JUDGMENT : Sandeep Mehta, J. The instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner establishment challenging the legality and validity of the order Annexure-3 dated 2/5.1.2009 passed by Assistant PF. Commissioner, Employees Provident Fund Organisation, Udaipur under Section 7A of the Employees Provident Fund & Misc. Provision Act, 1952 (in short hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1952) and the order Annexure-5 dated 4/13.3.2009 passed under Section 7B of the Act of 1952 by the Regional P.F. Commissioner, Employees Provident Fund Organisation, Udaipur. 2. Facts in brief are that the respondent no. 3 a former employee of the petitioner establishment submitted an application before the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (hereinafter referred to as the EPFO) for the recovery of his alleged P.F. dues from the petitioner. The Assistant Commissioner, EPFO replied to the said application vide letter Annexure-2 dated 2.5.2008 conveying that upon enquiry, the wages/salary of the employee was found to be Rs. 7600/- which was above the statutory wage limit of Rs. 6500/- per month. No deduction was made by the employer from his salary towards the RF. contribution. Thus the enquiry officer noted that the employee was not entitled to claim benefits under the provisions of the Act of 1952 and the Scheme framed thereunder. The relevant portion of the order Annexure-2 is quoted below for the sake of ready reference :- ^^1- laLFkku ds okf"kZd [kkrs o"kZ 2005&06 rd tkjh gSa ftlesa va'knku djus okyksa esa vkidk uke ugha ik;k x;kA 2- izoZru vf/kdkjh us laLFkku ds gkftjh ,oa osru jftLVj ,oa okmpj esa o"kZ 2003&04 esa vkidk uke ugha ik;kA o"kZ 2004&05 ds jftLVj dksVZ ds vf/kxzg.k esa gksuk crk;k gSA 3- o"kZ 2005&06 ¼flrEcj] 2006½ rd vkidk uke ugha ik;k x;k ijUrq vkidh osru 7]600@& :i;s ikbZ xbZ ftl ij dksbZ Hkfo"; fuf/k dVkSrh ugha ikbZ xbZ gSA Hkfo"; fuf/k dh lnL;rk ds ik= 6]500@& :i;s ekfld osru okys gh gksrs gSaA** 3. The employee respondent no. 3 was not satisfied with the reply Annexure-2 and thus he persisted with his grievance and accordingly proceedings under Section 7A of the Act of 1952 were undertaken before the Assistant Commissioner, EPFO, Udaipur. The proceedings culminated by way of the assessment order Annexure-3, dated 2/5.1.2009 being passed against the petitioner whereby a sum of Rs. 27,801/- was determined as payable by way of E.RF. dues to the respondent no. The proceedings culminated by way of the assessment order Annexure-3, dated 2/5.1.2009 being passed against the petitioner whereby a sum of Rs. 27,801/- was determined as payable by way of E.RF. dues to the respondent no. 3 for the period between May, 2005 to September, 2006. The petitioner institution was also directed to award PF membership to the employee respondent no. 3. The petitioner establishment assailed the validity of the said assessment order by filing a review petition before the Assistant Commissioner on 30.1.2009. The review petition was dismissed by order Annexure -5 dated 4/13.3.2009. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has approached his Court by way of the instant writ petition assailing the legality and validity of the order Annexure- 3 dated 2/5.1.2009 and the order Annexure-5 dated 4/13.3.2009. 4. Mr. Samdariya, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent no. 3 was not entitled to claim benefits under the Employees Provident Fund Scheme of 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Scheme of 1952) because he fell within the category of an ‘excluded employee’ as defined in Para 2(f)(ii) of the Scheme of 1952. He submitted that during his undisputed period of engagement with the petitioner establishment, the respondent was drawing pay of Rs. 7600/- per month which was in excess of the statutory limit of Rs. 6500/- provided under Para 2(f)(ii) of the Scheme of 1952. He thus urged that the respondent no.3 was not entitled to claim benefit of Provident Fund admissible to the employees under the provisions of the Scheme of 1952. Schedule-A has been annexed with the writ petition setting out details of the monthly salary drawn by the employee respondent no.3 during his engagement with the petitioner establishment. As per the Schedule, the respondent no. 3 worked in the petitioner establishment between May, 2005 to September, 2006. he was paid salary @ Rs. 7600/- per month till May, 2005. He remained absent during the months of June and July, 2006 and in the month of August and September, 2006 he was paid salary @ Rs. 7700/- per month. He left the establishment in September, 2006 after having met with an accident. As per the Schedule, no P.F. was deducted from the salary of the respondent during the period he worked with the petitioner establishment. Learned Counsel thus urged that the order passed by the Commissioner whereby the petitioner was directed to make payment of Rs. 7700/- per month. He left the establishment in September, 2006 after having met with an accident. As per the Schedule, no P.F. was deducted from the salary of the respondent during the period he worked with the petitioner establishment. Learned Counsel thus urged that the order passed by the Commissioner whereby the petitioner was directed to make payment of Rs. 27,801/- to the respondent employee and also to award RF. membership to him w.e.f. January, 2005 is grossly illegal and arbitrary and without jurisdiction. Learned counsel referred to page no. 2 of the