Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 48 (GAU)

Debabrata Sarkar v. State of Assam and Ors.

2015-01-20

TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2015
Tinlianthang Vaiphei, J. 1. Both the writ petitions involving a common question of fact and of law, were heard together, and are now being disposed of by this common judgment. In W.P.(C) No. 832 of 2013, the petitioner is questioning the legality of the order dated 15.2.2013 issued by the Director of Secondary Education, Assam (respondent 2) allowing the respondent No. 6 to act as the Principal-in-charge of Public Higher Secondary School (Science Stream), Lanka in W.P. (C) No. 836 of 2013, the petitioner is also challenging the same order made in favour of the same respondent by impleading the petitioner in WP(C)No. 832 of 2013 as the respondent No. 7. For simplification, the petitioner in WP(C) No. 832 of 2013 shall be referred to as "the petitioner No. 1" and the petitioner in WP(C) No. 836 of 2013 shall be called "the petitioner No. 2". 2. The facts leading to the filing of WP(C) No. 832 of 2013 may be briefly stated at the outset. The petitioner No. 1 joined the post of Subject Teacher of C.V.P. Higher Secondary School, Karimganj on 22.8.1988 in terms of his appointment order dated 17.8.1988. He was allowed to draw graduate scale of pay with effect from 14.8.1995. He was thereafter transferred to Public Higher Secondary School, Lanka ("the School" for short) by the order dated 22.9.1997 and joined the post on 7.10.1997. By the order dated 24.6.2006, he was allowed to act as the Principal-in-Charge (In-charge Principal) of the School, and was also appointed as the Officer-in-Charge of Lanka-A H.S.L.C. examination centre. It is the case of the petitioner No. 1 that his transfer to the School was in public interest as evident from the resolution dated 6.2.1997 of the School Managing Committee and not on his request. However, since his transfer order projected that his transfer was at his own request, he preferred an appeal dated 9.10.1997 before the respondent No. 2 for modification of the order of his transfer dated 22.9.1997, but the same has not been disposed of till now. However, since his transfer order projected that his transfer was at his own request, he preferred an appeal dated 9.10.1997 before the respondent No. 2 for modification of the order of his transfer dated 22.9.1997, but the same has not been disposed of till now. While he was serving as the Principal-in-Charge of the School, the impugned order was issued by wrongly interpreting the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court dated 20.12.2011 in Jamal Uddin Ahmed & Ors v. State of Assam & Ors., 2012 (I) GLT 1 holding that the rule relating order of transfer is retrospective whereas para 70 of the judgment clearly explains that application of the statute is prospective in nature and the impugned order dated 15.2.2013 is bad in law and was liable to be set aside. According to the petitioner, there are many allegations against him from the public as well as teachers and staff of the school: he remains absent from duty without any intimation to anyone which prompted the students to lodge complaints with the authorities. 3. According to the petitioner No. 1, he is senior to the respondent No. 6, but the respondent authorities, without taking into account his claim, fixed the seniority position of the respondent No. 6 over him and other teachers of the Public Higher Secondary School even though he has 23 years of working experience whereas the respondent No. 6 has only 16 years of working experience. The seniority list is correctly reflected in the seniority list sent to the respondent No. 2. In fact, the respondent No. 3 by the order dated 29.7.2006 had already held that the petitioner No. 1 is senior to the respondent No. 6. It is the contention of the petitioner No. 1 that as this order was never challenged at any time, his seniority position over the respondent No. 6 has attained finality and cannot now be disturbed: to do so would be to unsettle an already settled position. The respondent No. 2 had passed another order dated 13.9.2010 incompliance with the order dated 30.7.2088 in WP(C) No. 5395/2007 conferring upon the petitioner No. 1 the drawing and disbursing power until further orders, which has not been superseded till now. Moreover, the respondent No. 2 also passed another order dated 24.3.2012 holding that cases already decided should not be reopened again. Moreover, the respondent No. 2 also passed another order dated 24.3.2012 holding that cases already decided should not be reopened again. This has been completely overlooked by the respondent No. 2 while issuing the impugned order, which is, therefore, illegal, arbitrary, suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and cannot be sustained in law. 4. Subsequently, an additional affidavit was filed by the petitioner wherein he avers that the respondent No. 3 by his letter dated 10.12.2008 asked him to submit the seniority list of the 10 senior-most teachers of the School by 16.12.2008. In response to this, he submitted the list of such teachers along with their service books including that of the respondent No. 6. The respondent No. 2 thereafter by the order dated 22.4.2010 fixed the seniority position of the teachers of the School including that of the respondent No. 6. As instructed by the authorities published and displayed this seniority list in the notice board of the School on 15.5.2010, but none of the teachers including the respondent No. 6 ever raised any objection to this seniority list According to the petitioner, he cannot lose his seniority on transfer under the provisions of the Assam Secondary Provincialized Service Rules, 1982, which governs his case: the Assam Secondary Education Provincialized Service Rules, 2003 has been struck down by this Court in the judgment dated 18.12.2012 of WP(C) No. 1526/2012 (Mahendra Nath Mudoi v. State of Assam & Ors). 