Judgment :- 1. This is the second round of litigation between the same parties during the last two months. The genesis of the dispute is the proposal of the managing committee of Jeeva Shiva Mission Kiran Chandra Girls High School (hereafter the school) to place one of its teachers, the fifth respondent, under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceeding. 2. Insofar as the undisputed facts are concerned, it is noticed that the managing committee issued an order on December 28, 2013 placing the fifth respondent under suspension with immediate effect pending drawal of a disciplinary proceeding against her, where after approval of the step to place her under suspension was sought for from the Administrator of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (hereafter the Board), the second respondent, on December 30, 2013. A charge-sheet dated February 13, 2014 was issued against the fifth respondent citing instances of alleged acts and activities perpetrated by her amounting to misconduct. The fifth respondent answered the charges by submitting a reply on March 3, 2014. Allegedly, on due consideration of such reply, the managing committee had forwarded a proposal to the second respondent to grant first stage approval for proceeding further against the fifth respondent. Such proposal was forwarded by the managing committee on March 19, 2014 on the basis of its understanding of the provisions of Rules 28(8) and 28(8a) of the Rules for Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided), 1969 (hereafter the Rules). Reminders followed on May 22, July 2 and August 14, 2014, where after hearing was arranged by the Board on September 16 and September 19, 2014. According to the managing committee, nothing fruitful yielded and no decision was communicated by the second respondent. In the meanwhile, the fifth respondent had appealed against the order of suspension before the Appeal Committee of the Board and on receipt of notice, the managing committee has been duly contesting it. 3. A writ petition dated November 12, 2014 was presented before this Court by the managing committee claiming a direction on the second respondent to decide the proposal for grant of approval of first stage of disciplinary proceeding against the fifth respondent and for a further direction on the Board not to proceed with the appeal that had been preferred by the fifth respondent. 4. This Bench had the occasion to consider this writ petition on December 5, 2014. 4. This Bench had the occasion to consider this writ petition on December 5, 2014. It was noticed that on November 12, 2014 itself, the second respondent had passed an order holding therein that the prevailing circumstances do not warrant placement of the fifth respondent under suspension, wherefor the proposal of the managing committee to suspend the fifth respondent was not approved. Since presentation of the writ petition coincided with the order passed by the second respondent disapproving the proposal to suspend the fifth respondent, such order was obviously not under challenge and the managing committee was granted liberty to question the legality and/or propriety thereof by instituting appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. Regarding the other prayer of the managing committee, this Bench had proceeded to hold as follows: “Insofar as the prayer of the managing committee for an order on the Board to grant approval of first stage of the disciplinary proceeding against the respondent no. 5 is concerned, I am of the view that the stage is not mature enough for consideration as to whether such an order ought to be passed. Rule 28(8) of the 1969 Rules has been interpreted by the Special Bench of this Court in the decision in Arun Kumar Hait Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1999 (1) CHN 521 . The first stage approval of the Board is required only when upon an enquiry into the conduct of the delinquent staff being conducted in accordance with law, the managing committee upon consideration of the representation of the delinquent staff against the enquiry report accepts the findings contained in such report and proposes to proceed further against the delinquent staff for taking disciplinary action. Admittedly, in this case, the reply of the respondent no. 5 to the charge-sheet was received but no enquiry officer has been appointed. The managing committee, therefore, was not justified in seeking first stage approval without the charge(s) against the respondent no. 5 being proved. The managing committee shall, therefore, be free to appoint an enquiry officer for the purpose of conducting the disciplinary proceeding and taking the same to its logical conclusion in accordance with law and the observations in Arun Kumar Hait (supra).” While disposing of the writ petition, further observation was made to the following effect: “Since the proposal of the managing committee to place the respondent no. 5 under suspension has not been approved by the Administrator of the Board and such approval has not been interdicted, the respondent no. 5 shall be allowed to resume duty subject to result of further proceedings that may be initiated by the managing committee in accordance with law.” 5. It is not in dispute that in compliance with the said order, the managing committee permitted the fifth respondent to resume duty. A day before the said writ petition was disposed of, it presented this writ petition seeking an order to quash and/or set aside the order dated November 12, 2014 passed by the second respondent declining to grant approval to the proposal of the managing committee to place the fifth respondent under suspension. 