JUDGMENT ANANT S. DAVE, J. 1. Considering the common issue involved in both these petitions, they are taken up for final hearing together and are being disposed of by the common judgment. 1.1 The petitioner of Special Criminal Application No.4496 of 2014 has filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, with the following prayers: “[a] To strike down Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 [hereinafter referred to as `PMLA'] [as inserted/substituted by Amendment Act 2005 [20 of 2005] dt. 1.1 The petitioner of Special Criminal Application No.4496 of 2014 has filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, with the following prayers: “[a] To strike down Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 [hereinafter referred to as `PMLA'] [as inserted/substituted by Amendment Act 2005 [20 of 2005] dt. 21.5.2005, as the said provision does not bear any reasonable and rational nexus with variety of Scheduled offences mentioned in the Schedule under the Act which may even be non-cognizable, bailable and on much lighter pedestal, for being unreasonable and ultra vires, and consequently unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, and thus being violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and this Hon'ble Court may read down, lay down, expound, interpret and deliberate upon the scope and perspective of Section 45 of PMLA so as to harmonize the same in juxtaposition with various scheduled offences [under amended Part A of the Schedule], [b] To read down, expound, deliberate and interpret the scope and perspective of Section 19 of PMLA in light of section 49(3) read with Rules notified by GSR 446[E] dated 1.7.2005, in consonance and harmony with settled constitutional mandate of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of Constitution of India as also in the context of various provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as amended from to time and the Guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal 1997(1) SCC 416 , [c] For issuance of an appropriate writ of quo warranto, calling upon Respondent No.3, who being an Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, appointed under Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, can under Section 54 of PMLA only assist any officer investigating under PMLA, to show cause as to how and under what authority has he exercised the power of arrest under Section 19 of PMLA, while effecting arrest of the Petitioner on 01.09.2014 in ECIR/01/SRT/2014, without producing till date, despite specific objection by the Petitioner – [i] any authorization conferring upon him by way of any notification or order issued by the Central Government in terms of Section 19 and Section 49 of PMLA, 2002, read with Rules notified by GSR 446(E), dt.1.7.2005, authorizing him to be an “Arresting Officer” and to exercise power to arrest under section 19, [ii] any notification issued by Central Government for his appointment a Assistant Director under section 49 of PMLA, [iii] any records to show compliance of Rules notified by GSR 446(E) dated 1.7.2005, and [v] any Criminal Proceedings against the Petitioner in the alleged Scheduled offence showing the Petitioner as an accused person; and [d] For issuance of an appropriate writ of Habeas corpus, or order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directing forthwith release of the Petitioner from custody, by setting aside the Impugned Arrest Order dated 1.9.2014 and the consequent remand proceedings, as the arrest of the Petitioner is manifestly illegal, without jurisdiction, null and void ab initio, for clear violation of [i] The directives of the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal, 1997(1) SCC 416 [more particularly those prescribed in sub-para (2), (9) and (10) of Para 35 thereof], [ii] The provision of PMLA including amongst others of Section 19(1) of PMLA, which mandatorily prescribe the arrest to be made on the basis of such “material in possession”, on the basis of which there exists “reason to believe” that person is “guilty” of an offence under the PMLA; which shall be “recorded in writing”; and pursuant to arrest to inform him of the `Grounds' for such arrest, [iii] Rules notified by Central Government vide GSR 446[E], dt.1.7.2005, [iv] notification GSR 441(E) dated 1.7.2005 issued by the Central Government appointing Director to exercise the “exclusive” power conferred under section 19 of PMLA [v] Article 14, 21, 22 of the Constitution of India. [e] At the interim/adinterim stage [i] The proceedings under PMLA against the Petitioner may please be stayed, [ii] The Petitioner may please be released on regular bail in the above case in ECIR/01/SRT/2014, [f] Dispense with filing of affidavit in support to this Petition as the Petitioner is in judicial custody; [g] For such other or further order/s in the peculiar facts of the case. 1.2 The petitioner of Special Criminal Application No.4672 of 2014 has filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, with the following prayers: “[A] To strike down Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 [hereinafter referred to as `PMLA'] [as inserted/substituted by Amendment Act 2005 [20 of 2005] dt. 21.5.2005], as the said provision does not bear any reasonable and rational nexus with variety of Scheduled offences mentioned in the Schedule under the Act which may even be non-cognizable, bailable and on much lighter pedestal, for being unreasonable and ultra vires, and consequently unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, and thus being violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and this Hon'ble Court may read down, lay down, expound, interpret and deliberate upon the scope and perspective of Section 45 of PML Act so as to harmonize the same in juxtaposition with various scheduled offences [under amended Part A of the Schedule], [B] If the Hon'ble Court finds that provision of Section 45 is not ultra vires of the Article 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, then to read down, expound, deliberate and interpret the scope and perspective of Section 45 of the PML Act to the scheduled offences where minimum punishment is 3 years in the context of objects and reasons underlying the rigors of Section 45 r/w. Section 4 of the PML Act. [C] To read down, expound, deliberate and interpret the scope and perspective of Section 19 of PML Act in light of section 49(3) read with Rules notified by GSR 446[E] dated 1.7.2005, in consonance and harmony with settled constitutional mandate of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of Constitution of India as also in the context of various provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as amended from time to time and the Guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal 1997(1) SCC 416 , [D] For issuance of an appropriate writ of quo warranto, calling upon respondent No.3, who being an Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, appointed under Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, can under Section 54 of PMLA only assist any officer investigating under PMLA, to show cause as to how and under what authority has he exercised the power of arrest under Section 19 of PMLA, while effecting arrest of the Petitioner on 21.05.2014 in ECIR/01/SRT/2014, without producing till date [i] any authorization conferring upon him by way of any notification or order issued by the Central Government in terms of Section 19 and Section 49 of PML Act, 2002, read with Rules notified by GSR 446(E), dt.7.7.2005, authorizing him to be an “Arresting Officer” and to exercise power to arrest under section 19, [ii] any notification issued by Central Government for his appointment a Assistant Director under section 49 of PML Act, [iii] records to show compliance of Rules notified by GSR 446(E) dated 1.7.2005, and [d] For issuance of an appropriate writ of Habeas corpus, or order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directing forthwith release of the Petitioner from custody, by setting aside the Impugned Arrest Order dated 1.9.2014 and the consequent remand proceedings, as the arrest of the Petitioner is manifestly illegal, without jurisdiction, null and void ab initio, for clear violation of [i] The directives of the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 1997(1) SCC 416 [more particularly those prescribed in sub-para (2), (9) and (10) of Para 35 thereof, [ii] The provisions of PML Act including amongst others of Section 19(1) of PML Act, which mandatorily prescribe the arrest to be made on the basis of such “material in possession”, on the basis of which there exists “reason to believe” that person is 'guilty' or an offence under the PML Act; which shall be `recorded in writing'; and pursuant to arrest to inform him of the 'Grounds' for such arrest, [iii] Rules notified by Central Government vide GSR 446[E], dt.1.7.2005. [iv] Notification GSR 441(E) dated 1.7.2005 issued by the Central Government appointing Director to exercise the `exclusive' power conferred under section 19 of PML Act. [v] Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. [F] At the interim/adinterim stage [i] The Petitioner may please be released on regular bail in connection with Complaint No. 3 of 2014 pending in the court of Special Judge, Ahmedabad District, Ahmedabad [Rural] arising out of ECIR No.1/SRT/2014-15. [G] Dispense with filing of affidavit in support to this Petition as the Petitioner is in judicial custody. [H] For such other and further order/s in the peculiar facts of the case. 2. The facts of both the petitions are almost similar, however, for the purpose of deciding the issues involved in these petitions, facts of Special Criminal Application No. 4496 of 2014 are taken up. The facts of Special Criminal Application No. 4496 of 2014, as per the petitioner of that petition, are as under: 2.1 On 11.04.2014, FIR No.5/16/2014 dated 11.4.2014 was registered by the District Crime Branch, Surat, alleging various offences under IPC against one M/s R.A. Distributors Pvt. Ltd., Surat and its Directors for preparing bogus Bills of Entry and presenting the same for outward remittances to various parties in Dubai and Hong Kong. The petitioner herein is not amongst the accused persons in the said FIR dated 11.4.2014. 2.2. On 13.4.2014, another FIR was registered by the District Crime Branch, Surat, alleging various offences under IPC against M/s. Agni Gems Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Harmony Diamonds Pvt. Ltd., and their Directors for preparing bogus Bills of Entry and presenting the same for outward remittances to various parties in Dubai and Hong Kong. The petitioner herein is not amongst the accused persons even in the said FIR dated 13.4.2014. 