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Allahabad High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 4165 (ALL)

Shabana Khatoon v. District Election Tribunal/District Judge

2015-12-23

RAJAN ROY

body2015
JUDGMENT Rajan Roy, J. – Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This is a writ petition challenging inter alia the decision dated 09.05.2013 passed by the District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar allowing the Election Petition No. 04 of 2012 filed by the opposite party no. 2 declaring the election of the petitioner as President of Municipality, Asharafpur Kichhauchha, District Amebedkar Nagar as illegal. An order dated 08.05.2013 rejecting the application of the petitioner for adjournment and closing his evidence; another order dated 09.05.2013 rejecting the application for recall of the order dated 08.05.2013; another order dated 09.05.2013 rejecting the application for adjournment of the proceedings of the election petition till the hearing of the S.L.P. have also been challenged. 3. The case has a chequered history, it is, therefore, necessary to narrate relevant facts, which are as under. 4. The petitioner herein was elected as President of the aforesaid Municipality on 07.07.2012. On 27.07.2012, the opposite parties filed an election petition bearing No. 04 of 2012, under Section 19 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916(hereinafter referred as the 'Act, 1916') assailing the election of the petitioner herein on the ground of her disqualification by virtue of Section 43-AA(1)(b) the Act, 1916 as she had not attained the minimum age of 30 years on the date of her nomination i.e. on 12.06.2012, as, her date of birth was 15.07.1986. Notices were issued in the said Election petition. The Assistant District Election Officer filed written statement. The petitioner herein who was the defendant no. 1 in the election petition also filed her written statement inter alia stating that her date of birth is 15.07.1975 which has been erroneously mentioned as 15.07.1986 (in the High School Certificate). The proceedings were conducted ex-parte against the other defendants i.e. the defendants no. 2 to 12. Issues were framed on 16.11.2012. 5. In the meantime, on 13.12.2012 i.e. after filing of the election petition and during its pendency, the petitioner herein filed a Writ Petition No. 7064(MS) of 2012 seeking a direction to the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. Allahabad (hereinafter referred to 'the Board') to consider her representation for correction of date of birth in her High School Certificate. 6. On 15.12.2012, the testimony of the Election petitioner (opposite party no. 2 herein) was recorded as PW-1 and 18.12.2012 was fixed as the date for evidence of the defendant no. 6. On 15.12.2012, the testimony of the Election petitioner (opposite party no. 2 herein) was recorded as PW-1 and 18.12.2012 was fixed as the date for evidence of the defendant no. 1 (petitioner herein). On 18.12.2012, the defendant no.1 sought adjournment and the matter was posted for 20.12.2012 for her evidence. On the next date again adjournment was sought by the defendant and the matter was posted for 01.01.2013 for the same purpose. On 01.01.2013, the defendant no. 1(petitioner herein) moved an application for deferment of proceedings on the ground of pendency of representation for correction of date of birth before the Board and in view of the judgment of the High Court dated 17.12.2012 rendered in his Writ Petition No. 7064(MS) of 2012 for deciding such representation. The District Judge invited objections to the said application and posted the matter to 07.01.2013 for hearing of the same as also for the evidence of defendant no. 1. On 10.01.2013, adjournment request on behalf of the defendant no. 1 was accepted and the matter was posted to 14.01.2013 for the same purpose. The matter was again adjourned at the behest of the defendant no. 1 and fixed for 18.01.2013 accordingly. 7. In the meantime, the defendant no. 1 (petitioner herein) filed Writ Petition No. 159(MS) of 2013 challenging the order dated 07.01.2013 referred herein above which was disposed of on 11.01.2013 with a direction to the District Judge to decide the application of the petitioner for deferment first before proceeding with the matter. On 22.01.2013, the said application for deferment was considered and rejected by the District Judge with the observation that the election petition had to be decided on priority basis in view of the directions of the High Court on the Administrative side and 29.01.2013 was fixed as next date for evidence of the defendant no. 1 therein. 8. The defendant no. 1 (petitioner herein) filed another Writ Petition bearing No. 659(MS) of 2013 assailing the aforesaid order dated 22.01.2013 which was disposed of on 31.01.2013 with a direction to the District Judge not to proceed with the election petition till 25.02.2013. 9. In the meantime, on 14.02.2013, the Board rejected the petitioner's application dated 20.12.2012 for correction of date of birth as being time barred. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 1251(MS) of 2013 challenging the order of the Board dated 14.02.2013. 9. In the meantime, on 14.02.2013, the Board rejected the petitioner's application dated 20.12.2012 for correction of date of birth as being time barred. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 1251(MS) of 2013 challenging the order of the Board dated 14.02.2013. No interim order was passed in his favour. 10. On 25.02.2013 a Transfer Petition was filed by her before the District Judge alleging that she had seen the Election Petitioner and one Faizan Ahmad @ Chand leaving the residence of the District Judge thereby expressing apprehension of bias on his parts. The said petition was dismissed by the District Judge on 26.02.2013 stating that he had left his residence for Lucknow on 24.02.2013 to meet the Chairman of the Infrastructure Committee and had returned only on 25.02.2013. Further he gave liberty to the petitioner to challenge his order before the High Court within one week and fixed the case for her evidence on 05.03.2013. 11. On 04.03.2013, the petitioner filed a Transfer Petition No. 29 of 2013, under Section 24 of C.P.C. before the High Court regarding the transfer of Election Petition No. 04 of 2012. On 06.03.2013, this Court stayed further proceedings in the election petition. 12. On 09.04.2013, the petitioner filed a writ petition bearing No. 2404(MS) of 2013 assailing the order of the District Judge dated 26.02.2013 dismissing his transfer petition. The Writ Petition No. 2404(MS) of 2013 was disposed of on 11.04.2013 as the petitioner confined his grievance to the observation made in the order dated 26.02.2013 passed by the District Judge regarding her age. This Court observed that the District Judge would not be influenced by the observation made by him in his order dated 26.02.2013 while deciding the election petition. 13. On 06.05.2013, this Court dismissed the Transfer Petition No. 29 of 2013 for transferring the Election Petition No. 04 of 2012 holding that it was a malafide action with intent to delay the disposal of the election petition. 13. On 06.05.2013, this Court dismissed the Transfer Petition No. 29 of 2013 for transferring the Election Petition No. 04 of 2012 holding that it was a malafide action with intent to delay the disposal of the election petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner made a statement in those proceedings that the applicant shall not seek any adjournment before the learned District Judge on any ground whatsoever where upon the Court refrained from imposing cost in view of the aforesaid undertaking but dismissed the writ petition with a direction to the District Judge to proceed with the case preferably on day to day basis and shall not adjourn the case for want of counsel as it is the duty of the parties to keep their counsel ready with the case. 14. Contrary to the undertaking given before the High Court, the petitioner herein sought an adjournment on 08.05.2013 before the District Judge in the election petition on the ground of non availability of counsel. The said application was rejected by the District Judge on the same day considering the observations/directions of the High Court and also in view of the fact that Raees Ahmad, Advocate and earlier counsel for the defendant was present in the Court. The opportunity of the defendant no. 1(petitioner herein) to lead evidence was closed on the same day and the matter was fixed for argument on 09.05.2013. 