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2015 DIGILAW 431 (GAU)

Sarat Ch. Hazarika v. State of Assam

2015-04-07

P.K.SAIKIA

body2015
ORDER P.K. Saikia, J. – This criminal petition is directed against the order dated 22.7.2014 passed by Spl. Judge, Assam Guwahati in Special Case No. 5 of 2011 framing charges against as many as 13 (Thirteen) accused persons including present petitioners, namely, (1) Sarat Ch. Hazarika, (2) Phuleswar Konch & (3) Anadhar Doley u/s 120(B)/409/468/471 IPC read with Section 13 (1) (c) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the P. C. Act, 1988. 2. Being aggrieved by the framing of charges against them under the aforesaid provisions of law, the petitioners, herein, approached this Court by way of application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of such order. 3. I have heard Mr. A.M. Bora, learned counsel for the petitioners and also heard Mr. Z. Kamar, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. 4. Before I could proceed further, I find it necessary to look at the facts and circumstances which gave rise to Special Case No. 5 of 2011. The case, so projected by prosecution is that the accused persons namely, (1) Jogendra Bora, (2) Anadar Doley, (3) Poleswar Konch, (4) Sarat Hazarika, (5) Lakhinath Das, (6) Tilak Saikia (7) Mrs. Niroda Doley Pegu, (8) Krishna Kt. Baruah, (9) Indeswar Bora, (10) Phatik Ch. Doley (11) Paresh Ch. Neog (12) Kamal Hussain (13) Anuram Das had been working in different capacities in Dhemaji and Lakhimpur Districts, such as, District Elementary Education Officer (in short DEEO), Block Elementary Education Officer (in short B.E.E.O.), Deputy Inspector of Schools (in short D.I. of Schools) during the period from 1992 to 2007. 5. It is alleged that in 1989, a total number of 752 stipendiary teachers were appointed by D.I. of Schools in Dhemaji and Lakhimpur districts against as many numbers of non-existent posts of stipendiary teacher. However, when the matter was detected and was brought to the notice of the higher authorities, services of those stipendiary teachers were terminated on 18th May, 1992 after making one-time payment of salaries for 29 (Twenty Nine) months to those teachers since they were found working till such date, of course quite illegally. 6. However, when the matter was detected and was brought to the notice of the higher authorities, services of those stipendiary teachers were terminated on 18th May, 1992 after making one-time payment of salaries for 29 (Twenty Nine) months to those teachers since they were found working till such date, of course quite illegally. 6. It is alleged that out of 752 stipendiary teachers so terminated, 355 number of teachers continued to work till 2007 illegally for which the petitioners aforesaid, along with other officers, who stood charged under various provisions of Indian Penal Code (in short IPC) as well as the Prevention of Corruption Act , 1988 (in short, the Act of 1988) under the order dated 22.07.2014 in Spl. Case No. 5 of 2011, continued to prepare the budgetary estimate for those terminated teachers most illegally and forwarded the same to the office of Director, Elementary Education, Kahilipara from time to time who, in turn, made necessary budgetary allocation for payment of salaries to those terminated teachers till August, 2007 causing huge financial loss to the State exchequer. 7. An FIR with aforesaid allegations having been lodged with O/C CID, Police Station, a case was registered on such FIR, vide CID PS case No. 02/2008 U/s 120(B)/420/406 IPC and the matter was ordered to be investigated into by an officer of competent to investigate such a case and on conclusion of investigation, Investigating Agency submitted charge-sheet u/s 120(B)/420/409 IPC read with Section 13 (2) of the P.C. Act, 1988 against the accused persons and forwarded them to the court to stand trial. 8. On the receipt of the charge sheet, so submitted, the court below took cognizance of the same and in due course, on hearing the parties, it was pleased to frame charge u/s 120(B)/409/461/471 IPC read with Section 13 (2) of the P. C. Act, 1988 vide order dated 22.07.2014 in Spl. Case No. 5 of 2011. It is that order which has been assailed in this criminal petition U/s 482 of CrPC. 9. Mr. A.M. Bora, learned counsel for the petitioner now submits that the order under challenge is unsustainable for reasons more than one. Case No. 5 of 2011. It is that order which has been assailed in this criminal petition U/s 482 of CrPC. 9. Mr. A.M. Bora, learned counsel for the petitioner now submits that the order under challenge is unsustainable for reasons more than one. In the first place, it has been contended that while considering the charge, the court concerned needs to consider not only the documents which supports the prosecution case but it also needs to consider those documents which were collected by the Investigating Agency and which supports the innocence of the accused persons. 