2.3 On 17.4.2014, Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR)/01/Surat-Sub-Zonal/2014-15 was registered by the Directorate of Enforcement of Ahmedabad, Surat Zone Surat against the persons accused in the aforesaid FIRs dated 11.4.2014 and 13.4.2014. This Fir (termed as ECIR), was registered by respondent No.3 and the case was taken up for investigating purportedly under the provisions of PMLA and the Rules framed there under. The petitioner herein is not amongst the accused persons named in the said ECIR dated 17.4.2014. This Fir (termed as ECIR), was registered by respondent No.3 and the case was taken up for investigating purportedly under the provisions of PMLA and the Rules framed there under. The petitioner herein is not amongst the accused persons named in the said ECIR dated 17.4.2014. 2.4 Under the provisions of PML Act, although there is no bar on filing a Charge Sheet under section 173(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, however, second proviso to impugned section 45 provides for filing of a Complaint in writing in the manner prescribed. Therefore, on 18.7.2014, after completing investigations qua the persons accused there under, the Deputy Director of the Directorate of Enforcement filed a complaint before Trial Court against 79 accused, including natural persons and legal entities. The petitioner herein is not named as accused in this exhaustive complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate against 79 accused, which relief on plethora of statements. 2.5 On 01.09.2014, the petitioner on being summoned appeared before the respondent No. 3. He was coerced to give a confession. He was threatened that even his family members will be roped in the matter and put behind bars. Vide impugned Arrest Order dated 1.9.2014, the petitioner was arrested by respondent No. 3 purportedly in exercise of powers conferred by Section 19(1) of PMLA, while alleging to have reasons to believe that the petitioner has been guilty of offences punishable under Section 4 read with Section 3 of PMLA. This arrest was in blatant violation of the provisions of Section 19 of PMLA read with Rules notified vide GSR 446 (E), dt. 1.7.2005, Notification GSR 441(E) dated 1.7.2005, also in violation of the Guidelines framed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal, 1997(1) SCC 416 , and in derogation of fundamental rights conferred under the Constitution of India vide Articles 14, 21 and 22. Whereas the petitioner was coerced to give an endorsement of having been informed of the Grounds of Arrest and having understood the same, no such Grounds of Arrest were either shown or supplied to him. No witness was called to witness the petitioner's arrest and alleged oral communication of grounds. Consequently there is no endorsement of any witness on the Arrest Order, or alleged Grounds of Arrest. The respondent No.3 was not even authorized by the Central Government to exercise power of arrest under Section 19 of PMLA. No witness was called to witness the petitioner's arrest and alleged oral communication of grounds. Consequently there is no endorsement of any witness on the Arrest Order, or alleged Grounds of Arrest. The respondent No.3 was not even authorized by the Central Government to exercise power of arrest under Section 19 of PMLA. 2.6 After such illegal arrest of the petitioner, the relatives of the petitioner sent a friend to meet the petitioner to whom the personal belongings of the petitioner were handed over by the respondent no.3. It is not even the claim of the Respondents that at the time of Arrest or purported oral communication of the Grounds of Arrest, this friend was present and had witnessed the same. 2.7 On 2.9.2014, the Application for seeking Enforcement custody was filed by respondent No.3 before the Designated Judge under PMLA Principal District Judge Ahmedabad (Rural). In this Remand Application it was, inter alia, claimed by the Respondent No.3 that the arrest of the petitioner was done on 1.9.2014 concerning his involvement in the huge money laundering racket, and investigation could not be completed in a short period of time. Thus existence of reasonable belief that the petitioner has been guilty of offence was far from reality. 2.8 In Enforcement custody, the petitioner was again coerced, pressurized and threatened with dire consequences including arrest of all his family members and relatives, unless he submits to the dictates of the officers of Respondent No.3. The petitioner has truthfully narrated in his oral interrogation, all the requisite details and answers to all the questions orally put to him. However, instead of permitting the petitioner to record his statements as per his version and in his own handwriting, he was coerced to sign typed statements prepared by the officers of Respondent No.3 without knowing the contents thereof. By use of coercive measures, various such statements and endorsements were obtained from the petitioner, against his will and contrary to facts. The petitioner was not even permitted to read the contents of statements recorded by the officers of respondent No.3. The petitioner submits that false statements which were fictitious creations of the officers were forcefully trusted upon the petitioner, and the same are far from being voluntary and thus liable to be rejected. The petitioner was not even permitted to read the contents of statements recorded by the officers of respondent No.3. The petitioner submits that false statements which were fictitious creations of the officers were forcefully trusted upon the petitioner, and the same are far from being voluntary and thus liable to be rejected. 2.9 On 8.9.2014, the application for opposing further remand and for seeking bail was filed by the petitioner before the trial Court, inter alia seeking temporary bail till final disposal of the application. 3. The case of the respondent No.3, as stated on oath, against the petitioners, is as under: 3.1 That certain information was received from the Joint Commissioner of Customs, Customs Division, Surat that companies M/s. Harmony Diamonds Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Agni Gems Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. R. A. Distributors Pvt. Ltd. have made foreign remittance on the strength of fake bills of entry without having made any imports. It was gathered that within a span of two months i.e. January and February 2014, remittances to foreign shores worth more than Rs. 1000 crore against fake import documents viz. bills of entry and invoices were made from the said accounts. Investigations have revealed that the various companies were involved in presenting fake bills of entry before the ICICI bank for foreign outward remittances and all of them have opened accounts in late December, 2013 and January, 2014. The addresses and the names of the Directors who were dummy and name lenders. 3.2 Names of the companies involved in the fraudulent remittances from their bank accounts with ICICI Bank, their fake addresses and dummy directors: Sr. No. Name of the Company Directors Account No. Amount illegally remitted Rs. in Crores 1 M/s. Agni Gems Pvt. ltd. 304, Shayona Hatfalia, Haripura, Surat Pankaj S. Jain and Deepak Mahadev Patil 005205500995 168.93 2 M/s. Harmony Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. I Floor, Somnath Mahadev Street, Gurajara Faliyu, Surat Pankaj S. Jain and Deepak Mahadev Patil 005205501001 76.28 3 M/s. R.A. Distributors Pvt. Ltd. 6/1943, Office No. 303, Cabin No. 1, 3rd Floor, Navakar Building, Opp. 304, Shayona Hatfalia, Haripura, Surat Pankaj S. Jain and Deepak Mahadev Patil 005205500995 168.93 2 M/s. Harmony Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. I Floor, Somnath Mahadev Street, Gurajara Faliyu, Surat Pankaj S. Jain and Deepak Mahadev Patil 005205501001 76.28 3 M/s. R.A. Distributors Pvt. Ltd. 6/1943, Office No. 303, Cabin No. 1, 3rd Floor, Navakar Building, Opp. Kabir Mandir, Mahidarpura, Surat Shailesh R. Patel and Aniket Ambekar 624605501750 1521 4 M/s. Hem Jewels Pvt. Ltd. 6/1764, Cabin No. 6, Ground Floor, Back side, Krishna Kunj Gundisheri,Laldarwaja, Mahidarpura, Surat Sagar Kamble and Manoj Kamble 624605501807 348.59 5 M/s. Maa Mumbadevi Gems Pvt. Ltd. 6/1764, Cabin No. 6, Ground Floor, Back side, Krishna Kunj Gundisheri, Laldarwaja, Mahidarpura, Surat Sagar Kamble and Manoj Kamble 624605501808 446.4 6 M/s. Riddhi Exim Pvt. Ltd. 101, I Floor, Krishna Kunj, Gundisheri, Laldarwaja, Mahidarpura, Surat Sitaram Salvi and Shailesh R. Patel 085005500829 994.77 7 M/s. M.B. Offshore Distributors Pvt. Ltd. 6/1943, Office No. 303, Cabin No. 1, 3rd Floor, Navakar Building, Opp. Kabir Mandir, Mahidarpura, Surat Sachin Sitaram Salvi and Aniket Ambekar 085005500828 1013.18 8 M/s. Ramshyam Exports Pvt. Ltd. 6/1943, Office No. 303, Cabin No. 1, 3rd Floor, Navakar Building, Opp. Kabir Mandir, Mahidarpura, Surat Sumit Kumar Babel and Mahendra Kumar Ranka 085005500850 and 085005500879 650.42 9 M/s. Trinetra Trading Pvt. Ltd. 6/1943, Office No. 303, Cabin No. 1, 3rd Floor, Navakar Building, Opp. Kabir Mandir, Mahidarpura, Surat Sumit Kumar Babel and Mahendra Kumar Ranka 085005500849 and 085005500880 176.18 3.3 Investigation have also revealed that the companies based in Hong Kong and Dubai were the beneficiaries of foreign remittances made and the following table shows the amount of rupees in crores were fraudulently remitted by the above said Indian firms. Kabir Mandir, Mahidarpura, Surat Sumit Kumar Babel and Mahendra Kumar Ranka 085005500849 and 085005500880 176.18 3.3 Investigation have also revealed that the companies based in Hong Kong and Dubai were the beneficiaries of foreign remittances made and the following table shows the amount of rupees in crores were fraudulently remitted by the above said Indian firms. Indian Firms Foreign Firms R.A. Distributors Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Agni Gems Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Harmony Diamonds Pvt. Ltd M/s. M.B. Offshore Distributors Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Hem Jewels Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Riddhi Exim Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Ram Shyam Exports Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Trinetra Trading Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Maa Mumba Devi Gems Pvt. Ltd. Grand Total Nippon 230 0 0 165.94 60 150.25 106.14 6.29 103 821.62 Mabrook 239 0 0 228.08 0 269.58 106.6 0 163 1006.26 Daimur 290 0 0 55.93 49.59 74.45 43.71 12.55 42 568.23 Cornell 294 0 0 125.47 85 129.86 72.56 0 39.69 746.58 Al Saba 314 0 0 121.91 154 148.46 165.61 97.21 0 1001.19 Al Mignas 75 0 0 257.19 0 49.69 0 0 0 381.88 Al Almas 79 0 0 0 0 165.76 71.18 31.22 98.71 445.87 Golden King 34.89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34.89 Good Step Trading 47.79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.79 Bin Sabt Jewellery LLC 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.86 0 16.86 Nice able Trading 86.25 47.