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2015 DIGILAW 420 (PAT)

Puran Deo Narain Singh v. Budhdeo Singh

2015-03-11

MUNGESHWAR SAHOO

body2015
MUNGESHWAR SAHOO, J.:–The plaintiffs have filed this first appeal against the judgment and decree dated 29.05.1982 passed by learned 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge, Biharsharif in Title Suit No.155 of 1977/07 of 1982 whereby the learned court below dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit. 2. The plaintiffs-appellants filed the aforesaid suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession over the suit land measuring 72 decimals in the east out of 84 dismissals of Plot No.2492 and alternatively prayed for recovery of possession. 3. The plaintiffs claimed the aforesaid relief alleging that one Saudagar Singh was the common ancestor. He had a son Mishri Lal Singh, who is grandfather of Purandeo Narain Singh being the son of Rambrichh Lal Singh, who was the son of Mishri Lal Singh. Purandeo Narain Singh had three sisters Sanjogita Devi, Shakuntla Devi and Kamlata Devi. Purandeo Narain Singh has two sons and his mother is Shyamsundar Devi. The lands measuring 84 decimals appertaining to Plot No.2492 was the ancestral shivotar land of one Mohar Giri, who was in possession over the same. The rent was not payable. Waqf Masjeed and Imambara was 16 annas proprietor of Tauzi No.2188 in the village. The Motawali of the said Waqf Estate was one Syed Abbas @ Abu Sahab. One Purandeo Narain Singh and Mishri Lal Singh were the mortgagee of Tauzi No.2188 since before the Cadastral Survey. Subsequently Saudagar Singh purchased the suit land from Komal Giri son of Mohar Giri (Shivotardar) by virtue of registered sale deed dated 13.06.1898 and came in possession as absolute owner. Saudagar Singh died before the Cadastral Survey leaving behind his son Mishri Lal Singh, who became the absolute owner. On his death, his son Rambrichh Singh became the owner and on his death in the year 1977 his heirs became the owner of the same. After vesting, Rambrichh Singh filed petition for fixation of fair rent. One Baikunth Singh and Ramswarath Singh claimed remaining 12 decimals of land out of the said plot. The Circle Officer rejected the objection filed by the defendants and fixed fair rent in the name of Rambrichh Singh. The D.C.L.R. confirmed the order. On appeal the Additional Collector set aside the order of C.O. and D.C.L.R. In the said proceeding the plaintiff came to know that defendant nos.1 and 2 claimed the land alleging that they took settlement from the ex-landlord on 31.03.1950. The D.C.L.R. confirmed the order. On appeal the Additional Collector set aside the order of C.O. and D.C.L.R. In the said proceeding the plaintiff came to know that defendant nos.1 and 2 claimed the land alleging that they took settlement from the ex-landlord on 31.03.1950. The defendant no.6 Mohan Singh also claimed on the basis of settlement from ex-landlord through Hukumnama dated 31.03.1950. The defendant nos.1 and 2 did not produce any Hukumnama. However, Mohan Singh (defendant no.6) produced forged and antedated Hukumnama. The plaintiffs accordingly claimed that the plaintiffs have got title and exclusive possession over the suit land. 4. A contesting written statement was filed by defendant nos.1 to 4 alleging that the suit land was in possession of the defendants and one Khayali Singh for more than 12 years openly with the knowledge of plaintiffs and defendants as well. Therefore, they have acquired title by adverse possession. Their further case is that there was a temple of Shiv Jee in Gulzarbag and Komal Giri son of Mohar Giri was appointed to perform pooja in the said temple and for that purpose he was allotted some land in village Sabnahua. The condition was that till he performs pooja he will utilize the income. Komal Giri had friendship with Saudagar Singh, who in conspiracy obtained showy sale deed without consideration in the name of his son Mishri Lal Singh on 13.06.1898 from Komal Giri. The sale deed was never acted upon and Komal Giri had no title or possession and had no right to execute the sale deed in favour of Mishri Lal Singh. Mishri Lal Singh and Saudagar Singh had not acquired any title or possession as the property in suit was wakast and khudkast of Malik Waqf Estate over which the Maliks were coming in possession. The land was not Shivotar land. Mishri Lal Singh and Saudagar Singh were only thikedar and they were in possession in that capacity got their names recorded illegally in the survey record of right. Subsequently the Maliks of Waqf Estate when came to know fraud played by Mishri Lal Singh and Saudagar Singh, they vehemently opposed. The survey authorities enquired and found that the claim of Maliks is correct. Subsequently the Maliks of Waqf Estate when came to know fraud played by Mishri Lal Singh and Saudagar Singh, they vehemently opposed. The survey authorities enquired and found that the claim of Maliks is correct. Although the deed of the year 1898 has been described as sale deed but they had agreed that the deed will be simple Izara deed and when a sum of Rs.140/- as jarsaman be paid, the possession will be returned to Malik. Accordingly, this fact was entered in the remark column of the Khatian as “Shibotar Bajariya Kewala Registry Sudi 13.6.1898 Bad Pane Jarsaman 140/- Rupeya ke malik ko kabjadari hoga”. Thereafter the Maliks removed Komal Giri from service and came in possession. Rs.140/- was paid to Mishri Lal Singh on behalf of the Estate. Although it was in the shape of sale deed but in fact it was a mortgage deed. After Khayali Singh, the name of defendants was entered. The land was settled in the name of Khayali Singh in the year 1950 and after vesting he became the raiyat and continued in possession. Rent receipts have been granted in the name of Khayali Mahto but wrongly Rambrichh filed the mutation application. According to the defendants, Rambrichh has no brick kiln and it is false to say that one lac bricks are there. Rambrichh Singh sold the suit land by four registered sale deeds in favour of defendant 4th set on 19.12.1975 and all the sale deeds are without consideration. 