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Karnataka High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 499 (KAR)

Jaware Gowda v. Basavaraju N. J.

2015-04-29

N.KUMAR

body2015
ORDER : The plaintiffs have preferred this writ petition challenging the order passed by the trial Court allowing I.A. No. 7-an application filed by the 1st defendant under Section 11(2) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 (for short hereinafter referred to as ' the Act) and directing the plaintiffs to value the suit property in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act and pay the requisite Court fee before proceeding further in the matter. 2. The plaintiffs filed O.S.No.166/2006 on the file of the II Civil Judge at Mysore for declaration that the palupatti dated 8.7.1973 is a forged, concocted and invalid document and that it does not relate to or refer to or apply to the suit schedule item Nos. 1 and 2 and for a mandatory injunction directing defendant Nos. 2 and 3 “the Executive Officer, Mysore Taluk Panchayath and the Secretary, Naganahally Grama Panchayath to reverse, annul and cancel the khatha entries made in respect of suit schedule item Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of the concocted palupatti dated 8.7.1973 and to enter the name of the 1st plaintiff in the Khata pertaining to the said items. 3. The case of the plaintiffs is that the 2nd plaintiff is the second son of the first plaintiff and the first defendant is the first son of the first plaintiff; they constitute a joint family. In the year 1973, the 1st plaintiff effected partition of agricultural lands owned by the family which was reduced into writing on 5.7.1973. There is no dispute with regard to this property. However, no partition was effected in respect of the residential houses which are more fully described in Schedule 1 and 2 of the plaint. The plaintiffs claim that they came to know that the 3rd defendant /Naganahally Grama Panchayath changed the khatha in respect of all the schedule properties in the name of the 1st defendant and the 2nd plaintiff on the basis of a palupatti dated 8.7.1973, which is a concocted document. The 1st defendant, by grossly misusing the trust and confidence reposed in him by the plaintiffs, had obtained their signatures to a concocted palupatti obviously on the basis of some misrepresentation. The said concocted palupatti is invalid in law and does not bring about a partition of the suit schedule item Nos. 1 and 2. The 1st defendant, by grossly misusing the trust and confidence reposed in him by the plaintiffs, had obtained their signatures to a concocted palupatti obviously on the basis of some misrepresentation. The said concocted palupatti is invalid in law and does not bring about a partition of the suit schedule item Nos. 1 and 2. Therefore, in substance, cancellation of the said palupatti is sought in the form of declaration. The plaintiff valued the suit for the purpose of relief of declaration at Rs.1,000/- under Section 24(d) of the Act and for the purpose of mandatory injunction also at Rs.1,000/- under Section 26(c) of the Act and paid Court fee of Rs.50/- on the memorandum of plaint. 4. After service of suit summons, the 1st defendant filed I.A.No. 7 under Section 11(2) of the Act to direct the plaintiffs to pay the Court fee on the market value of the property prevalent as on the date of the suit failing which to dismiss the suit. The 1st defendant contended that the plaint schedule property is worth more than Rs.50 lakhs even though in the written statement filed, its market value is stated to be more than Rs.10 lakhs. 5. The plaintiffs filed their objections contending that the suit is one for declaration and not for cancellation of the document. The palupatti is not a validly executed document and therefore, the question of seeking its cancellation or valuing the suit under Section 38 of the Act does not arise. 6. The trial Court framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether it is necessary to direct the plaintiff to pay the Court fee as required under Section 38 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act? 2. If so, what Order? 7. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and referring to the judgment of this Court relied upon, the trial Court held that the plaint averments read as a whole make it clear that the plaintiffs are challenging the genuineness of the palupatti dated 8.7.1973. Therefore, the valuation of the suit as made by the plaintiffs is not proper and correct and therefore, it answered point No.1 in the affirmative which means that the plaintiffs have to pay the Court fee required under Section 38 of the Act though it is not so expressed in so many words. Therefore, the valuation of the suit as made by the plaintiffs is not proper and correct and therefore, it answered point No.1 in the affirmative which means that the plaintiffs have to pay the Court fee required under Section 38 of the Act though it is not so expressed in so many words. Therefore, the trial Court directed the plaintiffs to value the suit in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act and pay the requisite Court fee. Aggrieved by the said order, the present petition is filed. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs assailing the impugned order contended that the plaintiffs have valued the suit under Section 24(d) of the Act because in the palupatti dated 8.7.1973, the value of the property is not mentioned. It is only when a suit is valued under Section 24(a) and (b), the fee shall be computed on the basis of the market value of the property. If the suit is to be valued under Section 38 of the Act, the fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit, as mentioned in the document. In the instant case, in the disputed document no value is mentioned. Therefore, neither Section 24(a) nor (b) of the Act is attracted. Nor is Section 38 of the Act is attracted. Therefore, as contained in Section 24(d) of the Act, that is ' in other cases whether the subject-matter of the suit is capable of valuation or not, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees one thousand whichever is higher, the plaintiffs have valued the suit at rupees one thousand and paid requisite court fee. Therefore, he submits that the order of the trial Court is erroneous and requires to be interfered with. 9. Per contra, learned Counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the suit is one for cancellation of palupatti. Though there is a specific provision in Section 38 of the Act for valuing the said suit, the said provision has to be read along with Section 7 of the Act in which event, even though no value is mentioned in the instrument of palupatti, the suit has to be valued on the market value of the property. Though there is a specific provision in Section 38 of the Act for valuing the said suit, the said provision has to be read along with Section 7 of the Act in which event, even though no value is mentioned in the instrument of palupatti, the suit has to be valued on the market value of the property. Therefore, he submits that the order of the trial Court directing the plaintiffs to value the suit under Section 38 of the Act is in accordance with law and no interference is called for. 10. In the light of the above, the points that arise for my consideration in this writ petition are: When in substance, the relief sought amounts to cancellation of an instrument and if the instrument does not mention the value of the property which is the subject-matter of the instrument, how such suit has to be valued? and what is the Court fee payable?' 11. Reliance is placed on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court rendered while dealing with an identical provision under the Mysore Court Fees Act (3 of 1900) in the case of R. Rangaiah & another v. Thimma Setty & others, reported in 1963 (1) Mys LJ 67 where it is held that: ' It is clear from the provisions of this clause of S.4 of the Court Fees Act that it prescribes the Court Fee payable in respect of two categories of suits. What it first does is to require the payment of Court Fees in a suit brought for the cancellation of a decree on the amount specified in the decree if the decree is for money, and on the value of the property for which the decree has been passed, if the decree sought to be cancelled is a decree for property. It next provides that if the suit is brought for the cancellation of a document, the Court Fee is payable on the value of the property to which the document relates. If the document is for the payment of money, Court Fee payable is on that amount. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this clause prescribe the Court Fee payable respectively in cases in which the entire decree or document is sought to be cancelled and in suits in which the cancellation sought is a part of the decree or a part of the document. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this clause prescribe the Court Fee payable respectively in cases in which the entire decree or document is sought to be cancelled and in suits in which the cancellation sought is a part of the decree or a part of the document. Since the suit out of which this revision petition arises was not a suit brought for the cancellation of a decree but one brought for cancellation of a document, the question is whether the Court Fee payable in that suit is on the value of property in respect of which the deed of settlement is executed, specified in the deed of settlement, or on the market value of that property.' ' Now, one thing which is very clear from the paragraphs 1 & 2 of S.4(iv)A is that in a suit brought for the cancellation of a document executed for the purpose of securing property, the Court Fee payable is on the value of such property. Although those paragraphs do not refer in terms to the market value of the property, as some of the other parts of the Act do, I have no doubt in my mind that the word ' value occurring in those paragraphs has reference to no other value than the market value. The word ' value— when it occurs in an enactment like the Court Fees Act, has to my mind, particularly known and definite meaning, that word has reference to the price which the property will fetch when exposed to the test of competition.' Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Mahaboobasab v. Goudappa in CRP No. 739/1974 decided on 27.6.1974 interpreting Section 38(1) of the Act as under: 305. KAR. COURT FEES ACT, S.38(1) ' “ Suit for cancellation of sale deed ' “ Court fee. The value of the property in S.38(1) must be understood as the market value of the property and not the amount of consideration mentioned in the deed sought to be cancelled. Thus in a suit for cancellation of a sale deed, the plaintiff is justified in valuing the suit on the basis of the market value of the property which was the subject matter of the sale deed. (1963) 1 Mys LJ 67' . Thus in a suit for cancellation of a sale deed, the plaintiff is justified in valuing the suit on the basis of the market value of the property which was the subject matter of the sale deed. (1963) 1 Mys LJ 67' . After referring to the two judgments cited supra, the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Smt. Damegunta Rajeshwa-ramma and another v. Smt. Jayalakshmamma and others, reported in ILR 2010 Kar 2288 : (2010 (3) AIR Kar R 739) at para-9 has held as under: ' 9. Even reading of the provisions of Section 38 of the Act indicates that, value of the property referred to therein is nothing but actual value of the property. In case the legislation is intended to treat the value of the document, it could have specifically mentioned the same. Very fact that the property is mentioned, it is for the Court to determine the value of the property and not the value of the consideration mentioned in the document. This is also fortified by the decision of this Court reported in SHORT NOTE [1974(2) SHORT NOTE 305] (sic) where in this Court has observed that, the value of the property in Section 38(1) must be understood as the market value of the property and not the amount of consideration specified in the deed sought to be cancelled. Thus in a suit for cancellation of the document, the plaintiff is required to value the suit on the basis of the market value of the property which was the subject-matter of the transaction.' Therefore, it is clear that the phrase ' value of the subject-matter of the suit— does not mean the value mentioned in the instrument but the value of the subject matter of the suit and therefore, it is the market value. 