10. In support of such contention, my attention has been drawn to the decision of the Apex Court rendered in State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai, reported in 2009 (8) SCC 617 . The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below - "52. In this case, the probative value of the materials on record has not been gone into. The materials brought on record have been accepted as true at this stage. It is true that at this stage even a defence of an accused cannot be considered. But, we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr. Tulsi that where the entire materials collected during investigation have been placed before the court as part of the charge sheet, the court at the time of framing of the charge could only look to those materials whereupon the prosecution intended to rely upon and ignore the others which are in favour of the accused. 53. The question as to whether the court should proceed on the basis as to whether the materials brought on record even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety disclose commission of an offence or not must be determined having regard to the entirety of materials brought on record by the prosecution and not on a part of it. If such a construction is made, sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall become meaningless. 54. The prosecution, having regard to the right of an accused to have a fair investigation, fair inquiry and fair trial as adumbrated under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot at any stage be deprived of taking advantage of the materials which the prosecution itself has placed on record. 54. The prosecution, having regard to the right of an accused to have a fair investigation, fair inquiry and fair trial as adumbrated under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot at any stage be deprived of taking advantage of the materials which the prosecution itself has placed on record. If upon perusal of the entire materials on record, the court arrives at an opinion that two views are possible, charges can be framed, but if only one and one view is possible to be taken, the court shall not put the accused to harassment by asking him to face a trial. (See State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa.) 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in the present case too, the Investigating Officer had collected some documents during investigation and some of those documents very clearly established the innocence of petitioners herein and other similarly situated accused persons. Such documents were said to be various orders passed by this Court, viz. order dated 12.11.1999 passed in Civil Rule No. 2431 of 1992, Order dated 24.07.1995 passed in Civil Rule No. 2633 of 1992, order dated 14.11.1995 passed in Civil Rule No. 617 of 1993, order dated 2.1.1997 passed in Civil Rule No. 1557 of 1994, order dated 25.08.1995 passed in Civil Rule No. 1641 of 1995, order dated 24.5.1995 in Civil Rule No. 2082 of 1995, order dated 3.7.1995 in Civil Rule No. 2383 of 1995, order dated 8.4.1996 in Civil Rule No. 5189 of 1996. 12. In that connection, it has been submitted that some of the terminated teachers, their numbers being 355, had approached this Court by way of aforesaid Civil Rules and writ proceedings and got the termination order quashed and set aside with further direction to the State respondents therein to reinstate those terminated teachers and to make arrangement for payment of their current pay as well as back wages. 13. In pursuant to such direction, rendered by this Court in various proceedings aforementioned, the petitioners herein and other Education Officers who were arraigned as accused persons in Spl. Case No. 5 of 2011 had to take steps for making provisions for budgetary arrangement so as to pay those terminated teachers, who got order of termination set aside, the current salary and back wages. 14. Case No. 5 of 2011 had to take steps for making provisions for budgetary arrangement so as to pay those terminated teachers, who got order of termination set aside, the current salary and back wages. 14. Since the petitioners and others had to make the budgetary arrangement to pay the salaries of the terminated teachers in consequence of various directions passed by this Court, there cannot be any escape from the conclusion that the petitioners and other officers aforementioned cannot be said to have committed any crime whatsoever-- much less--- their entering into a conspiracy to commit the offences they were charged with under the order dated 22.07.2014 in Spl. Case No. 5 of 2011. 15. Since the order (s) aforesaid unmistakably establish the innocence of accused petitioners beyond any shadow of doubt, the trial court was duty bound to discharge the accused persons of the allegations levelled against them in terms of law laid down in State of M.P. v. Sheetla Saha (supra)-----instead of framing charge as has been done by the Court below-------argues learned counsel for the petitioners. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the charge u/s 13(1) (c) (d) read with Section 13 of the P.C. Act cannot be slapped against the accused petitioners since there is nothing on record to show that the petitioners and other persons obtained pecuniary advantage in taking steps for securing budgetary arrangement from authority concerned to make payment of salaries to those terminated officers since they took such steps in compliance of direction rendered by a court as high as the High Court of the State. 