JUDGMENT Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel,J. The petitioner is an officiating Principal of an institution, namely, Arya Shyama Balika Inter College, Bharthana, District Etawah. The said institution is a recognized and is under the grant-in-aid list of the State Government. It is governed under the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the U.P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries to Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. 2. In the institution a vacancy occurred in the office of the Principal. The petitioner, who was senior-most Lecturer in the institution was appointed as officiating Principal. The appointment of the petitioner was approved by the District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 30.11.2007. The District Inspector of Schools approved the said appointment till the regular selection of the Principal is made by the U.P. Secondary Service Selection Board. A copy of the order dated 30.11.2007 is on the record as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 3. It is recorded in the order of the District Inspector of Schools that the signature of the petitioner has already been attested on 06.07.2007. Since then the petitioner is working as officiating Principal in the institution. 4. The Director of Education on 02.04.2014 issued an order for recovery of the salary of the petitioner on the ground that she is not entitled for salary of the Principal as the grade granted to her is not applicable to ad hoc/officiating Principal. 5. The said order was challenged by the petitioner by means of Writ Petition No.43095 of 2014 (Smt. Savita Gupta v. State of U.P. & others). This Court vide order dated 20.08.2014 has passed the following order: "It is contended that the petitioner who is working as officiating Principal is entitled for the salary in view of the various judgements of this Court, however the Director of Secondary Education i.e. respondent no. 2 by impugned order dated 02 April 2014 has issued direction to the District Inspector of Schools, Etawah i.e. respondent no. 4 to recover the difference of salary and for the fresh pay fixation in the light of his directions. The respondent no. 4 has passed the consequential order on 26 April 2014 for the recovery of the excess amount. Matter needs consideration. Learned Standing Counsel is granted six weeks' time to file counter affidavit. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within a week thereafter. The respondent no. 4 has passed the consequential order on 26 April 2014 for the recovery of the excess amount. Matter needs consideration. Learned Standing Counsel is granted six weeks' time to file counter affidavit. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within a week thereafter. List this case in the week commending 27 October 2014. Till the next date of listing no recovery for the excess amount shall be made in pursuance of the impugned order." 6. In spite of the said order, the District Inspector of Schools in his order dated 03.08.2015 after extracting the order of this Court dated 20.08.2014 has issued a direction to the Principal of the institution that her salary as Principal should not be paid and the salary bill has been returned to correct it. A copy of the order dated 03.08.2015 is on the record. 7. It appears that in response to the said communication of the District Inspector of Schools the Committee of Management on 26.09.2015 again sent the salary bill of the petitioner on the ground that this Court has already granted the interim order on 23.02.2012 in Writ Petition No.9708 of 2012 (Dr. Manju Verma v. State of U.P. & others) which is also pending in this Court. 8. The grievance of the petitioner is that the District Inspector of Schools in spite of the interim order passed by this Court is not paying the salary of the petitioner although the interim order is still continuing. 9. While entertaining this writ petition this Court on 13.10.2015 has recorded the following observation: "I am prima facie satisfied that the District Inspector of Schools has tried to overreach the order of this Court dated 20.08.2014. The said order is in his full knowledge. He has extracted the order himself. The order does not assign any reason for not paying the salary to the petitioner as officiating Principal. Accordingly, the District Inspector of Schools is directed to file his personal affidavit on or before 28th October, 2015." 10. In compliance of said order the District Inspector of Schools has filed his personal affidavit. 