JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. Petitioner was appointed as a Driver in the respondent-corporation. He met with an accident while driving the bus. He remained admitted in P.H.C., Bharari, District Bilaspur w.e.f. 9.11.2007 to 10.11.2007. He was referred to Zonal Hospital, Hamirpur. He remained under treatment in Zonal Hospital, Hamirpur. The medical certificates are placed on record vide Annexures P-1 to P-3. Petitioner sent a telegram for the extension of his medical leave. Petitioner has suffered mono paralysis due to injury received by him during the course of employment. Petitioner was served with a memo Annexure P-5 dated 13.7.2009. He submitted a representation vide Annexure P-6 that he did not want the matter to be inquired into. Petitioner submitted representation to the Regional Manager vide Annexure P-7 dated 5.3.2012 that since he is not in a position to discharge the duties, he may be adjusted to some suitable post. He has placed on record medical certificate Ex.P-8. However, the Regional Manager vide memo Annexure P-9 dated 22.3.2011 has provisionally imposed major penalty upon the petitioner by stating in the order that the petitioner has already confessed charges levelled against him vide application dated 24.8.2009. He was permitted to file reply within 15 days. He submitted reply vide Annexure P-10. The Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of removal upon the petitioner vide office order dated 20.3.2012. Petitioner filed an appeal before the Divisional Manager. The Divisional Manager partly allowed the appeal and substituted the penalty of removal from service to compulsory retirement. 2. Petitioner has met with an accident while discharging his duties. He suffered mono-paralysis, as is evident from the medical certificate, placed on record. It is in these circumstances, he submitted an application vide Annexure P-6. Petitioner has not been permitted to join his duties pursuant to Annexure P-7. The Disciplinary Authority instead of holding a regular inquiry against the petitioner has treated Annexure P-6 as confession on behalf of the petitioner and has imposed the penalty of removal upon him. Petitioner as per Annexure P-6 has not admitted the charges specifically levelled against him. He has only stated therein that he never wanted the charges to be inquired into and whatever the decision would be, same would be binding upon him. Petitioner has filed reply to memorandum dated 22.3.2011 giving therein the circumstances in which he could not join his duties. He has only stated therein that he never wanted the charges to be inquired into and whatever the decision would be, same would be binding upon him. Petitioner has filed reply to memorandum dated 22.3.2011 giving therein the circumstances in which he could not join his duties. The Disciplinary Authority has not taken into consideration the reply filed by the petitioner vide memo Annexure P-10 to memorandum dated 22.3.2011. 3. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad Saxena vs. The State of Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh), AIR 1961 SC 1070 have held that the statements made by the appellant did not amount to a clear or unambiguous admission of his guilt, failure to hold a formal enquiry constituted a serious infirmity in the order of dismissal passed against him, as the appellant had no opportunity at all of showing cause against the charge framed against him and so the requirement of Article 311 (2) was not satisfied. Their Lordships have further held that even if the appellant had made some statements which amounted to admission, it was open to doubt whether he could be removed from service on the strength of the said alleged admissions without holding a formal enquiry as required by the rules. Their Lordships have held as under: “11. It is true that the appellant specifically admitted during the course of the previous enquiry that illegal liquor had been delivered to the contractor, and that he had given the key of the receiver to Narona. It is on the strength of those admissions that the High Court took the view that the appellant had substantially admitted his guilt and so there was really no need for holding a formal enquiry against him after the charge-sheet was supplied to him. In this connection it is necessary to remember that the previous enquiry was not directed against the appellant as such, and he was certainly not in the position of an accused in the said enquiry. In fact, as we have already indicated, the result of the said enquiry was that the appellant was absolved from any complicity in the commission of the offence, and the only criticism made against him was that he was slack in his supervision, that is why he was transferred. In fact, as we have already indicated, the result of the said enquiry was that the appellant was absolved from any complicity in the commission of the offence, and the only criticism made against him was that he was slack in his supervision, that is why he was transferred. In such a case, even if the appellant had made some statements which amounted to admission it is open to doubt whether he could be removed from service on the strength of the said alleged admissions without holding a formal enquiry as required by the rules. But apart from this consideration, if the statements made by the appellant do not amount to a clear or unambiguous admission of his guilt, failure to hold a formal enquiry would certainly constitute a serious infirmity in the order of dismissal passed against him. Under Art. 311(2) he was entitled to have a reasonable opportunity of meeting the charge framed against him, and in the present case, before the show-cause notice was served on him he has had no opportunity at all to meet the charge. After the charge-sheet was supplied to him he did not get an opportunity to cross-examine Kethulekar and others. He was not given a copy of the report made by the enquiry officers in the said enquiries. He could not offer his explanation as to any of the points made against him; and it appears that from the evidence recorded in the previous enquiries as a result of which Kethulekar was suspended an inference was drawn against the appellant and show-cause notice was served on him. In our opinion, the appellant is justified in contending that in the circumstances of this case he has had no opportunity of showing cause at all, and so the requirement of Art. 311(2) is not satisfied.” 