JUDGMENT Hon’ble Yashwant Varma, J.—The petitioner seeks to assail the validity of the order dated 16.10.2008 passed by the respondent No. 2 in terms of which he stood dismissed from service in exercise of powers conferred upon the said authority by the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1991. The aforesaid order of punishment came to be imposed upon the petitioner on culmination of departmental proceedings initiated against him on the charge of having consummated a second marriage without the permission of the appropriate authority. The charge asserted that the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner was in violation of Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules 1956. The order of termination also stood confirmed in appeal by the respondent No. 3 vide his order dated 30.1.2009 and in revision by the respondent No. 4 by his order dated 26.12.2009. 2. The undisputed facts, which emerge from the record, appear to be that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the Civil Police on 1.8.1972. During the course of his career, he rose to become a Head Constable and was drawing salary in the grade of Sub Inspector. 3. It appears that one Smt. Hausila Devi asserting herself to be the first wife of the petitioner made a complaint to the respondents alleging ill treatment having been meted out to her. It was at this stage that the petitioner having committed the misconduct of bigamy came to light. 4. Taking cognizance on the complaint made by Smt. Hausila Devi, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 4.8.2008 for violation of the Rules 1956, referred to above. Finding the reply of the petitioner to the aforesaid show-cause notice to be unsatisfactory, a charge-sheet dated 25.4.2008 was served upon him and to which a detailed reply was submitted by the petitioner on 5.5.2008. Disciplinary proceedings taken against the petitioner culminated in a report dated 5.6.2008 being submitted by the Enquiry Officer. 5. It becomes relevant to note here that the Enquiry Officer in the course of those proceedings recorded the statements of the first wife of the petitioner viz., Smt. Hausila Devi as well as his second wife Smt. Geeta Devi. 6. Disciplinary proceedings taken against the petitioner culminated in a report dated 5.6.2008 being submitted by the Enquiry Officer. 5. It becomes relevant to note here that the Enquiry Officer in the course of those proceedings recorded the statements of the first wife of the petitioner viz., Smt. Hausila Devi as well as his second wife Smt. Geeta Devi. 6. The first wife of the petitioner in these proceedings made a statement that she had been married to the petitioner in 1965 at a time when he was unemployed and that he subsequently married Smt. Geeta Devi in 1978 with her consent. She further submitted that she had no cause for complaint against the petitioner who makes adequate provisions for her livelihood. The second wife of the petitioner also stated that she had been married to the petitioner in 1978 with the consent of his first wife and that out of wedlock she along with the petitioner was looking after a family comprising of 4 children. The Enquiry Officer while returning a finding that the factum of bigamy stood admitted and proved from the statements of persons who had deposed before him found that the petitioner had not obtained any permission of the appropriate authority and accordingly recommended that three annual increments of the petitioner be stopped. 7. After receipt of the aforesaid report and the representation of the petitioner in respect thereof, the respondent No. 2 found that the petitioner had not obtained any permission for contracting the second marriage and that his contention that he had obtained such permission from his Platoon Commandant was not liable to be accepted as he was not the appropriate authority under the relevant rules. He accordingly proceeded to impose the punishment of dismissal upon the petitioner by an order dated 16.10.2008. It is this order, which has been affirmed by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in appeal and revision and are impugned in the present writ petition. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is clearly disproportionate inasmuch as in his entire service of 36 years, he was not found guilty of wrong doing or misconduct. He has submitted that his first marriage had occurred at a time when he was only a minor and was studying in Class XI. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is clearly disproportionate inasmuch as in his entire service of 36 years, he was not found guilty of wrong doing or misconduct. He has submitted that his first marriage had occurred at a time when he was only a minor and was studying in Class XI. He has submitted that the petitioner belonging to a poor family was perhaps got married of in terms of the age old custom of child marriage prevailing in the rural areas of the country. He has submitted that the petitioner was only 14 years of age when he was married to Smt. Hausala Devi and that such a marriage was not liable to be countenanced at all. He would contend that in fact the petitioner contracted the second marriage in 1978 on the proposal and with the consent of his first wife. He therefore submitted that the authorities should have taken a lenient view in the matter. 9. Learned standing counsel opposing the writ petition has however contended that once the factum of bigamy was accepted and admitted to the petitioner, the charge stood fully proved and therefore the respondents rightly dismissed the petitioner from service in the absence of any permission of the appropriate authority. He has submitted that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner, who was a member of the police force, could not be termed as disproportionate in the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the fact that the petitioner was only a minor and 14 years of age when he was married of for the first time in 1965 is not disputed. This fact is an embodiment of the age old curse and malady of child marriages, which unfortunately prevailed at the time in our country. This practice was more prevalent in the rural areas of our country, despite the promulgation of legislation to counter such practices. It is also not disputed by the parties that the first wife of the petitioner appeared in the proceedings and in fact admitted the above and also stated that the petitioner entered into the second marriage with her consent. 