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2015 DIGILAW 475 (ORI)

Adikanda Swain v. Debaraj Mishra

2015-08-13

D.DASH

body2015
JUDGMENT The appellant in this appeal has called in question, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhanjanagar in RFA No. 16 of 2003. In the said appeal, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bhanjanagar in T.S. No. 45 of 2001 have been set aside. The trial Court had dismissed the suit and counter claim. The lower appellate Court has decreed the suit declaring that the plaintiff has legal right to use the land under plot no. 834/2317 adjoining to his house standing over the land under plot no. 2341; further declaring that defendant no. 1 has no right to block the same by making any construction in any manner. Mandatory injunction has also been issued directing the defendant no. 1 to demolish and remove the construction made by him over the suit plot and on failure, the plaintiff is given the liberty to get it done through the process of law. The defendant no. 1 has also been restrained from making any further construction over the suit plot. 2. For the sake of convenience, ill order to avoid confusion and bring in clarity, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the Court below. 3. The plaintiffs case is that the suit land under plot no. 834/2317 under Khata No. 409 stands recorded in the name of State under Rakhita Khata. It measures an area of AC. 0.25 decimals. It is further claimed by the plaintiff that he was in unauthorized occupation of the said land since the year 1983 as can be seen from the ROR of the year 1983 i.e. Ext. 1. Further case of the plaintiff is that his own homestead land is situated to the adjacent west of the suit plot and that he had purchased in the 1971 from one Dandapani Rout for valuable consideration. When he purchased the land, it was 12 cubits X 100 cubits in size. Subsequently, the plaintiff purchased the land in the name of his wife which measures 5.1/2 cubits X 100 cubits adjoining his said purchased land by registered sale-deed of the year 1976 for valuable consideration. According to the case of the plaintiff to the east of the suit plot/ land there lies the PWD road and disputed suit plot is thus situated in between his house and PWD road. According to the case of the plaintiff to the east of the suit plot/ land there lies the PWD road and disputed suit plot is thus situated in between his house and PWD road. So, he claims to have right to enjoy the suit plot from every corner of his own land to go to the road. The plaintiff claims to be in peaceful, continuous and open enjoyment of the suit land since 1971 and only in the year 1997 defendant no. 1 forcibly laid foundation over the same putting up permanent structure and it is just in front of his house. Plaintiff states that defendant no. 1 has no manner of right, title, interest and possession over the suit land and in case he makes the construction over there, the plaintiff would be put to immense difficulty in using his own land as well as suit land so as pass over it to approach and go over to the PWD road. The plaintiff, therefore, prayed for declaration of his legal status to use the suit plot adjoining to homestead plot no. 2341 as such for having access to the road from his house plot and that the defendant no. 1 or his successors to have no right to block the land under plot no. 834/2417 by making any sort of construction as he has no right to do so by infringing the right of the plaintiff and cause deprivation to him by not allowing him to exercise such right. 4. The defendant no. 1 challenged the sale-deeds in favour of the plaintiff to be void. He further stated that he had been possessing the suit land since long as the same adjoins his land under plot no. 836/2341. That the suit land is a Government land over which the plaintiff has no authority. The defendant no. 1 claims with the land under plot no. 836/2341 which is adjacent to the suit land belongs to him and he is the owner thereof. He asserts to have constructed a thatched house over the suit plot, which invited initiation of an Encroachment Proceeding against him. He states that the claim of the defendants over the suit land is only to grab the same. 836/2341 which is adjacent to the suit land belongs to him and he is the owner thereof. He asserts to have constructed a thatched house over the suit plot, which invited initiation of an Encroachment Proceeding against him. He states that the claim of the defendants over the suit land is only to grab the same. In the written statement, be made a counter claim with the prayer to declare that the registered sale-deed of the plaintiff of the year 1971 as null and void and to issue mandatory injunction against the plaintiff not to put up further construction and to remove and demolish the construction made by encroaching land of defendant no. 1 under plot no. 836/2341 with further prayer for recovery of possession. 5.The trial Court on such rival pleadings framed as many as twelve issues. Having taken up all those issues together for decision ultimately the suit as well as counter claim were dismissed. The lower appellate Court having decreed the suit as stated in detail in the above first paragraph, the present appeal has come to be filed. 