5. The writ petition is opposed by the respondents. However, it is only the respondent No. 5 (President of Managing Committee of the School) and the respondent No. 6, who chose to file their affidavits-in-opposition. The respondent No. 6 in his affidavit-in-opposition states that he obtained graduation in Science stream with major course in Mathematics in the year 1988 and M.Sc. in Mathematics in 1993 and B.Ed degree in the year 1997. He was appointed as Assistant Teacher with graduate pay scale by the order dated 14.2.1992 and was posted to National Higher Secondary School and joined it on 21.2.1992. He was then transferred to Netaji Vidya Niketan Higher Secondary School, Lanka by the order dated 12.3.1992. in Mathematics in 1993 and B.Ed degree in the year 1997. He was appointed as Assistant Teacher with graduate pay scale by the order dated 14.2.1992 and was posted to National Higher Secondary School and joined it on 21.2.1992. He was then transferred to Netaji Vidya Niketan Higher Secondary School, Lanka by the order dated 12.3.1992. According to him, while he was working at Netaji Vidya Niketan Higher Secondary School, with the consent of the Principal, the Managing Committee of the Public Higher Secondary School sought for and obtained the permission of the jurisdictional Inspector of Schools to take Mathematics classes in the newly upgraded Public Higher Secondary School with effect from 2.11.1992 in addition to discharging his normal duty at Netaji Vidya Niketan Higher Secondary School. The High Secondary section of Public Higher Secondary School was provincialized on 29.2.1996. The respondent No. 6 came to be appointed as Subject Teacher of Mathematics in the post graduate pay scale on 20.5.1996. The names of the working Subject Teachers including the respondent No. 6 were approved on 6.5.2006. The respondent authorities, while granting him quasi-lien for the year vide the order dated 5.7.1996, allowed him to count his continuous service from 21.2.1992 and granted the revised scale of pay from 1.1.1996 to 2.6.1996 vide the order dated 24.3.1999. He, on coming to know of the order dated 24.4.2006 allowing the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of Principal of the School, preferred the representations dated 29.4.2006 and dated 29.8.2006 to modify the said order as he is senior to him. The respondent No. 3 by his letter dated 27.11.2006 requested the Principal of the School to submit the seniority list as directed by the respondent No. 2. 6. It is the further case of the respondent No. 6 that with the intention to disturb the process of appointing him as the Principal-in-Charge, one Bimal Dhar had filed WP(C) No. 5395/2007, which was disposed of on 30.7.2008. When the seniority list was prepared and submitted by the petitioner No. 1 as the Principal-in-Charge of the School, the answering respondent challenged the same by filing WP(C) No. 2781/2010, but during the pendency of the writ petition, the respondent No. 2 allowed the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of Principal of the School. When the seniority list was prepared and submitted by the petitioner No. 1 as the Principal-in-Charge of the School, the answering respondent challenged the same by filing WP(C) No. 2781/2010, but during the pendency of the writ petition, the respondent No. 2 allowed the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of Principal of the School. The answering respondent thereafter filed two representations dated 18.8.2010 and dated 18.8.2010 with a request to not finalise the seniority dispute till disposal of WP(C) No. 2781/2010. According to the answering respondent, WP(C) No. 2781/2010 challenging the seniority of the petitioner No. 1 was disposed of by the Full Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 20.12.2011 of WA No. 131/2010 reported in 2012 (1) GLT 1 by holding that teachers transferred on request would not carry his seniority to the transferred School. It is the case of the answering respondent that the Full Bench allowed his prayer for declaring his seniority over the petitioner No. 1 on the ground that the transfer order of the latter was made on request. It is submitted by the answering respondent that the so-called speaking order dated 29.7.2006 passed by the respondent No. 3 had never been communicated to him nor had he been afforded an opportunity to make his comment, and was issued without authority of law. It was in terms of the said judgment of the Full Bench of this Court that the impugned order was passed by the respondent No. 2 allowing him to hold the charge of Principal of the School. The petitioner No. 1 is guilty of suppressing the vital fact that he had been transferred to the school on his own request. These are the principal contentions of the respondent No. 6. 