17. Since there is nothing on record to show that in taking steps for securing the budgetary arrangement to make payment of salaries to those terminated teachers, the petitioners and others obtained for themselves pecuniary advantage on abusing their official positions, they cannot be charged with having committed the offence u/s 13(1) (c) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the P.C. Act. In support of such contention, my attention has been drawn to the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai reported in (2009) 8 SCC 617 (Supra)---- "46. In Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi this Court observed: (SCC pp. 570-71, paras 10-11) "10. In State of Punjab v. Ram Singh it was stated : (SCC pp. In Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi this Court observed: (SCC pp. 570-71, paras 10-11) "10. In State of Punjab v. Ram Singh it was stated : (SCC pp. 57-58, para 5) 5. Misconduct - A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or wrong behaviour; its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offense, but not negligence or carelessness." Misconduct in office has been defined as: "Misconduct in office - Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, wilful in character. Term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act." 11. In P. Ramanatha Aiyars Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn., at p. 3027, the term misconduct has been defined as under: Misconduct - The term "misconduct" implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. * * * Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word "misconduct" is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being, construed. "Misconduct" literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. 47. Even under the Act, an offence cannot be said to have been committed only because the public servant has obtained either for himself or for any other person any pecuniary advantage. He must do so by abusing his position as a public servant or holding office as a public servant. In the latter category of cases, absence of any public interest is a sine qua non. The materials brought on record do not suggest in any manner whatsoever that Respondents 1 to 7 either had abused their position or had obtained pecuniary advantage for Respondents 8, 9 and 10, which was without any public interest." 18. In the latter category of cases, absence of any public interest is a sine qua non. The materials brought on record do not suggest in any manner whatsoever that Respondents 1 to 7 either had abused their position or had obtained pecuniary advantage for Respondents 8, 9 and 10, which was without any public interest." 18. The learned counsel for the petitioners further contends that Section 224 Cr.P.C. states that a court is competent to frame charge against the accused person, if the prosecution succeeds in showing a strong prima facie case against the accused persons ---------- and--------------- usually--- whether or not, the prosecution makes out a prima facie case is to be considered on the basis of materials, collected by the Investigating Agency. 19. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, even in exceptional cases, a criminal court considering the question of framing of charge can look into the materials, produced by accused persons which conclusively establish the innocence of such accused persons of the offences they were sought to be charged with. In that connection, my attention has been drawn to the decision in Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 1 . "22. Thus in our opinion, while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the court while framing of the charge in view of D.N. Padhi case, there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an absolute proposition that under no circumstances can the court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted". 20. 20. But then, this Court dealing with a proceeding u/s 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can still exercise much more power to scrutinise not only the materials relied on by the prosecution but it can very well look into documents, produced by the accused persons if such document or documents firmly support the innocence of accused facing trial in a criminal case. 21. In support of such contention my attention has been drawn to the decision rendered in Harshendra K. Dee v. Rebati Lata Coley and Ors reported in (2011) 3 SCC 351 . The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below:- "25. In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizance, 7 (2004) 1 SCC 691 materials relied upon by the accused which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents - which are beyond suspicion or doubt - placed by accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage". 22. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage". 22. In view of aforesaid decision, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits this Court to take into account all the materials on record, more particularly, the directions in the order(s), rendered by this Court in various proceedings aforesaid under which the termination order (s) were quashed requiring the State-respondents therein to take back those terminated teachers into service with further directions to those respondents to pay such teachers not only the current salary but the back wages as well since such order (s) unmistakably establish the innocence of petitioners and others similarly situated persons. 