12. The Apex Court recently had an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in the case of Satheedevi v. Prasanna and Another reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622 : ( AIR 2010 SC 2777 ). This was a case under the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, where Section 40(1) of the said Act fell for consideration. The Apex Court after setting out various provisions of the said Act which are in pari materia with the provisions of the Act, has held as under: ' 12. This was a case under the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, where Section 40(1) of the said Act fell for consideration. The Apex Court after setting out various provisions of the said Act which are in pari materia with the provisions of the Act, has held as under: ' 12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well recognized rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise - Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, 1958 SCR 360 : ( AIR 1957 SC 907 ). 13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not therein it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the Court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission. Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 : ( AIR 1992 SC 96 ), Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation (1966) 3 SCR 466 : ( AIR 1966 SC 1678 ). 17. Section 40 deals with suits for cancellation of decrees etc. which are not covered by other sections. If this section is interpreted in the light of the expression ' save as otherwise provided used in Section 7(1), it becomes clear that the rule enshrined therein is a clear departure from the one contained in Section 7 read with Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48 which provide for payment of court fee on the market value of the property. In that sense, Section 40 contains a special rule. 18. In that sense, Section 40 contains a special rule. 18. Section 40(1) lays down that in a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject- matter of the suit and further lays down that such value shall be deemed to be if the whole decree or other document sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed. If a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property constitute the basis for fixation of court fee. Sub-section (2) lays down that if the decree or other document is such that the liability under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of the property belonging to the plaintiff or the plaintiff— s share in such property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property, or share or on the amount of the decree, whichever is less. 19. The deeming clause contained in the substantive part of Section 40(1) makes it clear that in a suit filed for cancellation of a document which creates any right, title or interest in immovable property, the court fees is required to be computed on the value of the property for which the document was executed. To put it differently, the value of the property for which the document was executed and not its market value is relevant for the purpose of court fee. If the expression ' value of the subject-matter of the suit was not followed by the deeming clause, it could possibly be argued that the word ' value means the market value, but by employing the deeming clause, the legislature has made it clear that if the document is sought to be cancelled, the amount of court fee shall be computed on the value of the property for which the document was executed and not the market value of the property. The words ' for which' appearing between the words ' property' and ' other documents' clearly indicate that the court fee is required to be paid on the value of the property mentioned in the document, which is subject matter of challenge. 20. If the legislature intended that fee should be payable on the market value of the subject matter of the suit filed for cancellation of a document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any present or future right, title and interest, then it would have, instead of incorporating the requirement of payment of fees on value of subject-matter, specifically provided for payment of court fee on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit as has been done in respect of other types of suits mentioned in Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48. The legislature may have also, instead of using the expression ' value of the property for which the document was executed', used the expression ' value of the property in respect of which the document was executed' . However, the fact of the matter is that in Section 40(1) the legislature has designedly not used the expression `market value of the property. 