7. The respondent No. 5 in his affidavit-in-opposition takes the stance that the petitioner No. 1 was transferred to Public Higher Secondary School in the year 1997 at the request of the Managing Committee of the School vide the resolution No. 2 of the meeting held on 6.2.1997 and that the same was done during his tenure as the bona fide Principal of the School. As he was transferred to the School in public interest, the past services rendered by him at C.V.P.H.S. School, Karimganj since 22.8.1988 should be taken into account while counting his seniority in the transferred school. As he was transferred to the School in public interest, the past services rendered by him at C.V.P.H.S. School, Karimganj since 22.8.1988 should be taken into account while counting his seniority in the transferred school. According to the respondent No. 5, the respondent No. 6 resigned as the Subject Teacher of Netaji Vidya Niketan Higher Secondary School, Lanka and was appointed as a Subject Teacher of Public Higher Secondary School on 3.6.1996. As the petitioner No. 1 was transferred to the School in public interest, he is senior to the respondent No. 6. Under Rule 12(d) of the Assam Secondary Education (Provincialization) Rules, 2003, the minimum prescribed qualification for the post of Principal is 17 years of teaching experience as a graduate teacher in any Higher Secondary School/Higher Secondary and Multi-purpose School and in case of post-graduate teachers, teaching experience of at least 15 years in any Higher Secondary/Higher Secondary and Multi-purpose School with a minimum age must be above 40 years. According to the answering respondent, at the time of the appointment of the petitioner No. 1 as Principal-in-Charge of the School on 24.4.2006, he had almost 18 years of experience as subject teacher and was above 40 years old, which was why he was considered for the post of Principal of the School. On the other hand, according to the answering respondent, on the date of the appointment of the petitioner No. 1, the respondent No. 6 had a teaching experience of less than 10 years and was below 40 years old. These are the sum and substance of the case of the respondent No. 5. 8. A rebuttal affidavit to the affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the respondent No. 6 wherein he contends that the resolution No. 2 relied on by the respondent No. 5 was never adopted by the School Managing Committee: the resolution is a false and fabricated document as evident from the complaint dated 13.3.2013 lodged by the three members of the Committee: the respondent No. 5 is biased in favour of the petitioner No. 1 and is out and out helping the petitioner No. 1. His seniority is to be counted from 17.3.1992 as a subject teacher and from 3.6.1996 as post graduate teacher. His seniority is to be counted from 17.3.1992 as a subject teacher and from 3.6.1996 as post graduate teacher. The petitioner No. 1, taking advantage of his position as the Principal-in-Charge of the School, obtained B.Ed degree from Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga, Bihar without actually appearing in the examination. The examination centre was supposed to be CM. Law College, Darbhanga, and on the dates of the examination, he did not take leave, and was rather present in the School: moreover, there is no examination centre of the University in Assam. This affidavit was followed by several affidavits filed by the parties. I do not propose to refer to them since the contents thereof are virtually repetition of their earlier affidavits. 9. Though the pleadings of the parties are numerous, there are only two crucial questions which need examination for proper adjudication of the disputes raised in the writ petition, namely, whether the transfer of the petitioner No. 1 from C.V.P. Higher Secondary School. Karimganj to Public Higher Secondary School. Lanka on 22.9.1997 was at his request, and even if it is so, whether the seniority position of the petitioner No. 1 over the respondent No. 6 can be said to have attained finality or a settled position, which cannot now be unsettled? There is no dispute, nor can there be any dispute in this behalf, that the transfer order dated 22.9.1997 of the petitioner No. 1, which is at Annexure-A, unambiguously indicated that his transfer was at his own request. The case of the petitioner No. 1, however, is that he, noticing this anomaly, immediately submitted a representation to the respondent No. 2 pointing out that his transfer had been effected on the recommendation of the School Managing Committee due to public interest and requesting him to count his seniority to the transferred School with effect from 22.8.1988 and modify "the language of the last line of the order". The resolution of the School Managing Committee dated 6.2.1997 for transferring the petitioner No. 1 to the School in public interest is found at Annexure-B. On the basis of the requisition made by the respondent No. 3, the petitioner No. 1 submitted to him the seniority list of the teachers of the School dated 10.12.08 wherein the name of the petitioner No. 1 appeared at Serial No. 11 above the respondent No. 6, whose name found a place at Serial No. 12. 10. It would appear that this inter-se seniority list was apparently approved by the respondent No. 3 by holding that the petitioner No. 1 is senior to the respondent No. 6 and by upholding the order dated 24.4.2006 allowing the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of Principal of the School. Subsequently, another order dated 13.9.2010 was issued by the respondent No. 2 allowing the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of Principal of the School in addition to his normal duties as subject teacher along with financial powers. In the meantime, the respondent No. 6 submitted a representation to the respondent No. 2 informing him that the writ petition filed by him i.e. WP(C) No. 2781/10 along with the analogous W.A. No. 131/10 had been disposed of by the Full Bench of this Court holding that the rule relating to order of transfer is retrospective in operation; that the petitioner No. 1, who was transferred to the School at his own request, could count his seniority only on 7.10.1997 when he was so transferred and he, having been substantively appointed as subject teacher on 3.6.1996, being the senior-most in the School, be allowed to hold the charge of Principal of the School. His representation was accepted whereupon the respondent No. 2 passed the impugned order. 