23. Such a contention was hotly disputed by Mr. Z. Kamar, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State contending that there is no dispute over the fact that while considering charge, a criminal court is to see if the materials placed before the court establish a prima facie case against the person sought to be charged with for having committed some offence/offences. 24. It is a settled proposition of law that the phrase "prima facie" means if on the materials on record, the court can presume that the accused has committed the crime which he is sought to be charged with. In other words, if there is a strong ground to suspect that the accused person had committed an offence, it is well within the competence of the Court concerned to frame charge. 25. However, in the stage of framing of charge, the court is not required to make a roving enquiry to ascertain the truthfulness of the materials on record which can be done only on the conclusion of trial when the case is ready for final disposal. In support of such contention, my attention has been drawn to the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and Ors. reported in (2010) 2 SCC 398 . The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below :- 11. The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39 , wherein this Court observed as follows:- 26. reported in (2010) 2 SCC 398 . The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below :- 11. The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39 , wherein this Court observed as follows:- 26. Similar view has been rendered in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan & Anr., reported in 2004 1 SCC 525 paragraph 12. Relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below:- "12. We are of the opinion that though it is open to a High Court entertaining a petition under section 482 of the Code to quash charges framed by the trial court, same cannot be done by weighing the correctness or sufficiency of evidence. In a case praying for quashing of the charge, the principle to be adopted by the High Court should be that if the entire evidence produced by the prosecution is to be believed, would it constitute an offence or not. The truthfulness, the sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced at the time of framing of charge can be done only at the stage of trial. By relying upon the decisions of the apex Court most of which were with reference to appeals arising out of convictions, we think the High Court was not justified in this case in giving a finding as to the non-existence of material to frame a charge for an offence punishable under section 304 Part II, IPC, therefore, so far as the finding given by the High Court is concerned, we are satisfied that it is too premature a finding and ought not to have been given at this stage. At the same time we are also in agreement with the arguments of learned counsel for the respondents that even the Sessions Court ought not to have expressed its views in such certain terms which indicates that the Sessions Court had taken a final decision in regard to the material to establish a charge punishable under section 304 Part II, IPC 27. According to learned Addl. According to learned Addl. P.P., in the instant case, there are materials on record which shows that despite knowing fully well that as many as 752 number of stipendiary teachers were illegally appointed against non-existent posts and in spite of their knowing that those teachers were terminated in 1992 for their being appointed most illegally without there being any sanctioned post, the petitioners along with other similarly situated accused persons took steps for preparing budgetary estimate to make payment of salaries to those terminated teachers and they did so for the period from 1992 to 2007. 28. Admitting that this Court had set aside the termination orders of some stipendiary teachers with further directions to take them back into jobs and also to take steps for arrangement of budget in order to pay those teachers their salaries, it has been contended that this Court set aside those termination orders on noticing that such termination orders were not made in accordance with the requirement of service jurisprudence. According to learned P.P. while rendering those orders, this Court did not consider the criminality involved in appointing large number of stipendiary teachers against non-sanctioned posts by the officials including present petitioners. 29. Therefore, the petitioners cannot take shelter under those orders when after due investigation, it is found that the petitioners and others prepared budgetary arrangement for payment of salaries to the terminated teachers on entering into a criminal conspiracy with those terminated teachers which ultimately allowed the terminated teachers to work for over a very long period requiring the State to suffer enormous financial loss. 30. In order to give life and blood to those contentions learned P.P. submits that this Court while setting aside the termination orders also remanded such matter to the State respondents therein directing them to take steps in matter of termination of those stipendiary teachers in accordance with prescription of service jurisprudence. 