5. The defendant nos.12 to 14 have filed separate contesting written statement. Accordingly to them, defendant 1st set are not the members of joint family. They have separated four years ago. Plot No.2492 was shivotar land. Shivotardar was in possession. Prior to survey operation Maliks had allotted some land to Mohar Giri for performing pooja-path. The said land was only kamibrit and he was to be in possession over the land so long he performs pooja-path but as soon as he will leave pooja-path, Malik will come in possession over the same. The purchase of land from Komal Giri son of Mohar Giri by registered sale deed dated 13.06.1898 is denied. The possession of plaintiffs and defendant 1st set is denied. According to these defendants, after death of Mohar Giri, his son Komal Giri was performing pooja-path. Therefore, the suit plot was allotted to him. The purchase of land from Komal Giri son of Mohar Giri by registered sale deed dated 13.06.1898 is denied. The possession of plaintiffs and defendant 1st set is denied. According to these defendants, after death of Mohar Giri, his son Komal Giri was performing pooja-path. Therefore, the suit plot was allotted to him. Komal Giri was in need of money, therefore, Saudagar Singh of village Kalyanpur told Komal Giri to execute a deed of rehan. However, instead of rehan deed he executed a sale deed on 13.06.1898 in favour of Saudagar Singh. Saudagar Singh came in possession as rehandar. In the year 1907 Komal Giri left pooja-path and then Malik came in possession of Plot No.2492. Komal Giri had no right to sell the suit land as it was kamibrit. After receiving Rs.140/- the malik came in possession. Komal Giri had settled the land in favour of these defendants by Hukumnama dated 31.03.1950. Hukumnama was filed in revenue court. It is false to say that Hukumnama is forged and fabricated document. 6. The further case of these defendants is that when they came to know that certain lands have been settled then they approached Motawali, Imambara Estate, Patna City and prayed for settlement of 1 bigha 7 kathas 17 dhoors of Plot No.2490 and 2491 on payment of najrana of Rs.85/-. The Amala of Malik put defendant no.12 in possession over the settled land and, therefore, Amala of State of Bihar put the defendant no.12 in possession of the suit land and since then they are coming in possession. Subsequently yadast was prepared regarding 1 bigha 7 kathas 10 dhoors recognizing the settlement and Hukumnama was executed on 31.03.1950. The sale deed executed by Khayali to the defendant 2nd set and deed of gift executed by Khayali in favour of defendant nos.3 to 4 are forged and fabricated document. The purchaser and the donee never came in possession nor they ever paid rent. The receipts granted in the name of defendant 2nd set and defendant nos.3 and 4 are forged and fabricated. The brick kiln over Plot No.2492 belonged to defendant. 7. On the above pleadings of the parties the learned trial court framed the following issues:— (i) Whether the plaintiffs have cause of action for the suit? (ii) Whether the suit as framed maintainable? (iii) Whether the suit barred by law of limitation? The brick kiln over Plot No.2492 belonged to defendant. 7. On the above pleadings of the parties the learned trial court framed the following issues:— (i) Whether the plaintiffs have cause of action for the suit? (ii) Whether the suit as framed maintainable? (iii) Whether the suit barred by law of limitation? (iv) Whether suit suffers from defect of parties? (v) Whether the plaintiffs acquired right, title and interest over the disputed land on the basis of sale deed dated 13.6.1898? (vi) Whether the plaintiffs came in possession over the disputed land on the basis of aforesaid sale deed? (vii) Whether the story of settlement as set up by defendant 1 and 3 on the basis of Hukumnama dated 31.3.1950 is correct? (viii) Whether the defendants 1st and 3rd set ever came in possession over the disputed land on the basis of said Hukumnama? (ix) Whether the brick kiln standing over the suit plot belongs to plaintiffs or defendants? (x) To what other relief or reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled? 8. After trial, the learned trial court on the basis of the materials and the evidences recorded the finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove complete dedication. The sale deed dated 13.06.1898 was not rehan deed. No title passed to the purchaser. The claim of defendant 1st set, i.e. settlement in the year 1950 is not proved and likewise the claim of defendant 3rd set regarding settlement is also not proved, the Hukumnama filed by defendant 3rd set is not reliable. The trial court drew adverse inference for non-production of the original sale deed holding that the best evidence has been withheld. On these findings, the learned trial court dismissed the plaintiffs? suit. 9. The defendant 1st set have filed cross objection against that part of the judgment whereby their title has been negatived. 