11. There is no dispute at the bar that there was no provision under the Assam Secondary School (Provincialization) Rules, 1982 dealing with the principles for determining the seniority of a teacher who has been transferred to another school at his own request. His representation was accepted whereupon the respondent No. 2 passed the impugned order. 11. There is no dispute at the bar that there was no provision under the Assam Secondary School (Provincialization) Rules, 1982 dealing with the principles for determining the seniority of a teacher who has been transferred to another school at his own request. It was under the Assam Secondary School (Provincialization) Rules, 2003 that a provision was for the first time inserted in Rule 24(2)(v) prescribing that such teacher on transfer at his own request cannot carry over his seniority position to the transferred school i.e. his seniority in the new school cannot be counted with effect from the date of joining such school. Later on, a controversy arose as to whether this provision is prospective in operation or retrospective in operation. The issue ultimately came up before the Full Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 102/2007 and 131 of 2010 along with many other writ petitions including WP(C)No. 2781 of 2010 filed by the respondent No. 6. The judgment was reported in Jamal Uddin Ahmed & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors., 2012 (1) GUT 1. This is what the Full Bench said at paragraph 73 and 74 of the judgment: "(73) We are, thus, of the unhesitant opinion that own request inter-school transfers were not contemplated under the 1982 Rules either in public interest or in administrative exigency. The 2003 Rules carries the same mandate explicitly enjoining the consequence of loss of past services for seniority of the incumbent concerned in such an eventuality. A perceptible continuum of this legislative ordainment persists to effectuate the retrospectivity of the 2003 Rules to remedy the purported state of ambiguity, indeterminability and the consequential inconsistency in approach of the State authorities on the issue opposed to the letter and spirit of the 1982 Rules. The 2003 Rules essentially is thus a clarificatory law and is held to be retrospective in operation on and from the date of enactment of the 1982 Rules. This determination, notwithstanding, as we are conscious that as on date, the issue of own request inter-school transfer after the 1982 Rules, has meanwhile been finally settled in many cases including those of several incumbents who since retired from service with their entitlements accordingly computed, we order such cases would not be reopened on the basis of this verdict. This determination, notwithstanding, as we are conscious that as on date, the issue of own request inter-school transfer after the 1982 Rules, has meanwhile been finally settled in many cases including those of several incumbents who since retired from service with their entitlements accordingly computed, we order such cases would not be reopened on the basis of this verdict. In other words, cases where departmental orders securing seniority even on such inter-school transfers have attained finality and no challenge thereto has been made before any judicial forum as on date as well as cases finally determined by a Court of law sustaining such seniority the same would not be reopened on the basis of this verdict. (Underlined for emphasis) (74) To reiterate, this adjudication has been made without reference to any particular fact situation and would be limited to the incumbents of the Assam Secondary Education (Provincialization) Service and at all relevant times governed by the provisions of the two Rules dealt with as above. The reference is answered accordingly. We leave the parties to bear their own costs." 12. In the instant case, the following facts may be kept in mind:- (a) the resolution dated 6.2.1997 of the Managing Committee of the School had noted that the service of the petitioner No. 1 was being requisitioned in public interest to teach Chemistry subject in the School; (b) though the order dated 22.9.1997 indicated that his transfer to the School was at his request and could not, therefore, claim seniority over the existing staff of the School, it is seen that he promptly filed an application to the respondent No. 2 for modification thereof as his transfer was not at request vide his letter dated 9.10.1997, but his application was never disposed of for some unknown reason. The pleaded case of the petitioner No. 1 at para 6 of his writ petition is not denied by the answering respondents; (c) the respondent No. 3 by the speaking order dated 29.7.2006 justified his earlier decision dated 24.5.2006 allowing the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of Principal of the School after deciding that he is senior to the respondent No. 6. This decision was reiterated by the respondent No. 2 in his order dated 13.9.2010 in compliance with the order dated 30.7.2008 by allowing him to hold the charge of Principal of the School; (d) In the seniority list dated 10.2.2008 prepared by the petitioner in his capacity as the Principal of the School, his name was shown at Serial No. 11 over the