assessment order wherein the Assessing Authority itself recorded that the employee's salary during the period between May, 2005 to September, 2006 was over and above the statutory limit. He contended that the claim made by the employee respondent no. 3 that he was working in the establishment since the year 2003 was rejected by the Assessing Authority but thereafter without dealing with the specific legal objection raised on behalf of the institution that the employee's salary was above the statutory limit and thus he fell within the category of excluded employee, the Assessing Authority passed the impugned assessment order against the petitioner and as such the order is arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. Learned counsel further submitted that the order Annexure-5 whereby the review application of the petitioner was dismissed is also totally illegal and arbitrary on the face of record. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Para 2(f) (ii) of the Scheme of 1952 and urged that as the respondent employee was drawing salary in excess of Rs. 6500/- for the period between May, 2005 to September, 2006 he was barred from becoming a member of the fund. Thus, the Assistant Commissioner, EPFO was not having any jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the respondent employee. He urged that the order Annexure-3 suffers from an error apparent on the face of record because by the said order the respondent employee who fell in the excluded category was directed to be inducted as a member of the provident fund and further, the petitioner was directed to make payment of P.F. to the employee forthe said period even though no P.F. was actually deducted from his salary by the petitioner employer. 6. In response to the preliminary objection raised by Mr. 6. In response to the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Ravi Bhansali, learned counsel for the respondent regarding the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of appeal, Mr. Samdariya contended that as the order passed by the Additional Commissioner is patently without jurisdiction, the petitioner is entitled to challenge the same by taking recourse to the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court without resorting to the remedy of appeal available under the Act. He placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks reported in (1998) 8 SCC I wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that alternative remedy is no bar in entertaining a writ petition where the issue of jurisdiction is raised. He further urged that the writ petition has already been admitted and the ad interim stay order passed in favour of the petitioner establishment was confirmed by this Court after hearing both the parties and thus it would be desirable to decide the writ petition on merits rather than relegating the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal at this belated stage. In support of the aforesaid proposition, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions:- 1. Ram Kishore Pareek v. Rajasthan Legislative Assembly & Ors. reported in 2001 (3) WLC (Raj.) 358. 2. Firdosh Khan v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2000 (3) WLC (Raj.) 358. 7. Attacking the impugned orders on merits, he contended that the statute has to be interpreted strictly and there is no reason to give liberal interpretation simply because the statute is a benevolent piece of legislation, he contended that as the Para 2(f)(ii) of the scheme covers a specific category of employees, it cannot be expanded to include such employees who are excluded from the operation of the statute by an express exclusion clause. Giving expansive interpretation by bringing within the purview of the term 'employee", those persons who are expressly excluded from the application of law would amount to committing violence with the express language of statute and would render the statute redundant and otiose. He relied upon the following decisions and contended that Para 2(i)(ii) of the Scheme is required to be interpreted in its literal terms and cannot be distorted by giving it a liberal interpretation. 1. He relied upon the following decisions and contended that Para 2(i)(ii) of the Scheme is required to be interpreted in its literal terms and cannot be distorted by giving it a liberal interpretation. 1. Union of India v. Alok Kumar reported in (2008) 5 SCC 349. 2. Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma reported in (2013) 11 SCC 451 . 3. Holani Auto Links (Pvt.) Limited v. State of M.P reported in (2008) 13 SCC 185 . 4. State of Kerala v. B.S. Six Holidays reported in (2010) 5 SCC 186 . 8. He contended that as the legislature has expressly excluded the employees drawing salary/pay above the statutory limit of Rs. 6500/- per month from the operation of the Act, the respondent no. 3 who was undisputedly drawing salary of Rs. 7600/- and above for his entire period of engagement with the petitioner was neither entitled to the membership of the Provident Fund nor could he claim the benefit of E.P.F. Scheme. For this precise reason, he was not granted P.F. membership and no deduction was made from his salary towards the employee's contribution in the E.P.F. Scheme. Learned Counsel further contended that despite availability of ample opportunities, respondent chose not to file any reply to the writ petition and thus the petitioner's case remains uncontroverted and uncontested on facts as well as on law and therefore, the writ petition deserves to be accepted and the impugned orders deserve to be set aside. 