10. The defendants 3rd set, i.e. defendants-respondent nos.12 to 14 also filed a cross objection against the finding of the trial court whereby it was held that Hukumnama (Ext.L) to be forged document. 11. The learned counsel Mr. Ajay Kumar Singh appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants submitted that the suit land, no doubt, has been mentioned as Shivotar but in fact it was not dedicated to deity. The suit land was given to pujari to perform pooja-path, therefore, it is named as Kamibrit and this is the admitted case of the parties. 11. The learned counsel Mr. Ajay Kumar Singh appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants submitted that the suit land, no doubt, has been mentioned as Shivotar but in fact it was not dedicated to deity. The suit land was given to pujari to perform pooja-path, therefore, it is named as Kamibrit and this is the admitted case of the parties. The defendant 3rd set also alleged that it was not completely dedicated and in fact the property was given to pujari for performing pooja-path. The defendant 1st set also stated that there was a temple of Shiv Jee in Gulzarbag and Komal Giri son of Mohar Giri was appointed to perform pooja in the said temple and for that religious service the suit plot was allotted in favour of Mohar Giri. Therefore, if the property was not dedicated to deity, there was no restriction for transferring the same. Moreover the Kamibrit land, which means that the land which was given in lieu of religious service is heritable and transferable. Komal Giri was Shivotardar, who was performing pooja-path. Admittedly the said Shivotardar had sold the property by registered sale deed dated 13.06.1898. So far this sale deed is concerned, it is a registered sale deed. The certified copy of the sale deed was produced in the Court, which was marked as exhibit. The court below wrongly drew adverse inference to the effect that the original sale deed has not been produced. According to the learned counsel, it is admitted by the parties that there is a sale deed dated 13.06.1898. Nobody denied it but the dispute is as to whether it is a sale deed or rehan deed. The court below found that it is a sale deed and not Izara deed but ultimately came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to prove as to why the original sale deed has not been produced and the certified copy has been produced. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to prove right, title and interest over the suit land on the basis of the certified copy of the sale deed (Ext.4) dated 13.06.1898, which according to the plaintiffs is title deed. The learned counsel submitted that since the sale deed is a registered sale deed and no one challenged the genuineness or otherwise of the same within the limitation prescribed, the court below could not have rejected the plaintiffs? The learned counsel submitted that since the sale deed is a registered sale deed and no one challenged the genuineness or otherwise of the same within the limitation prescribed, the court below could not have rejected the plaintiffs? suit on this technical ground, i.e. for non-production of the original, particularly when certified copy of the sale deed was produced and execution of sale deed is never denied. The defendants denied that the executant of the sale deed had no authority to transfer the devotar property. 12. The learned counsel submitted that since it was not dedicated to deity, there is no question of restriction from transferring the land arises. Moreover, the defendants are challenging the title of the plaintiffs on the basis of settlement in the year 1950 and their case has been disbelieved by the court below. According to the defendant 1st set they are claiming title on the basis of settlement and adverse possession whereas according to the defendant 3rd set the land was settled with them and they prescribed title by adverse possession. This is their inter-se dispute. Therefore, this dispute inter-se between the defendants cannot be decided in this first appeal and the cross-objection filed by them is against each other. If the plaintiffs’ title is proved then their cross-objection is bound to be rejected because they have not filed any counter claim in the suit. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiffs have come with a specific case, therefore, the burden is on the plaintiffs to prove their case. The plaintiffs cannot be granted any relief on the basis of weakness of the defendants. Here, by filing cross objection, the defendants are fighting between them. The defendant 1st set are claiming title on the basis of settlement in their favour whereas defendant 3rd set are claiming title on the basis of settlement in their favour. The learned counsel further submitted that the court below approached the case in wrong angle and wrongly non-suited the plaintiffs on the basis of adverse inference. 13. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant 1st set submitted that they have produced overwhelming evidence to show that the defendants are coming in possession of the property after settlement. The sale deed was a sham transaction and no consideration passed. 13. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant 1st set submitted that they have produced overwhelming evidence to show that the defendants are coming in possession of the property after settlement. The sale deed was a sham transaction and no consideration passed. The consideration was paid back as it was a rehan deed and then Malik came in possession of the property and settled the same in the year 1950 in favour of these defendants. After vesting, they became raiyat of the State of Bihar and they are paying rent to the State of Bihar. The learned court below wrongly disbelieved the case of the settlement made out by these defendants, therefore, they have filed cross-objection. 14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant 3rd set-cross objectors submitted that the court below wrongly disbelieved the Hukumnama (Ext.L). In fact the land was settled with these defendants in the year 1950 by the ex-landlord and after vesting they became raiyat of the State of Bihar. The brick kiln over the suit land is the brick kiln of defendant no.12. The court below has not properly appreciated the evidences adduced by these defendants in support of the fact that after settlement they are in possession continuously and paying tax earlier to the landlord and after vesting to the State of Bihar. If, in fact, on the basis of purchase the plaintiffs were in possession, they should have paid the rent to the ex-landlord or after vesting to the State of Bihar but except the sale deed they have not produced any evidence. Moreover, the land was given for the purpose of performing pooja-path, therefore, the said land could not have been transferred to the purchaser by poojari. 15. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiffs are claiming title on the basis of the sale deed dated 13.06.1898 but they failed to produce the original sale deed. Without any explanation as to what happened to the original sale deed, the plaintiffs got the certified copy of the sale deed marked Ext.4 in this suit. Therefore, the learned court below has rightly drawn adverse inference against the plaintiffs because when there is no sale deed, the fact has not been proved by the plaintiffs. Without any explanation as to what happened to the original sale deed, the plaintiffs got the certified copy of the sale deed marked Ext.4 in this suit. Therefore, the learned court below has rightly drawn adverse inference against the plaintiffs because when there is no sale deed, the fact has not been proved by the plaintiffs. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the appeal be dismissed and it may be held that Ext.L (Hukumnama) is genuine document and defendant 3rd set are coming in possession. 16. In view of the above contentions of the parties the points arise for consideration in this first appeal are as follows:— (A) Whether the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled for declaration of title with respect to the suit property on the basis of the sale deed dated 13.06.1898 and whether they are entitled for recovery of possession or not? (B) Whether the cross-objection filed by defendant 1st set and defendant 3rd set has got any merit and the said defendants-respondents are entitled to any relief in this appeal or not and whether the judgment and decree passed by the court below is sustainable in the eye of law? Point no.(A) 17. It is admitted fact that the plaintiffs have filed this suit for declaration of title on the basis of registered sale deed dated 13.06.1898. The certified copy of this sale deed has been produced by the plaintiffs, which has been marked as Ext.4. So far execution of this deed is concerned, there is no dispute raised by any of the defendants. According to the defendants, this sale deed is not a sale deed rather it is a Izara deed, i.e. conditional sale. The condition was that on repayment of Rs.140/- possession will be given to the vendor. From perusal of the judgment of the court below it appears that the court below recorded a clear finding that this sale deed is out and out sale deed and not Izara deed. So far this finding is concerned, nobody challenged before this Court. However, the court below recorded the finding that the plaintiffs withheld the original sale deed, therefore drew adverse inference. Now when the execution and registration of the sale deed is not under challenge rather it is admitted by the parties, in my opinion, on the ground that original has not been produced, the plaintiffs’ suit could not have been dismissed. However, the court below recorded the finding that the plaintiffs withheld the original sale deed, therefore drew adverse inference. Now when the execution and registration of the sale deed is not under challenge rather it is admitted by the parties, in my opinion, on the ground that original has not been produced, the plaintiffs’ suit could not have been dismissed. It is not the case of the defendants that the sale deed is forged sale deed or it was not executed by the vendor. The dispute is with regard to nature of the sale deed and the capacity, i.e. entitlement or title of the vendor to execute the sale deed was challenged. 18. According to the defendants, since the property was devotar property, the son of Mohar Giri (Shivotardar) could not have sold the property, which belonged to the Lord Shiva. So far this case made out by the defendants is concerned, it may be mentioned here that there is nothing on record to prove any dedication made by the landlord or anyone in favour of the deity, i.e. Lord Shiva. Only in the record of right (Ext.3) it is described as devotar and defendant 1st set alleged that the property was given to the poojari in lieu of performing pooja-path. Therefore, according to the case of defendants now it becomes admitted fact that the property was given to Mohar Giri, who was performing pooja-path. It is not the case of any defendant that it was dedicated to the Lord Shiva (the deity). 