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 134.15 Sharp Crown 15.81 0 0 0 0 0 0 15.81 Silver Smart 12.57 0 0 0 0 0 0 12.57 Al Johara 0 0 6.72 0 0 0 6.72 Oracle General Trading 58.66 0 0 0 0 0 58.66 Comet Corpn. 43.8 0 0 43.8 Chaushan Trading Ltd. 40.82 12.05 0 52.87 Total 1521 168.93 76.28 1013.18 348.59 994.77 650.42 176.18 446.4 5395.75 3.4 Investigation as to who are the sources of such huge funds revealed that fake firms with dummy partners have made RTGS Credits from their respective bank accounts with Axis Bank to the ICICI Bank accounts of above mentioned companies. Sr. No. Name of the company Address Name of the partners 1 M/s. Aarzoo Enterprises 6/1854, PAI, Shop No. 4, Cab. Sr. No. Name of the company Address Name of the partners 1 M/s. Aarzoo Enterprises 6/1854, PAI, Shop No. 4, Cab. No. 1, Navkar Chambers, Bhojabhai No Tekro, Mahidarpura, Surat-395003 Faisal Reza M Ali Patel and Zahir Abbas M Patel 2 M/s. GT Traders 6/869, Ami Kunj Building, Ground Floor, Back Side,Cabin No. A, Chapariya Sheri, Mahidarpura, Surat-395003 Shahid M. Tamboli and Faisal Reza M Ali Patel 3 M/s. Vandana & Co. 6/2132, 3rd Floor, Cabin NO. 301, B, Limbu Sheri, Mahidarpura, Surat Ali Raza H. Bhojani and Shahid M. Tamboli. 4 M/s. Maruti Trading 6/2497. 3rd Floor, Cabin No. 1 Ajanta Matlar, Limbusheri, Mahidarpura, Surat Shahid M. Tamboli and Zahir Abbas M. Patel. 5 M/s. Jash Traders 7/3717 A, Cabin No. 1, 2nd Floor, Rampura Main Road, Surat Faisal Reza M Ali Patel and Ali Raza H. Bhojani 6 M/s. Natural Trading Co 6/2155, Cabin NO. 3, Basement, Gokul Bldg., Pipala Sheri, Mahidarpura, Surat Pukhraj Anandmal Mutha and Munnichand Shantilal Bhandari. 7 M/s. M.D. Enterprise 6/1766, Sainath Building, Ground floor, Cabin No. 1, Gundisheri, Mahidarpura, Surat Munnichand Shantilal Bhandari and Sushil Kumar Anandmal Jain 8 M/s. Millennium & Co. 307, Suparshwa Building, 3rd Floor, Cabin No. 1, Near Ganesh Temple, Thoba Sheri, Mahidarpura, Surat. Shri Surendra Kumar Anandmal Dungarwal and Shri Sushilkumar Anandmal Jain 3.5 The following table further shows the amount of funds transferred through RTGS from the firms to the companies. 307, Suparshwa Building, 3rd Floor, Cabin No. 1, Near Ganesh Temple, Thoba Sheri, Mahidarpura, Surat. Shri Surendra Kumar Anandmal Dungarwal and Shri Sushilkumar Anandmal Jain 3.5 The following table further shows the amount of funds transferred through RTGS from the firms to the companies. Directorial Companies Partnership Firms M/s. R.A. Distributors Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Riddhi Exim Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Hem Jewels Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Maa Mumbadevi Gems Pvt. Ltd. M/s. M.B. Offhsore Distributors Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Ram Shyam Exports Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Trinetra Trading Pvt. Ltd. Total M/s. Vandana & Co 233 113.6 45 54 139 65.99 13.56 664.15 M/s. Natural Trading Co 95 46.40 0 0 74 49 9 273.4 M/s. Jash Traders 349 124.56 57 126 175 79.45 11.78 922.79 M/s. GT Traders 270 154 54 66 202 87 6.33 839.33 M/s. M.D. Enterprise 88 27 0 0 92 44.85 13.65 265.5 M/s. Aarzoo Enterprise 272 64.85 47 95 155 71.66 7.35 712.86 M/s. Millennium & Co 26 4.4 0 0 24 0 0 54.4 M/s. Maruti Trading 18 40 0 0 51 78.93 8.79 196.72 1351 574.81 203 341 912 476.88 70.46 3929.15 3.6 It has also been found that several firms, individuals, cheque discounters, commission agents and others based in New Delhi, Mumbai, Surat, Chandigarh, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad have made RTGS transfers to the partnership firms. 3.7 The respondent No.3 had initially started investigation under the FEMA, 1999, and following in the FIR NO. I/16/2014 dtd. 11.04.2014 and FIR No. I/17/2014 dtd. 13.04.2014 registered by the Detection of Crime Branch, Surat Police under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 477 A of IPC upon the complaint of ICICI Bank investigations under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) have been initiated as the Offences under Section 420, 467, 471 of IPC are ‘scheduled offences’ in terms of Section 2(y) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, which have been registered against the above said companies and its directors. Upon scrutiny of the said two FIRs, a case was registered under ECIR No. 01/2014 dtd. 17/04/2014 by the Directorate of Enforcement, Surat for investigation into the offence of money laundering under PMLA, 2002. Upon scrutiny of the said two FIRs, a case was registered under ECIR No. 01/2014 dtd. 17/04/2014 by the Directorate of Enforcement, Surat for investigation into the offence of money laundering under PMLA, 2002. 3.8 One Shri Afroz Mohamed Hasanfatta one of the petitioner in cognate writ petition along with one Shri Madanlal Jain was the brain behind the illegal transfer of money and since he has received huge proceeds for his active role in the crime he has been arrested under Section 19 of PMLA, 2002. Shri Madanlal Jain created the fake companies with dummy directors and lent the same for Shri Afroz Mohamed Hasanfatta for import and export of diamonds. No such import and export of diamonds have been made from the said private limited companies and bills of entry of the year 2011 were allowed to be made and forged with the signatures of Customs Officials for illegal transfer of money by submitting the same before the ICICI Bank. The Police have arrested Shri Madanlal Jain on 7/7/2014 and the Directorate has also arrested him on 17/7/2014 under the Section 19 of PMLA, 2002 following the transit remand granted by the Chief Court, Surat. During his custodial interrogation, he has stated that RTGS credits in huge amounts were received through Shri Rakesh Kothari and the said RTGS credits received in the accounts of the said firms with the Axis bank were transferred to M/s. R.A. Distributors Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Riddhi Exim Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Hem Jewels Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Maa Mumbadevi Gems Pvt. Ltd. M/s. M.B. Offshore Distributors Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Ramshyam Exports Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Trinetra Trading Company Pvt. Ltd. He has also stated that Shri Rakesh Kothari of M/s. Riddhi Siddhi Bullion Ltd would ensure credits through RTGS were made in the firms namely, M/s. Vandana & Co., M/s. Aarzoo Enterprise, M/s. GT Traders, M/s. Jash Traders, M/s. Maruti Trading, M/s. M.D. Enterprise, M/s. Millennium & Co., and M/s. Natural Trading Co. from places like Mumbai, Surat and Delhi and would use the same for smuggling of diamonds and Gold. from places like Mumbai, Surat and Delhi and would use the same for smuggling of diamonds and Gold. He further stated that M/s. Riddhi Siddhi Bullion Ltd. had business transactions in Dubai through Shri Raju Kothari of M/s. Riddhi Siddhi Bullion Ltd. had business transactions with M/s. Al Khayal Al Dahabi Jewellery LLC, Dubai and the said firm had reportedly made illegal transactions with the firm Al Khayal Al Dahabi Jewellery LLC, Dubai for smuggling of Gold. Role played by the Petitioner Shri Urvish D. Shah, Director of M/s. P. Umesh Chandra & Co, an Angadia firm, in his statement dtd. 26.6.2014 has named Shri Prithviraj Kothari (paternal uncle of Rakesh Kothari) would send cash to Surat from Mumbai through M/s. P. Umesh Chandra & Co. They would telephone from 02223098745 to M/s. P. Umesh Chandra & Co for collecting the cash and during a period of time the cash amounting to Rs. 150 crore was stated to have been transferred. The said cash was delivered to various persons on the instructions of Shri Prafful Patel, Surat. Shri Madanlal Jain in his statement dtd. 22/07/2014 has stated the sources of funds received through RTGS in second layer companies namely, M/s. Vandana & Co, M/s. GT Traders, M/s. Maruti Trading, M/s. Jash Traders, M/s. Aarzoo Enterprises, M/s. Millennium & Co, M/s. Natural Trading and M.D. Enterprise. He had stated that Shri Rakesh Kothari would ensure credits through RTGS transfer to the companies from places like Mumbai, Surat and Delhi. He had also stated that Shri Rakesh Kothari would use the fraudulent remittances made to Hong Kong and Dubai for smuggling of Gold and Diamonds. To specific question on the names of the companies in which Shri Rakesh Kothari had ensured the RTGS transfers to which Shri Madanlal Jain stated that Shri Rakesh made RTGS to M/s. GT Traders and M/s. Vandana & Co. The forensic analysis of the computer seized from the Office of Shri Madanlal Jain has the messages sent from Shri Jayesh Desai regarding the debit advice of Shri Raju Kothari, Shri Rajesh Kothari is an elder brother of Shri Rakesh Kothari. Shri Rakesh Kothari has not turned up on being twice summoned and turned up on 01.09.2014 for his statement to be recorded under Section 50 of PMLA, 2002. Shri Rakesh Kothari has not turned up on being twice summoned and turned up on 01.09.2014 for his statement to be recorded under Section 50 of PMLA, 2002. The Modus Operandi under which the Petitioner helped in Financing Shri Madanlal Jain: In one of the Statements of the Petitioner recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, 2002 on 06/09/2014 wherein he inter alia stated that he had agreed to the statements dtd. 5/9/2014 of Shri C.K. Patel (Jayanti Amba Angadia firm) and Shri Praveen Kumar Jain (Commission agent from Mumbai) recorded under Section 50 of PMLA, 2002 and perused and put his dated signature on the above statements; that he had sent Rs. 750 Crore to Surat through various angadias for further RTGS and the money belonged to his paternal uncle Shri Prithviraj Kothari; that on being asked to elaborate the whole modus operandi of collecting cash and sending it for the procurement of RTGS he stated that the man of Shri Prithviraj Kothari, Shri Anil would give cash to the petitioner and Mr. Anil was working in the Office of Shri Prithviraj Kothari; that Mr. Madanlal Jain and Mr. Prithviraj Kothari would discuss the issue of handing over the cash to individual/company for the purpose of RTGS and Mr. Anil would come to him with the cash and direction that to whom the cash might be given for the purpose of making of RTGS; that thereafter as per the direction given he would hand over the concerned company/individual and they would complete the transaction by making the RTGS; that he would wait for 2 to 3 hours and in case if the phone did not come to him then it would be presumed that RTGS process was complete and in case it was not complete then the person would inform him citing the reason for non completion and it was being completed the following day; that Rs. 750 Crore in cash had been given by him to different RTGS arranging persons from the period during December’2013 to February/March 2014; that besides him the other person who was doing