15. An application for recall of the order dated 08.05.2013 and for granting an opportunity to lead evidence was filed on 09.05.2013. The District Judge rejected the same and proceeded to hear the matter. During the course of hearing another application was filed seeking deferment of further proceedings on account of alleged pendency of a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court dated 06.05.2013 passed in the Transfer Petition No. 29 of 2013. The said application was also rejected as no proof of filing of and pendency of S.L.P. had been annexed and also in view of the direction of the High Court. On the same day the judgment was pronounced allowing the election petition and declaring the election of the petitioner illegal and void-ab-initio with a further direction to the concerned authority for proceeding to hold fresh elections. 16. On the same day the judgment was pronounced allowing the election petition and declaring the election of the petitioner illegal and void-ab-initio with a further direction to the concerned authority for proceeding to hold fresh elections. 16. This led to the final of the instant writ petition for the reliefs claimed and on 22.05.2013 this Court ordered maintenance of status quo in respect to the post of President of the Municipality. 17. During the pendency of the writ petition certain developments have taken place which also need a mention. On 24/30.06.2013 the Board resolved to correct the date of birth of the petitioner in the high school certificate and mark sheet from 15.07.1986 to 15.07.1975. This decision was communicated to the Principal of the Inter College concerned, from where the aforesaid qualification had been acquired by the petitioner, on 30/31.08.2013. In these circumstances, the petitioner withdrew Writ Petition No. 1251(MS) of 2013. The aforesaid fact along with corrected high school certificate and mark sheet were brought on record of this writ petition by the petitioner by means of a supplementary affidavit. The opposite party no. 2 herein (election petitioner) filed a writ petition bearing C.M.W.P. No. 51782 of 2013 before this Court at Allahabad assailing the said decision of the Board and the consequential action for correction of date of birth of the petitioner. On 20.09.2013, the decision impugned in the said writ petition was stayed by this Court with a direction that any mark sheet or certificate issued on its basis shall not be given effect to. The petitioner filed Special Appeal No. 1416 of 2013 assailing the aforesaid interim order dated 20.09.2013 which was dismissed on 07.10.2013. On 06.12.2013, C.M.W.P. No. 51782 of 2013 was allowed and the correction in the date of birth of the petitioner was set-aside. The petitioner preferred Special Appeal No. 95 of 2014 assailing the said judgment of the learned Single Judge which was dismissed on 10.09.2014. The said judgment has attained finality between the parties. 18. It is against the aforesaid factual background that the matter was heard and is being decided. 19. A preliminary objection was raised by Shri Apoorva Tiwari, learned counsel for the opposite party no. The said judgment has attained finality between the parties. 18. It is against the aforesaid factual background that the matter was heard and is being decided. 19. A preliminary objection was raised by Shri Apoorva Tiwari, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 that the writ petition against the decision of the District Judge seeking a writ of certiorari for its quashing itself was not maintainable in view of the recent dictum of the Supreme Court in the Case of Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors, 2015 (5) SCC 423 , the impugned decision being a judgment of a Civil Court. It was contented that the District Judge referred in Section 20 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, is not a persona designata, therefore a civil Court. In support of his contention, he relied upon the aforesaid judgment as also the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in (1991) 2 SCC 637 , Maharashtra S.F.C. v. Jaycee Dgrugs & Phamr.; (1995) 5 SCC 5 , Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayail Aboobacker; (2002) 5 SCC 510 , ITI Ltd. v. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd; AIR 1963 SC 874 , Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd; AIR 1965 SC 1595 , Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the District Judge does not function as a Civil Court so as to attract the aforesaid dictum, therefore, preliminary objection was misconceived. 21. The preliminary objection has to be considered in the light of the scheme of the Act, 1916. Section 13-K (c) provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to question the legality of any action taken or any decision given by the Returning Officer or by any other officer appointed under this Act in connection with an election. Sub-section 2 of Section 13-K provides that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Thus, by virtue of the said provisions, the jurisdiction of all Civil Courts with respect to the matters pertaining to election under the Act has been specifically barred. Section 20(5) provides that the election petition shall be presented to the District Judge exercising the jurisdiction in the area in which the municipality, to which the election petition relates, is situate. Thus, by virtue of the said provisions, the jurisdiction of all Civil Courts with respect to the matters pertaining to election under the Act has been specifically barred. Section 20(5) provides that the election petition shall be presented to the District Judge exercising the jurisdiction in the area in which the municipality, to which the election petition relates, is situate. Section 19 contains the grounds on which the election of any person as a member of a municipality may be questioned. Section 23 lays down that except so far as may be otherwise provided by this Act or by rule, the procedure provided in the Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908) in regard to suits, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with this Act or any rule and so far it can be made applicable, be followed in the hearing of the election petition subject of course to the proviso contained in the said section. Proviso (b) lays down that the District Judge shall not be required to record or have recorded the evidence in full, but shall make a memorandum of the evidence sufficient in its opinion for the purpose of deciding the case. Proviso (d) lays down that the District Judge for the purpose of deciding any issue, shall only be bound to require the production of, or to receive so much evidence, oral or documentary, as it considers necessary. Proviso (e) lays down that during the hearing of the case the District Judge may refer a question of law to the High Court under Order 46 of the First Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, but there shall be no appeal either on question of law or fact, and no application in revision against or in respect of the decision of the District Judge. Proviso (f) lays down that any person considering himself aggrieved by the decision may apply for review to the District Judge within 30 days from the date of the decision and the District Judge may thereupon review the decision on any point provided that in computing the period of limitation (for review) the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply. Section 25 deals with the findings of the District Judge and the reliefs to be granted by him. 22. Section 25 deals with the findings of the District Judge and the reliefs to be granted by him. 22. As far as the dictum of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) is concerned, the same fell for consideration by this Court in Writ Petition No. 6795(MS) of 2014, wherein, a similar objection was raised by the same counsel in respect to the exercise of revisional powers by the District Judge under Section 12-C(6) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as 'Act of 1947') and this Court after considering the said judgment and order held as under: - "On a holistic reading of the entire judgment this court is not in doubt that the term "Judicial Courts" and "Civil Courts" have been used synonymously. The term "Judicial Court" has been used with reference to regular civil courts, and not other courts dealing with civil issues. In fact, the proceedings in the said case arose from the proceedings of regular ordinary civil courts governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, and the question considered and answered was as to "whether a writ of certiorari would lie against the judicial orders passed by such regular civil courts ?". The dictum of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam's case (supra), therefore, has to be read, understood and applied in the context of the factual scenario, issues involved, considered and answered by it, and not bereft of it. On a perusal of the said judgment, referred herein above, this court has no doubt that the legal position clarified therein is with respect to the amenability of judgments and orders of the civil court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure to Article 226 of the Constitution and not other inferior courts or Tribunals. It draws a distinction between orders of civil court which stand on a different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. Radhey Shyam's case uses the term "judicial courts" and "civil courts" as synonymous and distinct from other Courts or Tribunals." 