19. This Court in the case of Sunderlal Goswami and another Vs. Jogeshwar Prasad Singh and others, A.I.R. 1975 Patna 246 has held that where there is no document, or where in a document there is nothing to show that there was a dedication, except the use of the word 'debutter' or 'Vishnuprit' or 'Sheoprit' etc. and the usufructs were apparently in the personal enjoyment of the grantee and the grantor might have contemplated that the profits of the property, after satisfying the personal wants of the grantee, would be devoted to the service of the God whom the grantee attended, such an expectation or anticipation may explain the use of the words 'debuttar', 'Sheoprit' etc., but does not suffice to constitute a valid dedication to the God. 20. 20. Here, in the present case, it is admitted case of the parties that Mohar Giri was given the suit lands for his personal use, i.e. the said Mohar Giri was enjoying the usufruct of the suit property and this grant was given to him as he was performing pooja-path. After his death, his son Komal Giri was performing pooja-path of Lord Shiva. Therefore, merely because in the record of right the property has been described as ‘Shivotar’ and the poojari has been described as Shivotardar by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the property has been dedicated to Lord Shiva, particularly when it is not the case of any party. Now, therefore, if the property was not dedicated to the deity then it became the personal property of poojari, i.e. Shivotardar, namely, Mohar Giri. 21. The further case of defendant 3rd set is that the nature of the land was kamibrit. From perusal of survey glossary it appears that the meaning of ‘Brit’ is given as the ‘rent free grant’ in consideration of religious services and such grants are almost invariable heritable and transferable even to person who cannot be expected to keep up the particular observances for which they were originally granted. Here, as has been stated above the defendants’ case is that no rent was payable and that no rent was ever paid. According to the plaintiffs it was a Brit land which is admitted by defendant 3rd set, therefore, it is admitted that the grant was a rent free grant in consideration of the religious service rendered by Shivotardar, Mohar Giri. So it was heritable and transferable. The son of Shivotardar, namely, Komal Giri has transferred the property by registered sale deed in the year 1898. In view of the above discussions it becomes clear that the property was not dedicated to Lord Shiva, rather it was a ‘Brit’ land given to Mohar Giri for performing pooja-path and since it was heritable and transferable, after death of Mohar Giri his son Komal Giri inherited and transferred the land by registered sale deed. 22. As stated above, the execution and registration of the sale deed dated 13.06.1898 is not in dispute. The certified copy of the sale deed has been produced as Ext.4. 22. As stated above, the execution and registration of the sale deed dated 13.06.1898 is not in dispute. The certified copy of the sale deed has been produced as Ext.4. It is admitted position that the register maintained in the registry office for registration of sale deed is a public document and the certified copy of the same is admissible in evidence. This Court in the case of Umashankar Singh & Anr. Vs. Keshwa Singh & Ors., 2014 (3) P.L.J.R. 121 has held that as far as the provisions of Evidence Act are concerned, a certified copy of the registered sale deed is admissible in evidence and does not need to be proved by calling witness. Moreover when the execution and registration is not under challenge, the question is whether title of plaintiff is dependent on production of original sale deed? If he failed to produce the original sale deed, the title will be divested. In my opinion, this view cannot be accepted. From perusal of the judgment of the court below I find that the court below has held that since the plaintiffs have withheld the best evidence and did not produce the original sale deed, they are not entitled for declaration of title. This reasoning of the trial court is not acceptable in view of my above discussion. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain and others Vs. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, reported in (2009) 5 Supreme Court Cases 713 has held that a registered deed of sale carries presumption that the transaction was genuine one. If execution of sale deed is proved, the onus is on defendant to prove that the sale deed was not executed and it was a sham transaction. In view of the settled proposition of law here the presumption of genuineness of the transaction dated 13.06.1898 is presumed. Since, there is no denial of execution, the execution also stands proved. The only case made out by the defendants is that the nature is of Izara deed and subsequently the consideration of Rs.140/- was given to the purchaser. In view of the settled proposition of law here the presumption of genuineness of the transaction dated 13.06.1898 is presumed. Since, there is no denial of execution, the execution also stands proved. The only case made out by the defendants is that the nature is of Izara deed and subsequently the consideration of Rs.140/- was given to the purchaser. When the registered sale deed is out and out genuine sale deed and consideration passed and the vendee became the owner of the property, merely because the case has been made out by the defendants that Rs.140/- was paid, title will not revert back or that the title of the vendee will not be divested unless he executes and registers a conveyance deed. 24. It is settled principle of law that title will not be passed on mere admission. If law requires that title will pass only after registration of document and after fulfilling the other requirements then title will pass only in that manner and not otherwise. 