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2015 DIGILAW 481 (BOM)

Dada Hari Keshavrao Choure v. State of Maharashtra

2015-02-13

A.B.CHAUDHARI, P.N.DESHMUKH

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JUDGMENT A.B. Chaudhari, J. 1. This is an application by Police Inspectors for quashing of FIR for an offence punishable under Sections 217, 166, 218, 202, 471, 465, 193 in Crime No. 172/2010 registered on 20.06.2010 at 9.30 a.m. Mr. Mardikar, learned counsel for the applicants, submitted that on 07.11.1999 one Alimunnisa w/o Rashid Khan sustained burn injuries and was taken to the hospital at Nanded. On 08.11.1999 she gave dying declaration that she was burnt due to bursting of kerosene stove and ultimately she died on 18.11.1999 for which A.D. No. 52/1999 was registered. The investigation was carried out in respect of the complaint made by Rashid Khan that Alimunnisa was burnt by neighbours, six in number and, therefore, investigation was carried out. After investigation, it was found that there was no evidence found during investigation about six persons involved in any offence in relation to the burning incident of Alimunnisa. Therefore, "C" summary report was filed in the court by the applicants. Rashid Khan, however, filed a private complaint case, which was registered as Sessions Trial No. 33/2005 against those six persons i.e. the neighbours of Alimunnisa. The trial was held in the said sessions case and all the six accused persons were acquitted of the charge of murder on 22.03.2006 but were convicted for an offence punishable under section 323 of the IPC. An appeal was filed against the said judgment of acquittal vide Criminal Appeal No. 459/2006, which was dismissed on 02.06.2008. Mr. Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel for the applicants, then contended that despite the above factual position, Rashid Khan lodged a complaint to Police Station, Pusad as late as on 20.06.2010 contending therein that the applicants had committed forgery during recording of the statements during investigation in respect of the burning case of Alimunnisa and, therefore, the applicants were liable to be prosecuted for various offences. Mr. Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel, then submitted that this report was lodged against the applicants after 11 years and was registered by Police Station Officer for an offence punishable under Sections 217, 166, 218, 202, 471, 465 and 193 of the IPC. 2. Mr. Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel, then contended that in the first place, no offence under section 193 can be said to have been constituted since it is for the concerned competent court to lodge complaint before the Magistrate and the FIR could not be registered. 2. Mr. Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel, then contended that in the first place, no offence under section 193 can be said to have been constituted since it is for the concerned competent court to lodge complaint before the Magistrate and the FIR could not be registered. He then contended that all the offences registered against the applicants could not have been registered nor investigation could have been made without the sanction under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the applicants had admittedly recorded the statements acting as Police Officers entrusted with investigation. No such sanction was obtained. Mr. Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel, then contended that at any rate the offence under section 217, 166, 218 and 202 being punishable below 3 years or by three years sentence, the complaint filed after 11 years, within the meaning of Section 468of the Cr.P.C. is obviously beyond the limitation and, therefore, no FIR could be registered nor investigation could be made. 3. Per contra, Mr. Dhumale, learned counsel for non applicant No. 2, opposed the application and submitted that the applicants could have applied for discharge and, therefore, no case is made out for interference in the present matter. They prayed for dismissal of the application. 4. We have perused the FIR in which offence under sections 217, 166, 218, 202, 471, 468and 193 were registered. Looking to the facts narrated above and on hearing Mr. Mardikar, learned Senior Counsel, we find that when Sessions Trial No. 33/2005 has ended in acquittal, the Court then could have made an order under section 193 for prosecuting the applicants, if at all any offence is made out against them. Section 193 of the IPC, therefore, clearly not attracted in the absence of such mandate of law. Insofar as section 471 and 465at concerned, we find that Section 195 Cr.P.C. clearly prohibits lodgment of such complaint since the applicants had performed their duty while recording statements, which are said to have been forged or fabricated, and during the course of their official duty statements having been recorded, in the absence of sanction under section 195 Cr.P.C. no FIR could be registered nor applicants could be prosecuted. Insofar as the offence under sections 217,166 and 202 are concerned, all these offences are punishable either with a sentence below 3 years or 3 years in respect of offence punishable under Section 218 of IPC. Insofar as the offence under sections 217,166 and 202 are concerned, all these offences are punishable either with a sentence below 3 years or 3 years in respect of offence punishable under Section 218 of IPC. The incident is said to have taken place during the period from 16.11.1999 to 19.09.2000, however, during this period, neither investigation has been done nor statements were recorded by the applicants in respect of which, the FIR lodged on 20.06.2010 at 9.30 p.m. that too after acquittal of the original six accused and dismissal of appeal by the High Court. Thus, the FIR was lodged in respect of an offence which had allegedly taken place 11 years before and limitation provided being three years, the same were obviously barred by limitation as contemplated by Section 468(3)(c) Cr.P.C. We, therefore, hold that the charges levelled against the applicants are clearly barred by limitation. 5. That apart, what we find is that present proceedings of lodgment of the FIR is the abuse of process of law. The facts are tale telling. It is clear that the complainant Rashid Khan did file private complaint case before the Sessions Court and the Sessions Trial No. 33/2005 was registered at his behest and accused were tried and six accused made by him in that trial were acquitted. If at all Rashid Khan had a grievance about applicants having committed any offence, at that time only he could have easily stated so before the Sessions Court or a competent Magistrate or before the Police Station Officer. Not only that, the acquittal was upheld by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 459/2006 which was dismissed on 02.06.2008. It is only after dismissal of appeal, on 20.06.2010, Rashid Khan decided to lodge a report that the applicants had committed forgery and so on so forth. In our opinion, in the above background when the sessions trial was held and the appeal having been dismissed, lodging of the FIR by Rashid Khan, thereafter, must be held to be an abuse of process of law. 6. The contention raised by Mr. Dhumale, learned counsel for non applicant No. 2 complainant that he had made report to the Police Station way back in the year 1999 but offences were not registered, is no ground to stop running of the limitation as contemplated by Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. The contention raised by Mr. Dhumale, learned counsel for non applicant No. 2 complainant that he had made report to the Police Station way back in the year 1999 but offences were not registered, is no ground to stop running of the limitation as contemplated by Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Once the limitation started running, it would never stop. Thus, it is not possible to accept the submission made by learned counsel for the non applicant No. 2. In view of above, we find that the present application must succeed. Hence, we pass the following order. "ORDER (i) Criminal Application No. 1057/2010 is allowed. (ii) Rule made absolute in terms of prayer clause (1) of the application." Application Allowed