Hon'ble SHARMA, J.—A challenge has been made by the petitioner-tenant (hereinafter “the tenant”) to the judgment dated 26.05.2007, passed by the Rent Tribunal, Ajmer as affirmed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Ajmer on 30.05.2013. By the judgment dated 26.05.2007, it was directed that the tenant , Biradh Mal, now deceased and represented by his son, the petitioner-tenant, was liable to be evicted from the tenanted premises and handover possession thereof to the respondents-landlords (hereinafter “the landlords”) within six months failing which he would be liable to pay three times contracted rent in terms of Section 20(3) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (hereinafter “the Act of 2001”). It was further held that the landlords were entitled to due rent @ Rs.10/- per month for a period of 28 months prior to the laying of the eviction petition aggregating to Rs.280/- with due adjustment of the rent deposited for the period aforesaid into the designated bank account of the landlords. The Rent Tribunal also held that the landlords would be entitled to revised rent in terms of Section 6(3) of the Act of 2001 @ Rs.78/- per month with suitable yearly statutory enhancement effective 17.02.2004 i.e. after the date of filing of the petition before the Rent Tribunal. 2. The facts of the case are that the landlords filed an application under Sections 6 & 9 of the Act of 2001 both for revision of rent effective the date of filing of the petition and also for eviction of the tenant on the grounds of default in payment of rent despite statutory notice and the details of the designated bank account, non-user of the tenanted premises for over six months prior to filing of the petition as also the bona fide and reasonable necessity of the landlords—both sisters. It was stated that the landlord had rented the premises in 1967 @ Rs.10/- per month but the tenant was in default for over a period of over four months effective 26.10.2001 and despite the statutory notice dated 01.11.2003 demanding the payment of arrears of rent with details of the designated bank account into which it was to be deposited, the arrears were not deposited and therefore the tenant was in default as defined under Section 9(a) of the Act of 2001 and liable to be evicted. It was further submitted that in any event the tenant was doing business in the name and style of Oswal Medical out of a shop in Yadav Building, near Kumhar Kothi, Brahampuri, Ajmer for the last over one year and the tenanted premises were not being used for the purpose let out i.e. for a medical shop without good cause and any justification for over six months immediately prior to the laying of the eviction petition but was under lock and key. The eviction of the tenant was also sought on this ground. It was also submitted that the landlords Smt. Zamila Bano and Khurshida Bano, both sisters required the premises in issue for the bona fide and reasonable necessity of their son/nephew, Hamid Ali, an unemployed youth for commencing business therefrom in women's fashion accessories such as bangles and the landlords had adequate capital and the tenanted premises were appropriately situated for the purpose. 3. On service of notice, reply of denial to the averments in the petition for revision of rent and eviction was filed by the tenant. It was stated that there was no default as alleged in view of the fact that despite attempt to deposit the amount due, the landlords had refused to accept it, consequent to which the rent was deposited for the period prior to the commencement of the Act of 2001 on 01.04.2003 before the jurisdictional Civil Court for the period 26.09.2002 to 25.09.2003 under Section 19A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter “the Act of 1950”). It was submitted that subsequently with the coming into force of the Act of 2001 and on receipt of the notice dated 01.11.2003 from the landlords for the purported outstanding / arrears of rent, the same as due was deposited in the designated bank account of the landlords. And consequently no ground of default under Section 9(a) of the Act of 2001 was made out for eviction. It was submitted that the tenanted premises was obtained during the time of the tenant's father for the purpose of a godown and it was so used by the tenant and his father. And consequently no ground of default under Section 9(a) of the Act of 2001 was made out for eviction. It was submitted that the tenanted premises was obtained during the time of the tenant's father for the purpose of a godown and it was so used by the tenant and his father. It was submitted that however subsequent to the death of the tenant's father, it came into the tenant's singular tenancy as agreed but was being used as a shop by the brother of the tenant one Sushil Kumar while the tenant had been doing business in the name and style of Oswal Medical in Yadav Building, Kumhar Kothi, Brahampuri, Ajmer. Non-user was however denied. The bona fide and reasonable necessity of the landlords for the tenanted shop for the business of their son/nephew Hamid Ali was also denied and it was submitted that the location of the shop in issue was not proper and commercially viable for doing business in women's fashion accessories. 4. In rejoinder, the landlords submitted that as per Exhibit—7, it was established that Biradh Mal alone had tenancy rights over the premises in issue and there was no question of anyone such as the tenant Biradh Mal's brother Sushil Kumar being a co-tenant therein. It was also pointed out that no affidavit in support of the reply to the eviction petition has been filed by the tenant and the one filed by one Sushil Kumar, the brother of the tenant, who had no privity of contract with the landlords with regard to the tenanted premises, was not only baseless but also false. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties before it, the Rent Tribunal framed five issues, which loosely translated were as under : (i) As to whether the tenant was in default on payment of rent since 26.10.2001 till filing of the eviction petition and despite receipt of notice and details of the designated bank account where the arrears were to be deposited had failed to make the requisite deposit rendering himself liable to be evicted under Section 9(a) of the Act of 2001. (ii) Whether for six or more months immediately preceding the filing of the petition on 17.02.2004, the tenant had not, without good cause used the tenanted premises for the purpose for which the shop was rented out but instead had kept it under lock and key resulting into his being liable to be evicted on the ground of non-user of the premises within the meaning of Section 9(k) of the Act of 2001. (iii) Whether the landlords, the mother and aunt respectively of Hamid Ali, bona fidely and reasonably required the tenanted premises for his business in women's fashion accessories as he was unemployed. (iv) As to whether the landlords were entitled to revision of rent under Section 6 of the Act of 2001. (v) Relief. 6. On consideration of the matter, the Rent Tribunal found that the evidence of the landlords with regard to the default, of non-user, and of the bona fide necessity was altogether unrebutted as the tenant Biradh Mal (now dead and represented by the tenant—his son / as his LR) had failed to support his reply to the eviction petition by way of an affidavit in evidence nor had appeared in the witness box before the Rent Tribunal. The Rent Tribunal found that the only evidence on behalf of the tenant was the affidavit of his brother Sushil Kumar which was contradictory in nature inasmuch as he was even unsure as to whether the tenancy of the shop in dispute was that of Biradh Mal alone or whether it devolved both on Biradh Mal and him from their father. The Rent Tribunal also found that the allegation of payment of due rent, duly supported by the landlords' unrebutted evidence in respect of the tenanted premises for the period 26.10.2001 to 17.02.2004 was not controverted by any evidence of probative worth for reason that the tenant had not filed an affidavit, nor appeared in the witness box, nor examined the landlords on their affidavits in evidence which remained unshaken. The Rent Tribunal also found that from the evidence of Sushil Kumar himself it was established that it was not Biradh Mal, who was using the tenanted premises for his business purposes in view of the fact that he was doing business of running a medical shop from Yadav Building, near Kumhar Kothi, Brahampuri, Ajmer. The Rent Tribunal also found that from the evidence of Sushil Kumar himself it was established that it was not Biradh Mal, who was using the tenanted premises for his business purposes in view of the fact that he was doing business of running a medical shop from Yadav Building, near Kumhar Kothi, Brahampuri, Ajmer. The Rent Tribunal also found that the evidence of the landlords with regard to the bona fide and reasonable necessity of Hamid Ali, their son/nephew, who was unemployed and intended to run a shop in women's fashion accessories such as bangles was wholly credible. 7. On the issue of revision of rent, taking note of the fact that the shop in dispute had been on rent since 1967, the Rent Tribunal found that the landlords were entitled rent for the period about 26.10.2001 to 17.02.2004 i.e. date of filing of the eviction petition @ 10/- per month i.e. Rs.280/- (with due adjustments) and were similarly entitled to revision of rent in terms of Section 6 of the Act of 2001 i.e. rent @ Rs.78/- per month payable after 17.02.2004—date of filing of the petition for revision of rent and eviction with statutory mandated yearly enhancement under Section 6 of the Act of 2001. 8. An appeal by the aggrieved tenant to the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Ajmer was filed challenging the judgment dated 26.05.2007, passed by the Rent Tribunal, Ajmer. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant-tenant expired and was substituted by his four LRs i.e. Smt. Vimla Devi, Rajendra Vaidhya, Sanjay Vaidhya & Rajrani—all but Rajendra Vaidhya now proforma respondents in this petition. An appeal by the aggrieved tenant to the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Ajmer was filed challenging the judgment dated 26.05.2007, passed by the Rent Tribunal, Ajmer. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant-tenant expired and was substituted by his four LRs i.e. Smt. Vimla Devi, Rajendra Vaidhya, Sanjay Vaidhya & Rajrani—all but Rajendra Vaidhya now proforma respondents in this petition. The Appellate Rent Tribunal on consideration of the matter held that the findings of the Rent Tribunal with regard to the tenants' default under Section 9(a) of the Act of 2001 being made out could not be unsettled or set aside in view of the fact that despite the receipt of notice under the proviso to Section 9(a) of the Act of 2001 demanding payment of rent due for over four months for the period and furnishing details of the designated bank account as required in law, neither the tenant had appeared before the Rent Tribunal to deny the allegations, nor had his witness Sushil Kumar proved the deposit of arrears of rent as claimed by him under Section 19A of the Act of 1950 as the receipts Exhibit A15 to A24 filed in support of the defence were unclear as to the period for which the rent had been deposited. The Appellate Rent Tribunal also noted that even the documents filed by the appellants along with an application dated 23.03.2013 under Section 21 of the Act of 2001 had no effect on the merits of the case because they did not establish that the deposit so made, if at all, was in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act of 1950 more particularly