31. More importantly, by its order dated 02.01.1997 in Civil Rule 1557 of 1984 as well as by the order dated 14.11.95 in Civil Rule 617/93, this Court also directed the State respondents to proceed against the persons strictly in accordance with law meaning thereby that the State respondents were left with liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings including criminal action against the persons who were responsible for appointing such stipendiary teachers illegally. The relevant parts of the order (s) are reproduced below :- "02.01.1997 1. The relevant parts of the order (s) are reproduced below :- "02.01.1997 1. This matter is covered by a series of judgment of this Court along with one reported in 1995 (2) GLA 226 (Smti. Dalimi Buragohain v. State of Assam & Others). By following that judgment (Annexure - 6) shall stand quashed. But it is made clear that the authority may proceed with the matter in-accordance with law. The petitioner shall be entitled to all the salaries for the period for which he rendered service and for which he was illegally thrown out from the service. Arrear salary shall be paid within a period of 4 (four) months. It is needless to say that as the termination orders have been quashed the petitioners shall be taken back into service. 2. Accordingly, this disposes of this case. 3. I have heard Shri A.K. Maheswari, learned Advocate for the petitioners." "14.11.1995 This is a case involving 55 Assistant Teachers who it is alleged were wrongfully removed from service. Its a matter of 1993 and today we are at the fag end of 1995. More than 2 years have elapsed, but the authority have not chosen either to file affidavit-in-opposition or to produce a single document to justify their action. On 18.5.95 a last chance was given to the State Authority either to file affidavit or to produce the document. It was also stated in the order that failing which the averments made in the petition shall be acted upon and decided in accordance with law. But nothing has been done. I have heard Mr. B.P. Kataki, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. S.K. Muktar, learned counsel for the respondents. A bare perusal of Annexure -III, the order dated 18.5.92 cancelling the appointments of the petitioners will show that no reason whatsoever has been given. It appears that the appointment given to the petitioners were cancelled without affording any opportunity and without giving any reason and therefore, this is in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and on the ground of non-traversing the statements made in the writ application it must be deemed to be correct in accordance with the law laid down by the apex court in AIR 1993 SC 2592 (Naseem Banu v. State of U.P.). In view of that matter, Annexure-III series order cannot stand and accordingly the Annexure series order terminating the service of the petitioners shall stand quashed. The petitioners shall be re-instated in their service. It is made clear that if there was any irregularity in making appointment, the authority may take action after giving due notice to the petitioners and pass necessary order in accordance with law, but the petitioners shall be reinstated in service immediately within a period of 1 (one) month from the date of receipt of this order and the salary due to the petitioners shall be paid after their reinstatement in accordance with law." 32. Though the petitioners herein and others chose to comply with the directions requiring them to reinstate the terminated stipendiary teachers and also made arrangements for payment of current salaries and back wages of those teachers, yet, it blissfully chose to ignore the other part of the order under which the State respondents were to initiate proceedings including criminal action against the persons responsible for alleged illegal appointment of stipendiary teachers. 33. Such conduct on the part of the accused petitioners and others are prolific testimonies of petitioners and other similarly situated accused persons working hand-in-glove with the terminated teachers thereby allowing those teachers to get salaries, which they were not otherwise legally entitled to. Learned P.P., therefore, submits this Court to dismiss this proceeding by affirming the judgment of the trial court. 34. I have considered the rival submissions, having regard to the order under challenge as well as the materials on record. Here, it needs to be stated that at the stage of framing of charge (s) u/s 224 Cr.P.C., the court needs to see if materials relied on prima facie makes out the allegations against the accused person. At such a stage, court is not required to make a roving enquiry. 