JUDGMENT : Hasnain Massodi, J. 1. These are two Appeals under Article 12, Letters Patent Appeal Act, directed against Writ Court judgment dated 25th February 2015, dismissing in limine writ petitions, being OWP No. 216/2015 and No. 220/2015, titled M/s. G.M. Trading Company and others v. State of J & K and others, and M/s. Associated Business Corporation and others v. State of J & K and others. Writ petitions, though pleading different grounds to question order of Technical Evaluation Committee, declaring bids submitted to be non-responsive, were taken up together as controversy raised related to same tendering process. Letters Patent Appeals on hand are, therefore, also taken up along for consideration. Appeals arise in following background. Director General of Police, J & K - respondent No. 2 herein, vide NIT No. 12 of 2014, dated 4th June 2014, invited offers from original manufacturers or their authorised dealers with proper authorisation for supply of uniforms and other items for use of personnel of respondent department. Notice provided for dual bid system. Those interested to make requisite supply were, therefore, to offer technical bid and price bid separately. Technical bids were to be opened on 7th August 2014, whereafter price bids of such aspirants, who crossed technical bid stage, were to be opened, comparative statement of prices quoted made and contract allotted in accordance with rules. 2. The technical bids submitted by the Appellants in LPA No. 25/2015, were declared responsive and therefore, their price bids decided to be opened and considered alongside price bids made by other successful contractors. Technical bids made by the Appellants in LPA No. 21/2015 were declared non-responsive and therefore, they excluded from tendering process. 3. Appellants in LPA No. 21/2015, aggrieved with their exclusion from tendering process, filed writ petition, being OWP No. 1474/2014. Other bidders chased out from tendering process on the ground that their technical, bids were non-responsive, also questioned their exclusion in different writ petitions in both Wings of High Court. One of such writ petition, being OWP No. 1597/2014. Writ petition registered as OWP No. 1474/2014 was disposed of vide order dated 30th December 2014 with an observation that respondents, in view of decision taken to revisit the issue, were expected to conduct technical evaluation afresh. One of such writ petition, being OWP No. 1597/2014. Writ petition registered as OWP No. 1474/2014 was disposed of vide order dated 30th December 2014 with an observation that respondents, in view of decision taken to revisit the issue, were expected to conduct technical evaluation afresh. It was observed that decision taken by respondents to go for fresh technical evaluation, may help bidders earlier excluded from tendering process, to participate in the tendering process, have their price bids opened and considered. Other writ petitions, involving same issue, were disposed of in terms of order, whereby OWP No. 1474/2014 was disposed of. 4. Respondents, acting on assurance extended to Writ court, appointed a fresh Technical Evaluation Committee comprising of Chief Accounts Officer, Dy. S.P., Sub Inspector (Provisions), Senior Prosecuting Officer. The Committee was to conduct technical evaluation afresh. Technical Evaluation Committee, on fresh consideration, reiterated decision as regards appellants in LPA No. 21/2015. In other words, their technical bids were rejected and they held not entitled to have their price bids opened and considered. Appellants in LPA No. 25/2015, earlier held to be responsive, and therefore, entitled to have their price bids opened and considered, were also held to be disqualified from participating in tendering process and have their price bids opened and considered. 5. Appellants in LPA No. 25/2015 as well as LPA No. 21/2015, questioned Technical Evaluation Committee order and decision taken by State Level Purchase Committee pursuant to order, in writ petitions OWP No. 216/2015 and 220/2015. 6. Appellants in LPA No. 25/2015 contended that once their bids were earlier declared responsive and they entitled to have their price bids opened and considered, respondents were estopped from declaring their bids non-responsive and thereby excluded from tendering process. It was contended that entire exercise was to confer benefit on their competitors, notwithstanding the fact that price proved by appellants was far less than price quoted by other competitors. Appellants in LPA No. 21/2015 were aggrieved that respondents ignoring the stand taken before Writ Court in OWP No. 1474/2014, in effect avoided to revisit the Technical Evaluation Committee decision and consider their technical bids afresh. It was pointed out that decision taken merely reiterated decision already taken. Emphasis was placed on order dated 30th December 2014, whereby OWP No. 1474/2014 was disposed of and respondents were held to have decided to revisit the issue. It was