JUDGMENT : A.M. Badar, J. This application by the applicant - State is directed seeking leave to file appeal challenging the judgment and order dated 18.10.2013 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sangamner, Dist. Ahmednagar in Sessions Case No. 7/2008, by which the respondents-accused were acquitted of offence punishable under sections 302, 304B, 498A r/w section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, who contended that, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to prove that, the respondents-accused have committed the murder of Kalpana Balasaheb Murtadak on 19.05.2007 by pushing her in a well. It has been contended that, alternatively, the prosecution has successfully adduced evidence to bring home the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC for the sake of brevity), as evidence on record is sufficient to hold that, the accused persons have subjected deceased Kalpana to cruelty soon before her death, in order to coerce her for bringing Rs. 50,000/- from her parental relatives. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents/accused justified the impugned judgment and order of acquittal by contending that, a plausible view has been taken by the trial Court on the basis of the evidence brought on record and as such, same does not require any interference. 4. With the assistance of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we have carefully perused record and proceedings, including depositions of witnesses and the documentary evidence placed on record. 5. It is not in dispute that, the marriage of Kalpana Balasaheb Murtadak (since deceased) was performed with respondent/accused No. 1 Balasaheb Dnyaneshwar Murtadak on 20th February, 2007. Undisputedly, Kalpana died on 19th May, 2007 and as such her death is within seven years of her marriage. It is not in dispute that, the rest of the accused are the relatives of the husband/accused No. 1-Balasaheb. 6. We have perused the evidence of PW-8 Dr. Bhagwan Damodhar Dauri, Medical Superintendent, Radhanagari, who at the relevant time, was working as Medical Officer, Rural Hospital, Rajur. His evidence shows that, Kalpana Balasaheb Murtadak died because of wet drowning and same findings are recorded in contemporaneous document that is, P.M. Report. The question before this Court is whether death of said Kalpana is homicidal or on account of commission of suicide by deceased Kalpana i.e. unnatural death. 7. His evidence shows that, Kalpana Balasaheb Murtadak died because of wet drowning and same findings are recorded in contemporaneous document that is, P.M. Report. The question before this Court is whether death of said Kalpana is homicidal or on account of commission of suicide by deceased Kalpana i.e. unnatural death. 7. The entire case of the prosecution so far as offence punishable under section 302 read with section 34 of IPC is concerned, is based upon circumstantial evidence. The circumstantial evidence is the evidence where on the basis of proved evidentiary facts the Court draws a conclusion regarding the facts in issue. It is well settled that, in cases where the evidence of circumstantial nature, circumstance from which the guilt of accused persons is to be drawn needs to be established firmly and cogently from the evidence on record. The prosecution has to establish each circumstance by independent evidence and the circumstances so established should be consistent only with the sole hypothesis of guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. If the case in hand is examined on these principles, it is seen that, except the fact that, deceased Kalpana was residing with the respondents/accused after her marriage, no other circumstance is relied upon by the prosecution for concluding that accused committed her murder. The evidence of prosecution shows that, Kalpana had been to the well situated nearby to her house and her death occurred due to fall in the well. It was contended that, there were ante mortem injuries on the person of deceased Kalpana. However, perusal of the evidence of PW-8 Dr. Bhagwan Dauri shows that, the only ante-mortem injury found on the person of deceased Kalpana was minor abrasion right popliteal region 1/2 cm in length, which according to autopsy surgeon may cause due to fall in well. Rest of the injuries found on the dead body were postmortem injuries. 8. Apart from this, there is no other evidence to come to the conclusion that, accused persons in furtherance of their common intention, in order to kill deceased Kalpana have pushed Kalpana in a well thereby causing her to fall in the well and thereby they authored her homicidal death. 9. We are having on record the report at Exhibit - 47 lodged by respondent-accused Rupesh Dnyaneshwar Murtadak, soon after incident. 9. We are having on record the report at Exhibit - 47 lodged by respondent-accused Rupesh Dnyaneshwar Murtadak, soon after incident. This report shows that, deceased Kalpana had gone to well for washing clothes and did not return. The spot panchanama at Exhibit - 75 which is contemporaneous document recorded by the Investigating officer shows that, near the well pair of sleeper of Kalpana was found. Apart from this, on the spot bucket containing wet clothes was also found. In the well from which dead body of Kalpana was fished out, one bucket along with rope was found floating on the well water. This circumstance seriously casts a shadow of doubt in the case of prosecution that, accused persons or anyone of them were responsible for death of Kalpana. Possibility of accidental death of Kalpana due to fall in the well cannot be ruled out considering the situation prevalent on the spot of incident. 10. Now let us examine whether evidence of prosecution is sufficient to bring home the guilt for the offence punishable under sections 304B and 498A read with section 34 of IPC to the respondent-accused. 11. In order to prove this offence, the prosecution has examined in all six witnesses. They are near relatives of deceased Kalpana. Her father Bhausaheb Warade and mother Mankarnabai Warade are examined respectively as PW-1 and PW-5. PW-2 Sitaram Warade is brother of informant. PW3 Ramesh Dhatrak is cousin of informant Bhausaheb. PW-4 Suresh and PW-6 Bhagwan are the cousins of Kalpana. Their consistent version shows that, after marriage Kalpana came to her matrimonial home and at that time, she told that, her husband was demanding Rs. 50,000/- for purchase of vehicle. Even at the time of 10th day ritual of sister of her father, she reiterated this fact to her parents, as seen from their evidence. PW-3 Ramesh has stated that, he heard Kalpana talking with her father regarding demand of money. This is evidence so far as alleged demand of respondent-accused husband is concerned is not even pointing finger to other accused persons. No role is as such attributed to other accused regarding demand of money. 12. Explanation to section 304B of IPC provides that, for the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as provided in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition, Act, 1961. No role is as such attributed to other accused regarding demand of money. 12. Explanation to section 304B of IPC provides that, for the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as provided in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition, Act, 1961. For the sake of convenience section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 needs to be reproduced and it reads thus:-- "2. "dowry".--In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-- (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before (or any time after the marriage) (in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies." 13. Perusal of this section shows that, the amount which has been demanded as a dowry must have nexus with marriage. Demand of dowry has to be for or in connection with marriage. In the case in hand from mere demand of Rs. 50,000/- from Kalpana, one can not come to the conclusion that, this demand was for or in connection of marriage of deceased Kalpana with respondent accused No. 1- Balasaheb. 14. The term "cruelty" is defined in explanation to Section 498A of IPC. Harassment to the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or on account of failure of her or any person related to her to meet such demand can be construed as cruelty. The expression "soon before the death" used in substantive provisions of section 304B of IPC also assumes importance in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Section 113(b) of the Evidence Act prescribes presumption and if it is proved that, soon before her death, the married woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, presumption of dowry death can be drawn against accused persons. 15. Section 113(b) of the Evidence Act prescribes presumption and if it is proved that, soon before her death, the married woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, presumption of dowry death can be drawn against accused persons. 15. If we consider the evidence of relatives of deceased Kalpana, then it is seen that, they in their evidence have only states about demand of Rs. 50,000/-from the deceased Kalpana by her husband. The essential ingredients of harassment of Kalpana with a view to coerce her in order to meet this demand is missing. As such, the prosecution has neither made out the offence punishable under Section 304B nor an offence punishable under section 498A of IPC. 16. In the result, we conclude that the view taken by the learned Trial Court in acquitting accused person, is plausible view which needs no interference in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. As such the order:-- The application is rejected.