11. Learned Standing Counsel has placed the various paragraphs of the counter affidavit filed by the District Inspector of Schools. 12. The District Inspector of Schools in his counter affidavit has reiterated the same stand which he has taken in his order dated 03.08.2015. In compliance of said order the District Inspector of Schools has filed his personal affidavit. 11. Learned Standing Counsel has placed the various paragraphs of the counter affidavit filed by the District Inspector of Schools. 12. The District Inspector of Schools in his counter affidavit has reiterated the same stand which he has taken in his order dated 03.08.2015. The District Inspector of Schools has also taken the stand that in the previous Writ Petition No.43095 of 2014 (Smt. Savita Gupta v. State of U.P. & others) a counter affidavit has been filed, therefore, granting the salary of the Principal to an ad hoc Principal would not be legal. The District Inspector of Schools has also taken the stand that in the previous Writ Petition No.43095 of 2014 (Smt. Savita Gupta v. State of U.P. & others) a counter affidavit has been filed, therefore, granting the salary of the Principal to an ad hoc Principal would not be legal. The relevant part of the affidavit filed by the District Inspector of Schools is extracted hereunder below: "6& ;g fd izfr'kiFki= nkf[ky djus ds mijkUr izca/kd] vk;Z ';kek ckfydk b.Vj dkyst] HkjFkuk] bVkok ds }kjk ,d i= fnukad 30-12-2014 bl dk;kZy; dks izsf"kr djrs gq, rnFkZ iz/kkukpk;Z dk osru iwoZ dh Hkkafr la'kksf/kr fd;s fcuk ikfjr djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k x;k FkkA ftlds mRrj esa bl dk;kZy; ds i= fnukad 19-01-2015 ds }kjk izca/kd dks ;g fy[krs gq, voxr djk;k x;k fd mDr izdj.k esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa ;ksftr ;kfpdk la0 43095@2014 ds vkns'k fnukad 20-08-2014 ds vuqikyu esa izfr'kiFki= nkf[ky fd;k tk pqdk gSA vr% rnFkZ iz/kkukpk;kZ dks iwoZ dh Hkkafr la'kks/ku fd;s fcuk osru Hkqxrku fd;k tkuk fof/k laxr ugha gSA blds mijkUr ;kph us ,d vkosnu i= fnukad 17-07-2015 dk;kZy; dks vius osru Hkqxrku ds laca/k esa izsf"kr fd;kA ftlds mRrj esa bl dk;kZy; ds i= fnukad 03-08-2015 ds }kjk ;kph dks iqu% fu;eksa ds vkyksd esa voxr djk;k x;k fd mudh ekax dks Lohdk;Z djrs gq, iwoZ dh Hkkafr osru fn;k tkuk fof/k laxr ugha gSA vr% vki viuk osru la'kksf/kr djkrs gq, osru fcy bl dk;kZy; dks 'kh?kz miyC/k djkdj ikfjr djokuk lqfuf'pr djsa ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds voyksdukFkZ vkosnu i= fnukad 17-07-2015 ,oa dk;kZy; ds i= fnukad 03-08-2015 dh Nk;kizfr dze'k% layXud lh0,0 04 o 05 ds : i esa layXu dh tk jgh gSA blds mijkUr dk;kZy; Lrj ij i= fnukad 21-09-2015 o 19-10-2015 esa ;kph dks osru la'kksf/kr djkrs gq, osru ns;d izLrqr djus ds funsZ'k iznku fd;s x;sA ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds voyksdukFkZ dk;kZy; ds i= fnukad 21-09-2015 o 19-10-2015 dh Nk;kizfr dze'k% layXud lh0,0&06 o 07 ds : i esa layXu dh tk jgh gSA fdUrq ;kph }kjk mDr vkns'k fnukad 03-08-2015 ds fo: ) iqu% ,d ;kfpdk la0 58456@2015 ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa ;ksftr djrs gq, vkns'k fnukad 13-10-2015 izkIr fd;k x;kA ;kph }kjk vius v/khu f'k{kdksa@ deZpkfj;ksa dk fu;fer : i ls vius fo+|ky; dk osru fcy gLrk{kj dj Lo;a izsf"kr fd;k tkrk jgk gS foHkkxh; vkns'kksa ds mijkUr Hkh ;kph osru la'kksf/kr u djkus ds dkj.k Lo;a viuh bPNk ls viuk osru la'kksf/kr djkdj izkIr ugha dj jgh gSA" 13. As can be seen the District Inspector of Schools has tried to justify his order ignoring earlier interim order passed by this Court. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this Court in a long line of decisions has held that ad hoc/officiating principal is entitled the principal's grade. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Dhaneshwar Singh Chauhan v. The District Inspector of Schools, Budaun and others, 1980 UPLBEC 286, wherein the Court has taken a view that the teacher officiating on the post of Principal shall be entitled to receive salary in Principal's grade. The said view has been reiterated by a recent Full Bench of this Court in Dr. Jai Prakash Narayan Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2014 (8) ADJ 617 (FB), and the Division Benches of this Court in Narbdeshwar Misra v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria, 1982 UPLBEC 171, and Soloman Morar Jha v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria, 1985 UPLBEC 113. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel. 17. A perusal of the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 03.08.2015 indicate that despite the fact that he has extracted the order of this Court, even then has taken the stand that granting the salary of the officiating Principal would not be legal, clearly indicates the adamant attitude of the District Inspector of Schools, coupled with the fact that a stand has been taken by him in paragraph-6 of the counter affidavit that since a counter affidavit in another writ petition has been filed, it would not be proper to pay the salary to the petitioner. 18. From the tenor of the counter affidavit of the District Inspector of Schools it is evident that he is bound by the Government Orders and not by the judgments of this Court. In the counter affidavit he has not expressed any regret for taking the stand mentioned in the impugned order dated 03.08.2015. 19. 18. From the tenor of the counter affidavit of the District Inspector of Schools it is evident that he is bound by the Government Orders and not by the judgments of this Court. In the counter affidavit he has not expressed any regret for taking the stand mentioned in the impugned order dated 03.08.2015. 19. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttarakhand and others v. Kanhaya Lal, (2014) 14 SCC 388, has considered the somewhat similar facts where in spite of the direction of the learned Single Judge the Additional Director of Education, without investigating the aspect properly, has revisited the entire case and has virtually overruled the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The Supreme Court, in such a situation, found that the action of the Additional Director of Education is contemptuous of the order of the High Court. Paragraph-3 of the judgment, as is material for the present case, is quoted below: "3. On a perusal of the SLP paper book, we are disturbed to note that pursuant to the orders of the learned Single Judge, the Additional Director of Education, Garhwal Division, Pohri, instead of investigating the aspect whether or not any other obstacles existed, has revisited the entire case and has virtually overruled the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Having perused the report/order of the Additional Director of Education, Pohri dated 23-5-2008, it would be possible to view his action as contemptuous of the orders of the High Court. The learned Single Judge had directed for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher (Language) LT Grade "unless there was some other impediment in selection". As we have already opined, the Additional Director of Education has not disclosed "any other impediment" and instead has merely reiterated the already articulated case of the State, which had not found favour with the High Court. It is palpably clear that the Additional Director of Education, Garhwal Division, Pauri, has contumaciously adorned itself with appellate powers over the decision of the learned Single Judge of the High Court. We shall desist from making any further directions, however, leaving it open to the respondent to initiate proceedings, if so advised." 20. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court has also deprecated the practice of the State to engage a teacher in fighting futile litigation. The relevant part of the judgment being paragraph-5 reads as under: "5. We shall desist from making any further directions, however, leaving it open to the respondent to initiate proceedings, if so advised." 20. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court has also deprecated the practice of the State to engage a teacher in fighting futile litigation. The relevant part of the judgment being paragraph-5 reads as under: "5. ...In this case, the writ petitioner is a Teacher and it is unfair to him to be repeatedly drawn into fighting futile, if not frivolous litigation by the State. It has become the practice of the State to carry on filing appeals even where the case does not deserve it, knowing fully well that private respondents will be physically fatigued and economically emasculated in pursuing protracted litigation." 21. In addition to above, the law in respect of payment of salary to officiating principal is no more res integra. This Court in a long line of decisions has held that the officiatingd hoc principal is entitled to salary of principal's grade while officiating on the post of the principal. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dhaneshwar Singh Chauhan v. The District Inspector of Schools, Budaun and others, 1980 UPLBEC 286 held as under: "2. The petitioner is a teacher in aided and recognised institution and the liability for the prejoint his salary is on the State Government under the U.P. High School and Intermediate College (Payment of Salary of Teacher and other Employees) Act, 1971. The salary of a teacher in aided and recognized institution is regulated by the regulation framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and the order issued by the State Government from time to time. Regulation 46 in Chapter III lays down that employees of an aided and recognized institution shall be given the pay scale sanctioned by the State Government from time to time. The State Government has prescribed the scales of pay for teachers. The State Government issued an order on 18th January, 1974 accepting the recommendations of the U.P. Pay Commission prescribing scales of pay for teachers. Paragraph 5(2) of the Government order lays down that a teacher while officiating on the post carrying higher grade is entitled to officiating salary in the higher grade and it further prescribed procedure for determining the salary of officiating teacher in the higher grade. A copy of the Government order was before us by the petitioner. Paragraph 5(2) of the Government order lays down that a teacher while officiating on the post carrying higher grade is entitled to officiating salary in the higher grade and it further prescribed procedure for determining the salary of officiating teacher in the higher grade. A copy of the Government order was before us by the petitioner. Respondents do not deny the petitioner's averment that the State Government issued orders sanctioning officiating pay to a teacher in the higher grade. The petitioner's claim for salary in Principal's grade was sanctioned by the District Inspector of Schools in pursuance of the aforesaid Government order. Respondents have failed to show any subsequent Government order or rule superceding the direction contained in Government order dated 24-1-74. The respondents have further failed to place any material before the court showing that the petitioner was not entitled to the salary in the Principal's grade while officiating on the post of Principal. The order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 31-8-77 is therefore not sustainable in law. (3) In the result we allow the petition and quash the order of the District Inspector of Schools and direct the respondents to pay salary to the petitioner in the Principal's grade for the period during which he has been officiating as Principal in accordance with the orders contained in the letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated 14-4-79. The petitioner is entitled to his cost." The same view was taken by another Division Bench of this Court in the cases of Narbdeshwar Mishra v. The District Inspector of Schools, Deoria and others, 1982 UPLBEC 171 and Soloman Morar Jha v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria and others, 1985 UPLBEC 113. 22. The same issue was referred to a Full Bench in the case of Dr. Jai Prakash Narayan Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2014 (8) ADJ 617 (FB). The relevant material in the present controversy reads as under: "29. A somewhat similar situation had arisen under the provisions of the U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board Act, 1982. That Act was enacted to establish a Secondary Education Service Commission for the selection of teachers in institutions recognized under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The expression 'teacher' was defined to include a principal. A somewhat similar situation had arisen under the provisions of the U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board Act, 1982. That Act was enacted to establish a Secondary Education Service Commission for the selection of teachers in institutions recognized under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The expression 'teacher' was defined to include a principal. Section 16 provided that subject to the provisions of Sections 18 and 33 and certain other sections, every appointment of a teacher upon the commencement of the Act would be made by the management only on the recommendation of the Commission and an appointment made in contravention of the provisions would be void. Section 18 dealt with ad hoc appointments of teachers. Since the provisions of Section 16 were made subject to Section 18, ad hoc appointments could be validly made under Section 18. However, after the enactment of U.P. Act 1 of 1993, Section 16 was substituted and Section 18 of the Principal Act was sought to be deleted. Section 33 empowered the State Government to issue and notify Orders for removing any difficulty, during