pointed out that decision taken merely reiterated decision already taken. Emphasis was placed on order dated 30th December 2014, whereby OWP No. 1474/2014 was disposed of and respondents were held to have decided to revisit the issue. It is urged that once respondents found Appellant's grievance genuine, it was not open to them to reject their technical bids on the same ground that earlier led to their rejection. Respondents in reply to OWP No. 216/2015, pleaded that once respondents, decided to revisit the entire issue and conduct fresh technical evaluation, respondents were free to go for technical evaluation of all technical bids afresh including technical bids that were earlier found to be responsive. It was stated that having regard to allegations levelled by some of aspirants for contract in question, it was decided to conduct technical evaluation of all technical bids and on such evaluation, appellants' bid was found to be non-responsive as bids submitted were not complying with requirements of NIT dated 4th June 2014. 7. The replies detailed discrepancies detected in technical bids submitted by the Appellants. The claim in OWP No. 220/2015 was resisted by respondents on the ground that Appellants' technical bid was rightly rejected as they failed to furnish "Original Test Reports" to respondents. It was stated that even where aspirants for contract in question uploaded scanned copy of all relevant documents including "Test Reports", it was nonetheless necessary to furnish original "Test Reports", so as to render documents uploaded creditworthy. It was pleaded that the Appellants did not have right to have contract allotted in their favour and right, if any, was only to have technical bids evaluated in a fair and non-arbitrary manner. Appellants having failed to adhere to terms and conditions of NIT. They, according to respondents, were not left with any grievance, entitling them to invoke writ jurisdiction of the Court. 8. Learned Writ Court did not find merit in case projected by the Appellants in writ petitions - OWP No. 216/2015 and No. 220/2015 respectively. Learned Single Judge took the view that once official respondents decided to revisit Technical Evaluation Committee report and to constitute new Technical Evaluation Committee with the mandate to give a fresh look to Technical Evaluation Committee report, it was open to Committee, so constituted, not only to examine the report vis-a-vis bids taken to be non-responsive but also bids earlier declared responsive. Grievance voiced by the Appellants in LPA No. 25/2015, therefore, was held by learned Single Judge, to be grossly misplaced. Learned Single Judge opined that as appellant did not furnish VAT clearance certificates along with tender documents required under terms and conditions laid down in NIT and therefore did not comply with the NIT, they had no right to question rejection of their bids. Learned Judge, on thorough perusal of record, found private respondent to have complied with terms and conditions of tender in letter and spirit and therefore, rightly accorded consideration and allotted supply contracts. It was next pointed out that as neither any mala fides were alleged against respondents nor any particulars in this regard brought to notice of the Court, there was no reason to interfere on such ground. Commenting on case set up by the Appellants that rates quoted by them were lower than rates quoted by private respondents and therefore they had a right to be allotted contract. Learned Single Judge held that rates quoted were not the only criteria to award contract. The tendering authority, it was held, was to consider host of factors like track record of an aspirant, for contracts, previously executed, taken over in preceding years, including payment of tax due and public interest at large while according contract. Appellants, therefore, according to learned Single Judge, had no reason to allege discrimination. 9. Appellants in LPA No. 21/2015 were found by learned Single Judge not to have manually furnished original "Test Reports' along with EMD and tender fee as required in terms of notice inviting tenders. Learned Single Judge did not find any merit in the claim made by appellants, that they by uploading scanned copy of "Test Report" had substantially complied with requirement of NIT and failure to manually handover copy of "Test Report" was not fatal to their right to be considered for allotment of contract. The lapse admittedly made by Appellants, according to Writ Court, was not a minor deviation to be ignored and condoned. 10. The facts of M/s. Poddar Steel Corporation v. M/s. Ganesh Engineering Works, AIR 1991 SC 1579 , relied upon by learned counsel for Appellants, were held to be distinguishable from facts of the case before the Court. The lapse admittedly made by Appellants, according to Writ Court, was not a minor deviation to be ignored and condoned. 