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2015 DIGILAW 490 (BOM)

Jaywant Govindrao Sanap v. Janki Shikshan Prasarak Sanstha

2015-02-16

Z.A.HAQ

body2015
Judgment 1. The writ petition is filed by the employee challenging the order passed by the School Tribunal dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner upholding the order of termination of his services by the respondent no.1 – Management. 2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner had been in the employment of the respondent no.1 – Management since 1999 and was promoted as the Headmaster of the School administered by the respondent no.1 – Society, on 1.7.2004. The Education Officer had granted approval to the promotion of the petitioner as the Headmaster of the School. The respondent no.1 – Management issued the statement of allegations to the petitioner on 27.10.2008 making 14 allegations against the petitioner. The petitioner had given his explanation in the matter, however, the respondent no.1 – Management was not satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner and decided to conduct enquiry. The respondent no.1 – Management nominated Sau. Shobha Digambar (President of the respondent no.1 – Society) as the Management's nominee and Shri Ramdas Narayan Murhekar (State Awardee Teacher) on the enquiry committee. The petitioner was informed about these appointments on the enquiry committee. The petitioner objected to the appointment of Shri Ramdas Narayan Murhekar on the enquiry committee on the ground that Shri Ramdas Narayan Murhekar had earlier threatened the petitioner in some matter which was mentioned in the letter dated 23.11.2008 which was sent by him to the President of the respondent no.1 – Society. The petitioner had communicated the name of his nominee on the enquiry committee, on 2.12.2008. The Chief Executive Officer of the respondent no.1 – Management issued the charge-sheet dated 5.12.2008. The petitioner had given his explanation to the charges, by the communication dated 16.12.2008. The enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and two members of the enquiry committee submitted their report and the nominee of the petitioner submitted his report separately. The respondent no.1 – Management issued the order on 25.2.2009 terminating the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 3.3.2009. The petitioner challenged the termination order before the School Tribunal. The School Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner and the petitioner being aggrieved by the order passed by the School Tribunal has filed the writ petition. 3. In the charge-sheet 14 charges were made against the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the termination order before the School Tribunal. The School Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner and the petitioner being aggrieved by the order passed by the School Tribunal has filed the writ petition. 3. In the charge-sheet 14 charges were made against the petitioner. After considering the material on the record, the Tribunal in paragraph no.17 of the impugned order has recorded that the charges referred in paragraph nos.13, 14 and 15 of the impugned order are found to be proved before the enquiry committee and the findings recorded by the two members of the enquiry committee in respect of those charges are based on the evidence on record. The Tribunal while examining as to whether other charges are proved or not has recorded that the other charges are not proved or they are not of such serious nature which warrant imposition of major punishment on the petitioner. 4. In paragraph no.13 of the impugned order the Tribunal has dealt with the following charges : (i) The petitioner had not held the meeting of the School Committee since 20042005. (ii) The petitioner had granted leave to the employees without their being any sanction by the School Committee. (iii) The petitioner had not taken prior permission or approval of the School Committee to purchase stationery and other material of the School. (iv) The petitioner enjoyed casual leave on 21.6.2007, 6.7.2007, 10.4.2008, 22.4.2008 and 23.4.2008 without giving leave applications and without sanction of the leave. (v) The petitioner enjoyed earned leave for the period from 24.7.2007 to 27.7.2007 without giving leave application and without getting sanction of leave from the Management. (vi) The petitioner did not supply information relating to the School administration to the Management. 5. The constitution of the School Committee, as per Rule 2 (1) (i) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules of 1981”) is provided in Schedule – “A” to the Rules of 1981. As per clause 2 (c) of the Schedule – “A” to the Rules of 1981, the head of the School is the ex-officio secretary of the School Committee. As per clause 2 (c) of the Schedule – “A” to the Rules of 1981, the head of the School is the ex-officio secretary of the School Committee. The charge levelled against the petitioner that he has not held the meeting of the School Committee since 2004-05 till 2008 appears to be based on the assumption that the petitioner was under an obligation to hold the meeting of the School Committee as required by clause 2 (e) of Schedule – “A” to the Rules of 1981. 