Judgment R.K. Deshpande, J. 1. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard the matter finally by consent of the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 2. The Additional Collector, Yavatmal, by his order dated 21.12.2013 disqualified the petitioner under Section 14(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1948, being the Member of Gram Panchayat, Shelu (Bk) on the ground of petitioner having directly or indirectly any share or interest in the employment of her son in the Gram Panchayat. The Additional Collector disqualified the petitioner and in Appeal No. 70/BVP16(2)/SheluBK./2013-14, decided on 21.01.2015, this order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed. Hence, this petition is against the said orders. 3. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Shelu (Bk), Tq. Pusad, Distt. Yavatmal. By Resolution No. 12, dated 23.06.2011, it was decided to employ Shri Vijay Laxman Mhaske, her son, for release of water for supply in the village on temporary basis. 4. In the light of this factual aspect, Section 14(1)(g) of the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, need to be seen and it is reproduced below. 14. Disqualification. - (1) No person shall be a member of a Panchayat continue as such, who- (a).... (b)..... (g) has directly or indirectly, by himself or his partner, any share or interest in any work done by order of the Panchayat, or in any contract with, by or on behalf of, or employment with or under, the Panchayat. As per the aforesaid provision, if a person has directly or indirectly, by himself or his partner, any share or interest in the employment with the Gram Panchayat, then it incurs disqualification. It is urged that merely because the petitioner was interested in her son, that would not sufficient to attract disqualification. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gulam Yasin Khan vrs. Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar and ors, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1339 , wherein the Apex Court has considered Section 15(1) of the Central Provinces & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, which provided that, "no person shall be eligible for election, selection or nomination as a member of a Committee, if such person had directly or indirectly any share or interest in any contract with, by or on behalf of the Committee, while owning such share or interest". The Apex Court has considered the said provision assuming that clause (1) includes "employment", though it is not specifically mentioned in the said clause. 6. It has been held in the aforesaid decision that, "the interest to which the clause refers cannot mean mere sentimental or friendly interests; it must mean interest which is pecuniary, or material or of similar nature. If the interest is of this latter category, it would suffice to incur disqualification even if it is indirect". It has further been held that, "even if, we were to adopt a liberal construction of section 15(1), we cannot escape the conclusion that the interest or share has to be in the contract itself. The person sought to be disqualified must "own such share or interest". When we are enquiring as to whether the appellant is interested directly or indirectly in the employment of his son we cannot overlook the fact that the enquiry is not as to whether the appellant is interested in the son, but the enquiry is whether the appellant is interested in the employment of the son. The distinction between the two enquiries may appear to be subtle, but, nevertheless, for the purpose of construing the clause, it is very relevant. Considered from this point of view, on the facts proved in this case, we find it difficult to hold that by mere relationship with his son, the appellant can be said to be either directly or indirectly interested in his employment. 7. Though the provision of Section 14(1)(g) includes the word "employment", the decision of the Apex Court would squarely govern the controversy involved in the matter. The enquiry has to be whether the petitioner has pecuniary, or material or of a similar nature of interest in the Gram Panchayat and not as to whether the petitioner is interested in her son. Mere relationship of the petitioner with her son would not attract the disqualification under Section 14(1)(g) of the said Act. The authorities below have, therefore, committed an error in holding that the petitioner has incurred disqualification under Section 14(1)(g) of the said Act. 8. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 21.12.2013 passed by the Additional Collector, Yavatmal, and the order dated 21.01.2015 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati, are hereby quashed and set aside. The proceedings for disqualification are dismissed. 8. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 21.12.2013 passed by the Additional Collector, Yavatmal, and the order dated 21.01.2015 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati, are hereby quashed and set aside. The proceedings for disqualification are dismissed. Rule is made absolute in these terms. No order as to costs.