10. The facts of M/s. Poddar Steel Corporation v. M/s. Ganesh Engineering Works, AIR 1991 SC 1579 , relied upon by learned counsel for Appellants, were held to be distinguishable from facts of the case before the Court. It was pointed out that in reported case, discretion vested in tendering authority to waive technical condition was recognised, though emphasising that such discretion would not extend to an essential condition. Rejecting contention that decision to deny the impugned decision, was violative of principles of natural justice inasmuch as they were not afforded an opportunity to comply with Condition No. 26 of NIT, it was held that as consequences of non-compliance of essential conditions laid down in NIT, were notified with sufficient clarity in Clause No. 26 of NIT, appellants could not insist on right of being heard before rejection of their technical bid. 11. Writ Court judgment dated 25th February 2015 is question in Letters Patent Appeals on hand almost on similar grounds pleaded before Writ Court. Appellants insist that Writ Court has not appreciated grounds urged, in right perspective and overlooked some of important pleas raised in writ petitions. 12. Appellants in LPA No. 25/2015 claim to have appended all requisite information with their bids and there was no reason to declare their bids non-responsive. Learned Single Judge is said to have misinterpreted Condition 26 of NIT and wrongly held Appellants not to have fulfilled conditions laid down in tender notice. Appellants in LPA No. 21/2015 reiterate that order dated 30th December 2014, was observed in breach. Writ Court judgment, it is pleaded, ignores settled legal position as regards scope of judicial review in the matter of contracts and distinction between non-compliance of essential and collateral/non-essential, conditions laid down in notice inviting tenders. 13. We have gone through impugned judgment. We have gone through memo of Appeals and writ record. We have heard learned counsel for parties at length. 14. Scope of judicial review in tender matters and contracts, is limited. The Court, approached by an aggrieved party, is not to assume role of Appellate Court and sit in appeal over decision taken by contract awarding authority, so as to find out whether decision taken was right. We have heard learned counsel for parties at length. 14. Scope of judicial review in tender matters and contracts, is limited. The Court, approached by an aggrieved party, is not to assume role of Appellate Court and sit in appeal over decision taken by contract awarding authority, so as to find out whether decision taken was right. All that is required to be considered is whether decision impugned is arbitrary, irrational, suffers from procedural irregularity or is tainted with mala fides. In other words, Court is not to examine the decision but decision making process. 15. Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and others, (2002 (2) SCC 617), has commented on ambit and scope of judicial review in contract matters in following words: "7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority 1979 (3) SCC 488 ), Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India 1981 (1) SCC 568 ), Assistant Collector, Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., 1985 (1) SCC 260 : 1984 (2) SCALE 819 ), Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 (6) SCC 651 : 1995 (1) Arb. LR 193), Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra 1997 (1) SCC 134 : 1996 (8) SCALE 417 ), and Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. 1999 (1) SCC 492 : 1999 (1) Arb. LR 431 (SC). The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are of paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amendable to judicial review, the Count can examine the decision making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision making process the Court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene." Law on subject was reiterated in Maa Binda Express Carrier and another v. Northeast Frontier Railway and others, AIR 2014 SC 390 . It reads:- The scope of judicial review in matters relating to award of contract by the State and its instrumentalities is settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. While these decisions clearly recognize that power exercised by the Government and its instrumentalities in regard to allotment of contract is subject to judicial review at the instance of an aggrieved party, submission of a tender in response to a notice inviting such tenders is no more than making an offer which the State or its agencies are under no obligation to accept. The bidders participating in the tender process cannot, therefore, insist that their tenders should be accepted simply because a given tender is the highest or lowest depending upon whether the contract is for sale of public property or for execution of works on behalf of the Government. All that participating bidders are entitled to is a fair, equal and non-discriminatory treatment in the matter of evaluation of their tenders. All that participating bidders are entitled to is a fair, equal and non-discriminatory treatment in the matter of evaluation of their tenders. It is also fairly well-settled that award of a contract is essentially a commercial transaction which must be determined on the basis of consideration that are relevant to such commercial decision. This implies that terms subject to which tenders are invited are not open to the judicial scrutiny unless it is found that the same have been tailor made to benefit any particular tenderer or class of tenderers. So also the authority inviting tenders can enter into negotiations or grant relaxation for bona fide and cogent reasons provided such relaxation is permissible under the terms governing the tender process." 