6. The findings returned by the second respondent in his order dated November 12, 2014 may be read first before embarking on the process of judicial review thereof. Relevant portion from the order of the second respondent is quoted below: “* * * Findings:- The principle laid down in the Management Rules 1969 is that the order of suspension can normally be passed against a teaching or nonteaching staff of the Non-Government Aided Institution where such suspension is in the interest of the Institution. As per Rule 28 sub-rule (9) (viia) of the Management Rules 1969, as amended read with circular no S/606 dt. 21.06.1982, the paramount consideration is whether the presence of the charged teaching staff will prejudicially affect the pending enquiry, if the answer is negative, the approval of the suspension could not be accorded. In course of hearing, the reasons assigned by the Headmistress do not warrant any suspension against the incumbent teacher. The elements of derogatory remarks are totally absent. Therefore, all the allegations are baseless and without any substance. It is needless to mention that there is no guideline prescribing the marking in the school examination. There is also no material on record to suggest that there is chance of tampering with the evidence or influencing the witnesses by Sm. Mondal, the assistant teacher of the school. The presence of Sm. Mondal is deemed unlikely to prejudice the proper conduct of the enquiry. Thus the school has failed to substantiate by cogent and sufficient evidence that the suspension is compelling necessity in the interest of institution. So proposal for approval of the suspension cannot be entertained. Mondal, the assistant teacher of the school. The presence of Sm. Mondal is deemed unlikely to prejudice the proper conduct of the enquiry. Thus the school has failed to substantiate by cogent and sufficient evidence that the suspension is compelling necessity in the interest of institution. So proposal for approval of the suspension cannot be entertained. Hence, after careful observation of the facts & circumstances of the case, it is ordered that the Proposal for suspension of Sm. Debanjana Mondal, Assistant Teacher of the School be disapproved, provided there is no contrary order of the Hon’ble Court that Sm. Debanjana Mondal be reinstated immediately and the period of suspension be treated as ‘period spent on duty’.” 7. Mr. Ghosh, learned advocate representing the managing committee of the school while referring to the aforesaid findings contended that the second respondent exceeded his jurisdiction in giving a decision on the merits of the continuing disciplinary proceeding, while considering grant of approval to the proposal to place the fifth respondent under suspension. According to him, such an approach of the second respondent is clearly in the teeth of the Full Bench decision in Arun Kumar Hait (supra). It was further contended by him that the second respondent did not record in the impugned order the reasons that were assigned by the Headmistress of the school to support placement of the fifth respondent under suspension and simply remarked that the reasons did not warrant suspension, which is nothing but his ipse dixit. He also contended that the impugned order of the second respondent not being legally sustainable owing to a faulty decision making process, the same may be set aside. 8. An alternative submission was advanced by Mr. Ghosh. According to him, an employer has an inherent right of placing its employee under suspension and not taking work from him; however, it is conditioned with a rider that full salary and allowances ought to be paid. 8. An alternative submission was advanced by Mr. Ghosh. According to him, an employer has an inherent right of placing its employee under suspension and not taking work from him; however, it is conditioned with a rider that full salary and allowances ought to be paid. Referring to the fact that this Court on the earlier writ petition of the managing committee had not approved the course of action that was taken by it to seek first stage approval of the disciplinary proceeding without conducting any enquiry against the fifth respondent and seeking continuation of the order of suspension of the fifth respondent, he submitted that the writ petition may be disposed of fixing a time-frame for conducting and completing the enquiry with a default clause that failure to conclude the enquiry within such time would result in revocation of the order of suspension of the fifth respondent and that she would be entitled to resume duty, and that during such period the enquiry continues, the fifth respondent shall be entitled to full salary and allowances. 9. The writ petition was opposed by Mr. Moitra, learned senior advocate for the fifth respondent. According to him, the managing committee of the school has been proceeding against the fifth respondent mala fide and to wreak vengeance against her. It was contended that the second respondent had taken stock of the entire situation and upon finding that the fifth respondent was made the victim of circumstances he had rightly disapproved the proposal of the managing committee to place her under suspension. Attention of the Court was invited to Rule 28(8) of the Rules as well as to Circular No. S/606 dated June 21, 1982 issued by the Board to contend that suspension is warranted only if it is in the interest of the institution and/or if presence of the delinquent staff in the school premises is likely to hamper the smooth conduct of enquiry. Mr. Moitra claimed that the charges against the fifth respondent are not so grave so as to warrant an order of suspension, thereby keeping her away from work unnecessarily and thereby casting a stigma on her. 10. Regarding the alternative submission of Mr. Ghosh, Mr. Mr. Moitra claimed that the