such period as may be specified in the Order, whereupon the provisions of the Act would have effect subject to adaptations whether by way of modification, addition or omission. Two notified Orders were issued under Section 33 (1). Neither of the two Orders provided for any time limit during which the orders would remain effective. (30) These provisions came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Radha Raizada v. Committee of Management, Vidyawati Darbari Girls Inter College, 1994 (2) ESC 345 (All)(FB). Dealing with the situation, the Full Bench held as follows: "...After enforcement of U.P. Act No.1 of 1993 except Section 13 thereof the situation that emerges is that by new Section 11 of Amendment Act which has substituted Section 16 of the Principal Act, has come into force whereas the omission of Section 18 from the principal Act by Section 13 of this amending Act has not been enforced which means Section 18 still continues in the Principal Act. In view of this legislative development a peculiar situation has arisen that new Section 16 which has come into force is no longer subject to Section 18 of the Act which means that no appointment on ad hoc basis can be made under Section 18 of the Act. In view of this legislative development a peculiar situation has arisen that new Section 16 which has come into force is no longer subject to Section 18 of the Act which means that no appointment on ad hoc basis can be made under Section 18 of the Act. New Section 16 begins with a non-obstante clause which means in spite of other provision, no appointment shall be made except on the recommendation of the Board. Where a section begins with a non-obstante clause, it indicates that the provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provisions in the Act. Thus after omission of Section 18 from Section 16 no ad hoc appointment is permissible under Section 18 and if made, would be void under sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act. It has not been brought to my notice that First Removal of Difficulties Order 1981 issued by the State Government has either been revoked or rescinded. On the contrary, it was asserted that the said Removal of Difficulties Order is continuing. (49) Now the question for consideration is that if no ad hoc appointment of teacher or Principal can be made under Section 18 of the Act, whether it is permissible to appoint a teacher or Principal on ad hoc basis under the First Removal of Difficulties Order? A perusal of Section 16 would show that Section 16 is still subject to Section 33 of the Act which empowers the State Government to issue Removal of Difficulties Order. Since Removal of Difficulties Orders have been issued under Section 33 of the Act, an ad hoc appointment either by direct recruitment or by promotion under the Removal of Difficulties Order would be a valid appointment." 23. Regard being had to the fact that recently the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow on 25th August, 2015 issued an order to all the District Inspector of Schools that an officiating principal shall be paid in the grade of the principal. Regard being had to the fact that recently the Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow on 25th August, 2015 issued an order to all the District Inspector of Schools that an officiating principal shall be paid in the grade of the principal. A copy of the order of the Director dated 25th August, 2015 is quoted here-under below: "lwPp gS fd tuizfrfuf/k;ksa ,oa ek/;fed fo|ky;ksa ds lsok la?kksa ds izfrfuf/k;ksa }kjk ;g laKku esa yk;k x;k gS fd v'kkldh; lgk;rk izkIr ek/;fed fo|ky;ksa esa ekSfyd : i ls fjDr iz/kkuk/;kid@iz/kkukpk;Z ds in ij laLFkk ds T;s"Bre l-v-@T;s"Bre izoDrk ds LFkku ij dfu"B l-v-@dfu"B izoDrk ds gLrk{kj izekf.kr fd;s tkrs gSaA 2- vki voxr gh gaS fd mRrj izns'k ek/;fed f'k{kk lsok p;u cksMZ vf/kfu;e] 1982 ¼;Fkkla'kksf/kr½ dh /kkjk&18 esa izko/kku fd;k x;k gS fd /kkjk 10 dh mi/kkjk&1 esa fd;s x;s izko/kkuqlkj cksMZ dks fjfDr dh lwpuk fn;s tkus ,oa iz/kkuk/;kid@iz/kkukpk;Z dk in okLro esa 02 ekg ls vf/kd fjDr gksus dh fLFkfr esa laLFkk ds iz/kkuk/;kid@iz/kkukpk;Z ds in ij laLFkk ds T;s"Bre l-v-@T;s"Bre izoDrk dh rnFkZ inksUufr laLFkk izcU/kra= }kjk dh tk;sxhA mijksDr /kkjk esa ;g Hkh izko/kku fd;k x;k gS fd tgka izcU/kra+= T;s"Bre l-v-@T;s"Bre izoDrk dks rnFkZ : i ls inksUufr djus esa foQy jgs ogka fujh{kd ,sls v-v-@izoDrk dh inksUufr vkns'k Lo;a tkjh djsxk ,oa lEcfU/kr l-v-@izoDrk tc inksUufr ds ,sls vkns'k ds vuqlj.k esa in dk dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djsa] iz/kkuk/;kid@iz/kkukpk;Z