JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Suman Shyam, J. Heard Mr. A. Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. K.K. Bhatra, learned counsel assisted by Mr. R. K. Bhatra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 03.09.2013 passed by the learned District Judge, Jorhat in Title Appeal No. 2/2013 dismissing the appeal preferred under Section 96 read with Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 04.02.2013 passed in Title Suit No. 25/2012 rejecting the plaint filed by the appellant as plaintiff by taking recourse of Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, the present appellant has approached this Court by filing instant second appeal. 3. The facts leading to filing of the Title Suit No. 25/2012 is that the respondent bank had earlier issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security interest Act, 2002 (hereafter referred to as SARFAESI). By the said notice dated 03.02.2012 issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI, the respondent bank (Union Bank of India) had made a demand on the appellant/plaintiff to pay up the amount due to the bank upon the loan account becoming NPA. On receipt of the notice, the appellant/plaintiff did not file any objection against the same. On the contrary the plaintiff had approached the Court of learned Civil Judge, Jorhat by filing Title Suit No. 25/2012 inter alia praying for a declaration that the notice issued by the respondent bank was illegal, void and inoperative in law; a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking over possession of the property belonging to the plaintiffs; a temporary injunction in terms of the prayer made above and for other consequential reliefs. 4. From the pleadings contained in the plaint, it is apparent that the appellant/plaintiff has admitted the fact that he has availed loan from the respondent bank to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000/- (One lakh fifty thousand) by way of cash credit facility based on an application made by him. It has also been admitted that the respondent bank had disbursed the loan amount as requested by the appellant/plaintiff. 1,50,000/- (One lakh fifty thousand) by way of cash credit facility based on an application made by him. It has also been admitted that the respondent bank had disbursed the loan amount as requested by the appellant/plaintiff. However, the basic dispute sought to be raised in the plaint appears to be one pertaining to certain discrepancies in the account maintained by the respondent bank whereby, the plaintiff has questioned the demand made by the bank on the ground that the repayment already made by him has not been properly reflected in the account maintained by the bank. 5. The respondents/defendants entered appearance in the aforesaid Title Suit and raised an objection regarding maintainability of the suit on the ground that the suit itself was barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. Taking note of such plea of the respondent bank, the learned trial Court had passed order dated 04-02-2013 rejecting the plaint by taking recourse to Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. The said order passed by the learned trial court was carried in an appeal being Title Appeal No. 2/2013 which was also dismissed by the learned District Judge, Jorhat on 03.09.2013. Undeterred by the judgment and order dated 03.09.2013 the plaintiff as appellant has preferred the instant second appeal. 6. Mr. Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the plaintiff's case, as would emerge from a reading of the plaint, is one of fraud having been committed by the respondent bank. The plaintiff has specifically pleaded that as against the disbursement of an amount of Rs. 1,55,374/- the plaintiff had already repaid an amount of Rs. 1,05,300/- and the outstanding against him in the Bank Statement dated 04.04.2006 had been shown as Rs. 50,074/-. As per the bank Statement dated 02.05.2006 the outstanding amount against the plaintiff was shown as Rs. 75,612/-. The Bank Manager had closed the Cash Credit account on 30.06.2006 but under the Notice dated 03.02.2012, the Bank is now claiming an amount of Rs. 2,40,187/- which demand has been made by ignoring the fact that after closing the account on 30.06.2006, the plaintiff had paid an amount of Rs. 6,60,000/- and therefore, nothing more was due and payable by the plaintiff to the bank. However, deliberately suppressing such re-payment made by the plaintiff, the bank had issued the demand Notice in a most fraudulent manner. According to Mr. 6,60,000/- and therefore, nothing more was due and payable by the plaintiff to the bank. However, deliberately suppressing such re-payment made by the plaintiff, the bank had issued the demand Notice in a most fraudulent manner. According to Mr. Ahmed since the question of fraud committed by the bank would have to be determined by the Court by resorting to a threadbare investigation based on proper appreciation of evidence, hence, it is the Civil Court which alone would have the jurisdiction to decide the same. 7. By relying upon a judgment and decision of this Court dated 08.09.2014 rendered in the case of Bank of Baroda Vs. Ranjan Chetia and Ors in (CRP No. 187/2013) Mr. Ahmed submits that it has already been held by this Court that when fraud is alleged, the suit filed by the plaintiff would be maintainable before the Civil Court and the bar of Section 34 of the SARFAESI would not come into play in such a case. 8. Mr. Ahmed has further submitted that under the Provision of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution Act 1993, the bank cannot institute a recovery proceeding before the DRT for an amount which is less than Rs. 10 lakhs. Therefore, the DRT would not have the jurisdiction to entertain any plea raised by the bank since the amount in dispute is less than Rs. 10 lakhs and such issues would be triable only by a Civil Court. He, therefore, submits that the learned Court below had committed error in exercising the jurisdiction vested by law by holding that the plaintiff suit was not maintainable