charges against the fifth respondent are not so grave so as to warrant an order of suspension, thereby keeping her away from work unnecessarily and thereby casting a stigma on her. 10. Regarding the alternative submission of Mr. Ghosh, Mr. Moitra contended that when the terms and conditions of an employee are governed by a statute, an order of suspension could be passed only in the manner ordained by the statute or not at all. According to him, the principle of the employer having an inherent right to place its employee under suspension without affecting salary and allowances, as referred to by Mr. Ghosh, is a permissible course of action in case of a master-servant relationship arising out of a private contract not permitting interim suspension pending disciplinary action and is not applicable in a case of the present nature. He urged that the simple reason for this is, an aided school receives grants-in-aid from the Government which is public money and not the money of the school; in such a situation, it would be against public interest in placing the fifth respondent under suspension but to pay her full salary and allowances without extracting any work from her. 11. While wrapping up, it was also submitted by Mr. Moitra that this Court having permitted the fifth respondent to resume duty by its order dated December 5, 2014, it would amount to review of such order if the Court were to interdict the order dated November 12, 2014 of the second respondent. 12. Accordingly, it was prayed by Mr. Moitra that the writ petition be dismissed. 13. The learned advocates for the parties have been sufficiently heard and the materials on record duly perused. 14. This Bench is am ad idem with Mr. Moitra that when the terms and conditions of an employee are governed not by a private contract but by a statute or provisions having the force of law, there is no scope for an employer to place an employee under suspension in exercise of its inherent right and to pay full salary and allowances to him without extracting any work. Moitra that when the terms and conditions of an employee are governed not by a private contract but by a statute or provisions having the force of law, there is no scope for an employer to place an employee under suspension in exercise of its inherent right and to pay full salary and allowances to him without extracting any work. What is possible for a private employer may not be possible for a public employer and there can be no doubt having regard to the provisions of the extant law, i.e. the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 and the rules/orders issued thereunder, that employer-employee relationship between the managing committee and the fifth respondent is not a private master-servant relationship; it is a relationship that is governed by the public laws. When the power to suspend is expressly made subject to specific statutory limitations or the circumstances for exercise of the power are enumerated, then the scope of the power cannot be extended beyond what is expressly stated [see Sudhir Kumar Banerji v. Superintendent of Police, 1979 (2) CHN 178 ]. There is no question of allowing the managing committee to mis-utilize funds flowing to it from the public exchequer for meeting the salary and allowances of a teacher, without asking her to work. The alternative submission of Mr. Ghosh is not acceptable and, accordingly, stands rejected. 15. Next, the contention of Mr. Moitra that interference with the order of the second respondent would amount to a review of the order dated December 5, 2014 falls for consideration. It is found that by the date the earlier round of litigation was terminated, the second round of litigation had commenced with presentation of this writ petition on December 4, 2014. It is unfortunate that this Bench was not apprised of such fact, or else both the writ petitions could have been taken up for consideration together. Be that as it may, it is found from the order of December 5, 2014 that not only did the Court grant the managing committee of the school the liberty to challenge the legality and/or propriety of the order dated November 12, 2014 of the second respondent but had also observed that resumption of duty by the fifth respondent would be subject to result of further proceedings that may be initiated by the managing committee in accordance with law. It is, therefore, clear that resumption of duty by the fifth respondent was not unconditional. If the Court were to find the impugned order of the second respondent declining approval of the proposal to suspend the fifth respondent indefensible, it could pass appropriate order to set things right and such course of action would not be barred under any provision of law. Having regard to the fact that the order dated December 5, 2014 has attained finality, the contention raised by Mr. Moitra in this behalf stands overruled. 16. Moving on to the impugned order, its legality and/or propriety has to be examined in the light of the Full Bench decision in Arun Kumar Hait (supra). One of the issues that fell for consideration before the Full Bench was: “Whether the managing committee has the power to initiate or to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings once order of suspension has been disapproved by the Court?” It was in course of answering such question that the Full Bench took note of the relevant sections of the Act, the Rules as well as circular nos. S/606 and S/607, both dated June 21, 1982 issued by the Board. Paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the decision being relevant for a decision on the present writ petition are quoted below: “19. It needs to be emphasized that the broad base for ordering suspension under Rule 28(9)(viia) namely, the interest of the Institution is sought to be exemplified in the notification No. S/606 by providing for suspension not only before the charges are framed but also after the charges have been framed provided the inquiry at either stage is likely to be hampered by the continued presence of the teacher/employee. Therefore, under the Management Rules the suspension is either preparatory to disciplinary proceedings or ancillary to or in aid of the disciplinary proceedings. Suspension is not a sine qua non of disciplinary proceedings and may not at all be taken recourse to by the School Authorities disciplinary proceedings against a teacher/employee. 