23. On a perusal of the said decision, it is quite evident that the dictum in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) is applicable in the case of judicial orders passed by the ordinary civil court which are distinct from other Courts or Tribunal. On a perusal of the said decision, it is quite evident that the dictum in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) is applicable in the case of judicial orders passed by the ordinary civil court which are distinct from other Courts or Tribunal. In the said case considering the scheme of the Act, 1947 it was held that the District Judge while exercising power under Section 12-C(6) did not function as a Civil Court as referred in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) and the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari was held to be maintainable. The plea that the District Judge under the said provision was not a persona designata but an ordinary civil court based on the decisions already referred herein above was also considered but was repelled considering the legislative intent to the contrary contained in the provisions of the Act, 1947. The relevant extract of the said judgment on the issue of persona designata reads as under: - "In view of the scheme of the Act of 1947, if, it is held that the District Judge functions as a civil court under Section 12-C(6) under Section 12-C(6), it will be incongruous to the express language and specific provision contained in Section 12-I. Merely because the District Judge is not a persona designata, it does not ipso facto follow that he is a civil court thereby attracting the dictum of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam's case. Though the District Judge is not a persona designata. He is also not a civil court. The legislative intent is clear. The remedy has not been provided before the civil courts. In fact, jurisdiction of all civil courts is specifically barred in such matters, as is evident from the use of words "no civil court shall have jurisdiction" to question the legality of any decision given by an officer or authority approved under the Act in connection with the conduct of elections thereunder. If the legislative intent was to provide a remedy against the decision of the prescribed authority before the civil court, then the language of Section 12-I would have been different. It is not in dispute that the authority prescribed for the purposes of Section 12-C(1) is not a court. If the legislative intent was to provide a remedy against the decision of the prescribed authority before the civil court, then the language of Section 12-I would have been different. It is not in dispute that the authority prescribed for the purposes of Section 12-C(1) is not a court. The decision in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation's case is not applicable to the present case, as, the scheme of the Act of 1947 and the provisions contained in the Act of 1951 which was considered in the said case, are different. The issues were also different. In the said case the question, inter alia, was applicability of C.P.C. to the proceedings under Sections 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporation Act 1951 for enforcement of liability under Section 31 read with Section 32 thereof upon a person who had not given any property in security and had given only a personal guarantee. The contention was that the court below veritably passed a money decree against such a person as if under the provisions of C.P.C. The Supreme Court firstly taking into consideration the words in Section 31 of the Act of 1951 held that "any surety" would include such a person; secondly, it held that though Sections 31 and 32 had the effect of cutting across and dispensing with the provisions of C.P.C. and the order under Section 32 was not stricto sensu a money decree under Section 2(2) C.P.C., considering Section 46(B) of the said Act it held that "in the absence of anything inconsistent in the Act" the provisions of C.P.C. shall obviously be applicable for the enforcement of liability of the surety in the same manner as a decree is enforced in a suit instituted in this behalf. It also held that even if Section 46(B) was not there, "in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the Act" such order could have been enforced in the manner provided in C.P.C. The legal basis for this was mentioned in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment and it is on these observations that Sri Tiwari has relied. It was held that the District Judge referred in Sections 31 and 32 was not a persona designata, but a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. The Supreme Court relied upon National sewing thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. It was held that the District Judge referred in Sections 31 and 32 was not a persona designata, but a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. The Supreme Court relied upon National sewing thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 357 , wherein it was held that "the rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practise and procedure of that court". In National Sewing thread Co.'s case (supra) another decision rendered in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster-General, 1913 AC 546, was cited wherein it was stated "when a question is stated to be referred to an established court without anything more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of procedure of that court are to attach and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches". It also referred to the case of Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21 , wherein it was held that Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the High Court "and says nothing more about it", that being so the High Court has to exercise its other appellate jurisdiction by a Single Judge Bench. Therefore, his judgment becomes subject to appeal under Clause 15 of latter's Patent Act, "there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act". Relying on these decisions the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation ' case (supra) held that even in absence of Section 46(B) provisions of C.P.C. would have been attracted. In the said case provisions of C.P.C. were applicable as per sub-Sections 6, 8, 8A and 9 of Section 32, though not in its entirety, and also in view of Section 46B and as the District Judge functioned under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act of 1951 not as a persona designata, but a civil court, there being nothing to the contrary in the said Act of 1951. However, in the Act of 1947 which is under consideration in this writ petition, as stated earlier, while entrusting the revisional function to the District Judge under Section 12-C(6), the Legislature does not stop at that and it is not as if it does not say anything more, nor that there is nothing inconsistent or contrary to the aforesaid proposition in the Act of 1947. Firstly it has inserted Section 12-I which bars the jurisdiction of all civil courts in respect of any action taken or decision given by an officer or authority in connection with the conduct of elections under the Act, therefore, to say that the District Judge under Section 12-C(6) functions as a civil court will be inconsistent with and in conflict with Section 12-I, as has already been considered and concluded in the earlier part of the judgment. There is no provision in the State Financial Corporation Act 1951 analogous to Section 12-I of the Act of 1947." 24. Though, the provisions of the Act, 1947 contain certain provisions which were different vis-a-vis the Act of 1916, nevertheless, the observations quoted herein above do apply in this case also considering the scheme of the Act, 1916, irrespective of some of the distinguishing features. 