JUDGMENT K.R. MOHAPATRA, J.- The appellants as plaintiffs in this appeal seek to assail the judgment and order dated 19.05.2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar in C.S. No. 548 of 2003 in a proceeding for probate of Will filed under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for short ‘the Act’). 2. Briefly stated, the case of the plaintiffs is that. plaintiff no. 2 (appellant no. 2) and defendant nos. 2 to 5 (respondent nos. 1 to 4) are sons and daughters of one Dinabandhu Mohapatra. The suit property appertaining to Plot No. 566 under Khata No. 85 of mouza Badagda, measuring an area of Ac. 0.50 decimals, is the self- acquired property of said Dinabandhu Mohapatra. Said Dinabandhu Mohapatra breathed his last on 9.2.1995. Before his death, he had executed his last registered Will on 22.7.1994 in favour of the plaintiff- appellant no. 1, who is none other than the son of plaintiff-appellant no. 2. As the plaintiff-appellant no. 1 was minor at the time of execution of the Will, the plaintiff-appellant no. 2 was appointed as Executor in respect of the said Will. On death of the testator, namely, Dinabandhu Mohapatra, the plaintiffs-appellants filed the aforesaid suit for probate of the said Will. 3. Defendant nos. 2 and 3 were set ex parte vide order dated 23.07.2011 passed by the learned trial Court in the aforesaid suit. Defendant no. 4 (respondent no. 3) filed her written statement contending that the proceeding is not maintainable under law and the same is barred by limitation. Therefore, the plaintiffs-appellants have no cause of action to file the suit. Instrument describing it to be a Will is not a document coming under Section 62 of the Act. Hence, the plaintiffs-appellants cannot get any benefit out of such document, which has no legal entity and validity. It was further contended that the suit property is the self-acquired property of her father, namely, Dinabandhu Mohapatra and after his death on 09.02.1995, the suit land devolved upon his legal heirs including the defendants. It was further stated that Batakrushna Behera and Raimohan Mangaraj are strangers to their family and they might have been set up by plaintiff-appellant no. 2. Therefore, she prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost. Defendant no. 5 (respondent no. 4) filed his written statement reiterating the contention of defendant no. It was further stated that Batakrushna Behera and Raimohan Mangaraj are strangers to their family and they might have been set up by plaintiff-appellant no. 2. Therefore, she prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost. Defendant no. 5 (respondent no. 4) filed his written statement reiterating the contention of defendant no. 4 and the assertion made in the written statement of defendant no. 4. It was further contended that on 04.02.1995, said Dinabandhu Mohapatra had executed two numbers of documents, i.e., the deeds of family arrangement in respect of his all ancestral and the self-acquired property including the suit land. Out of those, one being executed in favour of Purendranath Mohapatra (plaintiff no. 2) and another in favour of defendant no. 5 dividing the suit land into two parts allotting the front half to an extent of Ac. 0.25 decimals in favour of plaintiff no. 2 and rest Ac. 0.25 decimals in favour of him (defendant no. 5). Both the brothers acknowledged such distribution by their deceased father. On the strength of such family settlement deed, the plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 5 have been enjoying the suit land as per distribution made in those two family settlement deeds. Thus, he prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost. 4. Basing upon the rival pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed as many as three issues, which are as follows: 1.Whether the suit is maintainable? 2.Whether there is any cause of action to file the suit? 3.Whether the plaintiff no. 1 is entitled to probate the ‘Will’? 5.To prove their respective cases, the plaintiffs examined as many as six witnesses, P.W. 1 being plaintiff no. 2, P.W. 5 being plaintiff no. 1, P.Ws. 2 and 3 being the attesting witnesses and P.W. 4-G.K. Mishra is an independent witness and exhibited documents including the registered Will dated 22.07.1994 as Ext. 7. Exts. 7/ a, 7/b and 7/ c are the signatures of Batakrushna Behera, Dinabandhu Mohapatra and Raimohan Mangaraj respectively. On the other hand, defendant no. 5 examined himself as D.W. 1 who is the sole witness and exhibited family settlement documents as Exts. A and B. Ext. C is an affidavit sworn to by plaintiff no. 2 along with other documents. 6. The learned trial Court, for the sake of convenience, discussed all the three Issues simultaneously. On the other hand, defendant no. 5 examined himself as D.W. 1 who is the sole witness and exhibited family settlement documents as Exts. A and B. Ext. C is an affidavit sworn to by plaintiff no. 2 along with other documents. 