illegal transfer of money work for Shri Prithviraj Kothari were Shri Hukam Raj, Rajni Mahal, Tara deo, Shri Yunus, Masjid under etc and the cash was given by him to either angadias or the persons who arranged the RTGS; that the RTGS arranged in Mumbai for that money was given directly to the person who arranged the RTGS and the RTGS procured in Surat money was given to the Angadias; that the angadias thereafter would transport the money from their Office in Mumbai to Surat and would give it to the persons arranging RTGS in Surat; that the name of RTGS arranging persons were Shri Sagar and Shri Dharmendra; that those two were main persons who arranged RTGS and the total money given by him to the following angadias which was around Rs. 750 Crore were M/s. P. Umesh Chandra & Co, M/s. Gujarat Angadia, M/s. Jayantilal Ambalal Choksi, M/s. S. Babulal, Shri Arpit, Fofal wadi, Bhuleshwar, M/s. Soma Magan, Fofal wadi, Bhuleshwar and in addition to above, certain cheque discounters in Mumbai would also arrange direct RTGS from Mumbai itself; that his brother Shri Rajesh Kothari alias Raju Kothari has a company named Al Khayal Al Dhahabi Jewellery LLC, M1, M2, M3, Gold Souq, Deilva, P.O. Box, 51377, Dubai, U.A.E. 4 According to the petitioner of Special Civil Application No.4496 of 2014, FIR No.5/16 of 2014 was registered by District Crime Branch, Surat on 11.04.2014 alleging various offences under IPC against one M/s. R.A. Distributors Pvt. Ltd., Surat and its directors for preparing bogus bills of entry and presenting the same for outward remittance to various parties in Dubai and Hong Kong. That another FIR came to be registered by District Crime Branch, Surat on 13.04.2014 for various offences under IPC against M/s. Agni Gems Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Harmony Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. and the directors for preparing bills of entry and presenting the same for outward remittance to various parties in Dubai and Hong Kong. That another FIR came to be registered by District Crime Branch, Surat on 13.04.2014 for various offences under IPC against M/s. Agni Gems Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Harmony Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. and the directors for preparing bills of entry and presenting the same for outward remittance to various parties in Dubai and Hong Kong. However, Enforcement Case Information Report [ECIR]01/SuratSubZonal/2014-15 was registered by Directorate of Enforcement of Ahmedabad, Surat Zone, Surat against persons accused in the aforesaid FIRs dated 11.04.2014 and 13.04.2014 and it was registered by respondent No.3 and investigation commenced under provisions of the PML Act and the Rules framed there under. During the course of investigation, the Deputy Director of the Directorate of enforcement complained against 79 accused including interested persons and legal entities, but the petitioners herein were not named. Later on, when the petitioner, who appeared on being summoned was arrested by respondent No. 3 purportedly in exercise of powers conferred by Section 19(1) of the PML Act. On reasonable belief that the petitioner has been guilty of offences punishable under Section 4 read with Section 3 of PML Act, on 02.09.2014 an application was filed by respondent No.3 before the designated Judge under PML Act viz. Principal District Judge, Ahmedabad [Rural] for seeking enforcement custody of the petitioner. In the remand application it was claimed by respondent No.3 that arrest of petitioner was done on 01.09.2014 for involvement in the huge money laundering racket and investigation could not be completed in short time. Thereafter, the application for opposing further remand and for seeking bail was filed by the petitioner on 08.09.2014 for seeking temporary bail, till final disposal of the said application. However, by order dated 09.09.2014, learned Sessions Judge [PMLA] Designated Court was pleased to reject the prayers for interim relief and thereafter matter was kept for hearing on regular bail. An affidavit in reply was filed by respondent No.3 on 15.09.2014 and arguments were canvassed by both the learned advocate for the parties respectively and finally application filed by the petitioner for opposing remand and grant of bail came to be rejected by order dated 08.10.2014. 4.1 In the above mentioned factual aspects, petitioners have filed the present petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with manifold prayers as quoted herein above. 4.2 At the outset, legality, validity and constitutionality of the PML Act is not under challenge. 4.1 In the above mentioned factual aspects, petitioners have filed the present petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with manifold prayers as quoted herein above. 4.2 At the outset, legality, validity and constitutionality of the PML Act is not under challenge. However, Section 45 of PML Act is challenged as arbitrary, unreasonable, illegal, discriminatory inasmuch as certain offences under amended schedule, which can even be non-cognizable and bailable and/or had much lighter importance mandates such offences not only cognizable and non-bailable, but also put onerous restrictions on accused persons of such schedule offences while taking bail from the competent court of law and such accused persons have to undergo rigor of provisions of Section 45 of the PML Act which makes it impossible for them to get any relief unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing such accused person is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. That in the present case, when the petitioner herein is not even accused of any schedule offence, still, rigors of impugned Section 45 are erroneously made applicable and law clearly abhors deprivation of any individual except according to procedure established by law as per Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is also submitted that even arrest of the petitioner in exercise of powers under Section 19 of the PML Act by respondent No.3 is per se illegal and violative of procedure prescribed in the above Section itself read with directions issued by the Apex Court in the case of D.K. Basu [supra] and respondent No.3 is not competent enough to order such arrest of the petitioner and further mandatory procedure of rules notified by Central Government vide GSR 446[E] dated 01.07.2005 viz. “The Prevention of Money Laundering [the Forms and the Manner of Forwarding a Copy of Order of Arrest of a Person along with the Material to the Adjudicating authority And Its period of Retention] Rules, 2005”. That respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the officers of the enforcement directorate and such officers are empowered to order arrest, as envisaged under Section 19 of the PML Act. That respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the officers of the enforcement directorate and such officers are empowered to order arrest, as envisaged under Section 19 of the PML Act. 4.3 Referring to two notifications dated 01.07.2005, GSR 446[E] and GSR 441[E], it is stated that the above notifications were issued in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) read with clause [a], Clause [p] of sub-section (2) of section 73 of PML Act notifying The Prevention of Money Laundering [the Forms and the Manner of Forwarding a Copy of Order of arrest of a Person Along with the Material to the Adjudicating Authority and its Period of Retention] Rules, 2005 and the second notification was issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section [1] of Section 49 of the PML Act whereby the Central Government appointed with effect from 1st day of July, 2005 Directorate of Enforcement holding office immediately before the said date under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 as the Director who exercise the exclusive powers conferred under Sections 5, 8, 16, 17, 18, 19 20 and 21 and sub-section (1) of Section 26, Sections 45, 50, 57, 60, 62 and Section 63 of the PML Act and the said director shall also concurrently exercise powers conferred by sub-sections 3, 4 and 5 of Section 26 and Sections 39, 40, 41, 42, 48, 49, 66 and 69 of the PML Act. 4.4 That on 01.06.2009 Prevention of Money Laundering [Amendment] Act, 2009 [No.21 of 2009] was amended and vide Section 38 of the said Amended Act, 2009, the Schedule was partly amended and the offences of lesser gravity remained in Part B of the said Schedule with monetary ceiling. That on 27.11.2011 the Directorate of Enforcement issued a circular Order bearing [Tech] No.03/2011 after cadre restructure of the Directorate and re-designation of posts at various levels. 4.5 On 03.01.2013, Prevention of Money Laundering [Amendment] Act, 2013 was amended further to amend the PML Act and Section 3 of the Act came to be amended and vide Section 30 of the amended act, even offences enumerated in Part B of the Schedule were also inserted in Part A of the Schedule by omitting Part B and substituting Part A of the said Schedule. That on 08.02.2013 Central Government appointed 15.02.2013 as the date on which provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2012 came into force by putting same into gazette. 4.6 That Section 54 also came to be amended and which was pertaining to certain officers empowered to assist in inquiry etc. and clause [g] of the said section 54 provide that officers of enforcement appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 36 and Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 along with other such officers of the Central Government institutions recognized under law and thus like any other officers of any other Department mentioned under Section 54, the respondent No.3 was empowered according to the petitioner to assist in inquiry and was not competent to arrest the petitioner under Section 17 of the PML Act. 5. In the backdrop of factual scenario of facts and law, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Vikram Chaudhary with Mr. Sanjay Agarwal for the petitioner contended that Section 45 of the PML Act is unreasonable, unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and ultra vires to Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that amended schedule would show minor/lighter offences under the IPC and other enactments which are even non-cognizable or bailable have been subjected to rigor in terms of Section 45 of the PML Act, even when a person is accused of such an offence and recourse to Section 3 of PML Act is attracted, the offence under the PML Act could necessary become cognizable and non-bailable. Such an anomalous situation would lead to disastrous consequences. On the one hand a person may be accused of non-cognizable and/or a bailable offence however, if applied rigors of PML Act, such an offence if finds place in Part A of the Schedule of the offences under PML Act, would become much graver, and if the liberty of such person is curtailed, by application of the provisions of Section 45 of the Act, a greater burden would be put on the Court to hold that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused person is not guilty of offences under PML Act in order to grant bail and such rigor is blatantly unreasonable, absurd and discriminatory. Such rigor is even greater than Section 37 of the NDPS Act where in case of certain types of offences viz. Such rigor is even greater than Section 37 of the NDPS Act where in case of certain types of offences viz. under Sections 19 or Section 24 or Section 27A and for offences involving commercial quantity under NDPS Act where to undergo rigor of section 37 and not for lesser offences. 