25. The defendants have examined witnesses. D.W.2 is on the question of grant of Hukumnama. D.W.29 and D.W.16 are the witnesses, who have compared the signature and their report has been marked Ext.L/1 and Ext.H. It may be mentioned here that the dispute regarding settlement is in between defendants inter-se. The other witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants are on the question of possession after settlement. The plaintiffs have examined P.W.5 (Rameshwar Singh) and P.W.6 (Bujhawan Singh). Both have stated that the suit property is in possession of Rambrichh Singh and his sons. The witnesses have further denied the possession of defendants. The evidences of P.Ws.7 to 9 are on the same point. 26. It may be mentioned here that since the evidences produced by two sets of defendants are inter-se conflicting the evidence regarding possession, i.e. defendant 1st set claimed possession on the basis of settlement whereas the defendant 3rd set claimed possession on the basis of settlement (Ext.L). It is not necessary to decide this inter-se dispute because the plaintiffs have filed the suit for declaration of their title. The registered sale deed (Ext.4) is there, which is a genuine document. If the plaintiffs are able to prove their title then the next question will be whether the defendants have been able to prove their title by adverse possession. The registered sale deed (Ext.4) is there, which is a genuine document. If the plaintiffs are able to prove their title then the next question will be whether the defendants have been able to prove their title by adverse possession. So far this question is concerned, here the defendant 1st set and defendant 3rd set both are claiming title on the basis of settlement. Therefore, when the title is referable to settlement, there is no acquisition of title by adverse possession arises. 27. The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs. Government of India & Ors., reported in 2004 (3) P.L.J.R. 245 SC has held that the pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. This is the consistent view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. The plaintiffs have filed this present suit claiming title and recovery of possession, therefore, the suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Once the plaintiff proves his title then it is for the defendant to prove adverse possession. The Supreme Court in the case of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Ors. Vs. Revamma and Ors. reported in (2007) 6 Supreme Court Cases 59 has held that for acquisition of title by adverse possession the adverse possessor has not only to prove his possession but also to prove his intention to dispossess the owner. Howsoever long possession may be, it will never constitute adverse possession unless corpus possidendi is followed by animus possidendi. 29. In view of my above discussion, in the present case, in my opinion, it is not necessary to decide as to whether the defendant 1st set or defendant 3rd set are in possession. However they have failed to prove title by adverse possession. Since the plaintiffs have been able to prove acquisition of title by a registered sale deed dated 13.06.1898 they are entitled for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the property even if the defendants are in possession and thus, the Point no.(A) formulated is answered in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants and against the defendants-respondents. Point no.(B) 30. This point formulated is dependent on the answer of Point no.(A). The defendants are claiming title on the basis of settlement. This is their inter-se dispute. Point no.(B) 30. This point formulated is dependent on the answer of Point no.(A). The defendants are claiming title on the basis of settlement. This is their inter-se dispute. This inter-se dispute cannot be decided in the present case particularly when I have already found above that Ext.4 was out and out sale deed by which the plaintiffs have acquired title and are entitled for recovery of possession. Therefore, the question as to whether the suit land was validly settled with the defendants or not is not required to be gone into because if the plaintiffs were the owners then there is no question of settlement by ex-landlord arises. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, I find no merit in the cross-objection filed by both the parties. Point no.(B) is, therefore, answered against the cross-objectors. 31. In the result, this first appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree is set aside. The plaintiffs-appellants? suit is decreed. Both the cross-objections filed by the defendants-respondents are hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.