T. Vaiphei, J. - Having heard Mr. M.A. Sheikh, the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. P. Saikia, the learned standing counsel for he Education (Secondary) Department, Assam and Mrs. K. Devi, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 4 and 5, I am of the view that this writ petition is barred by the principles of laches and is, therefore, not maintainable. 2. The father of the petitioner, namely, the late Abu Tahir Azad @ Mvi Taher, died on 8-2-2013 while he was working as Arabic Teacher of Bamundongra Higher Secondary School leaving behind him his wife, two sons including the petitioner, three daughters. The petitioner passed Class IX examination, and, being qualified for the post of Grade-IV. To mitigate the hardship caused to his family due to the sudden death of the deceased, the petitioner filed an application for compassionate appointment to any Grade-IV post on 12-5-2014 to the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Education (Secondary) Department. Till now, no decision has been taken whereupon this writ petition is filed by him for appropriate relief. 3. Raising preliminary objection on the maintainability of the writ petition, the learned standing counsel for the Education (Secondary) Department, submits that when the application for compassionate appointment was filed by the petitioner on 12-5-2014 i.e. two months after the expiry of the said period of limitation, such an application is time-barred under Clause (1) of the Office memorandum dated 2-3-2009 issued by the Government of Assam in the Department of Personnel, Guwahati read with the decision of this Court in Fazinen Nessa and others v. State of Assam & ors., 2010 (4) GLT 340, which extended the period of limitation prescribed therein from three months to one year. He, therefore, contends that as the application of the petitioner is barred by the law of limitation, this writ petition filed after the period of limitation cannot be entertained. He relies on the decision of the Apex Court in State of J&K and others v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 5 SCC 766 to fortify his contention. He, therefore, contends that as the application of the petitioner is barred by the law of limitation, this writ petition filed after the period of limitation cannot be entertained. He relies on the decision of the Apex Court in State of J&K and others v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006) 5 SCC 766 to fortify his contention. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner maintains that considering the fact that the delay is only for two months and the concept of compassionate appointment being a welfare scheme, this Court while exercising its equity jurisdiction can afford to take a liberal or lenient view to the case of the petitioner and may not dismiss the writ petition. According to the learned counsel, this is not even a case of delay for one year or two years, and to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of limitation/laches will frustrate the very object of granting compassionate appointment. Strong reliance is placed by him on the decision of the Apex Court in Balbir Kaur and another v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, (2000) 6 SCC 493 and Uttam Rabidas v. State of Tripura, 2013 (4) GLT 1121 to fortify his submission. 4. The revised guidelines for appointment on compassionate ground are circulated in the Office Memorandum dated 2-3-2009 issued by the Department of Personnel, Government of Assam. Clause 1 thereof is the relevant portion, which reads thus: “(1) Application for appointment under the Scheme in prescribed format should be submitted within a period of 3 months from the date of death of the person to the respective Office/Departments under which the person dies in harness. Applications submitted after 3 months should not be considered.” 5. As already noticed, this Court in Faziron Ness (supra) extended the period of limitation for filing the application from three months to twelve months from the date of the death of the government employee. In the instant case, the petitioner had undoubtedly filed his application about 2 months after the period of limitation and is, therefore, time-barred. No explanation is offered by him for filing the application after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is not his case that he was not aware of the period of limitation for filing the application; even if he was not really aware of the period of limitation also, ignorance of law is no excuse. No explanation is offered by him for filing the application after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is not his case that he was not aware of the period of limitation for filing the application; even if he was not really aware of the period of limitation also, ignorance of law is no excuse. Even after this Court extended the period of limitation given in the revised guidelines in exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the petitioner is obviously not able to take advantage of the benevolent amendment made by this Court therein. Under the circumstances, to interfere in favour of an indolent litigant like the petitioner will give a wrong signal to others. This will amount to further concession and will also open a floodgate of litigations with the potential of setting at naught the period of limitation by now established by this Court, which is not permissible in law. In the view that I have taken, I do not see any reason for exercising the writ jurisdiction of this Court in a case of this nature. 5. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this writ petition, which is hereby dismissed, but by directing the parties to bear their respective costs.