Judgment : Ahluwalia, J. Rupnarayan alias Rupa Meena has preferred the present writ petition through his wife Smt. Suman Meena, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of the writ in the nature of certiorari, for quashing the order dated 9.9.2014 (Annexure-2), whereby the petitioner has been detained for a period of one year under the Rajasthan Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 2006 (hereinafter to be referred as ' the P.A.S.A. Act-2006- ). 2. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has questioned his preventive detention and has also sought quashing of order dated 17.9.2014 (Annexure-3) passed by the Government of Rajasthan (Home Department), affirming the detention order (Annexure-2) passed by Police Commissioner, Jaipur under Section 3(1) of the P.A.S.A. Act of 2006. 3. In the writ petition, primary contention made by the petitioner is that the detention order dated 9.9.2014 (Annexure-2) and affirmed by the Government vide order dated 17-9-2014 (Annexure-3) are liable to be set aside, as the grounds stated in the detention order are non-existent, misconceived, not sufficient and irrelevant. Therefore, the detention order along with the order whereby it was affirmed are liable to be set aside. 4. Briefly stated, the State of Rajasthan enacted the Rajasthan Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 2006 being Act No.1 of 2008. The said Act received assent of the President on the 25th day of February, 2008 and came into operation w.e.f. 5.3.2008. The object of the P.A.S.A. Act, 2006 is to provide preventive detention of bootleggers, dangerous persons, drug offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers, to prevent their anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 5. The Police Commissioner, Jaipur, on the basis of the report bearing Reference No. (Vernacular matter omitted..........Ed.)/2014/1219 dated 9.9.2014 (Annexure-1), divulged the grounds of detention. On the same date, the Police Commissioner, Jaipur, taking into account the grounds of detention (Annexure-1) passed the detention order dated 9.9.2014 (Annexure-2) under the provisions of the P.A.S.A. Act-2006 bearing Reference No. (Vernacular matter omitted..........Ed.)/2014/1212-15. 6. A perusal of the grounds of detention reveals that the petitioner has been termed as a dangerous person, being habitual offender and property grabber. The P.A.S.A. Act, 2006, defines the terms dangerous person, habitual and property grabber in Sections 2(c), 2(g), and 2(i), respectively. 6. A perusal of the grounds of detention reveals that the petitioner has been termed as a dangerous person, being habitual offender and property grabber. The P.A.S.A. Act, 2006, defines the terms dangerous person, habitual and property grabber in Sections 2(c), 2(g), and 2(i), respectively. For ready reference, the definition of above terms is reproduced below: (c) ' dangerous person' means a person, who either by himself or as member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act No. 45 of 1860) or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959 (Central Act No. 54 of 1959) or any of the offences punishable under first proviso to sub-section (1), and sub-section (1A), of section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (Central Act No. 53 of 1972) or any offence punishable under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (Central Act No. 21 of 2000). (g) ' habitual' , with all its grammatical variations, includes acts or omissions committed repeatedly, persistently and frequently having a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts or omission but shall not include isolated, individual and dissimilar acts or omissions. (i) ' property grabber' means a person who illegally takes possession of any land situated within the urban limits of any district Head Quarters not belonging to himself but belonging to Government, local authority or any other person or who illegally enters into or creates illegal tenancies or leave and licence agreements or any other agreements in respect of such land or who constructs any structure thereon for sale or hire or gives such land to any person on rental or leave and licence basis for construction of any structure thereon or use and occupation or who knowingly gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of such land or for construction of any structure thereon or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such land rent, compensation or other charges by criminal intimidation or who evicts or attempts to evict any such occupiers by force without resorting to the lawful procedure or who abets in any manner it, he doing of any of the above mentioned things. 7. 7. The grounds of detention (Annexure-1) state that the petitioner who is aged 26 years, in young age is involved in heinous criminal activities and between the year 2008 to 2014, he is involved in 17 criminal cases pertaining to murder, attempt to murder, grievous injury, loot, preparation of dacoity, kidnapping, abduction, cheating, damage to public property, beating, use of force, trespass and unlawful possession, fraudulent sale, possession of illicit fire arms, etc. The grounds of detention notice that since the petitioner was a habitual offender, his history sheet was opened on 19.5.2011 and he was kept under surveillance. Furthermore, the legal preventive measures taken from time to time have not proved fruitful. Unlawful activities of the petitioner have increased and criminal cases, one after the another, have been