35. It is in those backdrops, let us consider the order which is questioned in this proceeding. The relevant part of the order is reproduced below:- The relevant part of the judgment is also reproduced below - "A perusal of the record reveals that though the witnesses have referred to some orders passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati Court in connection with cancellation of their termination order the I/O during the course of investigation has not seized any such order referred by the terminated teachers, yet, ld. counsel has produced some certified copies of order passed by the Hon'ble High Court and has submitted Xerox copies of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati Court in Civil Rule Nos. 2431/92, 2633/92, 617/93 etc. The ld. defence counsel has submitted that all these orders passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court relates to the terminated teachers of Dhemaji and Lakhimpur districts in connection with which the instant case is pending for consideration of charge before this court. Though the copies of the order passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court and the above referred Civil Rules were not seized by the I/O during investigation and though the documents relied by the defence need not be considered at the time of consideration of charge, however, as the orders were passed by the court of law and in view of the provisions of section 57 r/w section 114 of the Evidence Act this court take judicial notice of the judgment and orders passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the above referred Civil Rules, Writ Petitions copies of which are furnished by the Ld. defence counsel. The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court vide order dated 12.11.92 in Civil Rule No.2431/92 has quashed the termination order of some teachers and sent back the entire matter to the Dy. Inspector of Schools, Dhemaji for reconsideration directing the officer to pass reasoned order i.e. "to slay he shall give the clear finding that the petitioners payment was irregular as stated in the show cause notice". The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in its judgment dated 24.7.95 passed in Civil Rule No. 2633/92 has set aside the termination order communicated by the Dy. Inspector of Schools, Dhemaji vide memo No.6517-692 dated 18.5.92 and other similar orders and directing that the petitioner shall be deemed in service. The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court vide order dated 14.11.95 in Civil Rule 617/93 held that annexure no. 3 i.e. the order dated 18.5.1992 terminating the service of the petitioner has been quashed and the petitioner was directed to be reinstated in service. However, in the said order it was made clear that if there was any irregularity in making appointment the authority may take action after giving due notice to the petitioner and pass necessary order in accordance with law. However, in the said order it was made clear that if there was any irregularity in making appointment the authority may take action after giving due notice to the petitioner and pass necessary order in accordance with law. While going through the judgment and orders passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in various Civil Rules as preferred by the Ld. defence counsel it reflects that the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court had only interfered regarding the manner in which the petitioners were terminated. The Hon'ble Gauhati High Court has not ventured into the aspect of criminal liability of the accused persons regarding the illegal appointments and subsequent release of salaries. It is pertinent here to mention that the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court was itself monitoring the investigation of this case regarding illegal appointments and subsequent release of salaries causing loss to the State Exchequer. Perusal of the above orders of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court further reflects that the concerned terminated teachers and the concerned officers (accuseds) of the DI of schools, Dhemaji and Lakhimpur were aware of the termination order. In view of the above, the submission made by the Ld. defence counsel that the accuseds have released payment only because of the various orders of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in ignorance of the order of termination given by the Director of Elementary Education is can not be accepted as true. On perusal of the entire record we have found that 752 teachers were appointed in the year 1989 in non existing post in the districts of Dhemaji and Lakhimpur and there services were terminated by the Director, Elementary Education, Kahilipara on 12.05.1992 which was communicated to the teachers by respective DI of Schools on 18.05.1992. Record also reveals that out of the 752 terminated teachers a group of 355 terminated teachers were getting their salaries till August, 2007. The termination of the other teachers out of the total 752 were given effect immediately and they did not get salary. So it is clear that the officers concerned of Dhemaji and Lakhimpur districts were aware of the termination order of the 752 teachers and that its why they were not preparing budget and salary for that group of teachers, excepting 355 teachers who were getting salaries. So it is clear that the officers concerned of Dhemaji and Lakhimpur districts were aware of the termination order of the 752 teachers and that its why they were not preparing budget and salary for that group of teachers, excepting 355 teachers who were getting salaries. It makes more clear that there was a conspiracy among the officers who were present during their tenure from 1992 to 2007 in Dhemaji and Lakhimpur districts regarding preparation and presentation of false budget and passing the same for approval to the office of the Director, Elementary Education and thereafter passing the same for payment as salary in the name of the terminated teachers. In view of the above conspiracy as appears from record there was a misappropriation of total amount of Rs. More than 25 crores during the period from 1992 to August, 2007". 