25. This Court finds specific exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters of elections under the Act, 1916 specially for the purposes of challenging any election under the said Act. A special forum has been created under Section 20(5). To hold that the District Judge referred therein acts as a civil court would be incongruous to the legislative intent contained in Section 13-K of the Act, 1916. A special forum has been created under Section 20(5). To hold that the District Judge referred therein acts as a civil court would be incongruous to the legislative intent contained in Section 13-K of the Act, 1916. Further more, as far as the procedure to be followed by the District Judge while trying an election petition under the Act, 1916 is concerned, like Rule 4 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1994, under Section 23 of the Act, 1916 also, the procedure provided in the Civil Procedure Code in regard to suit is applicable to the election petition under Section 19 and 20 of the said Act "so far as it is not inconsistent with this Act or any rule and so far it can be made applicable subject of course to the provisions contained therein and except so far as may be otherwise provided by this Act or by Rule." Under Rule 4 of the Panchayat Rules, 1994 referred herein above the C.P.C. has been made applicable to such proceedings before the prescribed authority under the Act of 1947 as far as may be'. Provisions of Section 23 of the Act, 1916 are similar to the provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules, 1994 referred herein above relating to the Panchayat Election. 26. Similar provisions regarding applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure are there in Section 87 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 and the purport of the words 'as nearly as may be' has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sammer Singh v. Kedar Nath reported in 1987 Supp SCC 660 and they were understood to mean that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure do not apply in their entirety to the trial of the election petition. The same was also considered in the case of K.V Rao v. Branch Manager reported in 1969 SC 872 wherein it was held that Section 87 of the Act, 1951 did not equate an election petition with a suit but merely shows that subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder the trial is to confirm as nearly as may be to the trial of a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, though the said Code is not applicable in its entirety. 27. 27. The same provisions again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Kailash v. Nanhku and others reported in (2005) 4 SCC 480 wherein it was held that the procedure prescribed by the Court in the trial of suit is not just adopted, and as if incorporated in the Act, so as to govern the trial of election petition. The procedure has been made applicable to the trial of election petition "as nearly as may be". The Supreme Court referred to the earlier decision in the case of Tirlok Singh v. Municipal Corpn. of Amritsar reported in (1986) 4 SCC 27 , wherein, the words "as far as it can be made applicable," occurring in section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, came up for consideration and the Court held that the relevant provisions of Code of Civil Procedure were made applicable for the purposes of guidance of procedure and it is not expected that the procedure of a suit was to be followed technically and strictly in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code. It also considered the expression 'as far as applicable' in its earlier decision in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1990)2 SCC 715 , wherein it was held that such expression had the effect of making the rules or provisions contained elsewhere applicable with realism and flexibility, true to life rather than with abstract absolutism. 28. In view of the above, in the hearing of an election petition under the Act, 1916 also the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable absolutely and strictly in its entirety but the same are to be applied so far it can be made applicable and so far it is not inconsistent with the Act, 1916 or any rule made therein subject to the provisions contained in Section 23 and except so far as may be otherwise provided by the said Act or Rules. 29. 29. A reading of the provisions specially provisions (b)(d)(e) and (f) to Section 23 of the Act, 1916 leave no doubt that under the scheme of the said provisions not only the District Judge while functioning under Section 19 and 20 read with Section 23 of the said Act is not bound to follow the detailed procedure of recording or adducing of evidence contained in the C.P.C. and has a discretion in the matter but normally hierarchical remedies available against the order of the District Judge under the C.P.C. have also been specifically excluded by proviso (e) to Section 23 of the Act, 1916 as is evident from the use of the words "but there shall be no appeal either on question of law or fact, and no application in revision against or in respect of the decision of the District Judge" shall be available, instead, a remedy by way of a review under proviso (f) has been provided before the District Judge himself and for this limited purpose, the provisions of Subsection (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act have been made applicable. Thus, the legislative intent is very clear that the provisions of the C.P.C. are not applicable in its entirety and absolutely. 30. In view of the above, it is not possible for this Court to hold that the District Judge while deciding an election petition under the Act, 1916 is a civil court of the kind referred in the dictum of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam's case (supra), even if, he is not a persona designata. Considering the legislative intent to the contrary as referred herein above, he does not function as an ordinary civil court. The preliminary objection is misconceived and is accordingly rejected. 31. Now coming to the merits of the case, the contention of Sri Raghvendra Kumar Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner herein was denied an opportunity to adduce evidence before the District Judge in the proceedings of the election petition, secondly, the burden of proving the allegation that the date of birth of the petitioner was 15.07.1986, was upon the election petitioner which was not discharged. Thirdly, even in ex-parte proceedings, the District Judge was under an obligation to record the findings of fact based on evidence and not to treat the version of the Election petitioner as gospels truth even in absence of any evidence to support her allegation. The District Judge has passed a cryptic order based on inadmissible and unreliable evidence, it was not the intention of this Court that the election petition be decided in such a hurried manner without affording any reasonable opportunity to the parties to defend themselves. He relied upon the judgments of Supreme Court reported in 2012(1) ADJ 600 , Kanaiya Lal v. State of U.P. and others; (2014) 4 SCC 491, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen; (2009) 2 SCC 570 , Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bankand and others; (2009) 4 SCC 240 , Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Laxmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Saran Varshney and others and also judgment rendered by this Court at Allahabad in Writ-C No. 67813 of 2011 (Smt. Anita Devi v. State of U.P. And Ors.) on 13.03.2012. 32. Shri Aproova Tiwari learned counsel for the contesting opposite party submitted that in spite of ample opportunity having been granted and as many as 12 dates having been fixed the petitioner (defendant no. 1 in the Election petition) did not adduce her oral and documentary evidence and kept delaying the proceedings on one pretext or the other. Election proceedings if allowed to procrastinate in such a manner defeat the very purpose of it as the tenure is only of five years. Sufficient evidence was led by his client in the form of information derived from public documents, extracts of School register etc. showing the date of birth of the petitioner as 15.07.1986 which corroborated the specific assertion in the pleadings in this regard. The defendant no. 1 (petitioner herein) herself admitted the date of birth mentioned in the High School documents as 15.07.1986 but stated that the said date was erroneous and in fact the correct date of birth was 15.07.1975 but she failed to prove her assertion. Once from the pleadings and documents on record as also the oral evidence of the Election Petitioner who was cross examined and also from the admission of the defendant no. Once from the pleadings and documents on record as also the oral evidence of the Election Petitioner who was cross examined and also from the admission of the defendant no. 1 as regards the date of birth mentioned