Judgment : AHLUWALIA, J. Aggrieved against the conviction and sentence, the present appellant, namely Hari Ram s/o. Ram Kishan has instituted the present appeal to assail the impugned judgment dated 02.08.2005, rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), No.1, Ajmer, whereby the appellant has been held guilty for offences punishable under Sections 302, 201 and 498-A of Indian Penal Code and under Section 4/6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. In the instant case, the appellant, Hariram was married with Smt. Guman thirteen-years ago before the occurrence. On 14.02.2004 the dead-body of Smt. Guman was found from a well. There were incised, stab and blunt injuries present on the dead-body recovered from the well. The cause of death of Smt. Guman was due to excessive bleeding, haemorrhage and shock as a result of multiple injuries caused to her. Thus, the present appellant being husband of Smt. Guman was convicted by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, (Fast Track), No.1, Ajmer for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201, I.P.C. 3. The trial Court had acquitted the present appellant for offence punishable under Section 498-A, I.P.C. and under Section 4/6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 4. The trial Court had also acquitted the co-accused of the appellants, namely Ramkishan, the father-in-law, Smt. Sohni, the mother-in-law and Basram alias Vishram, the brother-in-law. 5. Having convicted the present appellant for the above said offences, the trial Court, by a separate order of even date, sentenced him as under : ' For offence under Section 302, I.P.C. the appellant was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-. In default of payment of fine to further undergo three months- simple imprisonment. For offence under Section 201, I.P.C. the appellant was sentenced to undergo three years- rigorous imprisonment. 6. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 7. In the present case, since the marriage was more than thirteen-years old, therefore, Section 304-B, I.P.C. was not invoked against the appellant, even though, Poosa Lal (PW-10), the father of deceased had stated that the deceased was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry. 8. 6. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 7. In the present case, since the marriage was more than thirteen-years old, therefore, Section 304-B, I.P.C. was not invoked against the appellant, even though, Poosa Lal (PW-10), the father of deceased had stated that the deceased was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry. 8. The trial Court, while recording the conviction of appellant, noted the following circumstances to complete the chain of circumstances to arrive at a conclusion that the murder has been committed only by the present appellant : A. The appellant, in pursuance of the disclosure statement made, got recovered ' dantali- (sickle) the weapon of offence; and the same was stained with human blood, having its origin as Blood Group A. B. The blood stained soil lifted from the spot, the ' odhani- , ' ghaghra- and blouse of the deceased; and the pant and shirt recovered at the instance of appellant were also stained with human blood, having its origin as Blood Group-A. C. The appellant was last seen with his wife. D. The conduct of the appellant that he had not attended his wife in the hospital, as well as, the cremation of his wife. Furthermore, he had not made any attempt to rescue his wife from the well. 9. Mr. Rinesh Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant, duly assisted by Ms. Chandrakala, Advocate, has very vehemently contended that the circumstances, relied upon by the Court below are not sufficient to sustain conviction of the appellant. 10. Before we deal with the arguments raised by the learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant, and the rival submissions advanced by the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State of Rajasthan, it will be necessary for us to briefly note the facts of the case. 11. Poosa Ram (PW-10) had submitted a written-report (Exhibit-P/13) before Station House Officer, Police Station, Srinagar, District Ajmer. The written-report (Exhibit-P/13) submitted by Poosa Lal (PW-10), when translated into English, reads as under : To, The Station House Officer, Police Station, Srinagar, District Ajmer (Rajasthan) Applicant : Poosa s/o Goga, by caste Jat Kharra, resident of Dadiya, Police Station, Arai, District Ajmer. Subject : Regarding the murder of my daughter by throwing her into a well. Sir, It is submitted that my daughter, Guman was married to Hariram s/o Ramkishan, resident of Village Tihari, about thirteen years ago. Subject : Regarding the murder of my daughter by throwing her into a well. Sir, It is submitted that my daughter, Guman was married to Hariram s/o Ramkishan, resident of Village Tihari, about thirteen years ago. Her ' gona- ceremony had taken place about three-years ago. Since then my daughter was subjected to cruelty on account of demand of dowry by her father-in-law, mother-in-law