21. If the interpretation placed by the trial Court and the High Court on the expression ' value of the property for which the document was executed' is accepted as correct then the word ' value used in Section 40(1) of the Act will have to be read as market value and we do not see any compelling reason to add the word ' market before the word ' value in Section 40(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court has in extenso discussed the judgments of the Madras High Court, Kerala High Court and the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in R. Rangiah— s case at para 33, which is culled out below for convenience: 33. The Supreme Court has in extenso discussed the judgments of the Madras High Court, Kerala High Court and the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in R. Rangiah— s case at para 33, which is culled out below for convenience: 33. In R. Rangiah v. Thimma Setty (1963) 1 Mysore Law Journal 67, the Division Bench of Mysore High Court interpreted Section 4(iv)(A) of Mysore Court Fees Act, which is substantially similar to Section 40 of the Act and held that: ' Now, one thing which is very clear from the paragraphs 1 & 2 of S.4 (iv) A is that in a suit brought for the cancellation of a document executed for the purpose of securing property, the Court Fee payable is on the value of such property. Although those paragraphs do not refer in terms to the market value of the property, as some of the other parts of the Act do, I have no doubt in my mind that the word ' value occurring in those paragraphs has reference to no other value than the market value. The word ' value when it occurs in an enactment like the Court Fees Act, has to my mind, particularly known and definite meaning. That word has reference to the price which the property will fetch when exposed to the test of competition. Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar had to admit that the word value occurring in the first paragraph would have to be understood as the market value if paragraphs 2 and 3 did not exist in S.4(iv) A. If, therefore, the word ' value occurring in the first paragraph means market value, I see nothing in paragraphs 2 and 3 on which Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar strongly relied which can persuade me to take the view that the word ' value occurring in the first paragraph which, as ordinarily understood, is the market value, should be understood differently. Para 2 does no more than to merely provide that, if a document is sought to be cancelled in its entirety, the Court Fee is payable on the value of the whole of the property in respect of which the document is executed. Likewise paragraph 3 merely provides that where the cancellation sought is a partial cancellation, Court Fee is payable only on the value of the property in respect of which cancellation is sought. Likewise paragraph 3 merely provides that where the cancellation sought is a partial cancellation, Court Fee is payable only on the value of the property in respect of which cancellation is sought. It is for that purpose that the words ' value shall be deemed to be' are used by the Legislature in the first paragraph of the clause and not for the purpose of assigning to the word ' value— occurring in the first paragraph a meaning different from that which has to be ordinarily given to it. It is no doubt true that the second paragraph of S.4(iv) A directs that the Court Fee payable in a suit brought for the cancellation of a document is the Court Fee on the value of the property ' for which the document was executed. Ordinarily the expression ' for which occurring in that paragraph might have justified the interpretation that the amount on which the Court Fee has to be paid is the amount specified in the document. But, that, that would not be correct way of understanding those words occurring in paragraph 2 of that clause is clear from the fact that S.4(iv) A does not provide merely for cancellation of a document executed for a specified consideration such as a sale deed, but also provides for the payment of Court Fee even in suits brought for cancellation of other documents such as a deed of settlement, a gift deed or a trust deed. In the latter category of cases it would not be appropriate to regard those documents as executed for a consideration or a specified amount and those cases would not be cases in which there would be any value ' for which the document is executed. The second paragraph which requires the payment of Court Fee on the value of the property ' for which the document was executed, does not, when properly understood, direct the payment of such Court Fee on the value for which the document was executed, but on the value of the property for which it was executed. In other words, the words for which occurring in that paragraph do not refer to the value but to the property to which the document relates. In other words, the words for which occurring in that paragraph do not refer to the value but to the property to which the document relates. The words for which occurring in that paragraph, in my opinion, mean ' for securing which, so that what that paragraph directs is the payment of Court Fee on the value of the property for securing which the document is executed. That, that is the correct interpretation is indicated by the word securing occurring in the first paragraph of the clause in the context of a document of which cancellation is sought. It therefore follows that what is relevant for the purpose of S.4(iv) A is not the value of the property specified in the document but its real and actual value when the suit is brought. It is on that value that the Court fee has to be paid if the suit is for the cancellation of a document recording a transaction involving such property.' After referring to all these judgments, it held as under: 38. In view of our analysis of the relevant statutory provisions, it must be held that the judgments of the Division Bench of Madras High Court and of the learned single Judges in Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chandrayya (supra), Navaraja v. Kaliappa Gounder (AIR 1927 Mad 825) (supra), Arunachalathammal v. Sudalaimuthu Pillai (supra) and Andalammal v. B. Kanniah ( AIR 1972 Mad 5 ) (supra) as also the judgment of the learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Allam Venkateswara Reddy v. Golla Venkatana-rayana ( AIR 1975 AP 122 ) (supra) lay down correct law. In the first of these cases, the Division Bench of Madras High Court rightly observed that when there is a special rule in the Act for valuing the property for the purpose of court fee, that method of valuation must be adopted in preference to any other method and, as mentioned above, Section 40 of the Act certainly contains a special rule for valuing the property for the purpose of court fee and we do not see any reason why the expression ' value of the property used in Section 40(1) should be substituted with the expression ' market value of the property. 