in the high school certificate the initial burden of proof stood discharged by the Election Petitioner and it was for the defendant no. 1 to prove her assertion that the date of birth mentioned in the High School documents was incorrect and the correct date of birth was 15.07.1975. Her application for correction of date of birth mentioned in the high school certificate etc. was initially rejected as time barred but subsequently, she managed to get the same corrected by manipulation in connivance with the officials concerned which was put to challenge by his client before this Court at Allahabad and this Court quashed the said correction making strong observations against the petitioner and the officials. The Court also examined the merits of the controversy and rejected the claim on merits also. The said judgment having attained finality is binding upon the petitioner herein. The question of admissibility and relevancy of the documentary proof submitted by his client were never questioned before the District Judge, therefore, the same is not open for being question at this stage. The conduct of the petitioner throughout has not been above board and every attempt had been made to delay the proceeding before the District Judge and before this Court. Date of birth recorded at the time of admission in the school is an authentic evidence unless it is established by unimpeachable contrary material to show that it is inherently improbable. Fresh plea and evidence can not be allowed to be raised at this stage. He relied upon the judgments of Supreme Court rendered in Shushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673 ; Ravindra Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 584 ; Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1982)2 SCC 202 ;State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, (2005) 3 SCC 702 ; Dr. Sushila Balraj v. Ardhendu Bhushan, (1965) MhLj 65 and Heinz India, (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 443 . 33. Shri Mahendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 8 also opposed the writ petition and supported Shri Tiwari. Sushila Balraj v. Ardhendu Bhushan, (1965) MhLj 65 and Heinz India, (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 443 . 33. Shri Mahendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 8 also opposed the writ petition and supported Shri Tiwari. He stated that there was not even a whisper in the writ petition that the evidence led before the District Judge was inadmissible or irrelevant nor was any such objection raised before the District Judge, therefore, the same can not be permitted to be raised now. Fresh plea and evidence can not be allowed to be raised at this stage. He relied upon the judgments of Supreme Court reported in (1970) 3 SCC 768 , Chinta Lingam and others v. Government of India and others and AIR 1998 Supreme Court 2779, National Building Corporation Ltd. v. S. Raghunathan and others. 34. As far as the first contention is concerned, the record reveals that the first date of evidence of the defendant no. 1 (petitioner herein) was fixed as 18.12.2012 but the petitioner herein did not lead her evidence. Thereafter, as many as 7 dates were fixed, as already been mentioned in the earlier part of the this judgment wherein the facts have been stated, giving opportunity to the petitioner herein (defendant no. 1 before the District Judge) to adduce her evidence in defence but she did not do so. The petitioner herein was given ample opportunity to lead her evidence prior to 08.05.2013 but on one pretext of other she got the proceedings of the election petition adjourned. On 07.01.2013, last opportunity was granted to her in this regard but the said order was challenged by means of the Writ Petition No. 159(MS) of 2013 which was disposed of with a direction to the District Judge to decide the application for deferment first. The said application was rejected on 22.01.2013 which was again challenged by means of Writ Petition No. 659(MS) of 2013 which was disposed of with a direction to the District Judge to defer the proceedings till 25.02.2013. The said application was rejected on 22.01.2013 which was again challenged by means of Writ Petition No. 659(MS) of 2013 which was disposed of with a direction to the District Judge to defer the proceedings till 25.02.2013. On 25.02.2013, the petitioner filed a transfer petition before the District Judge on patently incorrect facts alleging that she had seen the election petitioner and one Faizan Ahmad @ Chand leaving the residence of the District Judge, thereby alleging bias on his part, whereas, in fact, the District Judge was not at his residence on the said date i.e. 24.02.2013 but was at Lucknow and had came back only on 25.02.2013. The said transfer petition was rejected on 26.02.2013 whereupon the petitioner filed a transfer petition under Section 24 C.P.C. before the High Court 04.03.2013 for transfer of the election petition which was registered as Transfer Petition No. 29 of 2013. Again on 09.04.2013 the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 2404(MS) of 2013 assailing the order of the District Judge dated 26.02.2013 rejecting the transfer petition filed before him. The said writ petition was disposed of on 11.04.2013 without interfering with the rejection of the transfer petition vide order dated 26.02.2013 but with the observations that the District Judge would not be influenced by any observations made therein. 35. The Transfer Petition No. 29 of 2013 filed before the High Court was dismissed on 06.05.2013. The Court took a serious view of the matter and was inclined to impose a cost of Rs. 10,000/- upon the petitioner but on an undertaking being given on her behalf by her counsel that she shall not seek any adjournment before the District Judge on any ground whatsoever the Court refrained from imposing cost in view of the aforesaid undertaking, it nevertheless dismissed the writ petition. The District Judge was directed to proceed with the case preferably on day to day basis with a further direction that he shall not adjourn the case for want of counsel as it is the duty of the parties to keep their counsel ready with the case. 36. Having given the undertaking as aforesaid, the petitioner was under an obligation to honour the same, instead, she had the audacity to move an application for adjournment before the District Judge on 08.05.2013 i.e. the date on which the election petition was already fixed before him. 36. Having given the undertaking as aforesaid, the petitioner was under an obligation to honour the same, instead, she had the audacity to move an application for adjournment before the District Judge on 08.05.2013 i.e. the date on which the election petition was already fixed before him. The record reveals that an adjournment was sought on the ground that she had engaged another counsel on that very date but the counsel was out of station. The District Judge rejected the said application vide its order dated 08.05.2013 considering the undertaking given before the High Court as also the directions issued by it and also on account of the fact that the earlier counsel Shri Raees Ahmad who was pursuing the case on behalf of the petitioner herein (defendant no. 1) was present in the Court and all the defendants were personally absent. The District Judge closed the evidence of the defendant no. 1 (petitioner herein) and posted the matter on the next day i.e. 09.05.2013 in keeping with the directions of the High Court. 37. On 09.05.2013 initially an application was filed by the petitioner along with an affidavit that her earlier counsel had withdrawn his vakalatnama which came to her knowledge on 30.04.2013. On 08.05.2013, she engaged a new counsel Shri Shailendra Kumar Mishra who had left the station suddenly and was unable to inspect the file, therefore, it was imperative to fix some other date in the matter but her application was rejected. It was prayed that the order dated 08.05.2013 for ex-parte proceedings be recalled and she be given opportunity to adduce evidence so that the matter may be decided on merits. The said application was again rejected by the District Judge considering the directions of the High Court contained in the judgment dated 06.05.2013 and the undertaking given by her therein. 38. At 4.00 p.m., another application was filed by the petitioner before the District Judge stating that against the judgment dated 06.05.2013 passed on the Application/Transfer Petition No. 29 of 2013 by the High Court, she had preferred the Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, therefore, the matter be deffered. This application was also rejected for the reason that no proof of filing of any S.L.P. had been annexed with the application. 39. This application was also rejected for the reason that no proof of filing of any S.L.P. had been annexed with the application. 39. At this stage, it is relevant to mention that during the course of hearing of this writ petition it was pointed out by learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 Shri Aproova Tiwari that in fact a Defective Special Leave Petition was filed which is still lying as such in the registry of the Supreme Court in the year 2015 which goes to show the conduct of the petitioner. The counsel appearing for the petitioner herein was not able to contradict this assertion of Shri Tiwari. Therefore, this Court has reason to believe the same. The Election petition was heard on merits on 09.05.2013 and judgment was pronounced by the District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar in open Court. 40. After perusing the records, this Court has no hesitation in holding that ample opportunity was given to the petitioner to adduce evidence before the District Judge prior to 08.05.2013 but she did not adduce the requisite evidence and kept seeking adjournment on one pretext or the other and also got the proceedings delayed using this time to get the date of birth corrected in the High School Certificate even after rejection of her claim in connivance with the concerned officials. The withdrawal of vakalatnama in the Election Petition, renegaging on the undertaking given before the High Court, seeking adjournment on the ground of pendency of S.L.P. though it was still defective, not removing the defect therein for next two years, tell heavily on her conduct. The first contention regarding denial of opportunity to lead evidence is rejected. 41. In an election petition, the initial burden of proving the allegation that the date of birth of the defendant no. 1 was 15.07.1986, on account of which she was not qualified under Section 43-AA for contesting the election on the date of filing of nomination i.e. 12.06.2012 as she had not attained 30 years of age, was upon the election petitioner. A perusal of the election petition reveals that in paragraphs no. 8 to 13 it was specifically pleaded by her that the elected candidate (defendant no. 1) did not fulfil the minimum age for the post of President of the Nagar Panchayat under Section 43-AA. A perusal of the election petition reveals that in paragraphs no. 8 to 13 it was specifically pleaded by her that the elected candidate (defendant no. 1) did not fulfil the minimum age for the post of President of the Nagar Panchayat under Section 43-AA. She had appeared in the high school examination as an institutional student from the D.A. Girls Inter College, Kataudha Janpad Basti and had appeared in the said examination at the examination center, namely, Janta Inter College, Bankati, District Basti. She succeeded in the high school examination conducted by the Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. in 2003 with Serial No. 7703051 and Roll No. 1889720 and her date of birth was 15.07.1986. She had appeared in the Intermediate Examination from the D.A. Girls Inter College, Kataudha, District Basti in 2006 as an institutional student and succeeded in the said examination conducted by the Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. with Roll No. 1283104 and Serial No. 17113037. She had deliberately concealed her date of birth and her age and filed a false affidavit at the time of submitting her nomination application for the election in question which were liable to be rejected and Election set-aside. 42. In the written statement the defendant no. 1 did not deny the facts asserted in paragraphs no. 8 to 12 to the election petition specifically and categorically but only baldly. In the additional pleas she stated that her date of birth was 15.07.1975 which was erroneously entered as 15.07.1986. 43. In support of her pleadings the Election petitioner led her oral evidence (examination in chief) on 15.12.2015 in the shape of an affidavit, in respect of which she was subjected to cross examination by the defendant no. 1. 44. The Election petitioner also filed documentary evidence comprising inter alia of documents comprising the details of her mark sheets, date of birth, Roll number, serial number etc. relating to the high school examination conducted by the Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. and similar details pertaining to the Intermediate Examination conducted by the same Board which showed the date of birth as 15.07.1986. She also submitted a letter of the Principal of the D.A. Girls Inter College, Kataudha, District-Basti dated 06.12.2012 providing information under the R.T.I. to the effect that Shabana Khatoon (defendant no. 1) had passed high school examination in 2003 with Roll No. 1889720. She also submitted a letter of the Principal of the D.A. Girls Inter College, Kataudha, District-Basti dated 06.12.2012 providing information under the R.T.I. to the effect that Shabana Khatoon (defendant no. 1) had passed high school examination in 2003 with Roll No. 1889720. The said letter dated 02.06.2012 contained a recital that on a perusal of the records of the D.A. Girls Inter College, the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon was 15.07.1986 and her Roll number in the high school was 1889720. The original letter of the Principal of D.A. Girls Inter College, Kataudha, Basti dated 25.07.2012 was also annexed stating that Shabana Khatoon D/o Shri Gulam Yahiya, Village & Post-Salehpur, District-Sant Kabir Nagar had passed the high school examination in the year 2003 as an institutional student with 2nd Division marks and as per the records of the college her date of birth was 15.07.1986. The certified copy of the nomination papers as certified and attested by the Assistant District Election Officer submitted by Shabana Khatoon was also filed which disclosed her age as 40 years. The letter of District Inspectors of Schools, Barabanki dated 21.01.2013 was also filed annexing therewith Scholar Register and Transfer Certificate Form issued by the D.A.G. Inter College relating to Shabana Khatoon (defendant no. 1) mentioning details of her academic record at the college which showed the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon as 15.07.1986 and that she studied in the said college from 2001 to 2006. 45. The defendant no. 1 also led her oral evidence (examination in chief) on affidavit and stated that her date of birth was 15.07.1975 but it was erroneously entered as 15.07.1986, that she was about 37 years of age on the date of nomination. She also stated that when she came to know about the erroneous entry in the high school mark sheet on its receipt, she submitted an application before the Board on 10.09.2003 for rectifying the said error but no action was taken, therefore, again an application was moved on 12.12.2006 before the Board. When the correction was not done, she submitted another application dated 19.07.2011 which was still pending. She had contested for the post of President in Nagar Panchayat in the year 2006 and she disclosed her age at the time of nomination as 32 years but she was defeated in the said election. When the correction was not done, she submitted another application dated 19.07.2011 which was still pending. She had contested for the post of President in Nagar Panchayat in the year 2006 and she disclosed her age at the time of nomination as 32 years but she was defeated in the said election. She had also contested the election in year 2012 but nobody has objected to it. 46. Once the defendant no. 1 admitted that her date of birth mentioned in the High School Certificate was 15.07.1986, though according to her it was erroneous, then, considering this admission and the oral and documentary evidence led by the Election Petitioner which corroborated the date of birth mentioned in the High School Certificate, the initial burden that defendant no. 1 had not attained 30 years of age as on 12.06.2012 stood discharged and the burden shifted upon defendant no. 1 to prove her assertion that the date of birth mentioned in the High School Certificate was erroneous and also the assertion made by her that the correct date of birth was 15.07.1975 as she was having special knowledge of the said facts and was the best person to prove it, but she failed to discharge this burden in spite of sufficient opportunity having been granted by fixing as many as 6 to 7 dates for her evidence between 15.12.2012 to 14.01.2013, instead she kept pursuing the matter before the authorities of the Board for correction of the date of birth (15.07.1986) mentioned in the High School Certificate/Mark sheets. The defendant no. 1 filed lists of documents containing orders passed by the High Court and petitions filed by her on 01.01.2013, 18.01.2013 and 12.03.2013 but did not adduce oral or documentary evidence to establish her assertions. The contention of Shri Singh that date of birth mentioned in the High School Certificate was not conclusive and it was only one piece of evidence along with other evidence is of no consequence as the petitioner did not lead any other evidence to the contrary instead kept making frantic efforts to get that very High School Certificate/ Mark Sheet corrected. The decisions relied upon by Shri Raghvendra Kumar Singh, Senior Advocate thus do not help the petitioner's cause. 