5.1 It is further submitted that a bare glance on the provisions of Section 45 of PMLA would show that irrespective of the nature of the accusation in scheduled offence, all offences under PMLA are cognizable as well as non-bailable, and if the person is accused of any scheduled offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of 3 years and more [even if of a non-cognizable and bailable offence], any offence under PMLA concerning Proceeds of Crime qua such Scheduled offence, would attracts rigors of Section 45(1) of PMLA thereof (supra). Although the petitioner is not an accused of any scheduled offence, and as such rigors of section 45 are not applicable to him, the respondents are making their endeavors to any how incarcerate the petitioner for oblique purposes. In any event, such provisions are therefore certainly tantamount to transgressing into fundamental rights of life and liberty of persons guaranteed in Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. 5.2 It is further submitted that viewed from any perspective, the provisions relating to bail under PMLA as well as construction of nature of offences there under, cannot be made in such a manner which may render the very purpose thereof to be oppressive, harsh, indiscriminate and repugnant to basic fundamental right of an individual. 5.3 It is further submitted that law on the subject is no more res integra that – [i] if the court wants to ignore any law on the ground that it violates the Constitution, declaration by the Court of its unconstitutionality is essential. Even though a law becomes void automatically under Article 13, without the necessity of any declaration by a court, a declaration that a law has become void is necessary before a court can refuse to take notice of it. The voidness of law is not a tangible thing which can be noticed as soon as it comes into existence, a declaration that it is void is necessary before it can be ignored. The voidness of law is not a tangible thing which can be noticed as soon as it comes into existence, a declaration that it is void is necessary before it can be ignored. [ii] In the alternative to submission (i), dire necessity is to expound and interpret Section 45 of PMLA. It is however well nigh settled that even if a provision under penal statue is intra vires, the same may not stand the scrutiny of law in case there is basic difficulty on account of jurisdictional issue. Section 19 read with Section 49(3) of PMLA, and Rules notified by GSR 446(E), dated 1.7.2005 would clearly show that officers authorized under the Act can exercise power to arrest only in the following manner and eventualities- (a) There has to be accusation of Scheduled offence, (b) There has to be Proceeds of Crime derived out of the Scheduled offence, and case shall relate to its projection as untainted. (c) There has to be 'material in possession', (d) There must be reason to believe, (e) The reasons for such belief must be recorded in writing, (f) Reasons to believe must relate to any person to be 'guilty' of an offence punishable under PMLA, (g) Pursuant to such arrest, it is mandatory to inform the arrestee of the grounds for such arrest, (h) In terms of Rules notified vide GSR 446 (E), dated 1.7.2005, particularly Rule 2(1)(c), 2(1)(e), 2(1)(f), 2(1)(g), 2(1)(h), Rule 3, and Rule 6, arrest under PMLA can be made by an “arresting officer” as defined in the Rules on the basis of “material” and upon service of Arrest order which must be made in accordance with Form III, containing material particulars in the matter of arrest, and the officer to be 'authorised' in this behalf by the Central Government, and also indicating 'reason to believe' as required under Section 19 because arrest order would mean the order of arrest of a person and includes the grounds for such arrest under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act. The aforesaid rules are reproduced hereinafter for ready reference – “2 Definitions 1. The aforesaid rules are reproduced hereinafter for ready reference – “2 Definitions 1. In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires, - (c) “Arresting Officer” means the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer, authorized in this behalf by the Central Government by general or special order to exercise the power to arrest any person under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act;” “(e) “Director” or “Deputy Director” or “Assistant Director” means a Director or a Deputy Director or an Assistant Director, as the case may be, appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Act;” “(f) “Form” means forms appended to these rules;” “(g) “material” means any information or material in the possession of the Director or Deputy Director or Assistant Director or any authorized officer, as the case may be, on the basis of which he has recorded reasons under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act;” “(h) “order” means the order of arrest of a person and includes the grounds for such arrest under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act;” (I) Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules further prescribes that pursuant to the arrest, the Arresting Officer shall prepare an index of the copy of the order and the material in possession and sign each page of such index of the copy of the order and the material and shall also write a letter while forwarding such index, order and the material to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope. Rule 6 specifically provides that the Arresting Officer while exercising powers under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act shall sign the arrest order in Form III appended to the Rules. 5.4 It is further submitted that as logical corollary would postulate mandate of law, it is luminous that in the event of breach of any of the mandatory procedure as culled out above, the arrest would be illegal and contrary to procedure established by law and thus violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 5.5 It is further submitted that even if Section 45 of PMLA is taken on its face value, the same cannot override the mandate of Section 19(1) read with Section 49(3) of PMLA and Rules thereunder (supra). 5.5 It is further submitted that even if Section 45 of PMLA is taken on its face value, the same cannot override the mandate of Section 19(1) read with Section 49(3) of PMLA and Rules thereunder (supra). Viewed from any perspective, Section 45(1) of PMLA must be construed in a harmonious manner in order to give true meaning, effect of lack of authority, and mandatory provisions under the Act and rigors as contained in Section 45 (1) cannot be invoked unless the other mandatory procedural requirements are met with. It is further submitted that Section 45 of PMLA, to the extent it is ultra vires of Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, is unconstitutional. 5.6 Learned Senior Advocate would contend that Section 19 of the PML Act is to be read down, expound, deliberate and interpret in light of section 49(3) read with Rules notified by GSR 446[E] dated 1.7.2005 and directions and guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal 1997(1) SCC 416 . The above contention of learned counsel are on the premise that the graver offences alleged stricter requirement to follow the procedure and in the instant case there is total breach of procedure prescribed by law while taking away liberty of the petitioner in illegal manner. 5.7 Section 49(3) permits the Central Government to impose such conditions and limitations on exercise of the powers and discharge of duty conferred or imposed on any authority under the PMLA. Thus, as a logical corollary it can be safely inferred that Central Government can by way of Rules and Notifications etc issued by it from time to time may also define and limit the scope and manner of exercise of powers and functions by any authority under the PMLA. It is not open for the respondents to claim the rules and notifications issued by the Central Government as redundant, much less when the personal liberty of any citizen is taken away in violation of the rules and notifications issued by the Central Government. 5.8 It is further submitted that in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) read with clause (b) of sub-section (2), of Section 73 of the PML Act, the Central Government has notified Rules. 5.8 It is further submitted that in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) read with clause (b) of sub-section (2), of Section 73 of the PML Act, the Central Government has notified Rules. 5.9 It is further submitted that on 26.9.2013, the purported Grounds of Arrest were handed over to the counsel for the petitioner, after the arguments in the bail application were concluded by them on earlier date. Even these purported Grounds of Arrest contain the following manifest illegalities – [a] The same are not even titled as 'Grounds of Arrest'. [b] The same are not even addressed to the petitioner. [c] No FIR of any Scheduled Offence is remotely mentioned in the Grounds of Arrest. [d] No gist of any Scheduled Offence is mentioned in the Grounds of Arrest. [e] It is not even informed that the petitioner is not accused of any Scheduled Offence. [f] No ECIR case number under PMLA is mentioned in the Grounds of Arrest. [g] No brief details of allegations leading to registration of the ECIR case are mentioned. [h] There is no reference to the Complainant already filed against 79 accused persons in the same case under PMLA. [i] The purported Grounds of Arrest do not bear endorsement of any witness to suggest that the same were actually informed to the petitioner. [j] The purported Grounds of Arrest do not bear any endorsement of the petitioner to suggest that these were the Grounds claimed as explained to the petitioner. [k] Although, the purported Grounds of Arrest claim that (copies of statements enclosed), no statements were provided even on 26.9.2014, despite specific request by the Counsel for the petitioner. [l] No proceeds of Crime relatable to the petitioner herein are identified in these Grounds, much less any willful conversion and/or projection of any Proceeds of Crime as untainted, by the petitioner, directly or indirectly. [m] It do not show any prima facie basis to have reasonable belief that the petitioner has been guilty of offence under PMLA. [n] In one paragraph the petitioner is alleged as connected with Real Time Gross Settlement RTGS received in about 8 second layer entities (Group C), in the very next paragraph it is restricted to 2 out of these 8 entities. [p] The purported Grounds of Arrest show that the petitioner had denied the allegations in interrogation. [n] In one paragraph the petitioner is alleged as connected with Real Time Gross Settlement RTGS received in about 8 second layer entities (Group C), in the very next paragraph it is restricted to 2 out of these 8 entities. [p] The purported Grounds of Arrest show that the petitioner had denied the allegations in interrogation. This however cannot be the reason for his arrest without there being any reasonable belief, on any material in possession, that he is guilty of offence under PMLA, even on prima facie basis. 