in the eye of law. 9. Per-Contra, Mr. K.K. Bhatra, learned counsel for the respondents, while supporting the judgment and order under appeal, submits that in the instant case, the bank had merely issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI, making a demand before the appellant/plaintiff. No precipitate action as contemplated by Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI has yet been initiated by the bank. Therefore, the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff besides being barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI is also a premature one. Mr. No precipitate action as contemplated by Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI has yet been initiated by the bank. Therefore, the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff besides being barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI is also a premature one. Mr. Bhatra further submits that in the event the bank proceeds to take further action under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI, the appellant would have adequate remedy under Section 17 of the Act in preferring an appeal before the DRT which forum has been vested with sufficient powers to look into the entire gamut of grievances that may be raised by any of the parties including even a 3rd party and pass appropriate orders for redressal of such grievances. In that view of the matter, there was no scope for the appellant to approach the Civil Court by filing the instant suit. 10. By referring to a judgment and decision of the Bombay High Court dated 24.04.2014 rendered in the case of Smt. Savita Bhagwantrao Patil and Anr. Vs. Shyam Pukhraj Asopa and Ors., Mr. Bhatra submits that it is settled law that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a civil suit questioning any action taken by the secured creditor under Section 13 of the SARFAESI has been expressedly barred under section 34 of the Act. Even in the case of Jagdish Singh Vs. Heeralal and Ors Reported in (2014) 1 SCC 479 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in clear terms that the Civil Courts jurisdiction is completely barred as regards measures taken by the secured creditor under Sub-Section 4 of Section 13 of the SARFAESI . Referring to a Division Bench judgment and decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of State Bank of India Vs. Smt. Jigishaben B. Sanghabi and Ors dated 08.12.2010 in Appeal No. 244/2010 Mr. Bhatra further submits that the various provision of the SARFAESI provides ample safeguard to the interest of aggrieved parties against the measures taken by the secured creditor under Sub-Section 4 of Section 13 and the Tribunal has been empowered to determine whether any action taken by the secured creditor was in accordance with the provision of the Act and Rules made thereunder. 11. I have considered the submissions made by and on behalf of both the parties. 11. I have considered the submissions made by and on behalf of both the parties. The basic argument of the appellant is that the case projected in the plaint is one of fraud committed by the bank and therefore as per the law declared by this Court in the case of Bank of Baroda (supra) the suit filed by the plaintiff was maintainable in the eye of law. 12. Section 34 of the SARFASEI provides that civil court not to have jurisdiction. Section 34 reads as follows:- "34.Civil Court not to have jurisdiction-No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)." 13. Further, section 17 of the SARFAESI provides a right to appeal to any person aggrieved by any measure initiated under section 13[4] of the Act of SARFAESI by the secured creditor. Section 17 is quoted herein below :- "17. Right to appeal (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation : For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management of the business to the borrower or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower, it may by order, declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditors as invalid and restore the possession of the secured assets to the borrower or restore the management of the business to the borrower, as the case may be, and pass such order as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13. (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt. (5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application: PROVIDED that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1). (6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5), any part to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the rules made thereunder." 14. While examining the scope and ambit of section 34 of the SARFASEI in the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Union Bank of India and Ors. Reported in (2004) 4 SCC 311 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in paragraph 50 as follows:- "50. It has also been submitted that an appeal is entertain able before the Debt Recovery Tribunal only after such measures as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 13 are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain any proceeding in respect of a matter which the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. Thus before any action or measure is taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13, it is submitted by Mr. Salve one of the counsel for respondents that there would be no bar to approach the civil court. Therefore, it cannot be said no remedy is available to the borrowers. We, however, find that this contention as advanced by Shri Salve is not correct. A full reading of section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debt Recovery Tribunal or appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action taken "or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act". That is to say the prohibition covers even matters which can be taken cognizance of by the Debt Recovery Tribunal though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. That is to say the prohibition covers even matters which can be taken cognizance of by the Debt Recovery Tribunal though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. It is further to be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter in respect of which an action may be taken even later on, the civil court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof. The bar of civil court thus applies to all such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13." 