39. 39. The judgment of the learned single Judge of Madras High Court in Balireddi v. Khatipulal Sab (AIR 1935 Mad 863) (supra), which was approved by the Full Bench of that Court in Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma ( AIR 1939 Mad 462 ) (supra) turned primarily on the interpretation of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fee Act as amended by Madras Act which refers to the value of the property simpliciter and the Court interpreted the same as market value. Neither the learned single Judge nor the Full Bench were called upon to interpret a provision like Section 40 of the Act. Therefore, the ratio of those judgments cannot be relied upon for the purpose of interpreting Section 40 of the Act. 40. In Arunachalathammal v. Sudal-aimuthu Pillai (supra), the learned single Judge rightly distinguished the judgment of the Full Bench by making a pointed reference to the language employed in Section 40(1) of the Madras Act No.XIV of 1955, which is identical to Section 40 of the Act. In Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and others ( AIR 1971 Mad 380 ) (supra) and S. Krishna Nair and another v. N. Rugmoni Amma ( AIR 1976 Mad 208 ) (supra), the other learned single Judges did not correctly appreciate the ratio of the judgment of the co-ordinate Bench in Arunachalathammal v. Sudalaimuthu Pillai (supra) and distinguished the same without assigning cogent reasons. We may also observe that if the learned single Judges felt that the view expressed by the co-ordinate Bench was not correct, they ought to have referred the matter to the larger Bench. 41. The judgments of the Division Benches of Kerala High Court in Krishnan Damodaran v. Padmanabhan Parvathy (supra), P.K. Vasudeva Rao v. Hari Menon ( AIR 1982 Ker 35 ) (supra) and Pachayammal v. Dwaraswamy Pillai (supra) and of the learned single Judges in Appikunju Meerasayu v. Meeran Pillai (supra) and Uma Antherjanam v. Govindaru Namboodiripad and others (supra) also do not lay down correct law because the High Court did not appreciate that the legislature has designedly used different language in Section 40 of the Act and the term ' market value has not been used therein. The same is true of the judgments of the learned single Judges of Mysore and Rajasthan High Courts noticed hereinabove.' 13. The same is true of the judgments of the learned single Judges of Mysore and Rajasthan High Courts noticed hereinabove.' 13. Thus the Apex Court has categorically held that when there is a special rule in the Act for valuing the property for the purpose of Court fee, that method of valuation must be adopted in preference to any other method. Section 40 of the Act certainly contains a special rule for valuing the property for the purpose of Court fee and they do not see any reason why the expression value of the property used in Section 40(1) should be substituted with the expression market value of the property. Therefore, they held that the judgment rendered by the Madras High Court, Kerala High Court and the Division Bench of this Court in the case of R. Rangaiah’s case supra do not lay down the correct law because the High Courts did not appreciate that the Legislature has designedly used different language in Section 40 of the Act and the term ' market value has not been used therein. 14. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court specifically dealing with the Division Bench judgment of this Court, the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court and the two other judgments rendered by the learned Single following the said judgment, as held by the Apex Court, do not lay down the correct law. 15. Therefore what follows from the above is, in a suit for declaration under Section 24(a) of the Act where in addition to declaration possession of the property is sought, fee shall be computed on the market value of the property or at Rs.1,000/- whichever is higher. If the prayer is only for declaration and consequential injunction and no relief of possession is sought for, the case would fall under Section 24(b) of the Act. Then the fee shall be computed on one half of the market value of the property or at Rs.1,000/- whichever is higher. Though the suit is styled as a declaration that a particular instrument is not binding on them or is null and void or voidable, in substance what the plaintiffs seek is the cancellation of said instrument. Then the case would fall under Section 38 of the Act. Though the suit is styled as a declaration that a particular instrument is not binding on them or is null and void or voidable, in substance what the plaintiffs seek is the cancellation of said instrument. Then the case would fall under Section 38 of the Act. If the suit falls under Section 38 of the Act, it has to be valued under that provision, where the word ' market value— is conspicuously missing. 16. Therefore, if the suit is to be valued under Section 24(a) and (b) of the Act, it is on the basis of the market value of the property. If the suit is to be valued under Section 38 of the Act, the fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit or the instrument. In order to find out the value of the subject-matter of the instrument, we have to find out what is the value mentioned in the instrument. In other words, what is the consideration for which that instrument is executed. If the instrument is a sale deed or a mortgage deed or a lease deed, the consideration would be mentioned therein. But in the case of a deed of settlement and deed of gift or a deed of trust, the consideration would be love and affection and the blood relationship, which cannot be valued in terms of money. That is the reason why the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has categorically held that the value of the subject-matter of the instrument does not mean the market value of the subject-matter of the instrument. That is the reason why the Legislature consciously has not used the word market value in Section 38 of the Act whereas the said word is explicitly used in Section 24 of the Act. If the word market value is read into Section 38 of the Act, then it amounts the Court rewriting the Section or recasting or reframing the provisions of law, which is not permissible. 