5.10 Inter alia, reliance is placed by the learned Senior Advocate on the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh – AIR 1999 SC 2378 and also in the case of D.K. Basu,. Vs. State of West Bengal, 1997(1) SCC 416 . 5.11 Thus, it is submitted that order of arrest of the petitioner by respondent No.3 in exercise of powers under Section 19(1) of the PML Act deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.12 Learned Senior Advocate submits that the “Grounds of Arrest” on the basis of material in possession for reason to believe the applicant as guilty of offence under PML Act, have not even been served upon the applicant, though mandatory under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of PML Act. The existence of such grounds for arriving at such reasonable belief is prerequisite for arrest under PML Act and are required to be recorded in writing. Hence, non-supply of such “Grounds of Arrest”, at the time of arrest or immediately thereafter is fatal and hence the applicant is entitled to be released on bail even on this ground. It is further submitted that the arrest officer shall record purported belief that the applicant is guilty of offence under PML Act and thus having arrived at such belief, non-communication of the grounds of arrest has rendered the arrest illegal, null and void ab initio and hence the petitioner is entitled to be released on bail. The applicant has also placed on record by way of an illustration “Grounds of Arrest” being served upon arrest under PML Act. Non-communication of grounds of arrest to the applicant is thus in violation of Article 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. The applicant has also placed on record by way of an illustration “Grounds of Arrest” being served upon arrest under PML Act. Non-communication of grounds of arrest to the applicant is thus in violation of Article 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Along with the above emphasis is laid on para 30 guidelines in the case of D.K. Basu and directions are also equally binding to Revenue Intelligence, Directorate of Enforcement, etc. 5.13 That even Rule 2(1)(c) of the Rules notified vide GSR 446[E] dated 01.07.2005 defines duly authorize arresting officer and not absence of any general or specific order by Central Government pursuant to respondent No.3 to exercise powers under Section 19 of PML Act and arrest of the petitioner again become illegal and such exercise and abuse of process of law, and therefore, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside and the petitioner is required to be enlarged on bail. 5.14 Learned Senior Advocate placed reliance on the following decisions: [1] D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal – (1997)1 SCC 416 . [2] State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh – AIR 1999 SC 2378 . [3] Harikishan v. State of Maharashtra – AIR 1962 SC 911 . [4] K. Kuppuswamy & Anr. vs. State of T.N. (1998)8 SCC 469 . [5] Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India – (2000)3 SCC 409 . [6] Hema Mishra v. State of UP – (2014)4 SCC 453 . [7] Madhu Limaye & Ors. 1969(1) SCC 292 . [8] C.B. Gautam v. Union of India – (1993)1 SCC 1999. [9] Pragnasingh Thakore vs. State of Maharashtra (2011)10 SCC 445 . [10] Hussein Ghandially & Ors. v. State of Gujarat – (2014)8 SCC 425 . The learned Senior Advocate has further relied on the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Bill 2011 and the Prevention of Money Laundering Bill of 1999. 6. Mr. [9] Pragnasingh Thakore vs. State of Maharashtra (2011)10 SCC 445 . [10] Hussein Ghandially & Ors. v. State of Gujarat – (2014)8 SCC 425 . The learned Senior Advocate has further relied on the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Bill 2011 and the Prevention of Money Laundering Bill of 1999. 6. Mr. Devang Vyas, learned ASG has heavily relied on the affidavit in reply and opposed grant of any relief in the prayer clauses and submitted that involvement of the petitioner in offence under PML Act have surfaced during the course of investigation carried out and submitted as under: 6.1 Learned ASG appearing for the respondent No.3 submits that Section 45 of PMLA is a mandate duly provided by the legislature so as to make the offence of money laundering a cognizable and non bailable offence, the offence of money laundering is a distinct and separate offence which is exclusive of the schedule offence on the basis of which money laundering investigation under PMLA takes it course and hence the investigation of the offence punishable under section 4 of the Act has its own sanctity which is not dependent on the course of schedule offence and its procedure, the exclusivity of the offence and section 45 has to be read in consonance with the Aims and Objective of the said Act. It is further submitted that public interest is paramount in the subject case and PMLA, 2002 has been enacted to serve public interest as evident in the opening statement of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which is as under: “It is being realized, world over, that money-laundering poses a serious threat not only to the financial systems of countries, but also to their integrity and sovereignty.” 6.2 It is submitted that the nature and classification of schedule offence be it bailable or cognizable or non bailable or non cognizable has no bearing on offence under S.3 of PMLA as the mandate of the same provides for a distinct offence under Section 3 which is punishable under Section 4 of the statute and creates a new, different and a separate investigation under PML Act which is totally exclusive and divergent of the course and nature of schedule offence investigated and prosecuted by the predicate agency and henceforth, it is pertinent to mention that Section 45 which has its applicability over the offence under Section 3 has to be dealt in without the nature and course of schedule offence and in light of the aims and objectives of the PMLA. 6.3 It is further submitted that the Respondent No.3 is empowered to investigate cases under PMLA and has rightly executed his powers as defined in the law. It is submitted that due process of law was scrupulously followed and was within the jurisdiction as manifested in the PMLA. 6.4 It further submitted that the contention raised by the Petitioner in terms of ‘Arresting Officer’ as defined in Rule 2(1)(C) of the rules notified vide GSR 446(E) dated 01.07.2005 has to be contrasted with the expression used in sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act and hence the rules cannot control the provisions of the enactment and therefore, the power of Arrest given under Section 19(1) by the Parliament, could not be curtailed under rule making power of the executive by specifying that such Assistant Director has to be additionally authorised by Central Government by general or special order. 6.5 It is further submitted that as far as the contention of the applicant in terms of the power to arrest has been conferred by Central Government exclusively upon the Director in the Enforcement Directorate vide Notification GSR 441(E) dated 01.07.2005, the words used in the notification do not show that the Director was to have powers under the Act to the exclusion of all other officers. It only reveals that the Director has the exclusive power but not necessarily to the exclusion of the others, who are empowered under the Act. The same contention was also settled by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the matter of Syed Mohamed Masood Vs D. Shanmugam and others in Criminal Bail Application No. 71 of 2013. 6.6 It is further submitted that PMLA was amended so as to bring the offences under various statutes under the ambit of investigation under the Prevention of Money Laundering, stringent and Statement as to notification. 6.7 It is further submitted that Amendment to the PML Act, 2002 has further been made which merged the erstwhile schedules under a single schedule so as to remove the monetary limit for investigation under PMLA, 2002. 6.8 It is further submitted that the contention raised by the petitioner in terms of Section 54 of the PML Act does not have any locus as the arresting officer is duly authorized under the provisions of statute and derives his authority from Section 19 of the Prevention of Money laundering Act, 2002 and as far as Directors, Deputy Directors, or Assistant Directors are concerned, no authorization of Central Government is required and that, as far as the contention of the petitioner in terms of the power to arrest has been conferred by Central Government exclusively upon the Director in the Enforcement Directorate vide Notification GSR 441(E) dated 01.07.2005, the words used in the notification do not show that the Director was to have powers under the Act to the exclusion of all other officers. It only reveals that the Director has the exclusive power but not necessarily to the exclusion of the others, who are empowered under the Act. It is further submitted that in terms of S. 54(g) of PMLA, 2002 that other officers of enforcement who are not specially empowered to authorized powers under various Sections like 19, 17 etc. It only reveals that the Director has the exclusive power but not necessarily to the exclusion of the others, who are empowered under the Act. It is further submitted that in terms of S. 54(g) of PMLA, 2002 that other officers of enforcement who are not specially empowered to authorized powers under various Sections like 19, 17 etc. are also to assist the officers like Director, Joint Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director who exercises the power to arrest etc under provisions of PMLA and hence 54(g) provides just as the staff to assist the officer exercising and the Assistant Director was well within his powers to investigate the cases under PMLA and the execution of powers vested in him under the Section 19 was apposite. 