15. In the case of Jagdish Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed as follows:- "25. We are of the view that the civil court jurisdiction is completely barred, so far as the "measure" taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, against which an aggrieved person has a right of appeal before the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal to determine as to whether there has been any illegality in the "measures" taken. The bank, in the instant case, has proceeded only against secured assets of the borrowers on which no rights of Respondent Nos.6 to 8 have been crystallised, before creating security interest in respect of the secured assets." 16. In the case of Smt. Savita Bhagwantrao Patil (Supra) the substantial question of law arising before the Court was "Whether the Courts below were right in holding that the suit claimed the consequential reliefs of injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from dispossessing the appellant/plaintiffs from the suit property is barred by provision of Section 34 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act 2002?" On an in-depth analysis of the various judgments and decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as different High Courts, the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court had concluded as follows:- "40. The principle that emerges from the in-depth discussion is that, if remedy is made available statutorily, it must be exhausted first before the Civil Court of ordinary jurisdiction can be approached upon afore-emphasized grounds. The principle that emerges from the in-depth discussion is that, if remedy is made available statutorily, it must be exhausted first before the Civil Court of ordinary jurisdiction can be approached upon afore-emphasized grounds. Conclusion is that when the remedy is specifically made available and specific remedy of injunction is carved out of the ordinary jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the special statute, such statutory remedy has to be exhausted first by the parties in accordance with special statutory provisions and then only the aggrieved party may approach the Civil Court if there was violation of fundamental judicial procedure or if process of law was abused by the statutory forum/Tribunal or that it acted in violation of the provisions of the Statute. This being the position, if, in view of averment in the plaint, the plaintiffs have statutory remedy, the plaintiffs must first approach the statutory forum for an order of injunctive reliefs available under the Statute against the respondents including the Bank concerned. Scheme and Object/Purport of the SARFAESI Act lead us to the above conclusion. Hence, no interference is required in the impugned judgments and orders in the facts and circumstances of the case. The substantial question of is answered accordingly." 17. Again the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Panna Lal Bhansali Vs. Axis Bank Ltd. (M/s) and Ors Reported in 2012 2 GLT 562 has held that a suit challenging the action taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI would be debarred under Section 34 of the Act and the correct forum for seeking remedy would be the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. By referring to various decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Division Bench of this Court had observed in the case of Panna Lal Bhansali (supra) in paragraph 47 as follows:- "47. But the SARFAESI Act places the Tribunal, constituted there under, on a different footing altogether, for, in the SARFAESI Act, power of the Tribunal has been enlarged so much so that Tribunal has been authorised to exercise its jurisdiction over all the matters covered by the SARFAESI Act, and has been empowered to grant all such reliefs as facts and circumstances of a particular case demand. Our foregoing discussion makes such a position more than clear and same needs no further reiteration here. Our foregoing discussion makes such a position more than clear and same needs no further reiteration here. Being so, decision, relied on is inapplicable to the case in hand." 18. Dealing with the scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act, Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed in the case of Mardia Chemicals (supra) as follows:- "We may like to observe that proceedings under Section 17 of the Act, in fact are not appellate proceedings. It seems to be a misnomer. In fact it is the initial action which is brought before a Forum as prescribed under the Act, raising grievance against the action or measures taken by one of the parties to the contract. It is the stage of initial proceeding like filing a suit in civil court. As a matter of fact proceedings under Section 17 of the Act are in lieu of a civil suit which remedy is ordinarily available but for the bar under Section 34 of the Act in the present case. We may refer to a decision of this Court reported in (1974) 2 SCC 393 Smt. Ganga Bai Vs. Vijay Kumar and Ors. where in respect of original and appellate proceedings a distinction has been drawn as follows:- "There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of civil nature and unless one's choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous to claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute." 19. In the case of State Bank of India (Supra) the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has further observed as follows:- "The Securitization Act provides a comprehensive scheme, under which initially upon a notice being served under Sub-section (2) of Section 13, a remedy is provided, to raise an objection, to the borrower. In the case of State Bank of India (Supra) the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has further observed as follows:- "The Securitization Act provides a comprehensive scheme, under which initially upon a notice being served under Sub-section (2) of Section 13, a remedy is provided, to raise an objection, to the borrower. The objection has to be considered by the secured creditor and reasons for non-acceptance have to be communicated. No cause of action accrues to challenge the action of the secured creditor at that stage. Once a measure is adopted Sub-section (4) of Section 13, the Act provides for a remedy of an appeal under Section 17. The scheme which is enunciated under the Act cannot be rendered nugatory by seeking recourse to the jurisdiction either of a Civil Court or, for that matter, in adopting a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution at the stage where notice is issued under Section 13(2). A challenge at the stage of a notice under Section 13(2) is not envisaged by the legislation and to allow it at that stage is to defeat the law. Such a challenge is barred. When the law expressly contemplates a challenge to a measure taken under Section 13(4) and a challenge before the Tribunal, it bars a challenge at an anterior stage and a challenge before any forum other than that created for hearing an appeal under Section 17 after a measure is taken. Once a measure is adopted under Section 13(4), a statutory remedy is provided not only to the borrower but to any person aggrieved by the taking of a measure. While enquiring into an appeal under Section 17, the Tribunal is empowered to determine whether the action which is taken by the secured creditor is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the action was invalid, it is vested with wide powers, including both to restore the management of the business or restoration of the possession to the borrower and to pass such orders as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to the recourse taken by a secured creditor under Sub-section (4) of Section 13. When a person other than a borrower is aggrieved by a measure taken by the secured creditor under Sub-section (4) of Section 13, a remedy is equally made statutorily available to such a person." 20. The ratio of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Division bench of this court as well as the Bombay High Courts in the aforementioned decisions leaves no manner of doubt that the Appellate Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI would be fully competent and empowered to deal with the grievances of the borrower or even a third party that may arise out of any action taken by the Secured Creditor under Section 13[4] of the SARFAESI and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain disputes arising in respect thereof would be barred under Section 34 of the Act of SARFAESI. A reading of section 17(3) of the Act of SARFAESI goes to show that the Tribunal would be entitled to receive evidence produced by the parties for the purpose of determining any disputed question of fact and after examining the facts and circumstances of the case if it comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in section 13(4) taken by the secured creditor is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder then it can pass orders inter-alia for restoration of the secured assets to the borrower. 21. In paragraph 51 of the judgment rendered in the case of Mardia Chemicals (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has, however, recognised limited jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or is claimed to be so absurd and untenable which may not required any further probe. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 51 is quoted below:- "51. However, to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or their claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe, whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the civil court in the cases of English mortgages. We find such a scope having been recognised in the two decisions of the Madras High Court which have been relied upon heavily by the learned Attorney General as well appearing for the Union of India, namely Vs. Narasimhachariar (supra) p.135 at p.141 and 144, a judgment of the learned single Judge where it is observed as follows in para 22: "22. The remedies of a mortgagor against the mortgagee who is acting in violation of the rights, duties and obligations are twofold in character. The mortgagor can come to the Court before sale with an injunction for staying the sale if there are materials to show that the power of sale is being exercised in a fraudulent or improper manner contrary to the terms of the mortgage. But the pleadings in an action for restraining a sale by mortgagee must clearly disclose a fraud or irregularity on the basis of which relief is sought: 'Adams Vs. Scott, (1859) 7 WR (Eng.) 213 (Z49). I need not point out that this restraint on the exercise of the power of sale will be exercised by Courts only under the limited circumstances mentioned above because otherwise to grant such an injunction would be to cancel one of the clauses of the deed to which both the parties had agreed and annul one of the chief securities on which persons advancing moneys on mortgages rely. (See Rashbehary Ghose Law of Mortgages, Vol.II, Fourth Edn., page 784)." 22. In the case of Panna lal Banshali (supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has further observed in paragraph 59 that under some extra ordinary situation and circumstances, the Civil Court can still exercise jurisdiction over the matter, although, such matters may otherwise be kept beyond the purview of the Civil Court by some special enactments. However, in order to avail the jurisdiction of Civil Court in such cases, it will be incumbent upon the plaintiff to make out a case showing existence of such conditions. 23. However, in order to avail the jurisdiction of Civil Court in such cases, it will be incumbent upon the plaintiff to make out a case showing existence of such conditions. 