16. Supreme Court in Siemens Aktiengeselischaft and Siemens Limited v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited and others, ( 2014 (11) SCC 288 ), had once again an occasion to deliberate upon scope and extent of judicial review in tender matters. Decision taken by Delhi Metro Rail Corporation to evaluate technical bids without validation of GEC values (energy efficiency values), was questioned by unsuccessful bidders on the ground that validation of GEC was an essential condition in evaluation of technical bids. It quoted with approval following observation in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, 2007 (14) SCC 517. "A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is a bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes." The Court re-emphasizing that judicial review in tender matters and award of contracts had its limitations, observed: "23.. What the Court has to constantly keep in mind is that it does not sit in appeal over the soundness of the decision. The Court can only examine whether the decision-making process was fair, reasonable and transparent. What the Court has to constantly keep in mind is that it does not sit in appeal over the soundness of the decision. The Court can only examine whether the decision-making process was fair, reasonable and transparent. In cases involving award of contracts, the Court ought to exercise judicial restraint where the decision is bona fide with no perceptible injury to public interest." Principle emerging from above referred case law is that the State, its instrumentalities and corporations are to be given some freedom in laying down criteria for award of contracts, evaluation of bids. The Courts are to feel dissuaded from interfering in contract matters in exercise of power of judicial review, unless decision taken is palpably tainted with illegality, arbitrariness, irrationality or mala fides. 17. The State is free to lay down conditions, required to be fulfilled by an aspirant for contract including furnishing of relevant information, so as to take decision regarding award of contract. Supreme Court in Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and others, 2005 (1) SCC 679 , dilating on right of Government and its instrumentalities to lay down conditions/qualifications for receipt of tender and award of contract, has observed: "43. Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the work. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits the Government from arbitrarily choosing a contractor at its will and pleasure. It has to act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract. At the same time, no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the Government. All that he can claim is that in competing for the contract, he should not be unfairly treated and discriminated, to the detriment of public interest. Undisputedly, the legal position which has been firmly established from various decisions of this Court, cited at the Bar (supra) is that government contracts are highly valuable assets and the court should be prepared to enforce standards of fairness on the Government in its dealings with tenderers and contractors." 18. Once it is held that Government is free to lay down preconditions and pre-qualifications for entertaining tender, it is necessary to follow that such preconditions and pre-qualifications are meant to be adhered to and not observed in breach. Once it is held that Government is free to lay down preconditions and pre-qualifications for entertaining tender, it is necessary to follow that such preconditions and pre-qualifications are meant to be adhered to and not observed in breach. The Court cannot in exercise of powers of judicial review sift and analyse preconditions and pre-qualifications and label some of the conditions as essential and other conditions collateral. Such conditions may be of utmost importance from viewpoint of contract awarding/decision making authority but may look unnecessary to a person not associated with decision. To illustrate, Contract Awarding Authority may insist on reliable information regarding annual turnover and works executed by an aspirant during previous years, so as to conclude whether it would be appropriated in public interest to award contract to such aspirant. 