6.9 It is further submitted that the contention of the petitioner with respect to not mentioning of his name in FIR No. I/16/2014 dated 11.4.2014 and FIR No.I/17/2014 dated 13.4.2014 is irrelevant and is not applicable in the present set of case as the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 r/w Section 2(1)(u) of the Act there should only be a nexus between the criminal activity relating to scheduled offence and the proceeds thereof in order to bring the person to book, and the said offence of money laundering is altogether a separate and a distinct offence which is investigated by Enforcement Directorate exclusive of the Schedule offence and persons found involved in the money laundering racket who may or may not have been named in offence registered by the predicate agency are been prosecuted for their alleged involvement in the offence as defined under S. 3 of the Act. 6.10 It is further submitted that the petitioner’s involvement in the offence has come up during the process of investigation carried on by the Directorate of Enforcement and his name appeared as one of the main accused while unearthing the said money laundering racket later on after 17.4.2014. Initially the investigation covers the individuals/companies mentioned in the FIR and as the investigation progresses, names of other individuals/companies keep on coming up. The persons/companies so emerged during the investigation consequently come under the ambit of investigation under the PMLA, 2002. It is most respectfully submitted that the petitioner’s role cropped up during the investigation and he was twice summoned under PMLA, 2002. The persons/companies so emerged during the investigation consequently come under the ambit of investigation under the PMLA, 2002. It is most respectfully submitted that the petitioner’s role cropped up during the investigation and he was twice summoned under PMLA, 2002. Since he was not forthcoming during the investigations his arrest under PMLA, 2002 has been effected. 6.11 It is next submitted that the Prosecution Complaint dated 18.07.2014 has been filed before the Hon’ble Designated Court Under PML Act against 79 accused and in the same case after further investigation a supplementary complaint has also been filed on 29.10.2014 against the said petitioner and other 9 accused. Investigation is still in progress in terms of the proceeds of crime and the beneficiaries of fraudulent remittances at Hong Kong and Dubai. 6.12 It is next contended that unsubstantiated allegations of the petitioner against the Directorate as to coercion and threatening are nothing but the afterthought just to abuse the due process of law and it is respectfully submitted that the arrest under section 19(1) of PML Act by respondent no. 3 is valid and within the powers conferred upon him by Section 19 read with Rules notified vide GSR 446 (E) dated 1.7.2005 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and not in derogation with the fundamental rights enshrined by the Constitution of India as the said arrest comes under the purview and fulfills requirement of S. 19. It is also submitted to the Hon’ble Court that as provided by S. 19(1) grounds of arrest were communicated to the accused, and a due medical check up was under taken after which accused was produced within stipulated time frame before the Hon’ble Designated Judge under PML Act, Ahmedabad along with the detailed Production memo providing reasons and written grounds of such arrest and the application for custody thereof which were not objected by the petitioner during the said production. It is further submitted that the baseless allegation as to derogation of fundamental rights are nothing but an afterthought added to the baseless allegations of coercion and the same was not complained by the petitioner on being produced on the very first day and thereafter before the Hon’ble Designated Court. It is further submitted that the baseless allegation as to derogation of fundamental rights are nothing but an afterthought added to the baseless allegations of coercion and the same was not complained by the petitioner on being produced on the very first day and thereafter before the Hon’ble Designated Court. It is also respectfully submitted that this is ploy to abuse due process of law since the investigation has revealed his involvement and the complaint has already been filed before the Designated Court under PML Act, Ahmedabad. 6.13 It is submitted that in execution of arrest in compliance with the procedure followed above, relatives of accused were telephonically informed about his arrest which has also been endorsed by the accused on arrest memo given to him and one Mr. Amit Solanki, a Chartered Account and friend of the accused was handed over the belongings and signed the inventory annexed to the arrest memo. The personal belongings of the petitioner as mentioned in the inventory were handed over to Shri Amit Solanki who accompanied the petitioner to Ahmedabad from Mumbai on 01/9/2014 and was waiting in the corridor of the office of the Enforcement Directorate. He has been told the reasons for handing over the belongings of the petitioner and had duly acknowledged of having received the belongings of the petitioner. 6.14 It is further submitted that along with the production of the accused, an application for Enforcement Custody was made before the Designated Judge and the learned Judge was pleased to grant custody of the petitioner for four days from 4/9/2014 to 8/9/2014. That the petitioner has been told the grounds of arrest and having learned about his grounds of arrest he has put his signature on the arrest memo. 6.15 It is further submitted that repeated allegations as to threatening of petitioner and his family members and coercing him to sign the statements made during the custody are preposterous, false, baseless and can be termed as added script as same were never contended by the petitioner during his production post arrest or after the enforcement custody, the statements given were voluntary and petitioner thereby was not forced to give any involuntary confession. It is also respectfully submitted that the statements were typed as per the version and say of the petitioner and he was allowed to read before he put his signature on all the occasions. It is also respectfully submitted that the statements were typed as per the version and say of the petitioner and he was allowed to read before he put his signature on all the occasions. That the petitioner has in his own handwriting made several corrections to the statements and hence there was no question of coercion or duress. The petitioner in his own handwriting has also mentioned that whatever was stated during the remand period was voluntarily, without any coercion and the facts to the best of his knowledge. 6.16 It is further submitted that on 08.09.2014 application opposing further enforcement custody has never been an issue involved in the given case as Enforcement Directorate has not prayed for any further custody of the petitioner and in addition to that Hon’ble Designated Court vide their order dated 09/09/2014 was pleased to reject the prayer of temporary bail to the petitioner and as on date the alleged involvement of the petitioner in offence of money laundering has been made clear by filing of a prosecution complaint dated 29.10.2014 against the petitioner and others in the Hon’ble Designated Court. The proceeds derived from helping Shri Madanlal Jain and others in the illegal transfer of money to Hong Kong and Dubai are being investigated against the petitioner. 6.17 It is further submitted that the Arrest Memo was served to petitioner and the inventory of the belongings of the petitioner were handover to Shri Amit Solanki, a Chartered Account and friend of the petitioner and grounds of arrest were inculcated in the production memo which was very well served upon the petitioner at the time of first production, moreover the file containing the grounds of arrest has been perused by the Hon’ble Designated Judge and was pleased to grant the petitioner the Enforcement Custody of the petitioner. During the hearing of the bail application a request has been made by the counsel of the petitioner that the grounds of arrest be made available to them and as per the directions of the Hon’ble Designated Judge, the copy of the grounds of arrest has been made available to the counsel of the petitioner. The said copy of grounds of arrest has also been seen by the Hon’ble Designated Judge and confirmed that it was the same copy that was produced before them for seeking remand. The said copy of grounds of arrest has also been seen by the Hon’ble Designated Judge and confirmed that it was the same copy that was produced before them for seeking remand. It is pertinent to note that production memo submitted before the Designated Judge also contained detailed grounds of arrest. 6.18 It is further submitted that the petitioner was in cahoots with Shri Madanlal Jain in financially helping him in as much as sending the money through various angadia firms to Surat and other places for the sake of RTGS transfers to the companies categorised as Group C by the petitioner himself is well established. That the petitioner has himself stated the modus operandi as to how the large chunks of money were allowed to be transferred through RTGS to the companies under Group C with the help of various cheque discounters/angadia firms known to the petitioner. The statement of the petitioner is quite evident as to how he helped in illegal transfer of money by various individuals without being connected to the companies mentioned under the Groups A, B, C and D either directly or indirectly. It is further submitted that investigations were initially started under FEMA and on receipt of the copies of FIRs from the Police authorities, investigations under PMLA have also been initiated. The investigation under FEMA is also in progress and is in parallel to the investigation under PMLA, 2002. The role of the petitioner has cropped up during the investigation in the form of statements of various cheque discounters, angadia firms and Shri Madanlal Jain with whom the Petitioner was having good relations. That the petitioner with the help of his brother Shri Rajesh Kothari used the said illegal monies remitted on the strength of fake documents to Dubai for smuggling of Gold and Diamonds was stated by Shri Madanlal Jain. Shri Rajesh Kothari is a beneficiary of the unlawful remittances to Dubai and his role has been evident by the summary of email messages sent from the computer of Shri Madanlal Jain wherein the summary reads as under: details of debit of Rajesh Kothari’s account. It is submitted that the petitioner is guilty of offence under Money laundering in as much as he had financially helped Shri Madanlal Jain for making RTGS transfers to the companies owned by Shri Madanalal Jain. It is submitted that the petitioner is guilty of offence under Money laundering in as much as he had financially helped Shri Madanlal Jain for making RTGS transfers to the companies owned by Shri Madanalal Jain. The Petitioner has used cheque discounters, angadia firms for sending money to various places and has also made arrangements for RTGS transfers from Mumbai itself. The statements of various persons who transferred monies belonging to the petitioner and further allowed the same for RTGS transfers is insurmountable. 