6.The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law:- (i) Whether the lower appellate Court is justified in law in granting the reliefs as prayed for by the plaintiff as regards his right of user of the suit land and the mandatory injunction, when the provision of Section 41 (j) of the Specific Relief Act mandates that the injunction cannot be granted when the plaintiff has no personal interest over the subject matter in the manner? (ii) Whether so far as the suit land is concerned in view of its peculiar situation in between the road and the land of the plaintiff where his house stands, the lower appellate Court is right in negating the claim of the defendant no. 1 and that it has erred in law by ignoring the defendant no. 1’s long possession of the suit land by putting up construction and if over such land the claim of acquisition of title by’ adverse possession is sustainable in the eye of law? 7. 1 and that it has erred in law by ignoring the defendant no. 1’s long possession of the suit land by putting up construction and if over such land the claim of acquisition of title by’ adverse possession is sustainable in the eye of law? 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that when the plaintiff has absolutely no right, title and interest over the suit land, and when his possession is also disputed, the lower appellate Court ought not to have decreed the suit for the reliefs as granted which offends the provisions of Section 41 (j) of the Specific Relief Act. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 on the other hand supports the lower appellate Court’s judgment in saying that the plaintiff has got his right of user over the suit land, specifically the right of access to the main public road from his house site. Learned counsel for the State (Respondent no. 2 and 3), fairly submits that neither the plaintiff nor defendant no. 1. have any right to cause any sort of obstruction over the land in suit and it has to remain vacant for user by the parties as well as others to come over the public road. It is his further contention that it being a road side land and earmarked as such has to remain vacant and none can claim title by way of adverse possession. According to him, said doctrine has no applicability to such nature of land and with such rights of abutting land owners in having access to the road from their lands. 8. It may be stated that the defendant no. 1 did not challenge the dismissal of his counter claim as ordered by the trial Court and now he is challenging the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court granting the above reliefs to the plaintiff. The admitted position is that the land under suit plot bearing no. 834 / 2317 measures an area of Ac. 0.25 decimals and it stands under Government of Rakhita Khata no. 409 by the side of the RD road and adjoining thereto. So, this suit land under the above plot on one hand- adjoins the public road and also adjoins land of the plaintiff on the other end. So, it is a road side land belonging to the State. 0.25 decimals and it stands under Government of Rakhita Khata no. 409 by the side of the RD road and adjoining thereto. So, this suit land under the above plot on one hand- adjoins the public road and also adjoins land of the plaintiff on the other end. So, it is a road side land belonging to the State. At this stage, it is felt apt and proper to first of all ascertain the nature of the land in view of its peculiar situation vis-a-vis the rights exercisable over it. 9. “A road is a highway for the passage of all the members of the public. The public have a right of passing and repassing thereon and can exercise that right in a reasonable way without transgressing the usual mode in which such right in normally exercised (Smith’s Leading Cases) Vol. II, 13th Edn., page 166). A road is also meant to provide access to and from the tenements which abut on it on either side. For the purposes of this case, it is this latter right that has to be considered. That right has been generally laid down in the following terms:- An owner of lands adjoining a highway is entitled to access to the highway at all points where- his land adjoins the highway, whether or not the soil of the highway be his. (Smith’s leading cases, Vol-II, is« Edn., page 172).” This right of immediate access from private property to a public highway is a private property to a public highway is a private right distinct from the right of the owner of that property to use the highway as one of the public, as has been pointed out in “William Lyon v. The Wardens- & Co., of the Fish Mongers Co., etc.” (1875-76 AC 662), a case relating to the rights of an owner of a wharf on the bank of a navigable river which in this respect are the same as those of an owner of land abutting a public highway. Such a right of access belongs to the proprietor of the adjoining land as a natural incident to the right to the soil itself of such adjoining lands and he is entitled to the benefit of it as he is to all the other natural advantages belonging to the land of which he is the owner (page 674 of the report of above mentioned case). In Marshall v. Mayor Aldermen and Burgesses of the County Borough of Blackpool ; (1935 AC 16 (22)), the House of Lords has explained that right in the following terms:- The owner of the land adjoining a highway has a right of access to the highway from any part of his premises. This is so whether he or his predecessors originally dedicated the highway or part of it and whether he is entitled to the whole or some interest in the ground subjacent to the highway or not. The rights of the public to pass along the highway are subject to the right of access just as the right of access is subject to this rights of the public and must be exercised subject to the general obligation as to nuisance and the like imposed upon a person using the highway. Apart from any statutory provision, there is no obligation upon an adjoining owner to fence his property from the highway. This right of access has also been recognized in the Indian law as appears from the following decisions: (i) Dwarka Prasad v. Patna M.C; AIR 1938 Patna 423. (ii) Municipal Committee, Delhi