registered against him at different Police Stations, namely Malviya Nagar, Jawahar Nagar, Sanganer Sadar, Gandhi Nagar, Shipra Path, all the above police stations falling within the jurisdiction of Jaipur Metropolitan. The petitioner being habitual criminal, is committing serious offences himself, or being a member of organized gang. The grounds of detention further state that all steps taken to prevent criminal activities of the petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of law have failed, as the petitioner has indulged in terrorizing the complainant, or his witnesses by putting them under fear. The grounds of detention further stated that the petitioner has succeeded in pressurizing the witnesses to turn hostile, or to succumb to compromise. Thus, he has saved himself from conviction, or has obtained bail. The grounds of detention further state that due to antisocial activities of the petitioner, and terror created by him, ordinary citizens do not come forward to give information, or to lodge the complaint regarding conduct of the petitioner as they apprehend that the petitioner will directly or indirectly harm the witnesses and the complainant. Hence, the anti-social activities of the petitioner are sufficient to term the petitioner as ' dangerous person- under Section 2(c) and as a ' property grabber- under Section 2(i) of the P.A.S.A. Act, 2006. Hence, the anti-social activities of the petitioner are sufficient to term the petitioner as ' dangerous person- under Section 2(c) and as a ' property grabber- under Section 2(i) of the P.A.S.A. Act, 2006. The grounds of detention have further given the details of 17 criminal cases in which the petitioner is involved along with the details of preventive proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Sections 107/116 and 110, Cr.P.C. Furthermore, the details of various complaints regarding the conduct of the petitioner noted in the daily diary register maintained at the police station Malviya Nagar was also furnished. On the basis of grounds enumerated in the report (Annexure-1), bearing Reference No. (Vernacular matter omit-ted..........Ed.)/2014/1219, the detention order dated 9.9.2014 (Annexure-2) was passed against the petitioner. The said order was duly affirmed and ratified by the Government vide order dated 17.9.2014 (Annexure-3). 8. In the present petition, reliance has been placed on the following four judgments rendered by the Hon- ble Apex Court:- (i) Pebam Ningol Mikoi Dev v. State of Manipur [ (2010) 9 SCC 618 ]. (ii) Rekha v. State of T.N. [ (2011) 5 SCC 244 ] : (2011 Cri LJ (Supp) 363). (iii) Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur [(2010) 7 SCC 181] : (2012 Cri LJ 2935). (iv) Cherukuri Mani w/o Narendra Chowdhari v. The Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh [Criminal Appeal No. 1133 of 2014] : (2014 Cri LJ 2748). 9. Referring to the above judgments, it has been urged that the detention order on the basis of grounds of detention enumerated have been passed in mechanical manner and without application of mind, as material facts have not been considered and noticed by the person authorized to pass the detention order. 10. In the present writ petition, following grounds have been pleaded as loopholes in the detention order to seek its quashment: (i) That the factual aspect that the detenu was in Central Jail, Jaipur have not been mentioned in the factual report which has been taken into consideration by Jaipur Police Commissioner while passing detention order dated 09/09/2014, the bail order is Annexure-5. Thus, it is quite crystal clear that the detaining authority (Jaipur Police Commissioner) has considered various irrelevant and illegal facts while passing detention order dated 09/09/2014 so it should be declared void ab initio. Thus, it is quite crystal clear that the detaining authority (Jaipur Police Commissioner) has considered various irrelevant and illegal facts while passing detention order dated 09/09/2014 so it should be declared void ab initio. (ii) That the criminal record of the detenu is being affixed with the factual detail which is in Annexure-1 as (Vernacular matter omitted..........Ed.) ' A' at Serial Nos. 2, 5, 20 are the criminal proceedings which have been finalized and at Serial Nos. 2 and 5 criminal proceedings, the detenu has been acquitted by the court, but the police is interpreting the law according to its own way. At Serial Nos. 23 to 31, the Roznamcha Rapat of History Sheet proceeding is being mentioned. History Sheet is illegal in the eyes of law because, it is an undefined term.' 11. We express our dismay at the reply filed by the State of Rajasthan on behalf of respondents. In the reply so filed, grounds specified seeking quashment of the impunged orders, have not been answered, rather in the most cryptic manner, the State in its reply has only reiterated the grounds of detention by presenting criminal antecedents of the petitioner. Furthermore, the Government Advocate cum Additional Advocate General, as is reflected in our order dated 21.1.2015, has cited no judgment to controvert the case law relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Since the respondents have not defended its order, with all its might, as they ought to have, we called for the record of the Advisory Board and have perused the same. Thereafter, the same had been returned to the Counsel for the State. 