6. As far as the charge against the petitioner that he had not held the meeting of the School Committee since 2004-2005, in the reply given by the petitioner to the statement of allegations, the petitioner specifically referred to the communication dated 30.5.2008 sent by him to the Management pointing out that the School Committee was not constituted. The respondent – Management has not been able to establish that the School Committee was constituted since 2004 and the petitioner had not held the meeting of the School Committee. The respondent-Management having failed to establish on the record that the School Committee was in existence since 2004-2005, the charge levelled against the petitioner in the record cannot be said to have been proved. The responsibilities of the head of the School are laid down in Rule 4 of the Rules of 1981. Rule 4 (1) of the Rules of 1981 lays down the responsibilities of the head of the school in the capacity of the academic head. Rule 4 (2) of the Rules of 1981 lays down the responsibilities of the head of the School in the capacity as the administrative head of the School. Even if the submission made on behalf of the respondent – Management that the petitioner neglected his responsibility of holding the meeting of the School Committee is to be accepted, the responsibilities of the head of the School as the administrative head are subject to the superintendence and control of the Management as laid down in Rule 4 (2) of the Rules of 1981. It is not the case of the respondent – Management that in spite of the instructions given by the Management to the petitioner to hold the meeting of the School Committee, the petitioner has not held the meeting of the School Committee. It is not the case of the respondent – Management that in spite of the instructions given by the Management to the petitioner to hold the meeting of the School Committee, the petitioner has not held the meeting of the School Committee. Thus, the charge levelled against the petitioner that he has neglected the duty of holding the meeting of the School Committee cannot be said to have been proved by the respondent-Management. 7. The respondent-Management has failed to establish that the School Committee was duly constituted and existed since 2004-2005 and therefore, the charges levelled against the petitioner that he granted leave to the employees without getting sanction of the School Committee and the petitioner had not taken prior permission or approval of the School Committee before purchasing the stationery and other material of the School cannot be said to have been proved by the respondent – Management. The School Tribunal has observed in paragraph no.13 of the impugned order that the petitioner should have communicated to the Management and requested the Management to constitute the School Committee. The observations of the School Tribunal show that even according to the Tribunal the respondent – Management has not established that the School Committee was duly constituted and was in existence since 2004-2005. In view of the above, the conclusions of the Tribunal that the charges in this regards against the petitioner are proved, are unsustainable. 8. In paragraph no.14 of the impugned order, the Tribunal has dealt with the charge made against the petitioner that he has enjoyed casual leave and earned leave without there being sanction to the leave. Rule 15 of the Rules of 1981 provides for the writing of confidential reports of the employees. Rule 15 (1) of the Rules of 1981 lays down that the confidential reports shall be written annually in the form in Schedule “G” to the Rules of 1981 and in respect of the head of the School confidential report is to be written by the Chief Executive Officer. Rule 15 (2) of the Rules of 1981 lays down that the confidential reports written as per Rule 15 (1) of the Rules of 1981 by the Chief Executive Officer shall be reviewed in case of head of the School by the President of the Management. Rule 15 (2) of the Rules of 1981 lays down that the confidential reports written as per Rule 15 (1) of the Rules of 1981 by the Chief Executive Officer shall be reviewed in case of head of the School by the President of the Management. Rule 15 (3) of the Rules of 1981 lays down that the reporting authority shall arrange to communicate confidentially in writing the adverse remarks, if any, to the concerned employee before the end of August every year. Rule 15 (4) of the Rules of 1981 lays down that the representation, if any, from the head of the School against the adverse remarks communicated to him shall be decided by the Managing Committee. Rule 15 (5) of the Rules of 1981 lays down that the failure to write and maintain confidential reports and to communicate adverse remarks to the employees before the end of August every year shall have the effect that the work of the employee concerned was satisfactory during the period under report. In the present case the respondent – Management has not placed on record any documents to show that Rule 15 of the Rules of 1981 was complied, that confidential reports of the petitioner were written, reviewed and the work of the petitioner having been found to be not satisfactory, adverse remarks were communicated to the petitioner. The respondent – Management has not placed any other correspondence on the record to show that the respondent – Management had disapproved the alleged act of the petitioner in the matter of enjoying the casual leave and earned leave without obtaining sanction of the leave. It is clear that the respondent – Management has failed to establish that the above referred alleged act of the petitioner was seriously taken by the respondent – Management and for which the respondent – Management could have taken the severe action against the petitioner. For the same reasons as recorded above i.e. the respondent – Management having failed to establish that Rule 15 of the Rules of 1981 was complied, the charge made against the petitioner that he had not supplied the information relating to the School administration to the Management cannot be said to have been proved. The Tribunal has overlooked the provisions of Rule 15 of the Rules of 1981 and therefore, the conclusions of the Tribunal are unsustainable. 9. The Tribunal has overlooked the provisions of Rule 15 of the Rules of 1981 and therefore, the conclusions of the Tribunal are unsustainable. 