17. It is well settled proposition of law that the Court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not therein. Even if there is a defect or omission in the statute, the Court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission. 17. It is well settled proposition of law that the Court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not therein. Even if there is a defect or omission in the statute, the Court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission. Therefore, Section 38 of the Act when it uses the words value of the subject-matter of the suit it is the subject- matter of the instrument i.e., the consideration mentioned in the instrument which is to be taken into consideration while valuing the suit for the purpose of the Court fee under Section 38 of the Act and not the market value of the property. 18. Insofar as the argument that Section 38 has to be read with Section 7 of the Act is concerned, it has no substance because the opening words of Section 7 of the Act starts with a caveat save as otherwise provided. It makes it clear that Section 7 comes into play only in the absence of a special provision provided under the Act. When the statute provides for valuing the property for the purpose of Court fee, Section 7 of the Act has no application. Secondly, Section 7 is attracted only where the fee is payable under the Act depends on the market value of any property. In other words, if the fee is not payable on the basis of market value, Section 7 of the Act has no application. 19. Section 7(2) of the Act provides for a different valuation in respect of agricultural land which has to be computed on the basis of the market value under the Act. Even in respect of Section 38 of the Act, though the value is mentioned in the instrument, if it is a market value, the Court fee is payable under Section 7(2) on the basis of the revenue paid in respect of the said agricultural land and not on the basis of the consideration for which the right in the agricultural land was acquired under the instrument. Therefore, Section 7(2) of the Act has no application, when Section 38 of the Act is a special provision enacted by the Legislature for cancellation of the instrument. 20. Therefore, Section 7(2) of the Act has no application, when Section 38 of the Act is a special provision enacted by the Legislature for cancellation of the instrument. 20. Now in the instant case, even if it is to be held for the purpose of Section 38 of the Act, that the value of the subject-matter of the instrument has to be taken into consideration and not the market value when no value is mentioned in the instrument, the question is how is to be valued. Thus Section 24(d) of the Act assumes importance and the said provision reads as under: Section 24. Suits for declaration: In a suit for a declaratory decree or order, whether with or without consequential relief, not falling under Section 25 (a) to (c) xxxxxxxxxx (d) ' in other cases' , whether the subject-matter of the suit is capable of valuation or not, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees one thousand whichever is higher.' The opening words are in other cases means, if the case do not fall under any of the provisions of the Act then whether the subject-matter of the suit is capable of valuation or not, fee shall be paid on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees one thousand whichever is higher. Therefore, when the relief sought for in the plaint does not fall under any of the provisions of the Act, liberty is granted to the plaintiffs to give their own valuation and pay the Court fee on the said amount or on rupees one thousand, whichever is higher. 21. As set out above, though the suit is styled as a declaration , Section 24(a) and (b) of the Act is not attracted. In substance, the relief sought being cancellation, it is Section 38 which is attracted but since no value is mentioned in the instrument, it cannot be valued under Section 38 of the Act. Therefore, Section 24(d) of the Act is attracted. Therefore, the plaintiff in the absence of the value of the subject-matter being mentioned in the instrument and as the case does not fall under Section 24(a) and (d), they have no obligation to value the suit on the basis of the market value. Therefore, Section 24(d) of the Act is attracted. Therefore, the plaintiff in the absence of the value of the subject-matter being mentioned in the instrument and as the case does not fall under Section 24(a) and (d), they have no obligation to value the suit on the basis of the market value. The plaintiffs have rightly valued the suit under Section 24(d) of the Act and have given their valuation as rupees one thousand. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the said valuation cannot be found fault with. 22. The trial Court has not properly appreciated the facts of this case. Probably it was misled by the aforesaid judgments of this Court which is now held to be not a good law by the Apex Court. In that view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Hence, I pass the following: ORDER a) Writ Petition is allowed; b) The impugned order passed by the trial Court is hereby set aside and I.A.No.7 filed by defendant No.1 under Section 11(2) of the Act is dismissed; c) The valuation made by the plaintiffs is correct. Petition allowed.