47. The decisions relied upon by Shri Raghvendra Kumar Singh, Senior Advocate thus do not help the petitioner's cause. 47. She did not lead any evidence to show that on coming to know of the said erroneous date of birth, she moved any application for correction in the high school certificate in spite of having stated on affidavit that she moved such applications in the years 2003, 2006 and 2011, no such documentary evidence was brought on record, in respect thereof. In the absence of anything to the contrary it is reasonable to conclude that no attempt was made by her to get the date of birth corrected till filing of the Election Petition and the assertions to the contrary were incorrect. All along she accepted the date of birth mentioned in the High School Certificate. No objection was raised by the defendant no. 1 regarding admissibility and relevance of the documentary evidence adduced by the Election petitioner at the appropriate stage before the District Judge. It is too late do so now especially for the reason stated herein above and hereinafter. 48. If the contention of the petitioner that her date of birth is 15.07.1975 is accepted it would mean she was 28 years old when she appeared in the high school examination in the year 2003 which appears to be quite unnatural and unacceptable unless a plausible explanation was offered by her for such delay, which she has not done. On the other hand based on the date 15.07.1986 she was about 17 years old at the time of her high school which appears to be reasonable, in the absence of any evidence having been lead by the petitioner to prove to the contrary. 49. The contention that there would be a difference of only about 5 months between the petitioner and her younger sister if her date of birth is treated as 15.07.1986, as, the younger sister's date of birth is recorded as 05.01.1987, though, appears to be attractive at first blush, but, this hardly persuades the Court to reach to the conclusion that the petitioner's date of birth was 15.07.1975. It is quite possible that the date of birth of the younger sister was wrongly mentioned. It was for the petitioner herein (defendant no. It is quite possible that the date of birth of the younger sister was wrongly mentioned. It was for the petitioner herein (defendant no. 1 in the Election Petition before the District Judge) to prove her assertion that her date of birth was 15.07.1975 which she failed to do. 50. It is not open for the petitioner to adduce fresh evidence before this Court in these proceedings and to raise fresh pleas, not having done so before the District Judge nor is it open for this Court to consider such fresh pleas and evidence on her behalf. The veracity of said evidence has been seriously disputed by the opposite parties in their counter affidavit saying those are forged and fabricated documents. 51. Though the judgment dated 06.12.2013 has been rendered in C.M.W.P. No. 51782 of 2013 subsequent to the decision in the election petition on 09.05.2013 nevertheless considering the issue involved the observations made therein are relevant, therefore, they are being referred herein. The relevant extracts are as under: - "It also transpires that it is only after the filing of the Election Petition that Shabana Khatoon filed Writ Petition No.7064(M/S) of 2012 before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court for correcting her date of birth, which petition was disposed of on 17th December, 2012 with a direction to the Authority concerned to decide the representation which had been enclosed as Annexure-7 to that writ petition in accordance with law within two months. ".........The Secretary of the Board also observed that Annexure-7 to the writ petition which is dated 3rd July, 2012 was not submitted in the office of the Board and nor any evidence of submission of the said representation was enclosed with the writ petition. The order further mentions that the representation to the Principal of the College for correction of the date of birth was also not submitted. The Secretary of the Board concluded that in such circumstances an attempt had been made by Shabana Khatoon for correcting the date of birth mentioned in the High School Certificate after nine years in a planned manner. The Secretary of the Board concluded that in such circumstances an attempt had been made by Shabana Khatoon for correcting the date of birth mentioned in the High School Certificate after nine years in a planned manner. This order dated 14th February, 2013 passed by the Secretary of the Board was assailed by Shabana Khatoon in Writ Petition No.1251 of 2013 before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court and on 26th February, 2013 the Court granted eight weeks time to the State to file the counter affidavit and two weeks to the petitioner to file the rejoinder affidavit and the petition was directed to be listed thereafter. The original records of the Board placed by learned Standing Counsel show that the dealing Clerk in the Regional Office at Varanasi had put up a note dated 14th April, 2013 before the Joint Secretary/Deputy Secretary/Regional Secretary of the Board with the letter sent by the State Law Officer for filing of the counter affidavit and copy of the writ petition filed by Shabana Khatoon. The note mentions that Shabana Khatoon had filed the petition for correcting the date of birth mentioned in the High School mark-sheet and certificate issued by the Board in 2003. There is a further note dated 20th April, 2013 which gives two options to these Officers. The first option is that a counter affidavit may be filed by stating that the matter is time barred. The second option is that since there is a difference of only five months and ten days between the date of birth of the two sisters, an inquiry may be conducted and thereafter counter affidavit may be filed. On this note Vijay Prakash Singh, Deputy Secretary of the Board made a remark that inquiry should be conducted and the counter affidavit can be filed thereafter and subsequently approval to the appointment of Anil Kumar Pandey, Administrative Officer as the Inquiry Officer was also granted. Anil Kumar Pandey, Administrative Officer in the Regional Office then conducted an inquiry and submitted the report dated 18th May, 2013. This report give details of the records maintained in the Schools where Shabana Khatoon had studied and the gist of the report is as follows: - 1) D.A. Girls Inter College, Kataudha, Basti. The records produced by the Principal of the College show that the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon is recorded as 15th July, 1986. This report give details of the records maintained in the Schools where Shabana Khatoon had studied and the gist of the report is as follows: - 1) D.A. Girls Inter College, Kataudha, Basti. The records produced by the Principal of the College show that the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon is recorded as 15th July, 1986. The date of admission in the College is 4th July, 2001 and the candidate left the School on 30th June, 2006. There is no cutting or overwriting in the records and the record also shows that Shabana Khatoon had earlier studied in Babu Ram Singh Janta Inter College, Majhauwa Jagat, Basti. 2) Babu Ram Singh Janta Inter College, Majhauwa Jagat, Basti The records produced by the Principal of the College show that the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon is recorded as 15th July, 1986 and that she had taken admission in the College on 31st July, 2000 and had left the College on 30th June, 2001. There is no overwriting or cutting in the records. The records also show that Shabana Khatoon had earlier studied in Kisan Inter College, Mudadeeh Khurdh, Sant Kabir Nagar. 3) Kisan Inter College, Mudadeeh Khurdh, Sant Kabir Nagar The Transfer Certificate of Shabana Khatoon was produced before the Principal of the College who stated that the number mentioned in transfer certificate was that of Raj Kumar whose date of birth is recorded as 3rd October, 1987. 