19. In the present case, appellants did not abide by one of preconditions/pre-qualifications laid down in tender notice. Appellants in LPA No. 25/2015, did not submit VAT clearance certificate, whereas Appellants in LPA No. 21/2015 failed to manually handover "Test Reports" to respondents. Appellants, therefore, had by their own conduct forfeited right to further participate in tendering process and get their price bids opened and considered. The contention that lapse because of its nature on their part should not have prompted respondents to reject their technical bids and exclude them from tendering process, does not sound convincing. Writ Court, therefore, was right in rejecting Appellants' case that they had substantially fulfilled preconditions/pre-qualifications laid down in Tender Notice and had a right to participate in tendering process. 20. Mr. M.Y. Bhat, counsel for appellants in LPA No. 25/2015 states that requirement to produce VAT clearance certificate of previous years were not to have been treated by learned Single Judge as an essential preconditions/prequalification, justifying declaration of Technical Bids of Appellants as non-responsive. Mr. Bhat, to buttress his arguments, seeks to draw support from Rashmi Metaliks Limited and another v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority and others, 2013 (10) SCC 95 . In reported case, one of terms of invitation of offer was "submission of latest income tax return along with the bid'. Supreme Court held requirement to be "collateral term", in absence of gross or net income as one of qualifications. The Court held that had net or gross income been one of qualifications to participate in tendering process, latest income tax returns would assume character of an essential term. Supreme Court held requirement to be "collateral term", in absence of gross or net income as one of qualifications. The Court held that had net or gross income been one of qualifications to participate in tendering process, latest income tax returns would assume character of an essential term. Facts of case relied upon by Mr. Bhat, are distinguishable from facts of present case. It would be advantageous to extract para 18 of judgment: "18. We think that the income tax return would have assumed the character of an essential term if one of the qualifications was either the gross income or the net income on which tax was attracted. In many case this is a salutary stipulation, since it is indicative of the commercial standing and reliability of the tendering entity. This feature being absent, we think that the filing of the latest income tax return was a collateral term, and accordingly the Tendering Authority ought to have brought this discrepancy of the notice of the appellant Company and if even thereafter no rectification had been carried out, the position may have been appreciably different." 21. In the present case, tenderers were not required to submit their latest income tax returns. They, in terms of Condition No. 25, were required to furnish authenticated copy of Sales Tax/VAT clearance certificate for the year 2013-14 or a year earlier. Respondents made it clear that they may put the certificate so produced to scrutiny/verification etcetera in case of successful bidders. The object, obviously, was to have a good idea about annual turnover during preceding year or year before, as Sales Tax/VAT, would be good indicator of turnover and also to satisfy that person, with whom respondents were to deal, was law abider and deposited tax due. The condition, therefore, cannot be treated as "collateral term", on touchstone of law laid down in aforementioned cases. 22. Contention that rates offered by Appellants was lower than rates quoted by private respondents, to whom contracts were allotted, loses significance in view failure on part of Appellants to adhere to prequalification/precondition laid down in NIT. It is well settled that Contract Awarding Authority need not be influenced by rates quoted. 22. Contention that rates offered by Appellants was lower than rates quoted by private respondents, to whom contracts were allotted, loses significance in view failure on part of Appellants to adhere to prequalification/precondition laid down in NIT. It is well settled that Contract Awarding Authority need not be influenced by rates quoted. In Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and others, 1999 (1) SCC 492 it has been held that mere difference in price offered by two tenderers may or may not be decisive to find out as to whether any public interest is involved in intervening in such transaction. Supreme Court in Jagdish Madal's Case (supra) quoted with approval following observations made in B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Cola Services Ltd., 2006 (11) SCC 548 ).