9. Per contra Mr. Ravi Bhansali assisted by Mr. Sidharth Tatia vehemently contended that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. A preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of writ petition was raised on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of appeal under Section 7(i) of the Act of 1952. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the decision of M.P High Court in the case of M.P. Electricity Board v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner reported in 2004 (1) MPLJ-168. They further urged that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands. The best evidence available with the petitioner establishment being the salary certificate of the respondent employee was deliberately not placed on record. They further urged that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands. The best evidence available with the petitioner establishment being the salary certificate of the respondent employee was deliberately not placed on record. Thus, as per them the writ petition suffers from the vice of concealment of material acts from the Court and it deserves to be dismissed in light of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. The Administrative Officer & Ors. reported in (2010) 2 SCC-114. It was contended that since the petitioner establishment failed to produce the service record of the respondent no. 3 workman before the Assisting Authority, adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the employer petitioner in support of this contention, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Mahak Singh reported in AIR 2007 SC 1570. On the strength of these submissions, it was prayed on behalf of the employee that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 10. I have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the material on record and the decisions cited at the bar. 11. The first consideration which this Court has to make is regarding the plea of non maintainability of the writ petition on ground of efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner by way of appeal under Section 7(i) of the Act of 1952. The question posed before this Court is as to when the order passed by the authority is challenged on ground of patent lack of so jurisdiction, whether the availability of alternative remedy bars this Court's jurisdiction from entertaining the writ petition. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (supra) held that alternative remedy is no bar in entertaining the petition where the issue of jurisdiction is raised before the Court. It cannot be gainsaid that the issue of jurisdiction is the primary ground canvassed on behalf of the petitioner for assailing the impugned order. Thus, the availability of alternative remedy can in no way be treated as a bar against entertaining the instant writ petition. That apart, the writ petition was admitted way back in the year 2009 and an exparte interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner. Thus, the availability of alternative remedy can in no way be treated as a bar against entertaining the instant writ petition. That apart, the writ petition was admitted way back in the year 2009 and an exparte interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner. The interim stay passed by the Court was affirmed on 5.9.2011 after hearing both the parties. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that it would be absolutely unreasonable to throw the writ petition out at this stage on the ground of alternative remedy Consequently, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent no. 3 regarding non maintainability of the writ petition is unacceptable and is turned down. 13. Now, coming to the main contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order are without jurisdiction. The relevant provision i.e. Para 2(f) (ii) of the Scheme of 1952 which has a material bearing on the controversy is quoted hereinbelow for ready reference :- "2(i)(ii) : "Excluded employee" means (i) NA (ii) Any employee whose pay at the time he is otherwise entitled to become member of fund exceeds six thousand five hundred per month. 14. It is clear that the provision specifically and expressly excludes from the operation of the Act an employee otherwise entitled to become a member of the fund in case his pay exceeds Rs. 6500/- per month. The letter Annexure-2 which is not denied by the respondent no. 3 employee clearly reflects that he was drawing pay of Rs. 7600/- between 2005 to 2006 during the period of his engagement with the petitioner. The said letter was issued by the Assistant Commissioner, EPFO to the respondent employee on 2.5.2008 in pursuance of an enquiry held to investigate the employee's grievances. The respondent did not raise any issue challenge the said letter before the Assisting Authority. It is relevant to mention here that in the Application Annexure-1 submitted by the employee respondent no. 3 before the Assistant Commissioner, EPFO, he conveniently omitted to mention the figure of salary drawn by him while in the engagement of the petitioner. Thus it is undisputedly a case of respondent no. 3 employee concealing material facts and not other way round as is argued by Mr. Ravi Bhansali, the counsel for the respondent. 