and brother-in-law. I had given two tolas of gold, silver ornaments and other utensils. Thereafter, they were demanding a motor-cycle. Number of times, I had gone to the Village of Hariram and my relative (sambandhi), Ramkishan along with the respectable persons of my Village. On 14.02.2004, my daughter had gone to cut fodder and barley crops. Earlier, I had come to meet my daughter along with Basram s/o Heera Khokhar. At that time, my son-in-law, Hariram and his father, Ramkishan told us that they will not keep my daughter, they further told me to take her away, otherwise, she will be killed. The name of the mother-in-law of my daughter is Sohni. In the field from where fodder was cut, stains of blood were present. After murdering my daughter, her dead body has been thrown in a dry Well. Therefore, Sir, it is prayed that a case be registered and legal action be taken against all these three accused-persons, and they be sternly dealt with as per law. On the night of 14.02.2004, Sukhpal, former Sarpanch had relayed information to me regarding the occurrence. On 14.02.2004 at about 10:00 p.m. we have returned to our home. Earlier thereto, Bishram, devar of my daughter had also given beating to my daughter and said that she will be killed. Signature Poosa s/o Goga Jat (Kharra) resident of Dadiya' 12. On the basis of above written-report (Exhibit-P/13), a formal First Information Report (Exhibit-P/14) was registered on 15.02.2004 at Police Station, Srinagar, Ajmer. 13. Dr. Rajesh Gupta (PW-1) had conducted autopsy on the dead-body of Smt. Guman, aged about twenty-two years. As per the Post-Mortem Report (Exhibit-P/1), he had found the following injuries on the person of deceased, Smt. Gumana : ' (1) Incised wound 3\" x ½\" x depth upto trachea (Trachea punctured) extending from right sideof neck to left side of neck below the level of thyroid cartilage margin of wound clean cut and everted. As per the Post-Mortem Report (Exhibit-P/1), he had found the following injuries on the person of deceased, Smt. Gumana : ' (1) Incised wound 3\" x ½\" x depth upto trachea (Trachea punctured) extending from right sideof neck to left side of neck below the level of thyroid cartilage margin of wound clean cut and everted. (2) Incised wound 1½\" x ½\" x 1/4\"th on lower part of left side of neck margins of wound clean cut and everted. (3) Incised wound 1\" x ½\" x ¼' \\\" on upper part of left side of neck. (above injury No.1). Margins of wound clean cut and everted. (4) Stab wound 1/2\" x ¼\" x 1\" on right side of neck. (Above the level of injury No.1) (5) Incised wound 1\" x ½\" x ½' \" on right side of neck above the level of injury No.4. (Margins of wound clean cut and everted). (6) Stab wound ½\" x ¼\" x 1\" on upper part of left side of chest just below the level of clavicle. (7) Lacerated wound 2\" x ½\" x bone deep on left side of middle 1/3 rd part of scalp. (8) Incised wound 2\" x ½\" x ¼\" on right shoulder region. (9) Abrasion 1\" x1\" below right knee region. Injury Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 were ante-mortem in nature and caused by sharp object. Injury Nos. (7) and (9) were ante-mortem in nature and caused by blunt object.' 14. As per opinion of the doctor, Injury Nos.1 to 6, and 8 were caused by incised weapon, and the Injury Nos.7 and 9 were caused by blunt weapon; and all the injuries were ante-mortem in nature. 15. It will be pertinent to mention here that no cross-examination was carried by the accused, and it was accepted that the deceased had died as a result of violence due to causing of injuries. 16. Gollu (PW-2) stated that accused, got a ' dantali- recovered in pursuance of the disclosure statement made by him near the field where fodder was sown, after removing earth. Furthermore, the accused from his house got recovered his pant and shirt, which he had concealed behind the bags of wheat stored in the house. 17. In the cross-examination, this witness admitted that the deceased, Smt. Guman was daughter of her maternal uncle. 18. Furthermore, the accused from his house got recovered his pant and shirt, which he had concealed behind the bags of wheat stored in the house. 17. In the cross-examination, this witness admitted that the deceased, Smt. Guman was daughter of her maternal uncle. 18. Birdichand (PW-3) stated that on 16.02.2004 in his presence and in the presence of Hariram, former Sarpanch and Dy. S.P., the accused got prepared the site-plan of fodder field and the well. As per the site-plan (Exhibit-P/6), the murder was committed in the fodder field which was identified at the instance of appellant. 19. Hemma (PW-4) stated that he knew the deceased, Smt. Guman as she was a daughter of his neighbour, Poosa. He was informed by his grand-son that Poosa- s daughter had died due to fall in the well. He had accompanied Poosa to Tihari, where they were informed by Sukhpal, Sarpanch that their daughter Smt. Guman has died due to fall in the well. This witness stated that later on, they had gone to the fodder field and had seen the blood stains there. The soil was soaked with blood. 