JUDGMENT : Bansi Lal Bhat, J. 1. Aggrieved of the judgment of acquittal formulated by learned Principal Sessions Judge, Srinagar, on 4-11-2009 in Sessions case titled State v. Abdul Hameed Malik and another in FIR No. 73/2005 of Police Station, Sadder, for the offences under sections 302, 498-A and 120-B, Ranbir Penal Code, the State has preferred the instant acquittal appeal assailing the impugned judgment on the ground that finding of innocence recorded by the trial Court is erroneous as the evidence adduced by the prosecution at the trial has not been correctly appreciated and no credit has been attached to the dying declaration of the deceased which was reliable and trustworthy. The factual matrix unfolding prosecution version is that on 16-4-2005, appellant-Abdul Hameed Malik allegedly poured kerosene oil on Mst. Shaheena and set her ablaze. The deceased happened to be his sister-in-law. The deceased was making tea for respondent No. 1 in her kitchen at that time. She was removed to hospital with serious burn injuries by her husband Hilal Ahmad Katju. She was admitted in SMHS Hospital, Srinagar, with sixty per cent burn injuries covering her arms, chest, abdomen and other parts of the body. Her vain battle for survival proved abortive and she succumbed to her burn injuries on 17-7-2005. According to prosecution her dying declaration was recorded on 17-4-2005 after she was declared medically fit to make a statement. Based upon her dying declaration, charge under section 307, RPC was converted into charge under sections 302, 498-A and 120-B, RPC. Respondents, Abdul Hameed Malik and Mst. Khatji were put on trial after they pleaded not guilty to aforesaid charges. Prosecution appears to have exhausted whole list of witnesses at the trial to bring home the guilt to the accused. No evidence was adduced in defence. On consideration of evidence adduced by prosecution at the trial, the trial Court has passed the impugned judgment. 2. We have been taken through the record of the trial Court and we have also heard Mr. N.H. Shah, learned Additional Advocate General at length. 3. PWs Zahoor Ahmad, Abdul Karim, Mohammad Yousuf and Mymoona Khalid are the star witnesses of prosecution, who are cited as eye-witnesses to the alleged occurrence. We have minutely gone through their depositions before the trial Court. None of them has deposed that the deceased had nominated the respondents or either of them in setting her ablaze. 3. PWs Zahoor Ahmad, Abdul Karim, Mohammad Yousuf and Mymoona Khalid are the star witnesses of prosecution, who are cited as eye-witnesses to the alleged occurrence. We have minutely gone through their depositions before the trial Court. None of them has deposed that the deceased had nominated the respondents or either of them in setting her ablaze. These witnesses are unrelated to the victim as also to the accused, and it is not demonstrated that testimony of these witnesses suffers from any taintedness. Thus there could have been no reason for these witnesses to withhold truth and screen the culprits. It is significant to notice that PW Mst. Mymoona in categorical terms deposed that the deceased was crying that she had caught fire which was compatible with no other hypotheses than the one that the deceased was herself unaware of what happened to her. In the wake of testimony of these witnesses, it is difficult to accept the proposition advanced by learned AAG that the deceased was aware of the identity of perpetrator of crime. Having regard to the ordinary human behavior, deceased, when engulfed by flames threatening her existence, was expected while crying, to nominate the persons who had set her afire. It is repugnant to reason that even in such situation the deceased would, instead of nominating her tormentors, be heard crying as to what had happened to her and that she had caught fire. The only conclusion available on re-evaluation of testimony of these witnesses is that the direct evidence does not establish nexus of respondents with the alleged occurrence. 4. Once credit is attached to the testimony of these star witnesses, deposition of PWs Farooq Ahmad, Altaf Ahmad, Mohammad Ismail and Ghulam Mohammad Beigh, that the deceased had made an oral dying declaration in their presence implicating the respondents would not inspire confidence. If the deceased did not make such declaration implicating the accused spontaneously, when she was consumed by flames and screaming for being rescued, there is no reason to attach credit to the testimonies of these witnesses, who are related to the deceased that the deceased had implicated the respondents, when she subsequently spoke to them while admitted in SMHS Hospital. Their testimonies have to be discarded yet for one more reason. Their testimonies have to be discarded yet for one more reason. Had the deceased confided in them and attributed the crime to respondents, there was no reason for these witnesses to withhold the same from the police investigating the crime. Contemporary record of events, i.e., FIR and statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure, do not incorporate such implication coming from the mouths of these witnesses during investigation. The trial Court has rightly discarded their testimonies, and, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion reached at by the trial Court. This is apart from the fact that the testimony of investigating officer who reached the hospital soon after these witnesses claim to have learnt about the identity of culprits from the deceased, is emphatic on the point that the doctor had opined that the deceased was not in a fit state of mind to make a statement. 5. Yet another mode of proof relied upon by the prosecution was the dying declaration EXPW 18/1 attributed to deceased which is claimed to have been recorded on 17-4-2004. It is well settled that where a dying declaration is suspicious or result of tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination, it should not be acted upon without corroboration. Court has to be satisfied that such declaration was true and voluntary, and that it is absolutely safe to rely upon. In the instant case, the dying declaration is said to have been recorded in presence of PW Dr. Majid Jahangir, a P.G. student, after the deceased was declared fit to make the statement. However, Dr. Majid Jahangir has denied the factum of dying declaration of the deceased having been recorded in his presence. He is emphatic on the point that he did not hear or overhear the deceased as he was attending to other patients when HC Abdul Rashid was recording the statement of the deceased. That leaves the investigating officer as the sole witness to testify to the contents of dying declaration. Admittedly, the dying declaration was recorded on the day following the alleged occurrence. Respondent No. 1 was nominated as the person who set the deceased ablaze. Such nomination is attributed to the deceased which emanated from her mouth about 24 hours after the alleged occurrence. Learned trial court has noticed that the deceased in the intervening night had her family and close relatives around. Respondent No. 1 was nominated as the person who set the deceased ablaze. Such nomination is attributed to the deceased which emanated from her mouth about 24 hours after the alleged occurrence. Learned trial court has noticed that the deceased in the intervening night had her family and close relatives around. Thus, the probability of the deceased having been tutored and prompted could not be ruled out. This conclusion drawn by learned trial Court on appreciation of evidence does not warrant exception as it has hereinbefore been noticed that the deceased did not implicate the respondents when she was engulfed by flames. Four eye-witnesses examined at the trial to discharge the mode of proof through direct evidence had clearly established that the deceased did not nominate the respondents or either of them as having set her ablaze. 6. Viewed from this perspective, the conclusion arrived at by learned trial Court is the only conclusion available on fair scrutiny of evidence and no exception can be taken to the same. Learned trial Court was justified in holding that the dying declaration of deceased was highly unreliable and un-creditworthy. Besides, such declaration was not corroborated in material particulars by any independent evidence. Thus, legal proof to establish nexus of respondents with the alleged occurrence was abysmally lacking. 7. All modes of proof relied upon by prosecution having failed to connect the respondents with the alleged occurrence; we find no substantial and compelling reasons to take a view other than the one taken by the trial Court on appreciation of prosecution evidence recorded at the trial. The findings recorded by the trial Court cannot be even termed erroneous much-less perverse. We concur with the judgment of acquittal formulated by learned trial Court. This criminal acquittal appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. Registry is directed to remit the record to the trial court.