9. Shri A.S. Kilor the learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the order terminating the services of the petitioner is based on the enquiry report submitted by two members of the enquiry committee and the third member of the enquiry committee has not supported the conclusions of the two members. The learned Advocate has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court given in the case of Vidya Vikas Mandal and another...Versus…Education Officer and another, reported in 2007 (3) Mh. L.J. 801 and has submitted that the report is not in consonance with the provisions of Rule 37 (6) of the Rules of 1981 and therefore, the termination order issued on the basis of the report is illegal. ShriA.S. Mardikar, the learned Senior Advocate has submitted that though two members of the enquiry committee had submitted separate report and the third member of the enquiry committee has submitted the separate report, both the reports are of the same date i.e. 18.2.2009 and both the reports were submitted to the Management simultaneously. It is submitted that two different reports submitted by the members of the enquiry committee does not vitiate the decision of the enquiry Committee proceedings and the decision of the two members out of three members of the enquiry committee. It is submitted that the enquiry proceedings show that there were deliberations amongst the three members of the enquiry committee and after discussions two members of the enquiry committee have prepared separate report and the third member of the enquiry committee has prepared separate report and in these circumstances it cannot be said that mere submission of two different reports by the members of the enquiry committee vitiates the conclusions of the majority of the members of the enquiry committee and it cannot be acted upon. In my view the submission as made on behalf of the respondent – Management in this regards has to be accepted. The provisions of Rule 37 (6) of the Rules of 1981 are mandatory and the enquiry committee has to submit the report as laid down in the Rule. In my view the submission as made on behalf of the respondent – Management in this regards has to be accepted. The provisions of Rule 37 (6) of the Rules of 1981 are mandatory and the enquiry committee has to submit the report as laid down in the Rule. However, only because the members of the enquiry committee submit separate reports on the same date as in the present case, it cannot be said that the provisions of Rule 37 (6) of the Rules of 1981 are not followed. In the case of Vidya Vikas Mandal (Supra) the report was submitted by one member of the enquiry committee within the stipulated time of 10 days and the other two members of the enquiry committee had not submitted their report till the stipulated time was over and the Management acted as per the report of one member of the enquiry committee. In these facts the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the report of the enquiry committee was not in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 37 (6) of the Rules of 1981. In the present case, all the three members of the enquiry committee have submitted their reports, the reports are submitted on the same day and after deliberations and discussions amongst them. Merely because separate reports are submitted by the members of the enquiry committee, it cannot be said that the provisions of Rule 37 (6) of the Rules of 1981 are not complied with. The object of the Rule is that the three members of the enquiry committee should have deliberations and consider the material which has come on record in the enquiry and then submit the report. In the present case, it being undisputed that the three members of the enquiry committee had discussions and then two members of the enquiry committee submitted one report and the third member of the enquiry committee submitted the report separately but on the same date, in my view, there is sufficient compliance of the provisions of Rule 37 (6) of the Rules, 1981. 10. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the constitution of the enquiry committee was not proper inasmuch as Shri Ramdas Narayan Murhekar (State Awardee Teacher) who was appointed on the enquiry committee was biased against the petitioner. 10. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the constitution of the enquiry committee was not proper inasmuch as Shri Ramdas Narayan Murhekar (State Awardee Teacher) who was appointed on the enquiry committee was biased against the petitioner. However, in view of the findings recorded by me that the respondent – Management has failed to establish the charges made against the petitioner, the submission as made on behalf of the petitioner is not considered. 11. In view of the above, I hold that the respondent – Management has failed to prove the charges made against the petitioner and consequently the order terminating the services of the petitioner cannot be sustained and the order passed by the School Tribunal dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner has to be set aside. However, the petitioner has not pleaded that he was not gainfully employed during the period when his services were terminated. Therefore, the petitioner will not be entitled for the arrears of salary from 03.03.2009 till today. The petitioner will be entitled for continuity of service and all other benefits including notional increments. Hence, the following order. (i) The impugned order passed by the School Tribunal is set aside. (ii) The order issued by the respondent – Management on 25.2.2009 terminating the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 03.03.2009 is quashed. (iii) The respondent – Management shall reinstate the petitioner on the post of Headmaster of the School with continuity of service and all other benefits including notional increments. (iv) However, the petitioner is not entitled for the arrears of the salary for the period from 03.03.2009 till today. (v) Rule is made absolute in the above terms. In the circumstances, the parties to bear their own costs. At this stage, Shri S.G. Joshi, the learned Advocate for the respondent – Management prays that the operation and execution of the impugned order be stayed for eight weeks to enable the respondent – Management to take appropriate steps in the matter. Ms Sapkal, the learned Advocate for the petitioner opposes the request made on behalf of the respondent – Management. Considering the facts of the case and the findings recorded by me, in my view, the prayer as made on behalf of the respondent-Management is not required to be considered. The prayer is rejected.