respondent No. 6; (e) This seniority position of the petitioner was confirmed by the respondent No. 2 as evident from his letter dated 22.4.2010 and (f) It was only in 2010 that the respondent No. 6 filed WP(C) No. 2781/10 challenging the seniority position of the petitioner No. 1: he had earlier in the year 2006 vide his application dated 29.8.2006 (Annexure-AO-8) made a representation against the order dated 24.4.2006 allowing the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of the Principal of the School, but not against the seniority position of the petitioner over him; (g) Though the writ appeal along with WP(C) No. 2781/10 and others filed by the respondent No. 6 were disposed of by the Full Bench of this Court, no relief was granted to him nor was his writ petition remanded to the learned Single Judge for his decision in accordance with the law laid down by the Full Bench: the net effect of such disposal is that the reliefs claimed in the writ petition can be said to have been refused and is, therefore, barred by the principles of res judicata. 13. It is, however, the contention of the Mr. D.K. Sarma, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 6, that as the petitioner No. 1 was admittedly transferred to the School at his own request, the decision of the Full Bench holding that the past services rendered by a teacher in his former school cannot be carried over by him on his transfer to the transferred school as his transfer is made at his request, will operate against the petitioner No. 1 and that since the law so declared by the Full Bench is held to be retrospective in operation, the impugned order holding the respondent No. 6 to be senior to the petitioner No. 1 and of allowing him to hold the charge of Principal of the School is, ipso facto, perfectly in order and is not, therefore, liable to be interfered with. In my judgment, where the seniority position of the petitioner No. 1 over the respondent No. 6 has held the field for a number of years, such settled position need not be upset by this Court in exercise of its equity jurisdiction. It is now time to give a quietus to this issue. Delay defeats justice: delay defeats equity. This is what the Apex Court held in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (2010) 12 SCC 471 in paras 18, 29 and 30, which are reproduced below": "18. The question of entertaining the petition disputing the long-standing seniority filed at a belated stage is no more res integra. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra: (1974) 1 SCC 317 :1974 SCC(L&S) 137 considered the effect of delay in challenging the promotion and seniority list and held that any claim for seniority at a belated stage should be rejected inasmuch as it seeks to disturb the vested rights of other persons regarding seniority, rank and promotion which have accrued to them during the intervening period. A party should approach the court just after accrual of the cause of complaint. While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments, particularly in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi: (1969) 1 SCC 110 , wherein it has been observed that the principle on which the court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on me ground of laches or delay, is that the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay in filing the writ petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for delay. The Court further observed as under: (Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi: (1969) 1 SCC 110 , SCC p. 115, para 7) "7.... The party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court." * * * * * * 29. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court." * * * * * * 29. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the court is guilty of delay and the laches. The court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallises in the interregnum. (Vide Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi: (1975) 4 SCC 285 : AIR 1974 SC 2077 ; State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan: (1976)2 SCC 895 : AIR 1975 SC 2190 ; Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig: (2000) 2 SCC 48 , Inder Jit Gupta v. Union of India : (2001)6 SCC 637 :2001 SCC (L&S) 1084; Shiv Dass v. Union of India: (2007) 9 SCC 637: ( (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 395; A.P. SRTC v. N. Satyanarayana: (2008) 1 SCC 210 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 161 and City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala: (2009) 1 SCC 168 ). 30. Thus, in view of the above, the settled legal proposition that emerges is that once the seniority had been fixed and it remains in existence for a reasonable period, any challenge to the same should not be entertained. In K.R. Mudgal, this Court has laid down, in crystal clear words that a seniority list which remains in existence for 3 to 4 years unchallenged, should not be disturbed. Thus, 3-4 years is a reasonable period for challenging the seniority and in case someone agitates the issue of seniority beyond this period, he has to explain the delay and laches in approaching the adjudicatory forum, by furnishing satisfactory explanation." 