36. Coming back to our case, I have found that there is no dispute over the fact that 752 stipendiary teachers were appointed in 1989 without there being any sanctioned post to make such appointments. It is not in dispute that those teachers were terminated in 1992, they being found appointed illegally. It is also not in dispute that some of those terminated teachers had approached the Court from time to time seeking quashing of the termination orders claiming such termination order to be illegal. There is no quarrel over the fact that the prayers for quashment of those termination orders were allowed since those termination orders were passed in gross violation of service jurisprudence. 37. I have also found that this Court while quashing the termination orders had also directed the State respondents therein to take the terminated teachers back in to service with further direction to pay their salaries. On the basis of the aforesaid admitted position, one can presume that the terminated teachers were reinstated and their current and arrear salaries were paid in terms of various orders passed by this Court. To that extent, I am of the opinion that taking back of the terminated teachers to services and paying their current and arrear salaries cannot be faulted. 38. But this Court had also directed the State respondents including the DI of Schools of Dhemaji and Lakhimpur to initiate process in accordance with law against the teachers who were appointed illegally. To that extent, I am of the opinion that taking back of the terminated teachers to services and paying their current and arrear salaries cannot be faulted. 38. But this Court had also directed the State respondents including the DI of Schools of Dhemaji and Lakhimpur to initiate process in accordance with law against the teachers who were appointed illegally. More importantly, by its order dated 12.11.1992, rendered in Civil Rule 2431/1992, this Court was further pleased to direct the DI, Dhemaji to pass reasoned order indicating that the appointments of the petitioners as stipendiary teachers was illegal. The relevant part is reproduced below:- "12.11.1992 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A.C. Buragohain, learned Govt. Advocate. There is no dispute at the Bar that this petition is covered by order dated 9.7.92 passed by Division Bench of this Court in Civil Rule No. 1331 of 1992, the petitioner is also entitled to get a similar order. The writ petition is disposed of by quashing the impugned order and the entire matter is sent back to the Deputy Inspector of Schools, Dhemaji for reconsideration of the matter afresh. The said officer shall pass reasoned order i.e. to say he shall give a clear finding that the petitioners appointment was irregular as stated in the show-cause notice. With the above observations and directions, the petition is disposed of." 39. We have already found that similar directions were also passed in the order dated 02.01.1997, 14.11.1997 rendered in Civil Rule no. 1557 of 1994 as well as Civil Rule No. 617 of 1993 respectively. Unfortunately, the petitioners and other similarly situated persons chose to ignore such important directions, rendered by this Court in its various orders while accepting that part of the order (s) which favour the teachers who were illegally appointed. 40. Their act of ignoring of such directions, in the backdrop of the fact that a large number of teachers, including the terminated teachers were appointed most illegally without there being any sanctioned posts only serves to show that everything is not hunky-dory on the part of the present petitioners and others in allowing some of those terminated teachers to continue with their jobs taking shelter under the various order (s), passed by this Court in the proceedings aforementioned. 41. 41. The selective conduct of the petitioners in complying with one part of the order (s), found favourable to the petitioners, and, in ignoring other part of such order (s) which are against the terminated teachers appointed most illegally, in my opinion, in facts and circumstances of the case in hand, raises a strong suspicion about all the accused persons working hand-in-glove with the terminated teachers in allowing them to continue in their services till 2007. 42. Above being the position, I am of the considered opinion, that one cannot find fault with the order under which the petitioners and others similarly situated accused persons stood charged under various provisions of the IPC and the Act of 1988 and consequently I have found no difficulty in upholding the plea raised by Mr. Z. Kamar, learned Public Prosecutor on holding that the decisions, relied on by Mr. A. Borah, learned counsel for the petitioner had no obligations to the case in hand. 43. Consequently, this proceeding is dismissed same having been found without any merit. 44. Since the case involves in this proceeding was initiated as back as 2007, I direct the Trial Judge to dispose of the case aforesaid expeditiously, uninfluenced by any of the observations made herein before.