleading him as a party and to see that such a decree does not become final affecting vitally the rights of such person. Therefore, to avoid such a situation and also to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, a Court should permit such a person to be added as a party (See Kamta Prasad v. Vidyawati : A.I.R.1994 Madh. Pra. 181). 23. In the case of Savinder Singh Vs. Dalip Singh, : (1996) 5 SCC 539 , Hon'ble the Apex Court held as under: - "It would, therefore, be clear that the defendants in the suit were prohibited by operation of Section 52to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the Court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the Court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lie pendens by operation of Section 52. Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit." 24. In the case of Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs Nanak Builders & Investrs. Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lie pendens by operation of Section 52. Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit." 24. In the case of Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs Nanak Builders & Investrs. Pvt. Ltd. & Others, : 2013 (2) JCLR 56 (SC), after considering the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC as well as Section 52 of the Transfer of Properties Act and Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, Hon'ble the Supreme Court had examined the question that whether a transferee pendente lite could in a suit for specific performance, be added as a party defendant and, if so, on what terms, held as under (relevant portion): - "1) The appellant is not a bona fide purchaser and is, therefore, not protected against specific performance of the contract between the plaintiffs and the owner defendants in the suit. (2) The transfer in favour of the appellant pendente lite is effective in transferring title to the appellant but such title shall remain subservient to the rights of the plaintiff in the suit and subject to any direction which the Court may eventually pass therein. (3) Since the appellant has purchased the entire estate that forms the subject matter of the suit, the appellant is entitled to be added as a party defendant to the suit. (4) The appellant shall as a result of his addition raise and pursue only such defenses as were available and taken by the original defendants and none other." 25. Further, as per provision of O.22, R. 10 CPC an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party. Although the plaintiff is not bound to make him a party. But the Court has discretion in the matter to allow him to be a party but the same must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. 26. For the foregoing reasons and the reasoning given by the court below in the impugned orders while allowing the impleadment application and rejecting the petitioner's application against the impleadment, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the said order, so the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.