Section 19A thereof for the purpose and credits therefor. It was further held by the Appellate Rent Tribunal that the conclusions of the Rent Tribunal with regard to the bona fide and reasonable necessity of the landlords also remained unrebutted. It was also held that the application filed on 25.05.2013 by the tenant under Section 21 read with Order 6 Rule 17 CPC pertaining to the alleged eviction obtained by the landlord Zamila Bano against one Zahur Mohammed on 09.04.2013 of House No.6/494, Langarkhana Gali, Khwaja Chowk Khadim Mohalla, Ajmer was of no relevance for the reason that the said judgment of eviction was obtained on the ground of the landlord's own necessity of running the said premises by herself as a guest house. Similarly the Appellate Rent Tribunal held that it was an admitted position from the evidence before the Rent Tribunal that Biradh Mal, the erstwhile tenant, was running his business in the name and style of Oswal Medical from Yadav Building, near Kumhar Kothi, Brahampuri, Ajmer and that there was no evidence such as electricity bills of the tenanted premises which would have been best evidence in defence to show that the tenanted shop was being used for the period six months immediately prior to the laying of the eviction petition. It was also held that the application dated 14.05.2013 moved by the tenant under Section 21 of the Act of 2001 was of no consequence as it merely sought to dislocate, without any semblance of relevance to the case at hand, the case of the landlords on a purported letter dated 13.05.2013 at the hands of one Zubenisha wife of Mukhtyar Ali, who vacuously claimed to be part owner of the tenanted premises in respect of which a dispute was allegedly stated to be pending before the High Court. In the circumstances, the Appellate Rent Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant and affirmed the judgment of the Rent Tribunal. Hence this petition. 9. I have heard the counsel for the petitioner-tenant and the respondents-landlord. 10. During the pendency of the writ petition, the tenant had filed two applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The first, stating that one Syed Sardar Ali has purchased a shop by a registered sale-deed dated 04.06.2010 and the son of the landlord Hamid Ali whose bona fide and reasonable necessity has been propounded in this eviction petition is carrying on business therefrom negating the ground of eviction in the petition for his bona fide and reasonable requirement. Reply to the application has been filed by the landlords stating that the shop was purchased by Syed Sardar Ali for his own business and has nothing to do with the requirement of Hamid Ali. The second application states that a shop with a huge basement bearing No.13/334, Bhattacharya Ji Ki Gali, Naya Bazar, Ajmer belonging to the applicants-landlords before the Rent Tribunal, was vacated by the tenant Durga Devi and the vacant possession thereof has been reverted to them. The second application states that a shop with a huge basement bearing No.13/334, Bhattacharya Ji Ki Gali, Naya Bazar, Ajmer belonging to the applicants-landlords before the Rent Tribunal, was vacated by the tenant Durga Devi and the vacant possession thereof has been reverted to them. A photocopy of Durga Devi's purported writing with regard to the aforesaid alleged fact of handing over the shop by her to the landlords has been submitted with the application. And consequently the bona fide and reasonable necessity of Hamid Ali propagated by the landlords can be satisfied therefrom. Assertions in the aforesaid application have been denied stating that the documents relied upon in support of the application are forged and in any event collusive with another tenant of the landlord inimical them, to achieve the ulterior motive of having the eviction petition laid against the tenant dismissed. 11. In my considered opinion, the filing of applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India to lead additional evidence in a writ petition filed against the final decision of a statutory Tribunal—as the impugned judgment of the Appellate Rent Tribunal—indicates that the judicial process of this Court is being misused with impunity. Section 19(11)(c) of the Act of 2001 provides that orders passed by the Rent Tribunal shall be final. Writ petitions under the Constitution of India against the final judgment of the Appellate Rent Tribunal are quite clearly not in the nature of an appeal, but only an invocation of the powers of judicial review / superintendence vested in the writ court limited to addressing issues of perversity and/or misdirection in law, aside of also evaluating as to whether the decision making process of the statutory Tribunals was lawful and whether the Tribunal acted in excess of jurisdiction or exercised its discretion in a manner occasioning manifest injustice to the aggrieved party. It is conceptual no-go and fundamentally erroneous for a party aggrieved of the final judgment of a statutory Tribunal to resort to Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India on the basis of additional evidence which was not before the Tribunal. It is conceptual no-go and fundamentally erroneous for a party aggrieved of the final judgment of a statutory Tribunal to resort to Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India on the basis of additional evidence which was not before the Tribunal. Were it so the finality of the proceedings conferred by statute on such a Tribunal would stand negated and the writ court required to reevaluate the evidence afresh as if in appeal, which it would loath to do or alternatively require the writ court to remit the matter to the Tribunal entailing lengthening the life of litigations even otherwise notoriously unending. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad vs. Pradumanju Agarwal (dead) by LRs. ( (1997) 4 SCC 413 ) has held that where a statute confers finality on the proceedings taken with reference to the issues exclusively within a Tribunal's jurisdiction, the High Court cannot in the exercise of its powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India interfere therewith by taking into account a subsequent event. Although Mr. Bhandari has relied upon a seemingly contrary judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedar Nath Agarwal (dead) & Anr. vs. Dhanraji Devi (dead) by LRs. & Anr. ( (2004) 8 SCC 76 ) to contend that subsequent events can also be taken into consideration by a writ court, the said judgment, to my mind, is of little succour to the petitioner-tenant for more than one reason. For one, the said judgment did not take into consideration the previous judgment in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad (Supra) and potentially can be circumvented as per incuriam. See : Punjab Land Development & Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh & Ors. ( (1990) 3 SCC 682 ) and Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. ( (2001) 6 SCC 356 ). But that is not necessary as the facts of Kedar Nath Agarwal's (Supra) case relied upon by Mr. Bhandari were extraordinary inasmuch as the ground of bona fide and reasonable necessity agitated by the landlords, who expired when the matter was before the writ court leaving behind three married daughters all living in different cities in their matrimonial homes. But that is not necessary as the facts of Kedar Nath Agarwal's (Supra) case relied upon by Mr. Bhandari were extraordinary inasmuch as the ground of bona fide and reasonable necessity agitated by the landlords, who expired when the matter was before the writ court leaving behind three married daughters all living in different cities in their matrimonial homes. The cause of action on which the eviction petition was founded has thus evidently suffered a permanent eclipse which went to the root of the relief sought and made granting of relief inappropriate. It was in this context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that subsequent event in an eviction proceeding ought to be taken into consideration also by the writ court. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court is thus contextual not of universal application. Even otherwise, as a close reading of Kedar Nath Agarwal's (Supra) case shows that it was not enunciated as an absolute proposition either, hemmed it was by preconditions, such as (i) the relief originally claimed in the eviction petition had by reason or subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate; (ii) It was necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation; and (iii) it was necessary to do so for complete justice between the parties. In the present case the landlords had propagated the bona fide and reasonable necessity for the tenanted premises for the use of their son/nephew Hamid Ali and Hamid Ali is well and alive. Alleged availability of alternate accommodation to satisfy the said need has been contested and does not evidently make the relief in the eviction petition inappropriate. Mr. Bhandari appearing for the tenant has also been unable to show that taking additional evidence propagated by the tenant in his two applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC would shorten the life of the litigation. Further in the facts of the case, it does not commend to this Court that taking of the landlord's additional evidence at the tenant's instance is necessary to render “justice” to the tenant. Far from it. The three situations detailed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedar Nath Agarwal's (Supra) to warrant taking on record the subsequent events in the present writ petition are thus not clearly made out. Far from it. The three situations detailed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedar Nath Agarwal's (Supra) to warrant taking on record the subsequent events in the present writ petition are thus not clearly made out. It would also be in place to observe that where there are two operative seemingly contra views of the Hon'ble Apex Court—both are good law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. In such a situation it is for the High Court to follow the one, the logic of which commends to it. To me the view of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad (Supra) is more commendable. I am therefore inclined to follow it. 13. It would also be well to refer judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maganlal vs. Nanasaheb ( (2008) 13 SCC 758 ) where it was observed that it is common experience in our country that litigation between landlord and tenant prolongs for a longtime. And no person can sit idle meantime nor development of events in the meantime stopped by him. Hence the crucial event for adjudication of the dispute is the time of crystallization of right with reference to the date of the institution of the eviction petition unless subsequent events materially change the ground of relief. The aforesaid test, to my mind, requires strict implementation as an application for taking on record subsequent event by way of additional evidence cannot be allowed to degenerate into a subterfuge for stalling final adjudication and gaining time. The two applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India to take subsequent events on record in this petition against the final judgment of the Appellate Rent Tribunal are therefore aside of being meritless completely misdirected and liable to be rejected. 14. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 and 227 in interfering with the judgments of the Tribunal is extremely narrow. Grounds of perversity, misdirection in law, manifest injustice or misuse of jurisdiction have to be made out. 14. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 and 227 in interfering with the judgments of the Tribunal is extremely narrow. Grounds of perversity, misdirection in law, manifest injustice or misuse of jurisdiction have to be made out. A perusal of the impugned judgments makes it evident that the conclusions with regard to the ground of default, non-user of the tenanted premises and the bona fide and reasonable necessity are based on the evidence on record which was considered in detail both by the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Rent Tribunal. No perversity or misdirection in law is attributable to the aforesaid findings. Of utmost importance in the case at hand, is the fact that the tenant Biradh Mal (now deceased) did not even file an affidavit in evidence in support of his reply to the eviction petition. He did not enter the witness box. The evidence of the landlords duly based on their affidavits in evidence with supporting documents thus remained un-controverted, un-rebutted and unshaken. The evidence in defence only came from Sushil Kumar, the brother of the tenant Biradh Mal but the Rent Tribunal found from his cross-examination that he made statements contradictory to his affidavit in evidence and was unsure even about the facts of the case and was thus wholly unreliable. I am of the considered opinion that the conclusion of the Rent Tribunal, as affirmed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal are well considered, based on an objective analysis of the evidence on record and are not vitiated by any legal infirmity to warrant interference. 15. I am of the considered opinion that from the very commencement of the proceedings in the petition for revision of rent and eviction, the tenant has only used the judicial process cynically to drag on litigation for about eight years in a landlord-tenant dispute which the legislature very optimistically visualized would in the first instance be concluded within 240 days of service on the opposite party. The defence of the tenant was non-existent with he himself not having even filed an affidavit in evidence with his reply to the landlords' petition. The defence of the tenant was non-existent with he himself not having even filed an affidavit in evidence with his reply to the landlords' petition. Thereafter subsequent to the judgment of eviction passed by the Rent Tribunal on 26.05.2007, an appeal was filed under Section 19 of the Act of 2001 before the Appellate Rent Tribunal which did not even bear the appellant-tenant's verification necessary under Form 13 appended to the Act of 2001 with reference to Section 22 of the aforesaid Act. An affidavit of the appellant-tenant in support of the appeal was only subsequently filed on 07.09.2007 yet the verification to the appeal required in law remained wanting. The matter was then sought to be dragged on by various applications under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, under Order 11 Rule 14 CPC, two applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC—all on different dates, in fits and starts, as if a new obstruction each day to the decision in the appeal while the tenant continued to enjoy interim protection and possession of the tenanted premises wherefrom he had been directed to be evicted under the judgment of the Tribunal. All these, the Appellate Rent Tribunal found to be wholly baseless and without substance. The practice of filing applications before the Rent Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal seeks root in the principle of fairness and natural justice provided for in the Act of 2001 and on analogy of the equivalent provisions of the CPC 1908. But it is intended only to advance justice not as a subterfuge or an armoury to stall the process of law and blunt them if not defeat them altogether. In the circumstances, just the tenant's farcical defence or lack of it being negated and the eviction petition succeeding with the dismissal of this writ will not suffice if the interest of justice is to be safeguarded. A frivolous access to the courts not so much as to vindicate rights but vexatious in nature to exploit court's delays in the context of limited infrastructure and overcrowded dockets is visited with exemplary costs, so should a frivolous and vexatious defence be. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A. Shanmugam vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam represented by its President & Ors. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A. Shanmugam vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam represented by its President & Ors. ( (2012) 6 SCC 430 ) has expressed its exasperation with the widely prevalent state of affairs where litigants raise obstructions to the progress of a case to gain time unfairly. This also leads to courts' delay in deserving cases. And therefore while even noting that the appellant before it was a watchman of small means, the Apex Court visited him with costs of Rs.25,000/-. The tenant's case, to my mind, falls in the same category for reasons set out hereinabove. 16. Consequently, apart from directing that the tenant would be liable to pay two times the rent determined by the Rent Tribunal effective 17.02.2004 @ Rs.78/- p.m. i.e. Rs.156/- p.m. six months following 26.05.2007, the date the Rent Tribunal passed its judgment, till the date of vacation of the tenanted premises with reference to the mandate of Section 20(3) of the Act of 2001, I would also visit the petitioner-tenant with costs of Rs.25,000/- payable to be respondents-landlords within six months from today. Failure to pay costs as directed shall entail contempt of the order of this Court. If cause of action therefore arises, the respondents-landlords shall 17. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, in my considered opinion, there would no occasion to address the pending applications, which are dismissed as infructuous.