v. Md. Ibrahim; AIR 1935 Lahore 196 . (iii) Patna Municipality v. Dwaraka Prasad; AIR 1939 Patna 683. In the above noted decisions under item no. (i) and [ii], this right has been referred to as a right of road frontage and it has been said:- The right of road frontage no less than the right of access is implicit in the position of land. It is unnecessary to discuss for the purpose of this case whether the right of frontage is or is not wider than the right of access and whether such right also arises with reference to the position of the land. There can, however, be no doubt that the owner of the abutting land has an, actionable right if his right of access to the frontage is infringed. There can, however, be no doubt that the owner of the abutting land has an, actionable right if his right of access to the frontage is infringed. But as has been laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bell v. Corporation of Quebeck; 1879-80 AC 84 (100). Whether an obstruction amounts to an interference with the access to frontage would be a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case. It is also well settled that while the abutting owner has the right of access it is not in the case of every interference with such a right that is actionable that he is entitled to obtain a remedy by way of injunction. In Sellor v. Local Board of the Health for Matlock Bath, the plaintiff who was an abutting owner claimed injunction in respect of two matter: (1) the erection and continuance of a public urinal adjacent to his property and alleged to be a nuisance; (2) the placing and continuing of kerb stones in front of plaintiff's property so as to prevent her access by carriages to that property. An injunction was granted in respect of the first but was refused with reference to the second with the following observations:- As to the rest of the plaintiff’s claim, I think it is much less substantial. Besides the triangular •piece of land, she has some land and buildings abutting upon the same high road consisting of’ an inn and some stables. These stand back from the road and in front of them is a space which has been left open to, and on a level with the road until recently when the defendants made a foot-path on the road outside the plaintiff's land with raised kerb stones, but left openings so that carriage can still go in from, and out into the road, but not at every part of the boundary as heretofore. The plaintiff contended that this was interference with her right to have access for all purposes to other portion of the highway adjoining her property. The plaintiff contended that this was interference with her right to have access for all purposes to other portion of the highway adjoining her property. ********* I think it cannot be contended that wherever any person has land adjoining the road which has remained undistinguished from the road, he can as a matter of course restrain the local authorities from making raised foot-path for the accommodation of the public on a part of the road, which is vested in them merely because by so doing they may render it impossible, for the time, for the owner of the land to draw up a carriage close to the exact boundary of his land or to enter his land at every inch of the boundary. ********* I am of opinion that this is a case in which the land-owner’s remedy at all events in the absence of any unreasonable conduct on the part of the local authority, is to claim compensation. In 1901 A.C. 329, the owner of an abutting premises brought an action for injunction to restrain a local authority from putting certain lamp-posts in the road near their premises on the ground that in interfered with and obstructed the business they were carrying on these premises. The Court in dismissing the action said :- The plaintiff set up a right to have a particular portion of the highway so kept that they shall be in a position to exercise an alleged right of using it to them maximum of their own convenience. It does not seem to me that they have any such right. 10. In the light of above, it has been held in case of Chairman, District Board, Puri Vrs. C.H. Achaya; 1950 ILR (Cuttack) at page 608 that :- “An abutting owner of a road including therein the roadside lands, which form part of the road has the undoubted right of access to the road from all points of his property but the right cannot be construed as entitling him to insist upon leaving the road absolutely free from any other kind of use than for mere passing and re-passing of the members of the public. If such a use is otherwise reasonable and is within the scope of the purpose of the Local Self-Government Act, an abutting owner has been substantially interfered with and whether that is so or not is a question of fact to be determined having regard to all the circumstances of the case. It appears to me also that on a question whether any particular use of the roadside land amounts to a substantial interference with the right of access of an abutting private owner, the fact that it is a roadside land and not the regular road carrying the traffic may conceivably make a difference on a consideration of the question as one of fact, and on the question whether there has been any unreasonable conduct on the part of the local authority and whether, in any case, the abutting owner is entitled to an injunction for the removal of the interference or obstruction.” 