4. In the instant case, regular inquiry was required to be held against the petitioner. 5. The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority has failed to take into consideration that the case of the petitioner was required to be considered as per the provisions of section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. 5. The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority has failed to take into consideration that the case of the petitioner was required to be considered as per the provisions of section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. Petitioner in view of section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, was required to be adjusted to any suitable post taking into consideration his disability instead of removing him. Petitioner rather has requested as per Annexure P-7 to permit him to join his duties and to adjust him on a post taking into consideration his injury. 6. Division Bench of Madras High Court (Madurai Bench) in G. Muthu vs. Management of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai), Limited, 2006 (4) MadLJ 1669 has held as under: “[14] Having heard the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the respondent on the above referred to contentions, namely as regards the distinctive application of Section 47 dehors the definition of 'disability' as found in Section 2(i), we find force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant. As pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the law makers have used a different set of expressions in Section 47, which deals with an employee who "acquires a disability" in contra distinction to the expression "with disability" which has been used in the various provisions falling under Chapters IV to VII of the Act. On a close reading of such provisions contained in Chapters IV to VII, we could discern that the benefits which are conferred under those provisions are to be made available to persons who already suffer a disability. In other words, the two categories, namely a person 'with a disability' is always distinguishable from a person who later on 'acquires a disability'. Viewed in that respect, it will have to be held that the expression 'disability' used in Section 47 of the Act can, by no stretch of imagination, be equated with a case of a person 'with the disability'. Once the said distinction as between Section 47 and the various other provisions of the Act, in particular the provisions falling under Chapters IV to VII, is understood, then the stand of the appellant can be better appreciated. Once the said distinction as between Section 47 and the various other provisions of the Act, in particular the provisions falling under Chapters IV to VII, is understood, then the stand of the appellant can be better appreciated. A close reading of Section 47 of the Act would show that the benefit granted under the said provision was to be conferred on a serving employee in an establishment who acquires a 'disability' during such service. When such 'disability' was acquired by him during his service, the Parliament thought it fit to ensure that his service is not in any way affected because of acquisition of such a 'disability' and with that view directed that he should be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits and in the event of such alternate post not being available, to create a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or till he attains the age of superannuation. Sub-section (2) of Section 47 goes one step further and stipulates that no promotion should also be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability. A further reading of the last proviso to Section 47 disclose that it is for the appropriate Government to take note of the type of work carried on in any establishment and issue a notification exempting such establishment from the provisions of the said Section 47, subject to such conditions if any. Therefore, unless and otherwise such a specific notification exempting an establishment depending upon the nature and type of work of that establishment is issued, no other establishment covered by the provisions of the Act can take a different stand. [15] Having regard to the special features contained in the said Section 47, providing for such a special benefit to an existing employee in an establishment when he acquires a 'disability' as held by us earlier, the application and implementation of the said provision will have to be ensured independent of various other benefits provided under the various other provisions falling under Chapters IV to VII of the Act which are meant for persons 'with disability'. Having regard to the said distinctive features contained in Section 47 of the Act, as compared to the other provisions, we are of the considered opinion that the context in which the benefit has been conferred under Section 47 stands apart from the context of all other provisions where various other benefits have been conferred. In other words, we are of the firm view that the opening set of expressions contained in the definition clause, namely Section 2, which denotes "unless the context otherwise requires" squarely gets attracted to Section 47 and therefore the definition of 'disability' as defined under Section 2(i) cannot be blindly applied to the term 'disability' which has been used in Section 47 of the Act. In other words, the term 'disability' used in Section 47 can draw support not only in respect of the defined 'disabilities' as contained in Section 2(i) of the Act but will also encompass such other 'disabilities' which would disable a person from performing the work which he held immediately prior to acquisition of such 'disability' and thereby entitle him to avail the benefits conferred under the said provision for having acquired such a 'disability'.” 7. Accordingly, in view of the analysis and discussion made hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed. Annexures P-5, P-11 and P-12 are quashed and set aside. Petitioner shall be deemed to be in continuous service of the respondent-corporation. However, it shall be open to the respondent-corporation to post the petitioner on a suitable post taking into consideration his injury, as per the medical record, placed on record, with all the consequential benefits. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.