20. The contents of the proposal sent by the Managing Committee for approval by the WBBSE as specified in the notification No. S/606 do not include the merits of the proposed disciplinary action. 20. The contents of the proposal sent by the Managing Committee for approval by the WBBSE as specified in the notification No. S/606 do not include the merits of the proposed disciplinary action. The WBBSE in granting or refusing the proposed suspension is limited to seeing whether the objects sought to be achieved by the suspension namely, the interest of the Institution or an unhampered inquiry, either exist or would in fact require the suspension of the teacher/employee. There is no scope for any decision on the merits of the proposed disciplinary proceedings by the WBBSE at all. 21. I would follow that an approval of an order of suspension cannot be taken as a finding of guilt nor a disapproval of the proposed suspension mean that the disciplinary proceedings cannot be commenced and proceeded with.” 17. Indubitably, the second respondent while considering the proposal of the managing committee to place the fifth respondent under suspension did not have in mind the ruling in Arun Kumar Hait (supra). If the second respondent had it in mind, this Bench is sure the impugned order would never have been passed. This is not the solitary instance where the second respondent has touched upon the merits of a disciplinary proceeding while considering a proposal of an institution governed by the Rules to place one of its staff under suspension. This Bench has noticed in other writ petitions too that the second respondent had proceeded to examine the merits of the disciplinary proceeding to come to a finding as to whether the suspension is warranted or not. That is an impermissible course of action and the second respondent would be well-advised to desist from proceeding in that direction in future. In course of consideration of the proposal for suspension, the second respondent acted beyond his authority by returning findings in relation to absence of elements of derogatory remarks, allegations being baseless and without substance, etc. It appears to be clear that the impugned order is legally unsustainable being in the teeth of the dictum of the Full Bench decision in Arun Kumar Hait (supra). 18. There is one other worthy ground for interfering with the order of the second respondent. He was discharging quasi-judicial functions while deciding the rights of the managing committee of the school and the fifth respondent. 18. There is one other worthy ground for interfering with the order of the second respondent. He was discharging quasi-judicial functions while deciding the rights of the managing committee of the school and the fifth respondent. This Bench is not aware as to whether the second respondent has a legally trained mind or not but even if he has no legal training, the minimum that was required of him in the circumstances was to place on record the submissions of the parties before him so that his finding that the submissions are without worth could be tested upon reading the recorded submissions. The reasons assigned by the Headmistress to support the order of suspension are conspicuous by their absence in the impugned order, yet, the second respondent proceeded to hold that the reasons assigned did not warrant suspension in a case of the present nature. This Bench is handicapped in assessing the situation as to whether the finding that has been returned is sustainable having regard to the reasons that were actually assigned. In the absence of recording of the submissions of the Headmistress, it is well-nigh impossible to record that the second respondent was right in his approach in not giving credence thereto. Since the second respondent as Administrator of the Board has the onerous task of deciding rights of parties, he ought to be careful in writing orders in regard to contentious issues. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order is held to be indefensible and, accordingly, stands set aside. The consequent effect of such setting aside is that the fifth respondent shall continue to remain under suspension with effect from this date. Such suspension shall continue till such time the second respondent passes a fresh order on the proposal of the managing committee to place the fifth respondent under suspension in the light of the observations made in this order as well as in the light of the extant law/guidelines. 20. Pendency of consideration of the proposal to place the fifth respondent under suspension shall not preclude the managing committee to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding that has been initiated strictly in accordance with law and in the light of the Full Bench decision in Arun Kumar Hait (supra). 21. The writ petition stands allowed to the extent mentioned above without, however, any order as to costs. 21. The writ petition stands allowed to the extent mentioned above without, however, any order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, shall be furnished to the applicant at an early date.