11. It has been held in case of Girish Chandra Sahu and Others Vrs. Nagendranath Mitra and Others; 46 (1978) CLT 52 as under:- “The owner of land adjoining a highway has a right of access to the highway from any part of his premises. This is so whether he or his predecessors originally dedicated the highway or part of it and whether he is entitled to the whole or some interest in the ground subjacent to the highway or not. The rights of the public to pass along the highway are subject to this right of access just as the right of access is subject to the rights of the public and must be exercised subject to the general obligations as to nuisance and the like impose upon a person using the highway. Apart from any statutory provision, there is no obligation upon an adjoining owner to fence his property from the highway. Apart from any statutory provision, there is no obligation upon an adjoining owner to fence his property from the highway. 12.The availability of such a right was also extended to the occupier of a land adjoining the highway, in Manbhum District Board v. Bengal Nagpur Railway Co., AIR 1945 Patna 200, where it was pointed out that the right of access to the highway at all points where a land adjoins the highway at all points belongs not only to the owner of the land, but also to the occupier and the occupier can sue for removal of obstruction interrupting his right of access to the highway and the fact that the owner or occupier of the adjacent land had fenced it off or raised a wall for his convenience or opened a gateway on the other side cannot affect his right of access to the highway. 13. It would also be relevant in this connection to refer to Mackenzie’s law of Highways; Twenty-first Edition at page -55 where it is stated as follows: “The owner of land adjoining a highway has a right of access to the highway from any part of his premises. This is so whether he or his predecessors originally dedicated the highway or part of it and whether he is entitled to the whole or some interest in the ground subjacent to the highway or not The right of the owner of land adjoining a highway to access to or from the highway from or to any part of his land is a private right, distinct from the right to use the highway as one of the public, and the owner of the land whose access to the highway is obstructed may maintain, an action for the injury, whether the obstruction does or does not also constitute a public nuisance” Relying upon the aforesaid passage, in Damodara Naidu v. Thirupurasundari. Ammal, (1972) 2 Mad LJ 4: AIR 1972 Mad 386 , Raghavan, J., held that where there is a public highway, the owners of land adjoining the highway have a right to .go upon the highway from any point on their land; and if that right is obstructed by anyone, the owner of the land abutting the highway is entitled to maintain an action for the injury, whether the obstruction does or does not constitute a public nuisance. To similar effect is the decision in Ganapathi Mudaliar v. Ponnusami Koundar, (1970) 2 Mad W 295 where it was pointed out that an obstruction caused to the right of access to and from the dwelling house could cause damage directly to the occupiers of houses and a suit could be maintained for the invasion or interference of that right and such a suit will lie without proof of special damage or even without sanction under Section 91, Civil Procedure Code. 14.The same is also position as held in case of Bala Din Yadav and Another Vrs. Ramdulare and Others; AIR 1990 Allahabad page 19. “Whether the plaintiff had an undoubted right of frontage to enable him to have access to the public road which access stood denied to him in consequences of the tin shed and other structures constructed by the defendant on the ‘Patri’ intervening between public road and plaintiff's house which indisputably vested in the Public Works Department, it was held that such structures were liable to be removed. The defendant could have no right or claim to make any permanent structure over the land vesting in the P.W.D. the plaintiff had a right to access to the public road by virtue of the fact that his house abuts on the road ‘patri’ adjoining the public road and therefore, any obstruction created by raising structures over the ‘patri’ in front of the plaintiffs house will indisputably have the effect of depriving him of access to the public road. In such a case, the principle which is applicable to the right of the owners of the properties immediately abutting on public road to have free access to the same and to enjoy right of frontage in equally applicable even to a case where the obstruction is caused to free access to a public road by making constructions over the road side patri abutting the house of person claiming that right. For, whether the house of person claiming that right. For, whether the house of the plaintiff immediately abuts the public road or the road side patri, the affect of such structure will be inevitably to deprive the plaintiff of the right of free access to public road even in such cases. And this access must be available from every point of the plaintiffs house facing the public road”. In case of Sangam Madhavaram and Another Vrs. And this access must be available from every point of the plaintiffs house facing the public road”. In case of Sangam Madhavaram and Another Vrs. Rola Sundaram and Others; AIR 1987 Madras page 183. “It has been held that the owner of land abutting road is entitled to access to it from every point on the boundary land is entitled to enforce his right notwithstanding the fact that there is some space available between the offending constructions. Offending constructions would constitute a continuing wrong. Therefore, the suit filed for its demolition is maintainable.” 