11. Be that as it may, from the records it is apparent that the factum of second marriage is admitted to the Petitioner. 11. Be that as it may, from the records it is apparent that the factum of second marriage is admitted to the Petitioner. This is not a case where the so called child marriage stood annulled as provided in law. Insofar as prior permission of the appropriate authority is concerned, the Petitioner failed to prove the same before the Disciplinary Authority. The sole question, therefore, which in the opinion of this Court, falls for consideration would be whether the punishment inflicted upon the Petitioner, is disproportionate to the misdemeanor alleged. 12. On this score, the Petitioner has placed strong reliance upon the judgment rendered by a Learned Single Judge of this Court in Pancham Giri v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (3) ADJ 487 , wherein this Court made the following observations : “To allow a man to peacefully continue to almost complete his journey as a public servant for 28 years and then make him stand at the edge of cliff and and push him over, resting the justification in law as misconduct, has to be observed, to my mind with a tittle diluted but human approach. The reason is his exceptionally long period of service. It is true that passage of time will not reduce the guilt, but the punishment can be proportioned with an approach towards the lesser punishments that are available in the rules itself. The mind has to be applied to find out a reason, in the peculiar facts of a case like the present one as to why the lesser punishments would not be appropriate when they have been provided under the same rules. This takes one to the gravity of the misconduct which in this case became a discovery after 28 years. It is here where one’s sense of mature justice is brought to test. The proportionality of the punishment therefore requires a careful measurement on the scales of reason and justice combined. Merely because it is a serious misconduct, does not necessarily categorise it for the extreme penalty of dismissal. It has to be assessed on its own facts and the nature of the indiscipline. The petitioner has not runaway with somebody’s elses wife so as to bracket the action involving moral turpitude nor has he attempted to shield himself on any such count. His case has been consistent throughout supported by his first wife. It has to be assessed on its own facts and the nature of the indiscipline. The petitioner has not runaway with somebody’s elses wife so as to bracket the action involving moral turpitude nor has he attempted to shield himself on any such count. His case has been consistent throughout supported by his first wife. These factors, which are the other side of the coin have not been assessed by the authorities appropriately which do require a consideration. The conscience of the Court on the above noted principles has been thoroughly disturbed which in my opinion calls upon my “conscious” approach to command the authorities to invoke the principle of proportionality. The petitioner has to live with a disrepute of misconduct but that can be done with a lesser punishment without putting the entire family of the petitioner to peril. That would be unjustly outrageous. To my mind, the said aspect has to be considered in the backdrop of the aforesaid facts. The continuance of the petitioner at the fag end of his career was found detrimental to a disciplined force which may in given circumstances be correct, but in my opinion, the said aspect deserves an examination by the appropriate authority as it strikingly moves the conscience to the extent as to why a lesser major penalty would not serve the purpose. Even though the Rules do not indicate any other penalty like compulsory retirement but the same can be explored by the appropriate authority in the given set of circumstances provided it is permissible under rules. The conduct of the petitioner was an absolute personal affair of the petitioner in relation to the consummation of second marriage and the same had got nothing to do with the affairs of the State or the discharge of his public duty to that extent. The judgment in the case of Amal Kumar Baruah of the Guwahati High Court (supra) comes to the aid of the petitioner.” 13. This submission advanced by the counsel for the Petitioner and the only issue in fact which in the opinion of this Court falls for determination must be considered and approached bearing in mind the parameters of judicial review set for exercise of power upon this Court. This submission advanced by the counsel for the Petitioner and the only issue in fact which in the opinion of this Court falls for determination must be considered and approached bearing in mind the parameters of judicial review set for exercise of power upon this Court. To bear in mind the contours of this exercise, one may usefully refer to what the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India stated in LIC v. S. Vasanthi, (2014) 9 SCC 315 : “10. The scope and power of judicial review of the Courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well-settled. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain, the law on this subject, is recapitulated in the following manner: (SCC pp. 110-12, paras 7-10) “7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instant case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of the charge. The disciplinary authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. A host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist. 8. The order of the appellate authority while having a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not. If the appellate authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which vests with the appellate authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the Court or a tribunal. The Court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts. Such a power which vests with the appellate authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the Court or a tribunal. The Court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts. (See UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad.) In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the Court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the Court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. 9. When the punishment is found to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle of proportionality comes into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with doctrine of Wednesbury rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the Court and the Court is forced to believe that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. This principle of proportionality was propounded by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, in the following words: (AC p. 410 D-E) ‘’... Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads of the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of “proportionality”.’ 10. An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of “proportionality”.’ 10. An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India. Speaking for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) emphasising that ‘’all powers have legal limits’ invokes the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p. 620, para 25) ‘’25. ... The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.’” 11. We are of the opinion that the High Court transgressed its limits of judicial review by itself assuming the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority, which is not permissible in law. The principles discussed above have been summed up and summarised as follows in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh: (SCC p. 382, para 19) “19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court. 19.4. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The Court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 14. Put more pithily, this Court would be compelled to interfere in the quantum of punishment if the same is in outrageous defiance of logic and moral standards. 15. With due deference to what the learned Single Judge came to hold in Pancham Giri (supra), this Court finds that the said judgment came to be cited before a Division Bench of this Court in Pawan Kumar Misra v. State of U.P. and another, (2014) 4 ADJ 612 , when this Court held as follows : “16. In the case of Pancham Giri v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 Indlaw ALL 459 (supra), Hon’ble Single Judge while deciding the writ petition has remanded the matter to the authorities to take a fresh decision on dismissal from service on account of the fact that the delinquent employee was at the verge of retirement. A lenient view was taken by Hon’ble Single Judge keeping the facts and circumstances of the case, which does not seem to be applicable to the present case. 17. A lenient view was taken by Hon’ble Single Judge keeping the facts and circumstances of the case, which does not seem to be applicable to the present case. 17. In the case in hand, the appellant-petitioner had committed an offence of bigamy after enjoying 11 years of matrimonial life. Once the 1956 Rules provides that second marriage by a Government servant during the lifetime of first wife is an offence, and it amounts to misconduct, then it is not open for the Court to take a different view than what has been considered by the disciplinary authority. 18. In the case of Union of India and another v. K.G. Soni, 2006 Indlaw SC 421 (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, Hon’ble Supreme Court in identical situation held that the High Court ordinarily should not interfere in such a matter by exercising power conferred by Article 226; rather it has to look into the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision. For convenience, relevant paras 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced: “3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: Respondent was a Store Attendant in the Bank Note Press, District Dewas (M.P). A charge-sheet was issued against him on the foundation that though he had got married with one Parvathibai in the year 1973, while filling up the attestation form on 16.3.1974, he did not show her name as his wife. It was further alleged that he got married for the second time in October, 1974 with one Ushabai. On the basis of this non-disclosure, which, authorities considered to be a misconduct, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated. It is to be noted that the non-disclosure came to the notice of the authorities when Parvathibai made a complaint about the second marriage. The enquiry was conducted under Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (in short the ‘Rules’). The Enquiry Officer recorded findings in favour of the respondent. The Disciplinary Authority differed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and came to hold that second marriage had in fact been performed and accordingly it issued show-cause notice to the respondent and eventually came to hold that the respondent was guilty of misconduct and imposed the punishment of removal by order dated 2.4.1996. 8. The Disciplinary Authority differed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and came to hold that second marriage had in fact been performed and accordingly it issued show-cause notice to the respondent and eventually came to hold that the respondent was guilty of misconduct and imposed the punishment of removal by order dated 2.4.1996. 