6. The learned trial Court, for the sake of convenience, discussed all the three Issues simultaneously. Taking into consideration the materials on record as well as the contentions raised by the parties, the learned trial Court came to a conclusion that Ext. 7 is not the last Will or last wish of the testator, Dinabandhu Mohapatra. It was further held that the plaintiffs have failed to dislodge the suspicion raised by the defendants. On the aforesaid findings, the learned trial Court dismissed the probate proceeding (suit). Hence, the plaintiffs-appellants have filed this appeal under Section 299 of the Act. 7. There is no dispute to the fact that the suit land in question is the self-acquired property of the testator, late Dinabandhu Mohapatra. Said Dinabandu Mohapatra on the date of execution of the Will was in sound state of mind and had a disposable right on that date, i.e., on 22.07.1994. The Will executed by Dinabandhu Mohapatra is a registered one being attested by two witnesses as required under law. However, the defendant no. 5, who was only contesting the probate case, alleged that the Will or Wish of the testator was not the last Will or Wish of his. It was contended that Dinabandhu Mohapatra few days before his death, had executed two deeds of family arrangement dividing his ancestral as well as self-acquired properties in two equal shares allotting front portion of the suit property to plaintiff no. 2 (appellant no. 2) and back portion of the same to defendant no.5 (respondent no. 4). The aforesaid documents are marked as Exts. A and B. 8. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4, strenuously urged that Exts. A and B are the last Will/Wish of Dinabandhu Mohapatra and thus, Ext. 7 cannot be treated to be the last Will of the testator. 9. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, submitted that under no stretch of imagination, Exts. A and B can be treated to be the deeds of family settlement or family arrangement. 7 cannot be treated to be the last Will of the testator. 9. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, submitted that under no stretch of imagination, Exts. A and B can be treated to be the deeds of family settlement or family arrangement. Those are merely lists of some properties being signed by said Dinabandhu Mohapatra and the same cannot be treated to be the Will or Wish of said Dinabandhu Mohapatra. Of course, the name of defendant no. 5 (respondent no. 4) appears on the top of Ext. A and the name of plaintiff no. 2 (appellant no. 2) appears on the top of Ext. B. But that by itself cannot confer those documents the status of family settlement deed. Apparently, Exts. A and B are the list of properties including the suit property being signed by Dinabandhu Mohapatra, but there is no material to show that Exts. A and B were prepared by Dinabandhu Mohapatra making a family settlement and allotting properties in favour of appellant no. 2 and respondent no. 4. He further contended that the learned trial Court proceeded on a presumption and misconception that Exts. A and B are two family settlement deeds executed by said Dinabandhu Mohapatra on 04.02.1995. It appears that Exts. A and B are only the lists of properties signed by Dinabandhu Mohapatra. There is nothing in Exts. A and B to suggest that those are deeds of family arrangement made by said Dinabandhu Mohapatra dividing the properties into two equal shares in favour of appellant no. 2 and respondent no. 4. Further, in addition to appellant no. 2 and respondent no. 4, said Dinabandhu Mohapatra had other legal heirs, who have been arrayed as respondents. There is no whisper in Exts. A and B about other legal heirs and their right and interest over the properties of Dinabandhu Mohapatra. ‘Deed’ explained in Black’s Law Dictionary (tenth edition) is as follows : “What then is a deed? Unfortunately the word is not free from ambiguity. In the original and technical sense a deed is a written instrument under the seal of the party executing it. Because, however, of the wide us of such instruments in the conveyance of real estate, it has come to mean in popular acceptance any formal conveyance for the transfer of land or of an interest there. In the original and technical sense a deed is a written instrument under the seal of the party executing it. Because, however, of the wide us of such instruments in the conveyance of real estate, it has come to mean in popular acceptance any formal conveyance for the transfer of land or of an interest there. The dual use of the term has crept into the language of Courts and law writers, so that in the reading of cases it is difficult to determine whether the word is used in the first and original sense, or whether it connotes a formal instrument of the type ordinarily employed for the conveyance of land.” Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of Personal Property, 46, at 118-19 (2d ed. 1955). “All deeds are documents, but note all documents are deeds. For instance, a legend. chalked on a brick wall, or a writing tattooed on a sailor’s back may be documents but they are not deeds. A deed is, therefore, a particular kind of document. It must be a writing and a writing on paper or its like, e.g., velum or parchment. Any instrument under seal is a deed if made between private persons. It must be signed, sealed, and delivered. A deed must either (a) effect the transference of an interest, right or property, or (b) create an obligation binding on some person or persons, or (c) confirm some act whereby an interest, right, or property has already passed.” Gerald Dworkin, Odgers’ Construction of Deeds and Statutes 1 (5th ed. 1967). 10. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellants drew attention of this Court to the evidence of appellant no. 2 (P.W. 1). In examination-in-chief, which is in Oriya, P.W. 1 deposed in para-2 of his examination-in-chief that his father, namely, Dinabandhu Mohapatra, had executed a Will taking into consideration the family affairs and he had also executed a family settlement deed in respect of other properties. In his cross-examination, he has categorically deposed that “...............the Deed of Family Settlement which I have admitted in para-2 of my affidavit is not the same as shown by you (an unregistered Deed of Family Settlement dated 04.02.1995 is shown to the witness by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants and the said document is marked as ‘X’ for identification)”. The said mark ‘X’ was subsequently marked as Ext. The said mark ‘X’ was subsequently marked as Ext. A. Thus, P.W. 1 has categorically denied Ext. A to be the family settlement deed. Thus, onus lies heavily on the defendant no. 5 (respondent no. 4) to prove that Exts. A and B are nothing but deeds of family settlement executed by Dinabandhu Mohapatra. Mr. Mishra heavily relied upon the statement of P.W. 1 to prove that Exts. A and B are the deeds of family settlement to the effect that P.W.1 in his examination-in-chief has admitted that Dinabandhu had executed a deed of family settlement. The contention of Mr. Mishra cannot be accepted for the reason that P.W. 1 has categorically said that the deed of family settlement was with regard to the properties other than the suit. land and he has denied Ext. A to be the deed of family settlement, when confronted. More importantly, Exts. A and B are mere list of some properties. There is no whisper with regard to conveyance of any right either to appellant no. 2 or respondent no. 4. It also does not speii out the names of other co-sharers and/or their right, if any, over the properties mentioned therein. There is no other material on record to show that Exts. A and B are the deeds of family settlement. Therefore, the presumption of the learned trial Court that Exts. A and B are two family settlement deeds is without any basis. Thus, it. can be safely said that Exts. A and B are not the deeds of family settlement and that Ext. 7 is the last Will of the testator, namely, Dinabandhu Mohapatra. 11. Defendant no. 5 (respondent no. 4) contended that Dinabandhu Mohapatra had never executed any Will in favour of the plaintiff-appellant no. 1 and the so-called Will dated 22.07.1994 is a forged and manufactured document. The signature thereon does not belong to his father, Dinabandhu Mohapatra. The attesting witnesses, namely, Batakrushna Behera (P.W. 3) and Raimohan Managaraj (P.W. 2) are not the family members. Thus, it is to be seen whether the plaintiffs-appellants are successful in dislodging the suspicion raised by the contesting defendants attached to Ext. 7. Ext. 7/b is the signature of Dinabandhu Mohapatra, which was marked without objection. Both the attesting witnesses (P.Ws. 2 and 3) have deposed in clear terms that Dinabandhu Mohapatra put his signature (Ext. Thus, it is to be seen whether the plaintiffs-appellants are successful in dislodging the suspicion raised by the contesting defendants attached to Ext. 7. Ext. 7/b is the signature of Dinabandhu Mohapatra, which was marked without objection. Both the attesting witnesses (P.Ws. 2 and 3) have deposed in clear terms that Dinabandhu Mohapatra put his signature (Ext. 7/b) in their presence and they have attested the Will. By order dated 28.09.2010, learned trial Court allowed the petition filed by defendant no. 5 (respondent no.4 herein) to send the signature of the testator, Dinabandhu Mohapatra on Ext. 7 for examination by handwriting expert and accordingly, a sum of Rs. 150/- was deposited on 13.10.2010 vide Challan No. 212 dated 11.10.2010 towards fees. Subsequently, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Handwriting Bureau intimated the prescribed fees to be Rs. 5100/-. Surprisingly, the defendant no. 5 without depositing the same filed a memo on 22.06.2011 indicating therein that the suit may be posted for hearing. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court holds that Ext. 7/b is the signature of the testator, namely, Dinabandhu Mohapatra on Ext. 7. Defendant no. 5 (respondent no. 4) contended that Batakrushna Behera (P.W. 3) in his cross-examination, has categorically admitted that he does not know how to read and write English. Moreover, in Ext. 7, the name of father of Batakrushna Behera (P.W. 3) is reflected as Durya Dalan Behera and during cross-examination, said P.W. 3 has frequently mentioned the name of his father as Duryodhan Behera. Thus, Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 submitted that P.W. 3 is not the same person who appears as an attesting witness in Ext. 7. Mr. Mohanty, on the other hand, referring to the cross-examination of P.W. 3, submitted that Batakrushna Behera has categorically stated in his cross-examination that he knows signing in English and his signature in Ext. 7 was marked as Ext. 7/ a without any objection. Moreover, no suggestion whatsoever was put to P.W. 3 with regard to his identity in his cross-examination as alleged by Mr. Mishra. 12. Considering the rival contention of the parties and on verification of Ext. 7 as well as the deposition of P.W. 3, it allows no scope of suspicion that P.W. 3 was one of the attesting witnesses to Ext. 7. Mishra. 