15.Thus comes the answer as to what is nature of right that is available to the plaintiff in respect of the suit land which situates in between the house site and the public road. It is only to use as such for passing and repassing in order to go to the road and come from the road. The true owner is thus burdened with such liability in the matter of exercise of all his rights of ownership and from those bundle of rights which an owner possesses in constituting title, this right remaining with the abutting land owner falls short being enjoyed by the abutting. land owner with the true owner. It must be remembered that this specific right subtracted from the bundle of rights constituting ownership and title of one property cannot get attached to the ownership of another property which is not situated in that way and that therefore remains as the natural right. An easement, therefore, must be distinguished from natural right. The latter as their name imports are those incidents and advantages which are provided by the nature for the use and enjoyment of a person’s property. This right thus, in my view is a part of the ownership rights only to that extent of passing and repassing over that piece of land so peculiarly situated. The right of access over a piece of land available to a person to enter upon the public road from his own land is simply because of the peculiar situation of his own land that is just beyond the road and the contiguous land appertaining to the road. Such right is not available to any other owner of the land whose land does not adjoin the land lying in between the road and their land. 16. Such right is not available to any other owner of the land whose land does not adjoin the land lying in between the road and their land. 16. It is, in the light of above principle and view that the claim of the plaintiff as also the claim of the defendant no. 1 have to be considered in answering the substantial questions of law and simultaneously to decide the pregnability of the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. The above discussion thus leads to hold that the plaintiff has the natural right over the suit land which adjoins the road and his house site to have the access to the public road. So any infringement to the same by any person is not tolerable and its a continuing wrong. Therefore, such obstructer can very well be injuncted by issuance of mandatory injunction for removal of obstruction over that piece of land situated stretching over the frontage of the own land of the plaintiff up-till the public road. Also such an order of injunction for not causing further any such obstruction in future in any manner so as to deprive the plaintiff in exercising such right of user only to the extent as indicated is squarely allowable in law. In that view of the matter, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that provision of Section 41 (j) of the Specific Relief Act in the particular case stand on the way of grant of relief of an injuction as prayed for and granted, falls flat. The answer to that specific question of law is hereby accordingly, rendered. 17. At this stage, I feel to make further elaboration concerning claim of such abutting land owners as also others over such type of land which situates by the side of the public road belonging to State or local authority and in front of the owner land of those persons i.e. in between the road and private land of private land owners which refers to the next substantial question of law. Whether they can perfect their title over said land by virtue of open, peaceful, continuous possession for upwards of the period prescribed and whether their possession can at all be said in the eye of law to be adverse possession for they if can be so termed as adverse possessor. Whether they can perfect their title over said land by virtue of open, peaceful, continuous possession for upwards of the period prescribed and whether their possession can at all be said in the eye of law to be adverse possession for they if can be so termed as adverse possessor. Precisely, the question that vexes is as to if in so far as such nature of lands are concerned, whether the doctrine of adverse possession can come into play safely and successfully to the aid of such possessors. 18. It is the settled position of law that:- “Every possession is not in law adverse possession. A person though having no right to enter into possession of the property of someone else, does so and continues in possession setting up title in himself and adversely to the title of the owner commences prescribing title into himself and such possession having continued for upward of the required period of years, he acquires title, not only on his own, but on account of default or inaction on the part of the real owner stretching for the period of required years resulting into extinction of latter’s title. It is that extinguished title of the real owner which comes to vest in the wrong doer. Law does not intent to confer any premium on the wrong doing of a person in wrongful possession. It pronounces the penalty of extinction of’ title on the person. who though entitled to assert his right and remove the wrong doer and reenter into possession has defaulted and remained inactive for all these years; which the law considers reasonable for attracting the said penalty inaction for that period is treated by the doctrine of adverse possession as evidence of loss of desire on the part of the rightful owner to assert his ownership and reclaim possession. The nature of the property, the nature of title vesting in the rightful owner, the kind of possession which the adverse possessor is exercising are all relevant factors which enter into consideration for attracting applicability of the doctrine of the adverse possession.” 