20. Sukhpal (PW-5), former Sarpanch of Village stated that he was informed that Hariram- s wife had died due to fall in the well. It was further stated by him that he had informed the Police. The Police had came at the spot. The Police got the dead body recovered and same was of Guman. This witness further stated that the dead body was in a pool of blood. 21. Laxman, the brother of deceased Guman, appeared as PW-6 and stated that whenever Guman came to her native place, she disclosed that she was harassed by her husband on account of demand of dowry; the husband was demanding a television and a motorcycle. This witness further stated that when enquries were made from Hariram he informed that he had left the deceased near the well. 22. Sheoraj (PW-7), being resident of the Village of the complainant, stated that he had accompanied Poosa Lal to the Village of the accused, and had learnt that she had died due to fall in the well. 23. To a similar effect is the statement made by Nathulal (PW-8), another resident of Village Dadiya. 24. Karan Singh (PW-9) stated that the dead body was recovered from the well. 25. 23. To a similar effect is the statement made by Nathulal (PW-8), another resident of Village Dadiya. 24. Karan Singh (PW-9) stated that the dead body was recovered from the well. 25. Poosa Lal (PW-10) has also reiterated as to what was stated by him in the First Information Report (Exhibit-P/14). This witness further stated that his daughter was subjected to cruelty. He further stated that the autopsy on his daughter was carried. 26. We need not notice the statements of the other witnesses, who had participated in the investigation. 27. As is evident from the above, the case of the prosecution rests upon the circumstantial evidence. 28. The statement of the present appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure. He denied all the incriminating circumstances and stated that ' Guman was my wife. We never demanded dowry. We had searched for Guman in the night. I and some other persons had helped the Police in recovering the dead body from the well and for sending the same to the hospital. I have been falsely implicated. The Police after giving beating to me, obtained my signature on blank papers. Nothing was recovered from me.' 29. In defence, the accused examined as many as seven witnesses. 30. Ramdeo (DW-1) stated that the appellant- s father is his sister- s husband. He never heard that the appellant harassed his wife. This witness has deposed regarding cordial relations between the appellant and deceased. 31. To a similar effect are the statements made by Shyodan (DW-2), Prasen Lal (DW-3), Banna Lal (DW-4), Hansraj (DW-5), Ramdhan (DW-6) and Ramchandra (DW-7) respectively. 32. A perusal of the site-plan (Exhibit-P/6) clearly reveals that the field in which Guman was murdered belongs to the appellant, and the accused disclosed that at point ' X- in the field, he had killed his wife, and later on had thrown her dead body in the well of Ugam Singh. 33. Smt. Sampat (PW-13), an elder sister of the deceased Guman, stated that on the day of the occurrence, she had come to the house of her sister, and as and when she enquired about the whereabouts of her sister from accused, she was informed by them that she had gone to the field and would return soon. 34. 33. Smt. Sampat (PW-13), an elder sister of the deceased Guman, stated that on the day of the occurrence, she had come to the house of her sister, and as and when she enquired about the whereabouts of her sister from accused, she was informed by them that she had gone to the field and would return soon. 34. It has come in the evidence of Laxman (PW-6) that the present appellant disclosed to him : (Vernacular matter omitted........Ed.) 35. Thus, from the above admission made by Laxman, (PW-6), it is apparent that he was last seen together with deceased Guman near the well from where her dead body was recovered. 36. In the present case, death is not due to drowning or asphyxia. The deceased was murdered by causing her incised, stab and blunt injuries. The doctor, who conducted the autopsy on the dead body, stated that the cause of death i.e. multiple injuries, which led to excessive bleeding and shock. The Medical Jurist was not cross-examined, and his opinion regarding cause of death was accepted by the defence. 37. Thus, admittedly, in the present case, after the murder was committed, the dead body was thrown in the well. The present appellant got the weapon of offence recovered. He also got his clothes recovered, which were stained with blood Group-A. The blood stained soil lifted from the field of the appellant also contained human blood Group-A. The appellant, being husband did not make any efforts to search for his wife and to inform the parents of the deceased. 