Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 484 (CAL)

Debashis Roy Mazumder v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation

2015-06-15

DEBANGSU BASAK

body2015
Judgment Debangsu Basak, J. The writ petitioner claims seniority over and above the respondent no. 4 based upon a Circular bearing No. 33/VIII/2009-10 dated December 15, 2009 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. It is contended on behalf of the writ petitioner that, the seniority is to be reckoned from the date of acquisition of the degree in Engineering with simultaneous reference to the date of joining the post of Assistant Engineer. The writ petitioner having joined the post of Assistant Engineer on promotion on September 29, 1996, that is, prior to the respondent no. 4 being promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer in 1999 and although the writ petitioner having acquired the degree of Engineering in 2008 later than that of the respondent no. 4 obtaining the degree in Engineering in 1989, since the writ petitioner had joined the post of Assistant Engineer prior to the respondent no. 4 he should be given seniority over the respondent no. 4. It is contended on behalf of the writ petitioner that the writ petitioner had made various representations to the Corporation authorities and that the Corporation authorities did not consider such representations. According to the writ petitioner he is senior to the respondent no. 4. He is suffering a continuing wrong due to the non-action of the respondent authorities in not considering and deciding on his representations. It is submitted that, there is no delay in filing the writ petition. In any event, delay, if any, has not defeated the rights of the writ petitioner. In support of such contention reliance has been placed on 2008 Volume 8 Supreme Court Cases page 445 (Ashok Kumar v. State of Bihar & Ors.) and 2013 Volume 1 Supreme Court Cases page 353 (Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors.). It is contended on behalf of the writ petitioner that, the authorities concerned cannot deny the entitlement of the writ petitioner on the ground of administrative chaos. In support of such contention reliance has been placed on 1985 (Suppl.) Supreme Court Cases page 432 (B. Prabhakar Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.). The Corporation authorities are represented; so also is the respondent no. 4. On behalf of the Corporation authorities it is contended that the writ petitioner is guilty of inordinate delay in filing the writ petition. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.). The Corporation authorities are represented; so also is the respondent no. 4. On behalf of the Corporation authorities it is contended that the writ petitioner is guilty of inordinate delay in filing the writ petition. The seniority amongst the Engineers had been settled long back and on the basis of such settled seniority the respondent no. 4 had been promoted to the post of Executive Engineer on September 9, 2010. Now if the seniority amongst such persons is directed to be redone, the same would lead to avoidable administrative chaos. The writ petitioner had notice of the developments. He did not challenge the same contemporaneously. He should not be allowed to challenge the settled position now. In view of such inordinate delay the writ petitioner is not entitled any relief. Reliance is placed on All India Reporter 1999 Supreme Court page 1510 (B. S. Bajwa & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors.) and All India Reporter 1980 Supreme Court page 1894 (Gian Singh Mann v. P. & H. High Court) in support of such contention. On merits it is submitted that the appointment of the writ petitioner as an Assistant Engineer was not regularized. The writ petitioner had obtained the Engineering degree subsequent to that of the respondent no. 4 and, therefore, cannot claim seniority in terms of the Circular. The Circular cannot read in the manner as sought to be contended by the writ petitioner. It is contended on behalf of the respondent no. 4 that, he was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer in 1999 and that he had an Engineering degree of 1989 which is much prior to the Engineering degree obtained by the writ petitioner in 2008. Relying upon the Regulation regarding fixation of seniority of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation it is submitted on behalf of the respondent no. 4 that, the seniority has been worked in accordance with such Regulation. Referring to 2004 Volume 3 Supreme Court Cases page 734 (Chandravathi P.K. & Ors. v. C.K. Saji & Ors.) it is submitted that the State as an employer is entitled to fix separate quota of promotion for degree holders, diploma holders and certificate holders in exercise of rule making power. In the present case, the Corporation has made a distinction between diploma holders and degree holders. v. C.K. Saji & Ors.) it is submitted that the State as an employer is entitled to fix separate quota of promotion for degree holders, diploma holders and certificate holders in exercise of rule making power. In the present case, the Corporation has made a distinction between diploma holders and degree holders. The Corporation has acted in terms of Regulation regarding fixation of seniority dated April 23, 1984. Such Regulation of 1984 is not under challenge. The list of seniority assailed by the respondent no. 4 has been fixed under the Regulation of 1984. There is no infirmity in the action of the Corporation authorities in fixing the seniority. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties and the materials made available on record. The writ petitioner is an employee of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. The writ petitioner had obtained a diploma in Civil Engineering in 1984. In course of his employment with the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, he had been promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) on September 21, 1996. Such promotion was on ad hoc basis. The writ petitioner had thereafter obtained an Engineering degree on February 28, 2008. The writ petitioner had applied with the authorities for insertion of his higher qualification. The writ petitioner complains that the respondent no. 4 who had been promoted as Assistant Engineer (Civil) after the promotion of the writ petitioner to such post, has been placed higher in the gradation list of Assistant Engineer (Civil) (Degree Holders) than that of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner had made a representation dated July 1, 2009 to the Corporation authorities requesting the authorities to rework the seniority list on the basis of the date of promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil). This representation has not been decided. The Corporation authorities had issued Circular bearing No. 33/VIII/2009-10 dated December 15, 2009. This Circular relates to the method of recruitment to the post of Executive Engineer. The writ petitioner had made another representation on February 11, 2010 to the authorities requesting them to rework the seniority of writ petitioner. This representation has not been decided by the authorities. On December 20, 2010, a gradation list of Assistant Engineers (Civil) had been published by the Corporation authorities. In such gradation list the writ petitioner has been placed in serial no. 74. The respondent no. This representation has not been decided by the authorities. On December 20, 2010, a gradation list of Assistant Engineers (Civil) had been published by the Corporation authorities. In such gradation list the writ petitioner has been placed in serial no. 74. The respondent no. 4 however in the mean time being promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) with effect from September 9, 2010 did not figure in the gradation list of Executive Engineer (Civil). The writ petitioner had made a third representation dated April 5, 2011 to the respondent authorities. This time the writ petitioner requested the authorities to determine his seniority afresh taking into consideration the date of acquisition of his degree in Engineering with simultaneous reference to his date of joining to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil). The third representation has also not been dealt with Corporation authorities. After waiting for more than three years the writ petitioner had made the fourth representation dated December 5, 2014. Such representation has also not been decided by the Corporation authorities. The conduct of the writ petitioner therefore gives rise to the contention of delay. In B.S. Bajwa & Anr. (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the question of seniority need not be reopened after lapse of reasonable period. In the fact of that case the Supreme Court had dismissed a writ petition challenging the list of seniority on the ground of laches. In Gian Singh Mann (supra) the Supreme Court in the facts of the case did not find the writ petitioner to have adequately explained the delay of about 11 years. Successive representations during the period had been held not to justify the inordinate delay. Relief to the writ petitioner had been refused on that ground. On behalf of the writ petitioner it is contended that, the fact situation of B. S. Bajwa & Anr. (supra) and Gian Singh Mann (supra) are not same as that of the present writ petition and, therefore, the ratio laid down therein is not applicable to the facts of this case. In Agarwal Oil Refinery Corporation, Kanpur (supra) the Supreme Court has held that reliance on a judgment which is factually distinguishable is erroneous. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. (supra). In Agarwal Oil Refinery Corporation, Kanpur (supra) the Supreme Court has held that reliance on a judgment which is factually distinguishable is erroneous. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. (supra). In Ashok Kumar (supra) the Supreme Court has held that since the writ petitioner had filed representation/review of the decision of the State Government and since the State Government had kept the same pending, the delay in moving the writ application against the decision of the State Government was sufficiently explained by the writ petitioner and that the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. (supra) it has been held that, “12. …………………………. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. that apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third-party interest is involved. …………………………” “13. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party’s defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.” “14. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party’s defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.” “14. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged by delay on the part of the petitioners.” If the contention of the writ petitioner with regard to the fixation of seniority on the basis of the Circular dated December 15, 2009 is upheld, it must be said that an illegality has been commuted affecting the substantial rights of the writ petitioner and that the writ petitioner is suffering a continuing wrong. The conduct of the writ petitioner shows that he did not accept the fixation of seniority. The writ petitioner had made four representations to the Corporation authorities. None of them have been decided by the Corporation authorities. In the facts of the instant case, therefore, the writ petition need not be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The contentions of the writ petitioner should be decided on merits. The other ground urged by the Corporation authorities on the aspect of delay is that the writ petitioner has allowed a considerable period of time to elapse after the fixation of seniority and, therefore, in the event the seniority list is to be reworked at this stage it would lead to administrative chaos. In B. Prabhakar Rao & Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court did not accept the argument of administrative chaos therein. In B. Prabhakar Rao & Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court did not accept the argument of administrative chaos therein. Referring to Bradbury v. London Borough of Enfield, (1967) 3 All ER 434, the Supreme Court had negated a contention of administrative chaos. In my view, the facts of the instant case do not allow the Corporation authorities to take shelter under the contention of administrative chaos. If a seniority list is to be reworked as the same was not done in accordance with law in the first place, such reworking could not be said to create administrative chaos. In any event, as observed in B. Prabhakar Rao & Ors. (supra) that, ‘those that have stirred up a hornet’s nest cannot complain of being stung.’ Much stress has been placed upon the Circular dated December 15, 2009 by the respective parties as to its interpretation. The parties accept that the Circular dated December 15, 2009 is not happily worded. The relevant portion of the Circular dated December 15, 2009 is as follows:- “(A) 60% of the posts of Executive Engineers of a particular wing be filled up from amongst the Degree holder Assistant Engineers having 6 (six) years working experience as such by way of promotion on the basis of seniority position to be reckoned from the date of acquisition of the Degree in Engineering with simultaneous reference to the date of joining to the post of Asstt. Engineers. (B) 40% of the posts of Executive Engineers of a particular wing be filled up after due process from amongst the Diploma holder Asstt. Engineers having 6 (six) years working experience as such by way of promotion on the basis of seniority position to be counted from the date of joining in the post of Asstt. Engineer of a particular wing.” The Circular dated December 15, 2009 provides separate quotas for promotion amongst degree holders as well as diploma holders. In Chandravathi P.K. & Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court has recognized the right of the State as an employer to fix separate quotas for promotion of degree holders, diploma holders and certificate holders. A statutory authority by the same reasoning would be entitled to do so. In the present case, the Corporation authorities have acted in terms of the Regulation dated January 31, 1984 and has fixed the seniority amongst the decree holders. A statutory authority by the same reasoning would be entitled to do so. In the present case, the Corporation authorities have acted in terms of the Regulation dated January 31, 1984 and has fixed the seniority amongst the decree holders. In paragraph (A) of the Circular dated December 15, 2009 quota for degree holders has been provided and in paragraph (B) thereof quota for diploma holders has been provided. In the case of degree holders the emphasis therefore must be the date of acquisition of the degree in Engineering and likewise in the case of diploma holders the emphasis would obviously be the date of acquisition of the diploma in Engineering. The date of joining the post of Assistant Engineer of a particular wing would thereafter be taken into consideration for determining the seniority. In the instant case, the writ petitioner had obtained his degree in Engineering on February 28, 2008. The writ petitioner had applied on April 10, 2008 for being considered as a degree holder. The Corporation authorities had published a gradation list of Assistant Engineers (Civil) cadre for both diploma holders and degree holders on May 26, 2009. The writ petitioner had chosen to join the cadre of degree holders and as such his name appeared in the seniority list of degree holders. The degree holders appear in the seniority list in accordance with the date of acquisition of the degree in Engineering by the respective persons. There is no infirmity in the gradation list so far as it relates to degree holders when considered from the date of acquisition of the degree in Engineering. Subsequent to the Circular dated December 15, 2009, the Corporation authorities had published an updated gradation list of Assistant Engineers (Civil) cadre both for diploma holders as well as the degree holders on December 20, 2010. In this gradation list the persons named therein have been arranged in accordance with the date of acquisition degree and diploma in Engineering as the case may be. Since the respondent no. 4 had acquired a degree in Engineering prior to the date of acquisition degree in Engineering by the writ petitioner, the respondent no. 4 has been placed higher than in the list than that of the writ petitioner. This gradation list is in terms of the Regulation regarding fixation of seniority dated January 31, 1984. The gradation is not vitiated by any infirmity. 4 has been placed higher than in the list than that of the writ petitioner. This gradation list is in terms of the Regulation regarding fixation of seniority dated January 31, 1984. The gradation is not vitiated by any infirmity. The contentions of the writ petitioner with regard to seniority are unacceptable. In such circumstances, I find no merit in W.P. No. 1208 of 2014. The same is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.