- "56. It may be true that a contract need not be given to the lowest tenderer but it is equally true that the employer is the best judge therefore; the same ordinarily being within its domain, court's interference in such matter should be minimal. The High Court's jurisdiction in such matters being limited in a case of this nature, the Court should normally exercise judicial restraint unless illegality or arbitrariness on the part of the employer is apparent on the face of the record." 23. The ground, urged that respondents before declaring their technical bids as non-responsive, ought to have given Appellants an opportunity to put forth their stand or make good deficiency, does not merit acceptance. Condition No. 26 of Tender Notice made it sufficiently clear to aspirant for contract that any Tender not conforming to conditions laid down in NIT in any manner shall make such offer - liable for rejection. It reminded them that all terms and conditions of tender notice including technical specifications are to be carefully studied for sake of responsive tender and that failure to comply with any of conditions/qualifications stipulated in Tender or offer with insufficient particulars/documents shall lead to outright rejection of tender. In said background, appellants are not to feel aggrieved that they were not given an opportunity to project their stand. In M. Vasudevan v. The Chief Executive Officer, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Chennai and others (AIR 2006 Madras 45) similar contention of aggrieved was rejected by the Supreme Court, observing: "5. We do not accept this contention. In said background, appellants are not to feel aggrieved that they were not given an opportunity to project their stand. In M. Vasudevan v. The Chief Executive Officer, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Chennai and others (AIR 2006 Madras 45) similar contention of aggrieved was rejected by the Supreme Court, observing: "5. We do not accept this contention. An order rejecting tender is not a quasi-judicial order nor is it even an administrative order which affects rights and liabilities. Hence neither reasons have to be given in the said order nor opportunity of hearing has to be given before passing the said order. 6. It is only when the contract is finalised that a right accrues in favour of some party. Hence even the highest tenderer has no absolute and indefeasible right to get a contract." 24. It is contended by Mr. Qayoom, learned counsel for appellants in LPA No. 21/2015 that once respondents decided to revisit the issue, consider evaluation afresh, respondents were left with no option but to accept Appellants' Technical Bid. Reference in this regard, in particular, is made to observation of the Court in order dated 31st December 2012 that "respondents, alive to genuineness of claim set out in petition, have decided to revisit issue". Mr. Qayoom insists that in view of observation made, Appellants' claim was taken as genuine and their Technical Bids were not to be rejected on the ground of their failure to manually handover Test Reports. Inference drawn is grossly misplaced. It appears that after Technical Evaluation Committee submitted its report, declaring some of Technical Bids including such bids made by appellants in LPA No. 25/2015 non-responsive and few of such bids responsive, large scale reservations were voiced regarding deliberations of Technical Evaluation Committee. Respondents, therefore, decided to revisit the issue. Respondents once made aware of such reservations without commenting on merits of such reservations, decided to revisit the issue and make fresh technical evaluation of technical bids received. This becomes clear from communication addressed by respondent No. 2 to the then Additional Advocate General on 27th December 2014, taken on record. It would be appropriate to notice communication:- "Police Headquarters J & K Jammu No:- Legal/OWP/89/2014/64870-71 Dated:-27.12.2014 Sh. R.A. Khan, Ld. Addl. Advocate General, J & K High Court Srinagar. Subject:-1. OWP No. 1474/2014 titled M/s. Associate Business Corporation v. State of J & K and others. 2. It would be appropriate to notice communication:- "Police Headquarters J & K Jammu No:- Legal/OWP/89/2014/64870-71 Dated:-27.12.2014 Sh. R.A. Khan, Ld. Addl. Advocate General, J & K High Court Srinagar. Subject:-1. OWP No. 1474/2014 titled M/s. Associate Business Corporation v. State of J & K and others. 2. OWP No. 1617/2014 titled New Alpine Traders & Anr. v. State and others. Sir, With regard to subjects cited above, it is to convey that the Department, in the interest of justice and fair play, is willing to revisit technical evaluation committee report and address the grievances of petitioners by conducting technical evaluation afresh. You are requested to explore the possibilities of getting the petitions withdrawn/dismissed in lieu of above stated concession. Sd/- For Director General of Police J & K, Jammu Copy to the:- 1. AIR (Prov.) PHQ J & K for information." Therefore the observations made by the Court related to genuineness of grievances as regards methodology employed by Technical Evaluation Committee and not merit of the Appellants' claim. Same is true about decision taken by respondents to go for fresh technical evaluation. 