JUDGMENT : B.R. Sarangi, J. The petitioner, who was working as a Development Officer in New India Assurance Company Ltd., has filed this application seeking to quash Annexure-2 dated 26.10.1995, the warning letter issued under paragraph 11 of General Insurance (Rationalisation of Pay Scale & Other Conditions of Service of Development Staff) Scheme, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the "1976 Scheme") and Annexure-5, the letter dated 21.03.1997 by which an amount of 15,156/- was recovered from the salary of the petitioner. 2. The short facts of the case, in hand is that the petitioner was appointed as Inspector by the order of Regional Manager, New India Assurance Company Ltd., dated 18.01.1984, pursuant to which he joined as a Probationer on 30.01.1984. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of Development Officer and he was confirmed against the said post on 01.02.1995. While he was so continuing, he received a warning letter from the Regional Manager on 26.10.1995 under Para-11 of the 1976 Scheme as the cost ratio exceeded the stipulated limits for the years, 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95. The petitioner filed a representation on 20.12.1995 for exonerating him from the said charge with a prayer to transfer him to some other place for better performance and working but the, same was not taken into consideration. Again he filed another representation on 01.03.1996, but the same was also not taken into consideration. Ultimately on 21.03.1997 the Divisional Manager intimated the petitioner that a sum of Rs. 15,156/- is to be recovered from his salary out of which Rs. 1,356/ - was already deducted from March, 1997 salary. Thereafter, a lump sum of Rs. 7,800 was also deducted from March, 1997 salary by debiting code 5473 and the balance Rs. 6,000/- was to be recovered from his salary in ten equal installments at the rate of Rs. 600/- per month ending with January, 1998 salary. 3. Mr. N.C. Panigrahi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner states that the action pursuant to Annexure-2 and recovery made in Annexure-5 having not been done in compliance to principles of natural justice, the same should be quashed and the amounts so recovered without following due procedure of law, should be refunded by the authority with interest. 3. Mr. N.C. Panigrahi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner states that the action pursuant to Annexure-2 and recovery made in Annexure-5 having not been done in compliance to principles of natural justice, the same should be quashed and the amounts so recovered without following due procedure of law, should be refunded by the authority with interest. It is further urged that the order passed in Annexures-2 and 5 are per se illegal since before passing the orders, the petitioners was neither given any opportunity to show cause nor any personal hearing. Otherwise also the orders have caused civil consequences which could not have been passed without hearing the petitioner. Therefore, the order so passed are vitiated and as such, the order is without authority of law, Para-11 of 1976 Scheme does not confer any right to make such deduction without taking the officer know the cause of such deduction. In support of his contention he has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court as well this Court in State of Haryana v. Ramkishan and others. AIR 1998 SC 1301, Kesar Enterprises Ltd. V. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 2709 and J.C. Budharaja v. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1990 Orissa 6. 4. Mr. S. Das, learned counsel for opposite party no. 1 justifying the action taken by the authority strenuously urged that the cost ratio having exceeded the stipulated limits under the Scheme during years 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95, such deductions and recoveries were inevitable under the provisions of the Scheme. It is further urged that paragraph-11 of the 1976 Scheme being a statutory one which has been framed by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred by Clause-G of Sub-Section (1) of Section 16 of the GIB (Nationalization) Act, 1972, the action taken in adherence to the said provision is wholly and fully justified and as such, the opposite parties have not committed any illegality or irregularity by passing the impugned orders in Annexures 2 and 5. More so, by issuing Annexure-2 inconsonance with Paragraph-11 of the 1976 Scheme, due notice has been given to the petitioner which amounts to compliance of principle of natural justice. More so, by issuing Annexure-2 inconsonance with Paragraph-11 of the 1976 Scheme, due notice has been given to the petitioner which amounts to compliance of principle of natural justice. It is further urged that the provisions for statutory Scheme does not envisage such procedural rituals but provides a self corrective mechanism to ensure cost effectiveness in procuring business by the field staff, aiming at to discourage lethargy and in efficiency. Therefore, once a person is governed by 1976 Scheme, he is to put to notice about the consequences which has been followed in this case in conformity with the provisions contained in para-11 of the 1976 Scheme and in compliance to the said provision recovery has been made, that ipso facto cannot be said that it is de hors the law. To substantiate his contention he has relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and others, AIR 1973 SC 258 . 5. On the basis of the facts pleaded it is now to be considered whether in absence of any provision under 1976 Scheme, before taking any action against the employee concerned, the principle of natural justice is required to be followed or not. 6. The admitted fact is that the petitioner was initially appointed as Inspector and on completion of probation he was allowed to continue in service. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Development Officer and was confirmed therein. While so continuing, he was issued with letter in Annexure-2 on 26.10.1995 in shape of warning as required under paragraph-11 of 1976 Scheme. Sub-Para-4 of Paragraph-11 of 1976 Scheme reads as follows:- 11. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Development Officer and was confirmed therein. While so continuing, he was issued with letter in Annexure-2 on 26.10.1995 in shape of warning as required under paragraph-11 of 1976 Scheme. Sub-Para-4 of Paragraph-11 of 1976 Scheme reads as follows:- 11. Cost Control:- xx xx xx (4) If in respect of a Development Officer, cost ratio is in excess of stipulated limit for the third or subsequent performance year in succession the non-core allowance payable to him if any, in the following performance year shall be reduced to the extent of the amount by which his cost ratio exceeded the stipulated limits: Provided that if no non-core allowances are payable to him or the amount of non-core allowance payable to him in the year following such third or subsequent successive performance years is less than the excess cost, decrements shall be effected to such Development Officer as per table below from the relevant appraisal date to provide him an opportunity to confirm to the stipulated limits of cost." xx xx xx 7. In State of Haryana v. Ram, Kishan (supra) wherein premature termination of mining lease as per Section 4(A) of Mines and Minerals. (Regulation