ORDER 1. This first appeal preferred under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 arises out of judgment and decree dated 31.7. 2014 passed by Additional District Judge, Ganjbasoda, District Vidisha in Civil Suit No.110-A/2013 whereby while decreeing the suit for divorce in favour of the respondent wife by annuling the marriage in question, the Family Court has directed the petitioner husband to pay maintenance for the minor children residing with the respondent wife at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per month per child with further direction that said amount be deposited in a Nationalized Bank in shape of Time Deposit so that the amount can be utilized for the welfare of children after attaining the age of maturity. 2. Learned counsel for the rival parties are heard on the question of admission. 3. The sole ground raised in this appeal by the appellant husband is that he is unemployed and therefore he cannot afford to pay the amount of maintenance ordered by the Family Court in favour of his minor children. 4. The Family Court while directing maintenance as aforesaid for the minor children invoked it’s powers under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Admittedly section 25 relates exclusively to permanent alimony and maintenance to be granted at the time of passing of the decree and consequent thereto in favour of either the husband or the wife but does not empower the Family Court to grant maintenance in favour of children. 5. However, section 26 which relates to custody of children empowers the Family Court to pass interim orders or make provisions in the decree inter alia in regard to maintenance and education of minor children. For convenience and ready reference section 26 is reproduced herein below : “26. 5. However, section 26 which relates to custody of children empowers the Family Court to pass interim orders or make provisions in the decree inter alia in regard to maintenance and education of minor children. For convenience and ready reference section 26 is reproduced herein below : “26. Custody of children- In any proceeding under this Act, the Court may, from time to time, pass such interim orders and make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes, wherever possible, and may, after the decree, upon application by petition for the purpose, make from time to time, all such orders and provisions with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of such children as might have been made by such decree or interim orders in case the proceeding for obtaining such decree were still pending, and the Court may also from time to time revoke, suspend or vary any such orders and provisions previously made : [Provided that the application with respect to the maintenance and education of the minor children, pending the proceeding for obtaining such decree, shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the respondent”. 6. Moreover, mere mention of a wrong provision (section 25) cannot vitiate the ultimate order passed if the power is traceable elsewhere in the statute in question. Decision of the apex Court in the case of Mohd Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010)4 SCC 653 , is worthy of reference in this regard. Relevant Paragraphs of the said case is reproduced herein below : 206. I am unable to accept the aforesaid submission for the simple reason that if the notification quotes a wrong section and refers to a wrong provision, the same cannot be held to be invalid if the validity of the same could be upheld on the basis of some other provision. 207. In N. Mani v. Sangeetha Thetre, a three-Judge Bench of this Court succinctly observed as follows: (SCC p. 280, para 9) “9. 207. In N. Mani v. Sangeetha Thetre, a three-Judge Bench of this Court succinctly observed as follows: (SCC p. 280, para 9) “9. It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law merely because while exercising that power the source of power is not specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can be traced to a source available in law.” 208. It is a well-established law that when an authority passes an order which is within its competence, it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision if it can be shown to be within its power under any other provision or rule, and the validity of such impugned order must be judged on a consideration of its substance and not its form. The principle is that we must ascribe the act of a public servant to an actual existing authority under which it would have validity rather than to one under which it would be void. In such cases, this Court will always rely upon sections 114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act to draw a statutory presumption that the official acts are regularly performed and if satisfied that the action in question is traceable to a statutory power, the Courts will uphold such State action. (Reference in this regard may be made to the decisions of this Court in P.Balakotaiah v. Union of India; Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. Custodian-cum-Managing Officer; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI and BSE Brokers’ Forum v. SEBI.) 7. The sole plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellant herein is that the appellant is unemployed. This plea to say the least deserves rejection at the very outset. The father of the children is duty bound to make provision for the well being of his children and cannot be absolved of its duty. It is not the case of the appellant that he is physically incapacitated or infirm to earn his livelihood. 8. More so the amount of maintenance directed by the Family Court at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per child is in the considered opinion of this Court not only reasonable but on the lower side looking to the prevailing inflationary trends. 9. 8. More so the amount of maintenance directed by the Family Court at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per child is in the considered opinion of this Court not only reasonable but on the lower side looking to the prevailing inflationary trends. 9. Thus, this Court has no reason to interfere in this appeal which is dismissed in limine by declining admission. 10. Accordingly the present first appeal deserves to be and is therefore rejected. 11. No order as to cost.