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 13. The star argument raised by Dr. Mithlesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that on the date of passing of detention order i.e. 9.9.2014, the petitioner was in judicial custody, in respect of a case arising out of FIR No. 671/2014, registered at Police Station Jawahar Circle, for the offence under Sections 147, 323, 379 and 452, IPC. The order granting bail to the petitioner (Annexure-5) was passed by the Additional Sessions Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur, on the same date i.e. 9.9.2014. A perusal of the order granting bail to the petitioner reveals that the petitioner was in custody since 12th August, 2014. The order granting bail to the petitioner (Annexure-5) was passed by the Additional Sessions Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur, on the same date i.e. 9.9.2014. A perusal of the order granting bail to the petitioner reveals that the petitioner was in custody since 12th August, 2014. The order granting bail to the petitioner also states that since the parties have effected compromise, therefore, continuous detention of the petitioner is not called for. 14. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that from perusal of the grounds of detention and detention order, it is apparent that the authority passing the detention order was not even aware that the petitioner is in custody or order granting bail has been passed in his favour. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the reply annexed with the reply filed by the State, it has been stated that the petitioner is yet to be arrested in the case in which he was granted bail on the date of passing of the order. 15. Para 17 of the reply states that Smt. Vijay Kushwaha wife of Late Shri Surendra Singh Kushwaha, on 1.8.2014, had lodged a report bearing No. 671/14, at Police Station Jawahar Circle, Jaipur under Sections 147, 323, 379 and 452, IPC. The concluding portion of the Para 17 of the reply in exact words is reproduced as under:- (Vernacular matter omitted..........Ed.) 16. A perusal of the above para reveals that as per the respondent, who had passed the detention order and had reaffirmed the same, petitioner is yet to be arrested, whereas as per Annexure-5, the petitioner, on the date of passing of the order dated 9.9.2014, vide Annexure-5 was ordered to be released on bail by Additional Sessions Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur. The matter does not end here. Rather, Para 30 of the reply states that the petitioner on 5.8.2014 while in police custody in respect to a case arising out of FIR No. 382/13, was interrogated and made an incriminating disclosure. The opening lines of Para 30 of reply in vernacular, reads as under:- (Vernacular matter omitted..........Ed.) 17. The matter does not end here. Rather, Para 30 of the reply states that the petitioner on 5.8.2014 while in police custody in respect to a case arising out of FIR No. 382/13, was interrogated and made an incriminating disclosure. The opening lines of Para 30 of reply in vernacular, reads as under:- (Vernacular matter omitted..........Ed.) 17. Thus, it has been rightly contended before us that from the grounds of detention, the detention order and the reply filed, it is apparent that authorities ordering the detention of the petitioner were not aware that the petitioner was arrested and was in custody on the date of passing of the order in case arising out of FIR No. 671/14, registered at Police Station Jawahar Circle, Jaipur for the offences under Sections 147, 323, 379 and 452, IPC and on the date of passing of the order, bail order was passed in his favour. 18. Furthermore, from the reply, it is also evident that as per the authorities, the petitioner was in custody in respect of a case arising out of FIR No. 382/13, registered at Police Station Malviya Nagar, for the offences under Sections, 420, 467, 468, 384 and 471, IPC. It has been urged before us that the custody of the petitioner, order granting him bail and detention of the petitioner in another case are material facts, which have not been noticed by the detaining authority and have not been considered. 19. We have been called upon to determine what is the effect of non-noticing of above two material facts. 20. A Three Judge Bench of the Hon- ble Apex Court upon reference to larger Bench, in Rekha v. State of T.N. [(2012) 5 SCC 244] : (2011 Cri LJ (Supp) 363), has held as under:- ' 8. It has been held in T.V. Sravanan v. State [ (2006) 2 SCC 664 ] : ( AIR 2006 SC 1462 ); A. Shanthi v. Govt. of T.N., [ (2006) 9 SCC 711 ; Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Anr. [ (2002) 7 SCC 129 : ( AIR 2002 SC 3094 ), etc. that if no bail application was pending and the detenu was already, in fact, in jail in a criminal case, the detention order under the preventive detention law is illegal. of NCT of Delhi and Anr. [ (2002) 7 SCC 129 : ( AIR 2002 SC 3094 ), etc. that if no bail application was pending and the detenu was already, in fact, in jail in a criminal case, the detention order under the preventive detention law is illegal. These decisions appear to have followed the Constitution Bench decision in Haradhan Saha v. State of W. B. [ (1975) 3 SCC 198 ] : ( AIR 1974 SC 2154 ), wherein it has been observed: ' 34.....Where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or public order.' 9. On the other hand, Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu, has relied on the judgments of this Court in A. Geetha v. State of T.N. [ (2006) 7 SCC 603 ] : ( AIR 2006 SC 3053 ), and Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of T.N. and Anr. [ (2006) 6 SCC 64 ] : ( AIR 2006 SC 3606 ), wherein it has been held that even if no bail application of the petitioner is pending but if in similar cases bail has been granted, then this is a good ground for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass the detention order. 