14. In my judgment, the seniority position of the petitioner over the respondent No. 6, which has been maintained since 2006, had never been seriously challenged by the latter except for questioning the legality of allowing the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of the post of the Principal of the School. In my judgment, the seniority position of the petitioner over the respondent No. 6, which has been maintained since 2006, had never been seriously challenged by the latter except for questioning the legality of allowing the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of the post of the Principal of the School. It is one thing to say that the action of the respondent authorities allowing the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of Principal is illegal, but it is an entirely different thing to say that the decision of the respondent authorities holding him to be senior to the respondent No. 6. Surely, the respondent No. 6 cannot say that he was never aware of the fact that the speaking order dated 29.7.2006 allowing the petitioner No. 1 to hold the charge of Principal of the School, had been issued by the respondent No. 3 on the basis that he (the petitioner No. 1) was senior to him. It was only in 2010 that the seniority list dated 20.12.2008 placing the petitioner No. 1 above him was for the first time put to challenge by him by overlooking the vital fact that such seniority position of the petitioner No. 1 had been the basis for allowing the latter to hold the charge of Principal of the School in the first place. The respondent No. 2 apparently misread the judgment of the Full Bench in Jamal Uddin Ahmed case (supra) and has in the process erroneously issued the impugned order holding the respondent No. 6 to be senior to the petitioner No. 1 and of allowing him to be the Principal-in-Charge of the School purportedly in compliance with the law laid down in Jamal Uddin Ahmed case: no such direction was ever issued by the Full Bench. It was perhaps due to the existence of peculiar cases of the nature obtaining in this case that the Full Bench did not think it fit to remand the case of the respondent No. 6 [WP(C) No. 2871 of 2010] to the Single Bench for adjudication in accordance with the law laid down by them or refused to grant the relief claimed by him. 15. 15. Although security of service cannot be used as a protective umbrella against the lapses of the employer, by and large one of the essential requirements of job satisfaction and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. The seniority position of the petitioner No. 1 had remained undisturbed for a number of years i.e. since 2006 during which he was allowed to act as the Principal-in-Charge of the School from time to time till the impugned order was issued by the respondent No. 2 in 2013. Even if total security of service cannot be guaranteed in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled once and for all should not be liable to be reopened after many years at the instance of a party who had during the intervening years chosen to keep quiet. After all, raking up all matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative chaos and avoidable complications. The principle on which Courts proceed to refuse relief to the petitioner on the ground of laches, is that the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay in filing the writ petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for delay. No explanation worth the name has been offered by the respondent in not challenging seniority of the petitioner No. 1 immediately. He cannot use the impugned order as a shield to defend his lapses for many years in not challenging the seniority of the petitioner No. 1 over him which held the field for years after year. This is exactly what happened in this case. It is distressing to notice that even the exercise of filling up of the post of Principal-in-Charge has now been reduced to the game of musical chair. This state of affairs should not be allowed to perpetuate. In this view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law, and is liable to be quashed. WP(C) No. 836 of 2013 16. This state of affairs should not be allowed to perpetuate. In this view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law, and is liable to be quashed. WP(C) No. 836 of 2013 16. As already indicated in the foregoing paragraph 2, this writ petition is filed by the petitioner No. 2, who is also challenging the order dated 15.2.2013 issued by the respondent No. 2 allowing the same respondent to hold the charge of Principal of the School by deciding him to be senior to him. The facts are undisputed. The service of the petitioner No. 2 was admittedly regularized by the order dated 22.8.2000 with effect from 1.3.1995.- See para 4 of his writ petition. The law is now well settled without reference to cases that seniority cannot be given with retrospective effect so as to adversely affect the seniority of others. At the time of issuing the impugned order, he had not even completed 15 years of regular service in the post of Assistant Teacher. As per the extant rules, to hold the post of Principal, he must have completed either 15 years of service as subject teacher or 17 years as graduate teacher. As he had not attained the qualifying service for the post of Principal when the impugned order was issued, he has no locus standi to file this writ petition, which is, therefore, not maintainable. Resultantly, WP(C) No. 832 of 2013 is allowed. The impugned order dated 15.2.2013 issued by the respondent No. 2 is hereby quashed. The interim order dated 21.2.2013 passed by this Court is, accordingly, made absolute. Let a mandamus issue directing the respondent No. 2 to allow the petitioner No. 1 to continue to hold the charge of the post of Principal of Public Higher Secondary School till the post is regularly filled up or till he is ousted by the operation of law. WP (C) No. 836 of 2013 is, however, not maintainable and is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. ……………..