25. It is important to note that Appellants in LPA No. 21/2015 were well aware that their technical bids were rejected on the ground that they had not manually handed over "Test Reports" to respondents. Once respondents decided to revisit the issue, make fresh evaluation of technical bids, appellants ought to have made an effort to take benefit of development and handed over manually "Test Reports" to respondents. They did not avail opportunity and therefore cannot complain that they were not given an opportunity to make good deficiency. This apart, condition No. 15(A)(vi), (vii), (viii), (ix) & (x), as its text would reveal relating to test report, is an essential condition and are not to be downplayed or held non-sensitive/collateral. It would be advantageous to notice condition No. 15: '15. TWO BID SYSTEM:- ........... vi. Technical specifications of the items quoted & samples furnished Test report of the sample regarding composition ingredient, strength, texture etc in terms of Bureau of Indian (B.I.S)/IND & other standards mentioned in the tender document from BIS/NABL Accredited Labs only. Moreover if the facility for testing of any item is not available in the above mentioned labs it may be carried out at any Govt. Moreover if the facility for testing of any item is not available in the above mentioned labs it may be carried out at any Govt. authorised Lab for that particular item provided that certificate of non-availability of testing facility for that particular item is obtained in writing from BIS/NABL Accredited labs. vii. Scan copy of Test report shall be uploaded (original test report shall also be furnished along with EMD and Tender fee manually) duly typed (having no overwriting, cutting, alteration) signed, stamped and sealed by the authorised signatory with full name, address, phone/fax No., designation of the authorised signatory. The issue date of Lab Test Report shall not be older than the date of issue of this tender enquiry. It should be free from any ambiguity. viii. Test report of each sample shall be complete in all respects. ix. Tenders with incomplete or without test reports shall be rejected. x. Sample tested shall bear the seal of the testing laboratory prominently." 26. The case set up in LPA No. 21/2015 to the effect that as in the first round of technical evaluation exercise, Appellants' technical bid was accepted, it was not open for respondents to declare their technical bid non-responsive on revisiting the matter, may look convincing on first blush but loses its force once considered in attending circumstances. The decision taken by respondents, as reflected in order communication dated 27th December 2014 and Writ Court order dated 30th December 2014, disposing of OWP No. 1472/2014, to revisit the issue and make fresh technical evaluation of all "Technical Bids" received, was not questioned by Appellants. Appellants, therefore, are taken to have accepted fresh appraisal of all Technical Bids including Bid submitted by them. This apart, respondents did not restrict decision to for fresh technical evaluation to one or more bids, they decided to make such exercise across the board. Appellants, therefore, cannot complain that their Technical Bids were not to be evaluated afresh pursuant to decision conveyed on 27th December 2015 to Additional Advocate General. 27. Upshot of above discussion, is that decision taken by respondents declaring technical bids non-responsive or to award contract in favour of private respondents, does not suffer from illegality, arbitrariness, irrationality nor is it tainted with mala fides. Learned Single Judge has, therefore, rightly declined interference and dismissed writ petitions at threshold. 28. 27. Upshot of above discussion, is that decision taken by respondents declaring technical bids non-responsive or to award contract in favour of private respondents, does not suffer from illegality, arbitrariness, irrationality nor is it tainted with mala fides. Learned Single Judge has, therefore, rightly declined interference and dismissed writ petitions at threshold. 28. We do not find a reason made out to take view different from one taken by Writ Court. 29. Viewed thus, Letters Patent Appeal No. 21/2015 and Letters Patent Appeal No. 25/2015 are held bereft of any merit, and accordingly, dismissed. 30. This Court on 27th March 2015 allowed respondents to draw amount sanctioned to respondent department for purchase of different items like uniforms, shoes, etcetera, for use of police personnel, so that, sanctioned amount does not lapse and department visited with any administrative problem. Respondents will be free to use the amount drawn for making payment to contractors on account of supplies made or to be received in execution of contract because of delay caused due to present litigation. Dismissed.