4) Zubeda Girls Inter College, Udsara, Sant Kabir Nagar The records produced by the Principal of the College show that the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon is recorded as 15th July, 1975. The date of admission is shown as 14th July, 1998 and the date when she left the College is 7th July, 1999. It also shows that the petitioner had earlier studied in Junior High School Chhapiya Chhitona. 5) Junior High School Chhapiya Chhitona, Sant Kabir Nagar The Headmaster refused to provide any information. The date of admission is shown as 14th July, 1998 and the date when she left the College is 7th July, 1999. It also shows that the petitioner had earlier studied in Junior High School Chhapiya Chhitona. 5) Junior High School Chhapiya Chhitona, Sant Kabir Nagar The Headmaster refused to provide any information. The Administrative Officer, in view of the aforesaid information and on the basis of the entries made in the family register then made a recommendation that since there is a difference of only five months and ten days in the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon who is shown at Serial No.3 and Rubina Khatoon who is shown at Serial No. 7 in the Family Register, the date of birth mentioned in the records of Zubeda Girls Inter College, Udsara Sant Kabir Nagar as 15th July, 1975 appears to be authentic and placed the matter before the Officers for appropriate orders. "............This order dated 14th February, 2013 also mentions that Shabana Khatoon had not filed the representation dated 3rd July, 2012, which she had enclosed with the writ petition, before the Secretary of the Board nor any representation was submitted to the Principal of the College and an attempt had been made by Shabana Khatoon to change her date of birth in a planned manner. What also transpires from the records is that this order dated 14th February, 2013 was assailed by Shabana Khatoon by filing Writ Petition No. 1251 (M/S) of 2013 before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court and when the letter of the learned Standing Counsel and the copy of the writ petition was received for filing the counter affidavit, the office placed two proposals before the Deputy Secretary of the Board. The first proposal was that counter affidavit can be filed stating that the claim was time barred and the second proposal was that counter affidavit can be filed after an enquiry is conducted as there is a difference of only five months and ten days between the date of birth of the two sisters and it is on this note that Vijay Prakash Singh, Deputy Secretary of the Board ordered that an enquiry be conducted. This inquiry was conducted by Anil Kumar Pandey-Administrative Officer in the Regional Office at Varanasi. This inquiry was conducted by Anil Kumar Pandey-Administrative Officer in the Regional Office at Varanasi. The enquiry report mentions that the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon is recorded as 15th July, 1986 in the records of D.A. Girls Inter College, Basti from where Shabana Khatoon had appeared at the High School Examination in 2003 and this date of birth is also recorded in the records of Babu Ram Singh Janta Inter College from where Shabana Khatoon had earlier studied from 31st July, 2000 to 30th June, 2001 but yet a recommendation was made by the Administrative Officer to correct the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon from 15th July, 1986 to 15th July, 1975 because this date of birth is mentioned in records of Zubeda Girls Inter College, Udsara, Sant Kabir Nagar from where Shabana Khatoon had studied from 14th July, 1998 to 7th July, 1999 and the fact that there is only a difference of five months and ten days in the date of birth of the two sisters. The report of the Administrative Officer does not mention why the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon recorded in the records of the D.A. Girls Inter College from where she passed the High School Examination in 2003 should not be accepted and nor does it mention as to why the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon recorded in the School records of Babu Ram Singh Janta Inter College in which Shabana Khatoon had earlier studied from 31st July, 2000 to 30th June, 2001 should not be accepted. The Administrative Officer also conveniently ignored the filing of a false transfer certificate of Kisan Inter College by Shabana Khatoon. What is also noticed is that the Examinations Committee of the Board merely accepted the report of the Administrative Officer and corrected the date of birth of Shabana Khatoon from 15th July, 1986 to 15th July, 1975. The Examinations Committee of the Board had no jurisdiction to take any decision with regard to change of date of birth of a candidate in view of the specific provision contained in the Regulations that the Secretary has to take such a decision. The Examinations Committee of the Board had no jurisdiction to take any decision with regard to change of date of birth of a candidate in view of the specific provision contained in the Regulations that the Secretary has to take such a decision. Even the reasons given by the Examinations Committee that this change in date of birth was necessary because there would be a difference of only five months and ten days between the date of birth of two sisters is arbitrary and illogical because even if it is accepted that there is a difference of five months and ten days between the date of birth of the two sisters, then too, this fact alone cannot, under any circumstances, be made a ground to accept the version of Shabana Khatoon that her date of birth is 15th July, 1975. This apart, once the application filed by Shabana Khatoon for correction of date of birth was rejected by the Secretary of the Board by the order dated 14th February, 2013, the Board could not have reviewed the order and instead of filing a counter affidavit to the writ petition filed by Shabana Khatoon, the Officers of the Board, in their anxiety to confer undue benefit on Shabana Khatoon, directed that an enquiry be held and there is no difficulty in accepting the version of the petitioner that this was done to protect the election of Shabana Khatoon by changing her date of birth from 15th July, 1986 to 15th July, 1975 so that she would be more than 30 years when she contested the election for the post of Chairman of Nagar Panchayat." 52. The observations/findings quoted herein above have attained finality between the parties. The petitioner herein was also an opposite party in the aforesaid C.M.W.P. No. 51782 of 2013 and had contested the matter. 53. It is evident from the aforesaid that an inquiry was conducted in the matter wherein it was found that in the records of the D.A. Girls Inter College, Kataudha, Basti and Babu Ram Singh Janta Inter College, Majhauwa Jagat, Basti, the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned as 15.07.1986. The petitioner herein had taken admissions in the latter college on 31.03.2000 and left it on 30.06.2001, thereafter she took admission in the former college on 04.07.2001 and left the school on 30.06.2006 after completing her Intermediate. The petitioner herein had taken admissions in the latter college on 31.03.2000 and left it on 30.06.2001, thereafter she took admission in the former college on 04.07.2001 and left the school on 30.06.2006 after completing her Intermediate. Specific finding is there in the inquiry that there was no cutting or overwriting in the records of these institutions. The records of the latter college revealed that prior to 31.03.2000 Shabana Khatoon had studied in Kishan Inter College, Mudadeeh Khurdh, Sant Kabir Nagar. The inquiry report revealed that the Principal of the said college at Sant Kabir Nagar, on the basis of the Transfer Certificate produced before her, stated that the number mentioned in the transfer certificate of Shabana Khatoon was in fact that of Raj Kumar whose date of birth was 03.10.1987. Thus, the alleged transfer certificate from Kisan Inter College itself was false. The planned manner in which the date of birth (15.07.1986) mentioned in the High School Certificate was sought to be corrected illegally, even after rejection of such claim on 14.02.2013, leaves no doubt that all this was done to influence the proceedings of the Election Petition, as has also been observed by this Court in the earlier proceedings. 54. The conduct of the petitioner throughout the proceedings also does not instill confidence in the Court to accept her stand or show any further indulgence in the matter. 55. In the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons mentioned herein above, the impugned decisions do not suffer from any such flagrant error so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of discretionary extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter. 56. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.