10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number, whether the bail order was passed in respect of co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored. 11. In our opinion, the detention order in question only contains ipse dixit regarding the alleged imminent possibility of the accused coming out on bail and there was no reliable material to this effect. Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained. 12. Moreover, even if a bail application of the petitioner relating to the same case was pending in a criminal case, the detention order can still be challenged on various grounds e.g. that the act in question related to law and order and not public order, that there was no relevant material on which the detention order was passed, that there was mala fides, that the order was not passed by a competent authority, that the condition precedent for exercise of the power did not exist, that the subjective satisfaction was irrational, that there was non-application of mind, that the grounds are vague, indefinite, irrelevant, extraneous, non-existent or stale, that there was delay in passing the detention order or delay in executing it or delay in deciding the representation of the detenu, that the order was not approved by the government, that there was failure to refer the case to the Advisory Board or that the reference was belated, etc. 13. In our opinion, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India which permits preventive detention is only an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution. An exception is an exception, and cannot ordinarily nullify the full force of the main rule, which is the right to liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Fundamental rights are meant for protecting the civil liberties of the people, and not to put them in jail for a long period without recourse to a lawyer and without a trial. As observed in R v. Secy. Fundamental rights are meant for protecting the civil liberties of the people, and not to put them in jail for a long period without recourse to a lawyer and without a trial. As observed in R v. Secy. of State for the Home Dept., Ex Parte Stafford, (1998)1 WLR 503 (CA) :- ' ......The imposition of what is in effect a substantial term of imprisonment by the exercise of executive discretion, without trial, lies uneasily with ordinary concepts of the rule of law.' Article 22, hence, cannot be read in isolation but must be read as an exception to Article 21. An exception can apply only in rare and exceptional cases, and it cannot override the main rule. 14. Article 21 is the most important of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Liberty of a citizen is a most important right won by our forefathers after long, historical, arduous struggles. Our Founding Fathers realised its value because they had seen during the freedom struggle civil liberties of our countrymen being trampled upon by foreigners, and that is why they were determined that the right to individual liberty would be placed on the highest pedestal along with the right to life as the basic right of the people of India. 15. Right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 implies that before a person is imprisoned, a trial must ordinarily be held giving him full opportunity of hearing, and that too through a lawyer, because a layman would not be able to properly defend himself except through a lawyer.' 21. From the perusal of the above observation of the Hon- ble Apex Court, it is apparent that it was incumbent for the detaining authority to consider that the petitioner is in custody pertaining to a criminal case registered against him. Furthermore, that his bail application is pending or decided or the petitioner is likely to be released on bail or has been released on bail. In the present case, as stated earlier, the authority was not aware regarding the petitioner being in jail in one case, grant of bail to him in that case and his custody pertaining in another case, was noticed in the reply but not in the grounds of detention. The authority was also not aware regarding pendency of the bail application or passing of the bail order. The authority was also not aware regarding pendency of the bail application or passing of the bail order. What we cannot condone, is the bail order has been passed on the date detention order was passed. By natural inference, the detention order was passed on the same day, either before passing of the bail order or afterwards. In both conditions, it was mandatory for the authorities to specify that the petitioner is likely to be released on bail or has been released on bail. 22. In Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur [ (2012) 7 SCC 181 ] : (2012 Cri LJ 2935), the Hon- ble Apex Court held as under:- ' 4. The question of personal liberty of a person is sacrosanct and State Authority cannot be permitted to take it away without following the procedure prescribed by law, otherwise it would be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. In Ayya alias Ayub v. State of U.P. & Anr. [ (1989) 1 SCC 374 ] : ( AIR 1989 SC 364 ), this Court held that the law of preventive detention is based and could be described as a ' jurisdiction of suspicion' and the compulsion of values of freedom of democratic society and of social order sometimes might compel a curtailment of individual- s liberty. 