3 before the Assistant Commissioner, EPFO, he conveniently omitted to mention the figure of salary drawn by him while in the engagement of the petitioner. Thus it is undisputedly a case of respondent no. 3 employee concealing material facts and not other way round as is argued by Mr. Ravi Bhansali, the counsel for the respondent. Obviously the respondent kept silent regarding the pay which he was drawing because had be admitted that he was drawing a salary in excess of Rs. 6500/- per month, then undisputedly, his claim application would have been discarded outright. The plea that the petitioner concealed material facts by not placing on record the salary certificates of the respondent no. 3 is untenable on the face of the record because the Assessing Authority whilst passing the impugned order Annexure-3 has recorded a finding based on the record that the employee was drawing pay over and above the statutory limit. The Assistant Commissioner while passing the impugned order Annexure-3 observed as below: "The Squad of EOs was deputed to examine the complaint and worked so out the dues. The Squad gone through the record of the Estt. and submitted its report in which the Squad certified the employment of the complain from 05/2005 to 09/2006 on the wage, over and above statutory unit." 15. Thus it is evident that upon verification of the petitioner's record, the squad of the department certified that the wages of the complainant were over and above the statutory limit. The respondent no.3 has not challenged this finding of the Assessing Authority. In the opinion of this Court, the moment his report was submitted to the Assistant Commissioner, the proceedings should have been dropped for the simple reason that the applicant was covered by the definition of an excluded employee as per Clause 2(f)(ii) and was not entitled to the benefits of the Act and the Scheme. However, the Assistant Commissioner adopted a strange methodology and awarded P.F. membership benefits to the respondent to the extent of statutory limit i.e. by trimming and down sizing the pay and treating his salary as being is below Rs. 6500/- per month for giving the benefit of RF. scheme to him. There is no provision in the Act by which such an exercise is permissible. 6500/- per month for giving the benefit of RF. scheme to him. There is no provision in the Act by which such an exercise is permissible. Even, though the Act is a benevolent piece of legislation, yet the legislature thought it fit to exclude the category of employees drawing pay above Rs. 6500/- p.m. from the application of the Act. Obviously the Commissioner was not authorised to split the pay and award P.F. benefits for the sum of Rs. 6500/- and exclude the remaining amount of the salary of the respondent no. 3 by splitting the salary in two parts. The procedure adopted by the Assistant Commissioner is highly unjust and unreasonable. Analogy for reaching to this conclusion can be drawn from Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The said provision provides a cap regarding the victim's annual income when a claim seeking compensation on the structured formula basis is preferred. The legislation specifically provided that annual income of Rs. 40,000/- will be treated to be a cap for entertaining the claims under the said provision on structured formula basis. It would be impermissible for the court to entertain a claim filed by or on behalf of any person whose annual income would be in excess of the said figure by splitting the income and awarding a structured formula compensation treating the victim's income to be within the statutory limit by excluding the excess amount. The provision was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in 2004(1) WLC (SC) Civil 598 : AIR 2004 SC 2107 as below:- "We, therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala (supra) has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala (supra) that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163-A, the annual income of Rs. 40,000/- per annual shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is upto Rs. 40,000/- can take the benefit thereof. 40,000/- per annual shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is upto Rs. 40,000/- can take the benefit thereof. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act." (emphasis supplied) Thus, even in a benevolent piece of legislation, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that claims under Section 163A for seeking compensation under the structured formula could be entertained only when the victim was carrying Rs. 40,000/- per annum. 16. As an upshot of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion so that in view of the undisputed fact that the respondent was drawing salary in excess of Rs. 6500/- per month, he fell within the category of an excluded employee as provided in Para 2(f)(ii) of the Scheme of 1952 and was not entitled to claim any benefit under the Act of 1952. 17. As a consequence, the Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain the application preferred by the respondent employee and pass an Assessment order thereupon. The impugned orders Annexure-3 dated 2/5.1.2009 and Annexure-5 dated 4/13.3.2009 are totally without jurisdiction and deserve to be quashed. 18. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders Annexure-3 dated 2/5.1/2009 and Annexure-5 dated 4/13.3.2009 are hereby quashed. No order as to costs. Writ petition allowed - Impugned order quashed.