and Development) Act (67 of 1957) was under consideration. On perusal of the said Section, the Apex Court observed that it does not direct termination of all mining leases, merely for the reason that a Government Company or Corporation has equipped itself for the purpose. The Section was enacted with a view to improve the efficiency in this regard and with this view directs consultation between the Central Government and the State Government to be held. In this view the Section must be interpreted to imply that the person who may be affected by such a decision should be afforded an opportunity to prove that the proposed steps would not advance the interest of mines and mineral development. Not to do so will be violative of the principles of natural justice. Since there is no suggestion in this Section to deny the right of the affected persons to be heard, the provisions have to be interpreted as implying to preserve such a right. A final decision to prematurely terminate a lease can, therefore, be taken only after notice to the lessee which is paramount consideration for compliance of the principle of natural justice. 8. A final decision to prematurely terminate a lease can, therefore, be taken only after notice to the lessee which is paramount consideration for compliance of the principle of natural justice. 8. Similar question also came up for consideration in J.C. Budharaj (supra) where Section 4(a) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (1957) read with Rules 29 and 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 were under consideration. This Court referring to State of Haryana v. Ramkishan (supra) held that from the language of Section 4A, it is apparent that there is no provision requiring service of notice on the lessee before passing the order of termination of lease. The question, therefore, is whether despite absence of specific provision a notice to show cause is a mandatory condition precedent to the order of termination. It was held that Section 4 must be interpreted to imply that the person who is to be affected by such a decision should be afforded an opportunity to prove that the proposed step would not advance the interest of mines and mineral development; not to do so will be violative of the principles of natural justice. Since there is no suggestion in the selection to deny the right of the affected persons to be heard, the provisions have to be interpreted as implying to preserve such a right and final decision to prematurely terminate a lease can, therefore, be taken only after notice to the lessee. 9. In Kesar Enterprises Ltd. (supra), Sub-Rule (7) of Rule 633 of the Excise Manual was under consideration. Keeping in view the nature, scope and consequence of direction under sub-rule (7) of Rule 633 of the Excise Manual, the Court held that the principle of natural justice demands that a show-cause notice should be issued and an opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the person concerned before an order under the said Rule is made, notwithstanding the fact that the said Rule does not contain any express provision for the affected party being given an opportunity of being heard. 10. 10. In view of the law laid down by the apex Court as well as this Court, it is clear that even if there is no provision for compliance of principles of natural justice, it implies that before taking any action, principle of natural justice has to be complied with by affording an, opportunity of hearing to the parties, otherwise the action is open to challenge and is violative of Article-14 of the Constitution of India. 11. In Capt. Harish Uppal (supra) a punishment imposed against an Army Officer under the Provision of Section 158 of Army Act was under consideration. The apex Court held that since procedure established by law has been completely followed, there was no violation of rules of natural justice. The argument advanced by learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 was that there is no provision of compliance of principle of natural justice in the Army Act, meaning thereby that the officer should not be given a hearing by the authority before confirming the subsequent sentence by the Court martial as the same is not a requirement under the Act. In the said case it was held that while it can be at least said that there is some semblance of reasonableness in the contention that before passing the order what in effect was an upward revision of the sentence passed on the employee concerned, he should have given a bearing, but such a contention cannot be accepted. 12. Considering the judgment in Capt. Harish Uppal (supra) referred to above this Court is of the view that the said judgment cannot have any application to the present context, inasmuch as that is a case under the Army Act and the procedure envisaged thereunder has been followed when the action has been taken against the officer concerned. But it is not the same in the case in hand. Though Para-11 of the 1976 Scheme requires to give notice to the Officer, merely giving a notice is not sufficient because it will only amount to an empty formality. Unless the officer is given an opportunity of hearing in compliance to the principle of natural justice. If any action is taken without compliance of principle of natural justice, it leads to civil consequences. Unless the officer is given an opportunity of hearing in compliance to the principle of natural justice. If any action is taken without compliance of principle of natural justice, it leads to civil consequences. Therefore, even if, there is no provision under the 1976 Scheme with regard to compliance of natural justice but by giving notice in consonance with para-1 of the 1976 Scheme itself implies that the requirement of law is for compliance of principle of natural justice otherwise the provisions envisaged in para-11 of the Scheme for giving notice without any cost thereafter will be redundant, inasmuch as the purpose of giving such notice is that the officer has to be communicated regarding the factum of cost control so as to allow the officer to improve his work. Once the authority decided to recover the cost control factor, then it puts a mandate for compliance of natural justice. 13. In view of the ratio decided in State of Haryana v. Ramkishan (supra), J.C. Budharaja (supra), Kesar Enterprises Ltd. (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the action taken for deduction of the amount from the salary of the petitioner by mere giving an notice in consonance with para-11 of the 1976 Scheme is not in adherence to the principles of natural justice. 14. It has been brought to the notice of the Court that the amount of Rs. 15,156/- has already been recovered from the salary of the petitioner and in the meantime during pendency of the writ application, on attaining the age of superannuation the petitioner has already retired from service. 15. Considering the above facts and law and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned orders in Annexures 2 and 5 are hereby quashed and the opposite parties are directed to refund the amount recovered from the petitioner with interest @ 6% from the date of recovery till payment and the entire exercise of payment of the said amount be made within a period of three months from the date of communication of the judgment. 16. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.