38. It was incumbent for the accused, who as per admission made before Laxman (PW-6) stated that he had last left Guman near the well, to explain as to how she died. 39. The learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant has relied upon the following cases: (1) State through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mahender Singh Dahiya (2011) 3 SCC 109 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1017 ). (2) Madan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 Cr LR (Raj) 422. (3).Musheer Khan alias Badshah Khan and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 748 : ( AIR 2010 SC 762 ) and (4). (2) Madan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 Cr LR (Raj) 422. (3).Musheer Khan alias Badshah Khan and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 748 : ( AIR 2010 SC 762 ) and (4). Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 702 : (2001 AIR SCW 4209), to contend that circumstances, emerging from prosecution case are not sufficient to sustain conviction of the appellant and furthermore, it cannot be said that nobody else had access to the deceased. 40. Recently, the Hon- ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Thakur Singh, 2014 Cri LJ 4047 : (AIR 2014 SC (Cri)1792), had observed as under : ' Discussion and conclusion 14. Questioning the decision of the High Court acquitting Thakur Singh, the State of Rajasthan has preferred this appeal. 15. We find that the High Court has not at all considered the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. This section provides, inter alia, that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. 106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.- When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustrations (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. 16. Way back in Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer ( AIR 1956 SC 404 ) this Court dealt with the interpretation of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and held that the section is not intended to shift the burden of proof (in respect of a crime) on the accused but to take care of a situation where a fact is known only to the accused and it is well nigh impossible or extremely difficult for the prosecution to prove that fact. It was said: ' This [Section 101] lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. It was said: ' This [Section 101] lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are ' especially' within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word ' especially' stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not.' 17. In a specific instance in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006 AIR SCW 5300) this Court held that when the wife is injured in the dwelling home where the husband ordinarily resides, and the husband offers no explanation for the injuries to his wife, then the circumstances would indicate that the husband is responsible for the injuries. It was said: ' Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime.' 18. Reliance was placed by this Court on Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra (1992 AIR SCW 1175) in which case the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife inside his house. Since the death had occurred in his custody, it was held that the appellant was under an obligation to give an explanation for the cause of death in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the death had occurred in his custody, it was held that the appellant was under an obligation to give an explanation for the cause of death in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant was a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. 19. Similarly, in Dnyaneshwar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 686) this Court observed that since the deceased was murdered in her matrimonial home and the appellant had not set up a case that the offence was committed by somebody else or that there was a possibility of an outsider committing the offence, it was for the husband to explain the grounds for the unnatural death of his wife. 20. In Jagdish v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 373) this Court observed as follows: ' It bears repetition that the appellant and the deceased family members were the only occupants of the room and it was therefore incumbent on the appellant to have tendered some explanation in order to avoid any suspicion as to his guilt.' 21. More recently, in Gian Chand v. State of Haryana ( AIR 2013 SC 3395 ) a large number of decisions of this Court were referred to and the interpretation given to Section 106 of the Evidence Act in Shambhu Nath Mehra was reiterated. One of the decisions cited in Gian Chand is that of State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar ( AIR 2000 SC 2988 ) which gives a rather telling example explaining the principle behind Section 106 of the Evidence Act in the following words: ' During arguments we put a question to learned Senior Counsel for the respondents based on a hypothetical illustration. If a boy is kidnapped from the lawful custody of his guardian in the sight of his people and the kidnappers disappeared with the prey, what would be the normal inference if the mangled dead body of the boy is recovered within a couple of hours from elsewhere. The query was made whether upon proof of the above facts an inference could be drawn that the kidnappers would have killed the boy. The query was made whether upon proof of the above facts an inference could be drawn that the kidnappers would have killed the boy. Learned Senior Counsel finally conceded that in such a case the inference is reasonably certain that the boy was killed by the kidnappers unless they explain otherwise.' 