12. Considering the rival contention of the parties and on verification of Ext. 7 as well as the deposition of P.W. 3, it allows no scope of suspicion that P.W. 3 was one of the attesting witnesses to Ext. 7. No doubt can be raised about his identity as because he has put his signature in English in Ext. 7 although he has signed the deposition in Odia. 13. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 contended that appellant no. 2 was present in the office of the Sub-Registrar on the date of registration of the Will and that itself is a ground of suspicion with regard to genuineness of the Will. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellant no. 2 has admitted in his deposition that he was present in the office of Sub-Registrar at the time of execution of the Will and said Dinabandhu Mohapatra handed over the Will to the appellant no. 2 on 22.07.1994. The said statement of appellant no. 2 was objected to. The presence of appellant no. 2 in the office of the Sub-Registrar on the date of execution of the Will cannot by itself raise any doubt with regard to genuineness of the Will. The person making such allegation has to prove that the presence of appellant no. 2 in the office of Sub-Registrar has influenced the testator for execution of the Will. Apparently, neither any allegation made nor any evidence to that effect led by defendant no. 5 except a bald allegation without any basis. Thus, the presence of plaintiff-appellant no. 2 in the office of Sub-Registrar on the date of execution of the Will cannot be held to be suspicious, circumstance to doubt the genuineness of the Will. 14. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for respondent no. 4 drawing attention of the Court to Ext. C submitted that appellant no. 2 has admitted Ext. C, which is an affidavit prepared to be submitted before the Consolidation Authority, that he (appellant no. 2) and defendant no.5 (respondent no. 4) have equal share over the ancestral property as detailed in the schedule. In the family arrangement, an amicable settlement has been arrived at by both the brothers, who are living in separate mess and separate possession over the schedule property. Thus, Mr. Mishra submitted that appellant no. 2) and defendant no.5 (respondent no. 4) have equal share over the ancestral property as detailed in the schedule. In the family arrangement, an amicable settlement has been arrived at by both the brothers, who are living in separate mess and separate possession over the schedule property. Thus, Mr. Mishra submitted that appellant no. 2 has himself admitted that the properties of Dinabandhu Mohapatra were divided into equal shares between the appellant no. 2 and respondents and Dinabandhu had no disposable right over the suit land to execute the Will. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, submitted that the schedule of property, as referred to in Ext. C, was not filed. Moreover, the affidavit refers the ancestral property of the family whereas the suit property is admittedly the self-acquired property of Dinabandhu Mohapatra. Thus, Ext. C is of no help to respondent no. 4 as it apparently does not relate to the suit property. In fact, Ext. C is purported to have been prepared to be produced before the Consolidation Authority, which relates to the ancestral properties of the family, but the suit property is admittedly the self-acquired property of Dinabandhu Mohapatra. The affidavit under Ext. C is of no use, more particularly when the schedule of property referred to in the said affidavit has not been filed or exhibited. Thus, Ext. C is inconsequential for adjudication of the case. 15. It is the specific case of the appellants that appellant no. 2 resides over the suit property along with his family including appellant no. 1. The electric bill and rent receipts etc. admitted to evidence as Exts. 4, 5 and 6 etc. have been filed in support of the possession of the appellants over the suit land. Though the respondent no. 4 claims to be in possession of back portion of the suit property, he had not filed any document except the solitary evidence of recent rent receipt marked as Ext. E. 16. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case in its entirety together with pleadings and materials placed by the parties, there remains no scope of suspicion that late Dinabandhu Mohapatra had executed Ext. 7 in favour of appellant no. 1, which was his last Will. The learned trial Court though narrated the evidence of parties but without discussing the same abruptly came to the conclusion that Ext. 7 in favour of appellant no. 1, which was his last Will. The learned trial Court though narrated the evidence of parties but without discussing the same abruptly came to the conclusion that Ext. 7 is not the last Will of late Dinabandhu Mohapatra on a mere presumption of Exts. A and B to be the family settlement deeds. Thus, the impugned order is not sustainable in law and accordingly, the same is set aside. The appeal be and the same is allowed directing the learned trial Court to issue a letter of administration in favour of appellant no. 1, who has become major in the meantime, being the beneficiary of the Will (Ext. 7). Parties are directed to bear their own cost. Appeal allowed.