ds : i esa vius osru dk gdnkj gksxkA 3- mijksDr izko/kkuksa ds vkyksd esa f'k{k.k laLFkk esa iz/kkuk/;kid@iz/kkukpk;Z dk in ekSfyd : i ls fjDr gksus dh fLFkfr esa laLFkk ds dfu"B l-v-@dfu"B izoDrk ds gLrk{kj dk;Zokgd iz/kkuk/;kid@ dk;Zokgd ds : i esa izekf.kr fd;k tkuk lUnfHkZr vf/kfu;e ds loZFkk foijhr gSA 4- vr% vkidks funsf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd vf/kfu;e O;oLFkkuqlkj dk;Zokgh fd;k tkuk lqfuf'pr djsaA vf/kfu;e ds izko/kkuksa ds foijhr dk;Zokgh gsrq vki Lo;a mRrjnk;h gksaxs ,oa vkidk mDr vkpj.k mRrj izns'k jktdh; deZpkjh fu;ekoyh] 1956 ds vkpj.k fu;e&3 ds foijhr gksus ds vk/kkj ij vkids fo: ) vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh lafLFkr fd;s tkus gsrq 'kklu ls vuqjks/k djus dh iz'kkldh; ck/;rk gksxhA vk'kk gS fd vki ,slh v: fpdj fLFkfr mRiUu ugha gksus nsaxsA" (emphasis supplied) 24. In view of the above, it is evident that the District Inspector of Schools has tried to overreach the interim order of this Court dated 20.08.2014 passed in companion writ petition, Writ-A No.43095 (Smt. Savita Gupta v. State of U.P. & others). 25. The Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and another (1996) 4 SCC 622 , has approved the decisions of the Madras and the Calcutta High Courts. Relevant part of the order reads as under: "19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and and Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah, AIR 1975 Mad 270 : (1975) 2 MLJ 54 and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun AIR 1986 Cal 220 : (1986) 90 CWN 342. In Century Flour Mills Ltd. AIR 1975 Mad 270 : (1975) 2 MLJ 54 it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of the court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order. 20. In Sujit Pal AIR 1986 Cal 220 : (1986) 90 CWN 342 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and took possession of the property. The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law. 26. The adamant attitude adopted by the District Inspector of Schools in his counter affidavit clearly indicates that his order is suffered from malice in law. 27. In Writ-A No.58665 of 2015 (Ram Raseeley Pandey v. State of U.P. & others), there was similar fact. The District Inspector of Schools in the said case has refused to follow the law laid down by this Court. 28. The Court in the said case found that the action of the District Inspector of Schools suffered from malice in law. The Court held as under: "In Kalabharati Advertising (supra) the Supreme Court has followed its earlier decision in Punjab State Electricity Board Ltd. v. Zora Singh and others (2005) 6 SCC 776 , where the malice in the legal sense has been explained by the Court. Relevant parts of the judgment in Punjab State Electricity Board Ltd. (supra), being paragraphs- 40, 41 & 42, are extracted below: "40. Furthermore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that even if an order is found to be not vitiated by reason of malice on fact but still can be held to be invalid if the same has been passed for unauthorised purposes, as it would amount to malice in law. 41. In S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India (1979) 2 SCC 491 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 216: AIR 1979 SC 49 this Court observed: (SCC p. 494, para 5) "It is not therefore the case of the appellant that there was actual malicious intention on the part of the Government in making the alleged wrongful order of her premature retirement so as to amount to malice in fact. Malice in law is, however, quite different. Viscount Haldane described it as follows in Shearer v. Shields 1914 AC 808: 111 LT 297 (HL): 'A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law. Viscount Haldane described it as follows in Shearer v. Shields 1914 AC 808: 111 LT 297 (HL): 'A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of malice in law, although, so far the state of his mind is concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that sense innocently.' Thus malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause." 42. In State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti (2003) 4SCC 739 this Court observed: (SCC p. 744, paras 12-13) "12. The legal meaning of malice is 'ill-will or spite towards a party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action'. This is sometimes described as 'malice in fact'. 'Legal malice' or 'malice in law' means 'something done without lawful excuse'. In other words, 'it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the rights of others'. (See Words and Phrases Legally defined, 3rd Edn., London Butterworths, 1989.) 13. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State. If at all it is malice in legal sense, it can be described as an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. Prof. Wade in his authoritative work on Administrative Law (8th Edn., at p. 414) based on English decisions and in the context of alleged illegal acquisition proceedings, explains that an action by the State can be described mala fide if it seeks to 'acquire land' 'for a purpose not authorised by the Act'." (See also Chairman & MD, BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja (2003) 8 SCC 567 and P. Anjaneyulu v. Chief Manager, A.P. Circle, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (2001) 3 An LD 313 (DB)" On the analysis of the above principle I am of the opinion that the stand taken by the second respondent in his counter affidavit is suffered by malice in law. It is astonishing that the District Inspector of Schools, being a senior official in education department, is totally unaware about the well settled law laid down by this Court and the order issued by the Director of Education. It is a common experience of the Court that the Government officers in general and officials of education department in particular disregard the well-settled law of this Court and try to justify their orders even after their order is set aside by the Court, on the pretext of some Government Order or circular of the department. The Supreme Court has noticed this tendency of the officials in the case of E.T. Sunup v. C.A.N.S.S. Employees Association and another (2004) 8 SCC 683 . The relevant paragraph of the judgment is as under: "16. It has become a tendency with the government officers to somehow or the other circumvent the orders of court and try to take recourse to one justification or other. This shows complete lack of grace in accepting the orders of the Court. This tendency of undermining the Court's order cannot be countenanced. This Court time and again has emphasised that in a democracy the role of the court cannot be subservient to administrative fiat. The executive and legislature have to work within the constitutional framework and the judiciary has been given the role of watchdog to keep the legislature and executive within check...." The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of India and others (2012) 1 SCC 273 . If such an official/officer is allowed to continue, his ignorance of law will be oppressive for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the institutions and will also burden this Court by unnecessary litigations. Public time will be wasted in such litigations." 29. In view of the above I am of the view that the District Inspector of Schools has taken a wholly unjustified stand for denying the principal's grade to the petitioner in spiteof the well settled law on this issue. He has also ignored the order of the Director dated 25th August, 2015 extracted herein above wherein a clear direction has been issued for payment of principal's grade to the officiating principal. 30. He has also ignored the order of the Director dated 25th August, 2015 extracted herein above wherein a clear direction has been issued for payment of principal's grade to the officiating principal. 30. In the counter affidavit it has not been denied by the District Inspector of Schools that the approval granted by him dated 30th November, 2007 has not been recalled or cancelled. Thus, in my view the petitioner is entitled for principal's grade from the date of assuming the charge of the office of officiating principal. 31. Pertinently, now the Director of Education (Secondary) on 25th August, 2015 has issued a direction for the purpose of principal's grade to ad hoc/officiating principal. The Director has also warned the concerned authorities that if direction is not complied it shall be treated as misconduct and they will be subjected to disciplinary proceedings. 32. In view of the recent order of the Director, there is no need to send the matter again to the District Inspector of Schools, who appears to adamant to reject the claim of the petitioner. 33. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The District Inspector of Schools is directed to pay petitioner's salary in principal's grade within two months from the date of communication of this order. 34. The petitioner shall file an affidavit that payment received by her shall abide the result of writ petition, Writ-A No.43095 of 2014 (Smt. Savita Gupta v. State of U.P. & others). 35. No order as to costs.