5. In Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur & Ors. [ (2012) 2 SCC 176 ] : ( AIR 2012 SC 321 ), this Court held that: ' 27... personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the issuance of such an order.' 6. Whether a person who is in jail can be detained under detention law has been a subject matter of consideration before this Court time and again. In Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat & Anr. Whether a person who is in jail can be detained under detention law has been a subject matter of consideration before this Court time and again. In Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., ( AIR 1990 SC 1196 ), this Court while considering the same issue has reconsidered its earlier judgments on the point in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, ( AIR 1964 SC 334 ); Masood Alam v. Union of India, ( AIR 1973 SC 897 ); Dulal Roy v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, ( AIR 1975 SC 1508 ); Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, ( AIR 1983 SC 1130 ); Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, ( AIR 1986 SC 315 ); Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1986 SC 2177 ); Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, ( AIR 1986 SC 2090 ); Smt. and Shashi Aggarwal v. State of U.P., ( AIR 1988 SC 596 ) and came to the following conclusion : ' 21. The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose, it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression ' compelling reasons' in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities.' 7. In Amritlal & Ors. v. Union Govt., ( AIR 2000 SC 3675 ), similar issue arose as the detaining authority recorded his satisfaction for detention under the Act, in view of the fact that the person, who was already in jail, was going to move a bail application. In Amritlal & Ors. v. Union Govt., ( AIR 2000 SC 3675 ), similar issue arose as the detaining authority recorded his satisfaction for detention under the Act, in view of the fact that the person, who was already in jail, was going to move a bail application. In the grounds of detention, it had been mentioned that there was ' likelihood of the detenu moving an application for bail' and hence detention was necessary. This Court held that there must be cogent materials before the authority passing the detention order that there was likelihood of his release on bail. 8. This Court while deciding the case in A. Geetha v. State of T.N., ( AIR 2006 SC 3053 ) relied upon its earlier judgments in Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, ( AIR 2002 SC 3094 ), Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of T.N. & Ors, ( AIR 2006 SC 3606 ). and Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. & Anr., (2006 AIR SCW 4648), and held: 10....that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. Its subjective satisfaction based on materials, normally, should not to be interfered with. 9. In view of the above, it can be held that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case. However, if the detention order is challenged, the detaining authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts : (1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody. (2) There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which he could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary. In case either of these facts does not exist, the detention order would stand vitiated....' (Emphasis supplied) 23. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary. In case either of these facts does not exist, the detention order would stand vitiated....' (Emphasis supplied) 23. On the touch-stone of legal position noticed by the Hon- ble Apex Court, in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh, (2012 Cri LJ 2935) (supra), we are of the view that in the present case, authorities have not applied their mind. Without any application of mind, the detention order was passed in a mechanical manner. The authorities were not aware regarding the arrest of the petitioner in a case arising out of 671/2014, registered at Police Station Jawahar Circle, for the offence under Sections 147, 323, 379 and 452, IPC. Passing of the order granting bail on the same day when the detention order was passed, was also not in their knowledge, or if order was passed before granting bail, authorities were not aware regarding pendency of bail application. As per Para 30 of the reply, the authorities were under belief that the petitioner is in custody in case arising out of FIR No. 382/13, registered at Police Station Malviya Nagar, for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 384 and 471, IPC. In the chart accompanying grounds of detention in Column No. 15, detaining authorities have noticed that the accused has been arrested and co-accused Lal Chand is to be arrested and the case is under investigation. The authorities were also not aware whether in that case (FIR No. 382/13), which is in Column No. 15, the petitioner has been released on bail or not. 24. Thus, for glaring lapse on the part of the detaining authority, the detention proceedings initiated against the petitioner shall stand vitiated and the detention order dated 9.9.2014 (Annexure-2) along with the order of ratification dated 17.9.2014 (Annexure-3) passed by the State, cannot be sustained and are hereby, quashed. 25. Consequently, the present writ petition stands allowed. Petition allowed