22. The law, therefore, is quite well settled that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused is on the prosecution, but there may be certain facts pertaining to a crime that can be known only to the accused, or are virtually impossible for the prosecution to prove. These facts need to be explained by the accused and if he does not do so, then it is a strong circumstance pointing to his guilt based on those facts. 23. Applying this principle to the facts of the case, since Dhapu Kunwar died an unnatural death in the room occupied by her and Thakur Singh, the cause of the unnatural death was known to Thakur Singh. There is no evidence that anybody else had entered their room or could have entered their room. Thakur Singh did not set up any case that he was not in their room or not in the vicinity of their room while the incident occurred nor did he set up any case that some other person entered the room and caused the unnatural death of his wife. The facts relevant to the cause of Dhapu Kunwar- s death being known only to Thakur Singh, yet he chose not to disclose them or to explain them. The principle laid down in Section 106 of the Evidence Act is clearly applicable to the facts of the case and there is, therefore, a very strong presumption that Dhapu Kunwar was murdered by Thakur Singh. 24. It is not that Thakur Singh was obliged to prove his innocence or prove that he had not committed any offence. All that was required of Thakur Singh was to explain the unusual situation, namely, of the unnatural death of his wife in their room, but he made no attempt to do' 41. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254 : (AIR 2007 SC 144, Paras 23 & 24), the Hon- ble Supreme Court held as under : 17. It is not necessary to multiply with authorities. The principle is well settled. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254 : (AIR 2007 SC 144, Paras 23 & 24), the Hon- ble Supreme Court held as under : 17. It is not necessary to multiply with authorities. The principle is well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the Court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. The principle has been succinctly stated in Re. Naina Mohd., AIR 1960 Mad 218 . There is considerable force in the argument of counsel for the State that in the facts of this case as well it should be held that the respondent having been seen last with the deceased, the burden was upon him to prove what happened thereafter, since those facts were within his special knowledge. Since, the respondent failed to do so, it must be held that he failed to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. This circumstance, therefore, provides the missing link in the chain of circumstances which prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.' 42. Since, the respondent failed to do so, it must be held that he failed to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. This circumstance, therefore, provides the missing link in the chain of circumstances which prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.' 42. In Narendra v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2009 SC 1881 , the Hon- ble Supreme Court observed as under : ' 5. In the present case there are certain material aspects which were lost sight of by the trial court but have been noted by the High Court. The dead body was detected in the morning of 14.2.1994. Parents of the deceased informed the police and not the inmates. The parents were informed by neighbours and not by the inmates. DW2 has been disbelieved as he was nearly 70 years of age. It was highly improbable that he was in employment as a watchman. The trial court had held that the evidence of PWs.6 to 8 regarding pressing mark on the neck and injuries on the fore arms of the deceased are not corroborated by the medical opinion. This is factually incorrect. The doctor (PW2) had categorically stated that he was of the opinion that death was due to result of compression of the neck, and the post-mortem report was accordingly issued. PW6 has stated that second opinion was sought for and then the report was given. The falsity of alibi is an additional link. 6. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cri LJ 20 it has been noted as follows: The demand for dowry or money from the parents of the bride has shown a phenomenal increase in the last few years. Cases are frequently coming before the courts, where the husband or in-laws have gone to the extent of killing the bride if the demand is not met. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are generally reluctant to depose in court as they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonize a neighborhood family. No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are generally reluctant to depose in court as they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonize a neighborhood family. The parents or other family members of the bride being away from the scene of commission of crime are not in a position to give direct evidence which may inculpate the real accused 2015-02-20 (Page 3 of 4 ) www.manupatra.com except regarding the demand of money or dowry and harassment caused to the bride. But, it does not mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the house should go unpunished. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, 2003 Cri LJ 3892 : (AIR 2006 SC 3609). The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.' 43. In view of the well settled legal position enumerated in the judgments considered and reproduced herein above, the judgments, cited by the learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant, no longer hold the field and are distinguishable on the facts and circumstances of the case. 44. We cannot ignore the fact that as per family members of the deceased, the relations between the husband and wife were estranged due to demand of dowry. She was subjected to cruelty; on day of occurrence, she died due to violence because of multiple injuries. Thereafter, her dead body was thrown into the well. The appellant got weapon of offence recovered. The blood group on the clothes of the deceased tallied with the blood group found in the blood stained soil picked up by the Investigating Agency. Similarly on the clothes of accused, recovered at his instance, human blood of same group was found. Furthermore, the appellant was last seen with the deceased near the well from where the dead body was recovered. 45. In view of consistent law laid down by the Hon- ble Supreme Court, while interpreting Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, we are of the view that where the wife is living along with the husband and she is married by her family members with an expectation that her husband will ensure her welfare, it is incumbent for the husband to disclose as to how his living wife had turned into corpse. 46. It will be apposite to reproduce here the observations made by M.M. Punchhi, J., as His Lordship then was Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, in Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab,(Punjab and Haryana) (DB) 1989 (1) RCR (Criminal) 18. ' 20. As it appears to us, in the changing social pattern, with the greed for dowry and lust for money respect for human life, and moreso of the female-victim involved, has gone with the wind. ' 20. As it appears to us, in the changing social pattern, with the greed for dowry and lust for money respect for human life, and moreso of the female-victim involved, has gone with the wind. The closed doors behind which such crimes are committed, the opportunity to choose the time of the commission of crime with the accused, the non-availability of direct evidence and the non-availability of even circumstantial evidence, which would complete the chain of guilt, has led to a deplorable situation putting to ridicule the rules of trial and the role of the Judge. 21. It is well recognised in criminal law of breach of trust that where property is entrusted to another, it is the duty of that other to give the true account of what he did with the property so entrusted to him and his failure to do so raises under section 105 a presumption that he had criminally misappropriated the property so entrusted to him. We view that the position of a bride, cannot be worse. Her welfare and physical protection is also in trust with the people in whose care she has been put in and if she has been deprived of her life, the person to whom she stood entrusted must necessarily account for as he or she alone is supposed to have a special knowledge about the crime especially when he or she was the last person to be seen together or expected to be together with the deceased. It would not be out of place to note a quotation from Syrus-Judexdamnatur-cum-nocens absolvitur. ' The Judge is condemned when the guilty is acquitted.' 47. It would not be out of place to note a quotation from Syrus-Judexdamnatur-cum-nocens absolvitur. ' The Judge is condemned when the guilty is acquitted.' 47. Taking the totality of the circumstances, and the law laid down by the Hon- ble Apex Court, we are of the view that the evidence of last seen, the recovery of weapon, the blood stained clothes of accused, which were recovered at the behest of the appellant, and the fact that the blood group ' A- on them tallied with the human blood group found in the soil lifted from the spot and with the clothes of the deceased, and by invoking Section 106 Indian Evidence Act, and as per law laid down on this point, we are fully convinced that the prosecution has succeeded in completing the chain of circumstances to arrive at a conclusion that the murder was committed by the appellant alone, and by no one else. 48. Hence, there is no merit in the present appeal; the same is, hereby, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.