23. From the aforesaid observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as the Division Bench of this court, it is thus, apparent that a civil suit challenging any of the measures initiated by the secured creditor under section 13[4] of the SARFASEI may be maintainable only if a clear case is made out falling within the ambit of the exceptions carved out in paragraph 51 of Mardia Chemicals (supra). If the plaint discloses full material facts and particulars of fraud depicting on the face of the record that the measures initiated by the secured creditor was being actuated by deliberate deception with a design for taking an unfair advantage upon the borrower raising as issue that goes into the root of the matter and if it can be readily inferred that the Tribunal under section 17 of the Act SARFAESI would not have the jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for in the suit, a civil suit would be maintainable. 24. In the instant case a bare reading of the pleadings contained in the plaint goes to show that the appellant/plaintiff has admitted that he had availed the loan from the respondent bank but claims that the amount had been repaid by him. The dispute raised by the appellant/plaintiff appears to be one pertaining to the entries made in the account maintained by the bank. Save and except using the term "fraudulent" in paragraph 8 of the plaint, the plaintiff has failed to plead the material facts and particulars of the alleged fraud so as to meet requirement of Order 6, Rule 4 of the CPC. The pleadings contained in the plaint, taken together, at best makes out a case of fudging of account. The question as to whether the Cash Credit Account had been properly maintained by the bank by correctly making entries therein is certainly a question of fact that can be examined by the Tribunal in exercise of power under Section 17 of the Act of SARFAESI as and when the occasion arises. The question as to whether the Cash Credit Account had been properly maintained by the bank by correctly making entries therein is certainly a question of fact that can be examined by the Tribunal in exercise of power under Section 17 of the Act of SARFAESI as and when the occasion arises. Therefore, the dispute raised in the civil suit is obviously a matter that can be determined by the appellate Tribunal in exercise of powers under section 17 and as such in view of what has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 50 of Mardia Chemicals (supra) the civil court could not have entertained such disputes due to the bar contemplated under section 34 of SARFAESI. 25. That apart, it is also the admitted position of fact that except for issuing the Notice dated 03.02.2012 under section 13[2] of the SARFAESI, the bank has not initiated any measure under section 13[4] of the Act of SARFAESI till date. The Notice issued under section 13[2] of the SARFAESI is merely a demand made by the secured creditor calling upon the borrower to discharge his liabilities to the secured credit within the period mentioned therein. If the grievance of the plaintiff is pertaining to the correctness of the amount demanded under the notice then the right course of action would have been to raise an objection under section 13[3A] of the Act so as to enable the secured creditor to reflect upon such objection and communicate its decision in respect thereof within the statutory period. Since the communication of the decision by the secured creditor is mandated by the statute itself hence, it is only upon receipt of such communication from the secured creditor that the borrower would know where he stands in the matter. However, in the present case the appellant/plaintiff has admittedly not raised any such objection against the Notice dated 03.02.2012 and instead had straight away approached the civil court by filing the suit. Even under the SARFAESI, the cause of action for the borrower to prefer an appeal under section 17 would arise only when the secured creditor initiates any of the measures contemplated under section 13[4] of the Act. Therefore, it is obvious that there was no cause of action for the appellant/plaintiff to institute the Title Suit No. 25 of 2012. Even under the SARFAESI, the cause of action for the borrower to prefer an appeal under section 17 would arise only when the secured creditor initiates any of the measures contemplated under section 13[4] of the Act. Therefore, it is obvious that there was no cause of action for the appellant/plaintiff to institute the Title Suit No. 25 of 2012. Permitting a borrower to approach the civil court seeking order of injunction merely upon receipt of notice issued by the secured creditor under section 13[2] of the SARFAESI would render the provisions of section 13 of the SARFAESI as wholly otiose. 26. In the case of Bank of Baroda (supra) this Court had observed that the complaint made by the plaintiff therein was to the affect that although he had never availed any loan facility from the bank, yet the officials of the concerned bank in collusion with another person had forged his signatures and thereafter put the entire loan liability upon the plaintiff by indulging in fraud. The learned Single Judge, after a threadbare discussion of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the law applicable therein, had found that the plaintiff had pleaded full material facts and particulars so as to make out a clear case of fraud falling within the ambit of the exception carved out by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mardia Chemical (supra). Therefore, the ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Bank of Baroda (supra) would be of no assistance to the appellant/plaintiff in facts and circumstances of this case. 27. In view of the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs I am of the view that the present appeal is devoid of any merit. The judgment and decision rendered by the Court below does not suffer from any infirmity and as such, there is no substantial question of law that arises for decision in this second appeal. 28. In the result, this second appeal stands dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost.