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Jharkhand High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 45 (JHR)

K. N. Mukhopadhyay v. State of Jharkhand

2015-01-09

H.C.MISHRA

body2015
ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. No one has appeared on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in spite of repeated calls. 2. The petitioner has filed this writ application with a prayer for issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing the I.D Case No.16 of 2002 filed under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for non-implementation of the award dated 26.4.1982 passed in Reference No. 30 of 1980 by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad. 3. From the perusal of the record, it appears that the State represented by the Labour Enforcement Officer (Central), Dhanbad-III, had filed the I.D Case No.16 of 2002 against the then Chairman and Managing Director and the other officers of M/s BCCL Koyla Bhavan, Koyla Nagar, Dhanbad, in which, the petitioner, being the Company Secretary of B.C.C.L., was also made an accused. The said complaint was filed alleging non-implementation of the award dated 26.4.1982 in Reference Case No. 30 of 1980, passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, in respect of workmen of D & F Rope-ways, merged with M/s BCCL, wherein, the Tribunal held that the workmen of D & F Rope-ways were entitled to the same benefits and scale of pay as provided in Ext.W-4 read with Ext.W-13, in Reference Case No. 30 of 1980. The petitioner has challenged the very filing of the said I.D Case No. 16 of 2002 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, and has prayed for quashing the same. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the award itself is vague and not very specific and even the respondents were not fully aware whether the award had been implemented or not by the B.C.C.L., and accordingly, it is a fit case for quashing the entire I.D Case No. 16 of 2002. 5. It appears from the record that during the pendency of this application, several I.As have been filed by the concerned workmen, alleging that the award had not been implemented, whereupon steps were taken during the pendency of this application in this Court, for implementation of the award. 6. 5. It appears from the record that during the pendency of this application, several I.As have been filed by the concerned workmen, alleging that the award had not been implemented, whereupon steps were taken during the pendency of this application in this Court, for implementation of the award. 6. Lastly, by Order No. 27 dated 20.12.2013, this Court passed an order, relevant portion of which is as follows :- “Admittedly in Reference Case No. 30 of 1980, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. I, Dhanbad (hereinafter referred as 'CGIT') has given an award, which runs as follows:- “For the reason given above by M/s BCCL to the workmen of the J&K Ropeways of former Coal Board the demand of the workmen of D and F Ropeways which merged with M/s BCCL is justified. The workmen of D and F Ropeways, therefore, are entitled to the same benefits and scale of pay as provided in Ext.W-4 read with Ext.W-13. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances there will be no order for costs.” It is also an admitted position that part of the award has been implemented by regularizing the workmen of D & F Ropeways in monthly time scale w.e.f. March, 2000. It is also an admitted position that after March, 2000, the concerned workmen have been paid their salaries and other allowances legally admissible to them. It is also an admitted position that the concerned workmen are entitled to get the benefit of the award w.e.f. 01.04.1975, but the Management of BCCL has not given that benefit to the workmen concerned because there is some confusion regarding the fixation of salary and determination of arrears of the workmen. Sri Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for the BCCL submits that now the amounts which workmen are entitled have been determined by the Chartered Accountant namely M/s P.S. Kesari & Company, Dhanbad. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, in my view, the dispute between the parties can be resolved if the BCCL Management pay the arrears to the workmen and / or their legal representative w.e.f. 01.04.1975 till date as determined by the Chartered Accountant M/s P.S. Kesari & Company, Dhanbad. Accordingly, I direct Management of BCCL (Petitioner) to pay the aforesaid arrears amount to all concerned workmen and / or their legal representative by 31st of March, 2014." 7. Accordingly, I direct Management of BCCL (Petitioner) to pay the aforesaid arrears amount to all concerned workmen and / or their legal representative by 31st of March, 2014." 7. The order passed by this Court clearly shows that the award was not implemented till 20.12.2013. A supplementary affidavit has been filed by the petitioner on 4.4.2014., wherein, the stand of the petitioner is that the award has been fully complied with. However, the stand of the petitioner in the supplementary affidavit, appears to be in dispute from the record, and still it is not clear whether the award has been satisfied in its entirety or not. 8. Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, reads as follows :- “29.Penalty for breach of settlement or award -Any person who commits a breach of any term of any settlement or award, which is binding on him under this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both, and where the breach is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees for every day during which the breach continues after the conviction for the first and the Court trying the offence, if it fines the offender, may direct that the whole or any part of the fine realised from him shall be paid, by way of compensation, to any person who, in its opinion, has been injured by such breach." 9. Thus, from a bare perusal of Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is apparent that there is provision for penalty for the breach of settlement of the award. The record clearly shows that at least until 20.12.2013, when the order quoted above was filed, the award was not fully satisfied and this Court had directed the management of the B.C.C.L, i.e., the petitioner to pay the arrears amount of all the concerned workmen or their legal representative by 31st of March, 2014. This clearly shows that there was a cause of action for filing the I.D Case No.16 of 2002, for the offence under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, 10. In the supplementary affidavit filed on 4.4.2014, it is stated as follows:- "5. This clearly shows that there was a cause of action for filing the I.D Case No.16 of 2002, for the offence under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, 10. In the supplementary affidavit filed on 4.4.2014, it is stated as follows:- "5. That the petitioner states that the amount payable to 60 concerned workmen to whom the notices could not be delivered is also ready and if this Hon'ble Court directs the same can be deposited before the Registry of this Hon'ble Court. It is further submitted that 3 persons to whom notices have been served but they have not responded, the petitioner management is ready to do the same exercise in order to comply with the directions of this Hon'ble Court. The petitioner management is also not aware about their whereabouts. They are also not aware as to whether they are living or dead. They also do not know as to who are their dependents of the persons living or dead." 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the petitioner management is not aware of the whereabouts of certain workmen and also not aware whether they are living or dead, the petitioner is ready to deposit the amount payable to them in this Court, if so directed. 12. In my considered view, this Court cannot become the Executing Court for execution of the awards of the Labour Courts and the Industrial Tribunals. Whether the offence is made out or not against the petitioner, and whether the award has been satisfied in its entirety or not, are the facts to be considered by the Competent Court where the application under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act has been filed. Prima-facie the record shows that the award which was passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in the year 1982 itself, has not been implemented up-to the year 2014 in its entirety. 13. I am of the considered view that there can be no interference by this Court and no case can be said to be made out at this stage, for quashing the application filed in the Competent Court for the offence under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 14. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in this writ application and the same stands dismissed. Consequently, all the pending I.As filed in this case also stand disposed of.