8. The High Court was of the view that ordinarily it would have remanded the matter to Tribunal for fresh consideration on merits but it was of the view that this is a fit case where the matter should be remitted to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration with regard to the quantum of punishment. The only basis for coming to the conclusion that the complaint was made by the wife about the alleged second marriage belatedly, and this is not such a misconduct which warrants compulsory retirement before his superannuation. 13. In Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, (1997 [7] SCC 463 :1997 Indlaw SC 587), this Court summed up the position relating to proportionality in paragraphs 31 and 32, which read as follows: “The current position of proportionality in administrative law in England and India can be summarized as follows: (1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether action was not bona fide. The Court would also consider whether the decision absurd or perverse. The Court would however go into the correctness of the made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury (1948 1 KB 223) test. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational \026 in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU (1985 AC 374) principles. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU (1985 AC 374) principles. (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay (1987 AC 514), Brind (1991 (1) AC 696) and Smith (1996 (1) All ER 257) as long as the Convention is not incorporated into English law, the English Courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English Courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (4)(a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the Courts/tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of “proportionality” and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide whether the Courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms under Articles 19, 21 etc. are involved and not for Art. 14.” 14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. are involved and not for Art. 14.” 14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury’s case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decisionmaking process and not the decision.” 19. Keeping the principle emerging from Union of India and another v. K.G. Soni, 2006 Indlaw SC 421 (supra), there appears to be no reason to interfere with the order passed by Hon’ble Single Judge and the disciplinary authority, as held by their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Courts should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court. The department moved ahead to charge the appellant-petitioner in pursuance of complaint submitted by his own first wife and factum of remarriage has not been denied by the appellant-petitioner. Accordingly, the appellant-petitioner has been punished in pursuance to 1956 Rules (supra).superannuation.” 16. Considering a matter arising out of the same U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 this is what the Apex Court held recently in Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of U.P. and others, Civil Appeal No. 1662 of 2015 decided on 9.2.2015 : “9. As regard the charge of misconduct in question, it is patent that there is no material on record to show that the appellant divorced his first wife before the second marriage or he informed the Government about contracting the second marriage. In absence thereof the second marriage is a misconduct under the Conduct Rules. The defence of the appellant that his first marriage had come to an end has been disbelieved by the disciplinary authority and the High Court. In absence thereof the second marriage is a misconduct under the Conduct Rules. The defence of the appellant that his first marriage had come to an end has been disbelieved by the disciplinary authority and the High Court. Learned counsel for the State has pointed out that not only the appellant admitted that his first marriage was continuing when he performed second marriage, first wife of the appellant herself appeared as a witness during the inquiry proceedings and stated that the first marriage was never dissolved. On that basis, the High Court was justified in holding that the finding of proved misconduct did not call for any interference. Learned counsel for the State also submits that the validity of the impugned Conduct Rule is not open to question on the ground that it violated Article 25 of the Constitution in view of the law laid down by this Court in Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India[1]. He further submitted that the High Court was justified in holding that the punishment of removal could not be held to be shockingly disproportionate to the charge and did not call for any interference. 10. We have given due consideration to the rival submissions. We are of the view that no interference is called for by this Court in the matter.” 17. Bearing in mind the above, this Court finds itself unable to accept the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. The bane of child marriage has been sought to be removed by our country for centuries. Legislation to end this cursed custom was enacted as far back as 1929 in the form of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 and subsequently replaced by the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The custom not only amounts to child abuse, it deprives the girl child of basic human rights. A member of the police force is charged with the duty of maintaining the law, upholding the standards of a civil society. The punishment, viewed in light of the above facts, does not shock the conscience of this Court warranting substitution of the choice made by the administrator. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. ——————