JUDGMENT Hon’ble Arvind Kumar Mishra-I, J.—Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record. 2. This is defendant’s second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. 3. The plaintiff-respondent instituted Original Suit No. 2215 of 1994 against Paras Nath in the Court of the VII-Additional Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Allahabad, for obtaining decree of permanent injunction which was contested by the defendant-appellant and the original suit was ultimately decreed in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 29.5.2000, whereagainst Civil Appeal No. 101 of 2000 was preferred before the Special Judge (EC Act)/Additional District Judge, Allahabad which was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 28.11.2014. 4. It emanates from record that the learned trial Court framed in all six issues and recorded finding specifically on all issues while decreeing the suit. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned first appellate Court while deciding the appeal did not frame any specific point for determination of the appeal which is against the spirit of the provisions of Order 41 C.P.C. 5. Learned counsel further submitted that both the Courts below have not examined and scrutinized the evidence properly and the view taken by the Courts below is not correct. 6. As regards submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that evidence has not been examined and scrutinized properly by the Courts below, learned counsel for the appellant could not point out as to which part of the evidence has been misread and the relevant evidence has been omitted or inadmissible has been taken into account. 7. Instead of satisfying above query the learned counsel for the appellant stuck to the same arguments that both the Courts below did not examine the evidence properly. Suffice to say, that argument alone cannot be ground to act upon it, in the absence of any supporting material. In so far as the plea that the Courts below did not appreciate correctly the evidence is concerned, only this much would be observed that the plea will by itself not give rise to any question of law and what to say about substantial question of law. For substantial question of law the appellant is required to show that the Courts below took note of inadmissible evidence and irrelevant evidence and omitted to consider admissible evidence. 8. For substantial question of law the appellant is required to show that the Courts below took note of inadmissible evidence and irrelevant evidence and omitted to consider admissible evidence. 8. In so far as contention that the learned first appellate Court did not frame any point for determination of the appeal is concerned, suffice is to observe that it is always not necessary for the first appellate Court to lay down in specific words points for determination but the point for determination of the appeal is to be gathered from overall reading of the judgment. In the present context, it can be observed that the appellant raised specific objection before the first appellate Court while assailing the decree passed by the trial Court and also in the original suit. The plea/objection to the decree as raised by the appellant before the first appellate Court was specifically denied by the respondent’s side and the first appellate Court basically based its findings on the above plea of the appellant. The very plea made by the appellant while assailing the finding recorded by the trial Court assumes nomenclature of the point for determination of the appeal which fact is very much obvious from a simple reading of the judgment of the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court has very much considered all the pleas raised by the appellant before it and concurred with the finding of the trial Court, therefore, it cannot be said that the appellate Court’s judgment sans the point for determination. 9. It appears that learned counsel for the appellant wants this Court to assume nomenclature of the first appellate Court and to re-appreciate evidence and fact which have been concluded by concurrent finding of the Courts below. This plenary exercise cannot be done in second appeal in view of concurrent findings which are very much based upon proper appreciation of evidence. It would not be out of reference to note at the cost of repeation, that the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. is limited only to the substantial question of law. To be a substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to the rights of the parties before the Court. To be a substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to the rights of the parties before the Court. This very aspect of substantial question of law has been elaborated by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Govindaraja v. Mariamman, AIR 2005 SC 1008 . 10. In the present case, both the Courts below while recording concurrent finding have taken into consideration all the points raised and answered between the parties, pros and cons, therefore it is incumbent upon the appellant to come out with the particular piece of evidence which has been left untouched by the Courts below. The scope of substantial question of law has been further elaborated in the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, 2001 (3) SCC 179 and Thiagarajan and others v. Sri Venugopalswamay B. Koll and others, AIR 2004 SC 1913 . The aforesaid view is supported recently by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Talwar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, (2011) 1 SCC 763, Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 . The aforesaid decisions have been followed by this Court in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Stanti Devi and others, 2013(7) ADJ 37 (NOC). 11. To sum up the appeal, it can be conveniently observed that both the Courts below have taken comprehensive view of the material/evidence available on record and have recorded concurrent findings as discussed above. Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any manifest error or illegality in the impugned judgments of the Courts below so that any substantial question of law may arise for determination in the instant second appeal. In absence of any substantial question of law, the instant second appeal deserves to be dismissed at this stage under Order 41 Rule 11 C.P.C. 12. Dismissed, accordingly. —————— [2015(4) ADJ 480] ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT BEFORE : RAN VIJAI SINGH, J. RAVINDRA AND ANOTHER ....Petitioners Versus STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ....Respondents (Civil Misc. In absence of any substantial question of law, the instant second appeal deserves to be dismissed at this stage under Order 41 Rule 11 C.P.C. 12. Dismissed, accordingly. —————— [2015(4) ADJ 480] ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT BEFORE : RAN VIJAI SINGH, J. RAVINDRA AND ANOTHER ....Petitioners Versus STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ....Respondents (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8762 of 2015, decided on 2nd April, 2015) Fishery lease—Inheritence—After death of original lessee—Since fishery lease inheritable, the District Collector not justified in rejecting application of petitioner on the ground that after death of petitioners’ mother (original lessee), the period of lease came to an end and stand cancelled and heir and legal representatives could not be inherited the same. [Paras 5, 6 and 7] Result; Petition Allowed. Counsel : Kundan Rai for the Petitioners; C.S.C., D.D. Chauhan and Prabhakar Dubey for the Respondents. JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Learned counsel for the petitioner is permitted to correct the description of respondent No. 3 and serve copy of the writ petition to Sri D.D.Chauhan, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha. 2. Heard Sri Kundan Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents, Sri D.D.Chauhan, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha and Sri Prabhakar Dubey, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. 3. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 21.1.2015 passed by the Collector/Zila Aadhikari, Sant Kabir Nagar in Misc. Case No. 8 (Ravindra and others v. Shoba Devi and others) by which the petitioners’ application, for permitting them to perform their fishery right over pond situated over Plot No. 290-Ka (measuring about 0.376 hectare) situated in Village Dharmsinghva Tappa Patana Pargana Bansi Purab Tehsil Mehadawal District Sant Kabir Nagar, has been rejected. 4. While assailing this order, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that fishery lease is inheritable and the Collector concerned has erred in rejecting the petitioners’ application on the ground that after the death of the petitioners’ mother in whose favour lease was executed, the period of lease has come to an end and the petitioner cannot be permitted to inherit the same. 5. The facts giving rise to this case are that a lease was executed in favour of the petitioners’ mother Smt. Chandrawati Devi for performance of fishery right over the pond mentioned hereinabove. 5. The facts giving rise to this case are that a lease was executed in favour of the petitioners’ mother Smt. Chandrawati Devi for performance of fishery right over the pond mentioned hereinabove. The lease was executed for the period of ten years and was operative till 31.12.2018. Later on, the petitioners’ mother has died and after the death of the mother, the respondents have started hindrance in performance of fishery right by the petitioners. In that eventuality, the petitioners have approached this Court through Writ Petition No. 64996 of 2014. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of on 2.12.2014 with the liberty to the petitioner to make a representation/application before the Collector/District Magistrate Sant Kabir Nagar. Pursuant thereto, the representation was filed. The Collector has rejected the petitioners’ application on the ground that after the death of the original lessee, the period of lease has come to an end and stand cancelled and the heirs and legal representatives cannot inherit the same. 6. This type of controversy has earlier came up before this Court in the writ petition No. 5536 of 2005 (Mohan Lal v. State of U.P.and others) decided on 9.2.2005, wherein this Court has held that the fishery lease is inheritable. Not only in that case, but in another Writ (C) No. 7322 of 2014 (Smt. Sonmati v. State of U.P. and others), this Court has held that fishery lease is inheritable. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid cases, I am of the opinion that the Collector has erred in rejecting the petitioners’ application holding that the petitioners have no right to perform fishery right on the strength of the earlier lease executed in favour of their mother. The question as to whether the petitioners are the sons of the original lessee or not, this is a question of fact and that can be examined by the District Magistrate but so far as their inheritable right is concerned, that cannot be denied in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Mohan Lal and Smt.Sonmati (supra). 7. In view of foregoing discussions, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 21.1.2015 passed by the Collector/Zila Aadhikari, Sant Kabir Nagar in Misc. 7. In view of foregoing discussions, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 21.1.2015 passed by the Collector/Zila Aadhikari, Sant Kabir Nagar in Misc. Case No. 8 (Ravindra and others v. Shoba Devi and others) is hereby quashed with the direction to pass a fresh order in this regard in accordance with law looking into the order passed in this petition and earlier decisions of this Court as mentioned hereinabove expeditiously but not later than two months from the date of filing of certified copy of the order of this Court. ——————