19. Right of private owners like the present plaintiff over the suit land is thus, only to use it as a part of tile road to approach the public road from the frontage points of his private land and nothing more. Right of private owners like the present plaintiff over the suit land is thus, only to use it as a part of tile road to approach the public road from the frontage points of his private land and nothing more. The true owner of that very piece of land i.e. the State or local authority etc. as the case may be over which the private land owner has got a right of access is also prevented from causing any obstruction to such right or in any way to cause hindrance for the abutting land owners in exercising such rights of user of access and in that event, such acts are to be termed as wrongful. Thus for each moment’s possession, the wrong is caused and continues. Every moment of such wrongful possession thus gives rise to fresh cause of action for legal action which continues till removed. So the limitation for the suit with such reliefs springs up from every moment’s such possession. Likewise, the private land owners cannot also claim any such right wider than said natural right which is implicit with the rights in respect of his own property because of its peculiar situation and that is a part of ownership rights of that strip of land which belongs to the State or Local authority etc. as the case may be. First of all, such a claim is quite contradictory and runs wholly in conflict with that natural right which the private land owner is enjoying over the such land lying between the road and his land. So the claim of one as regards the acquisition of title / ownership by adverse possession can never spring up. It can never conceive in the womb of law for ‘being nurtured further for the birth of a full grown child to take place at all. Since for the doctrine to be applicable, the possessor must not have any such right of ownership over that land at the time of entering upon possession and he must start to exercise all such rights of ownership. But being the holder of a part of the rights of ownership, there remains no scope to disown that right of his own at any point of time so long he is remaining the owner of the adjoining land. But being the holder of a part of the rights of ownership, there remains no scope to disown that right of his own at any point of time so long he is remaining the owner of the adjoining land. That apart, in such cases possession has no meaning as it has to be deemed to have been so only in course of exercise of said right of user over the land in question for the access to the public road. 20. Let us now look it through another spectrum. It is the settled position of law that the adverse possession implies that it commences in wrong and maintained against the right. Considering the nature of property as we are here concerned and other aspects already highlighted, including peculiar nature of the situation of land of the private land owner and the land in question even accepting the private owners possession over these intervening land for fairly a long length of time abutting the road, the same cannot bring into application the doctrine of adverse possession as the wrong is committed thereby every moment so long as he continues to be in possession of such land. In other words wrong, continues and that can never mature to right irrespective of the period for which it is stretched over. So, in the present case, neither the plaintiff can have any claim of title by virtue of his long possession nor the defendant no. 1. Thus, the claim of the plaintiff anything more than the extent of right of access as also that of the defendant no. 1 have been rightly negatived by the lower appellate Court which gets confirmation of this Court for above discussions and reasons. The plaintiffs right of simple access over of the land under plot no. 534/2317 adjoining his house site under plot no. 2341 to approach the road thus stands recognized in the eye of law and nothing more. The land in suit is to remain free from any sort of obstruction and the plaintiff having the right of access over the same to come over to the public right can also in no way put up any such construction of whatever nature it may be over the same and cause any obstruction. Equally, the defendant no. The land in suit is to remain free from any sort of obstruction and the plaintiff having the right of access over the same to come over to the public right can also in no way put up any such construction of whatever nature it may be over the same and cause any obstruction. Equally, the defendant no. 1 has no such right of either putting up any construction whatsoever by encroaching upon the land or causing any sort of obstruction over the same in any manner at any point of time, so long as the public road exists. The aforesaid discussions and reasons accordingly provide answer to the next substantial question of law. 21. In the wake of aforesaid, the appeal with above observations stands dismissed with cost throughout. The plaintiff suit is hereby decreed declaring his right of simple user of the land under plot no. 534/2317 adjoining his house site under plot no. 2341 to have access to the public road having no further right to put up any such construction whatsoever or cause obstruction thereon except for its maintenance as such for exercise of said right of user and access to the public road. The defendant no. 1 is permanently injuncted from creating any such obstruction in exercise of such right of access by the plaintiff and a mandatory injunction is issued against him to demolish and remove all such constructions made by him over the said land under plot no. 534 / 2317 at his cost within a month hence, failing which the plaintiff is at liberty to get those demolished and removed by way of execution through Court and in that event, the entire cost that would be incurred for the purpose would stand to be realized from the defendant no. 1. Appeal dismissed.