6.19 It is further submitted that the petitioner with his strong financial clout sourced huge chunks of money to the companies mentioned under Group C which belonged to Shri Madanlal Jain is undeniable. That the petitioner having lent money to Shri Madanlal Jain for his fraudulent activities has also unquestionably received commission for helping in the Offence of Money Laundering. Since the petitioner has helped Shri Madanlal Jain in his criminal activities and the petitioner having derived proceeds from such criminal activities are nothing but proceeds of crime which is a matter of investigation being conducted by the Enforcement Directorate. The petitioner has been guilty of offence of money laundering, a complaint under PMLA, 2002 has been filed before the designated court on 29/10/2014. 6.20 It is further submitted that the investigation conducted so far has undoubtedly established the role of the Petitioner in the Offence of Money Laundering. The material in possession and other evidence submitted before the designated court and after considering the same the bail application of the petitioner was rejected vide an order dtd. 8/10/2014 by the Hon’ble Designated Court. That the claim of the petitioner that the material possession with the Enforcement Directorate was vague or insufficient to be called the petitioner guilty of Offence under Money Laundering has reasonably been set aside by the Hon’ble Designated Judge for PMLA, 2002. 6.21 It is further submitted that mere mention of the words such as “believe” “Incontrovertible” and other phrases without the full sentences accompanying the above words do not give a complete understanding of the background in which the said words/phrases have been used. 6.21 It is further submitted that mere mention of the words such as “believe” “Incontrovertible” and other phrases without the full sentences accompanying the above words do not give a complete understanding of the background in which the said words/phrases have been used. In so far as the grounds under which the above words and phrases were mentioned under the remand application and the reply filed before the designated court for PMLA, 2002 was to elaborate the role of the involvement of the petitioner in sourcing funds to Shri Madanlal Jain in the mammoth fraudulent remittances to Hong Kong and Dubai. That the petitioner was not alleged to have made remittances abroad but had only sourced funds belonging to his paternal uncle to the companies mentioned under the Group C is unquestionably substantiated. That the companies under Group C were of Shri Madanlal Jain and made RTGS transfer to Companies mentioned under Group A which used the same for illegal transfer of money to places like Hong Kong and Dubai on strength of fake documents. The investigation has also established the role of the petitioner beyond an iota of doubt to the extent of sourcing funds to the companies categorised as Group C and the petitioner himself as stated the way the funds were seen to be transferred through RTGS. Shri Rajesh Kothari, the brother of the petitioner has been named by Shri Madanlal Jain to be a beneficiary of illegal remittances in Dubai and the petitioner with the help of his brother used such illegal remittances for smuggling of Gold and Diamonds is incontrovertible. Hence it is most respectfully submitted that the petitioner is guilty of offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 of PMLA, 2002. 6.22 It is further submitted that the petitioner’s involvement in the offence of money laundering has been established by the statements of various persons and the investigation carried out by the Directorate of Enforcement following which a prosecution complaint has been duly filed against the accused before Designated Court on 29/10/2014. Shri Madanlal Jain for whom the petitioner lent Rs. 750 crore financial help for illegal transfer of money amounting to Rs. 5395.75 Crore has stated that the two brothers, the Petitioner and Shri Rajesh Kothari used the illegal remittances for the sake of smuggling of Gold and Diamonds. Shri Madanlal Jain for whom the petitioner lent Rs. 750 crore financial help for illegal transfer of money amounting to Rs. 5395.75 Crore has stated that the two brothers, the Petitioner and Shri Rajesh Kothari used the illegal remittances for the sake of smuggling of Gold and Diamonds. The petitioner has himself named various commission agents and cheque discounters who helped in arranging RTGS transfers from Mumbai and other places. The forensic analysis of the computer seized from the Office of Shri Madanlal Jain had email messages sent from Shri Jayesh Desai, an accomplice of Shri Madanlal Jain regarding the debit advice of Shri Raju Kothari also known as Shri Rajesh Kothari who is an elder brother of the petitioner and details of transactions in PDF format. 6.23 It is further submitted that the Respondent has taken due care in making arrest of the said petitioner and the same has been executed after fulfilling the requites as laid under S. 19 of the prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, The material in possession and reasons to believe were also made explicit in the production memo at the time of production of the petitioner after arrest before the Designated Court. 6.24 It is further submitted that offence under prevention of money laundering act, 2002 is a separate and distinct offence altogether exclusive of the schedule offence registered by predicate agency, hence the contention of the petitioner not being named in the FIR has no relevance because on the basis of the FIR a distinct case has been registered under PMLA and role of petitioner has been established by the investigation carried on by the Directorate. The ECIR was registered following the receipt of FIR registered by the Police authorities. The investigations launched under PMLA,2002 after registering the ECIR for source and trail of this mammoth illegal transfer of money led to various individuals and companies. The financial sources to the companies categorised under Group C by the petitioner himself was used for RTGS transfers to the companies categorised under Group A which have made the fraudulent remittances made from Surat on the strength of fake documents. The financial sources to the companies categorised under Group C by the petitioner himself was used for RTGS transfers to the companies categorised under Group A which have made the fraudulent remittances made from Surat on the strength of fake documents. It is most respectfully submitted that Shri Madanlal Jain created the companies mentioned under categories Group A and Group C and one of the sources of funds to the companies under Group C is the petitioner who had used the services of cheque discounters, angadias and other commission agents for the benefit of Shri Madanlal Jain. The petitioner is thus appropriately termed as guilty under the offence of money laundering and his role is aptly covered under the definition under Section 3 of PMLA, 2002. The proceeds thus derived from the illegal transfer of money are nothing but proceeds of crime as has been defined under Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA, 2002. 6.25 It is further submitted that it has been held by the Hon’ble Designated Judge under PML Act, Ahmedabad that the Respondent No. 3 i.e. Assistant Director of Enforcement has been authorized to execute arrest and arrest is not invalid in law vide their order dated 09.09.2014 and Hon’ble Designated Court was also pleased to reject the interim and regular bail application of the petitioner. The Hon’ble Designated Court was pleased to reject the bail application of petitioner vide its seasoned order dated 8/10/2014. The Hon’ble Designated Court was pleased to reject the bail application of petitioner vide its seasoned order dated 8/10/2014. 6.26 It is further submitted that on mere perusal of the bare provisions of Section 37 of NDPS Act and Section 45 of the PML Act shows similarity in the provisions moreover, the S. 45 of PML Act cannot be construed as violative of the Constitution of India on sole reasons of providing grounds in addition to the normal bail procedure provided under code of criminal procedure, furthermore the mandate of the Act is intended to make money laundering an offence and provide for its punishment thereof so as to deprive the offender to enjoy fruits of money which has ill gotten source, henceforth creating an altogether separate and distinct offence which is purely exclusive of the schedule offence, so contention as to nature of the schedule offence with respect to bailable or non cognizable does not have any locus as the investigation under PMLA is not dependent on the investigation and procedure under schedule offence and it is the aim and objective of the Act to provide for such provisions so as to deprive the offenders of such heinous crime to continue involving themselves in such racket and enjoy fruits of the proceeds so generated. The scope of S.45 PMLA, 2002 like S. 37 of NDPS Act and similar provision in MCOCA Act stands to the offence included in the same statute and thus, it is submitted that ‘offences’ which come within the purview of the S.45 are the offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act and hence applicability of the said section is over the offence under PMLA, 2002 and not over the investigation or trial under the schedule offence on basis of which the independent investigation under PMLA takes it course. 6.27 It is further submitted requisites of S.19 have been complied while executing arrest under PMLA and hence no such breach and violation of Fundamental Rights of the petitioner have been done. 6.28 It is further submitted that the rules which have been relied on have been framed in exercise of the powers under clauses (a) and (p) of Section 73(1) and (2) of the Act. 6.28 It is further submitted that the rules which have been relied on have been framed in exercise of the powers under clauses (a) and (p) of Section 73(1) and (2) of the Act. These clause (a) and (p) of Section 73(2) read as under: 73(2)(a) the form in which records referred to in this act may be maintained; 73(2)(p) the manner in which the order and the material referred to in Section 19(2) shall be maintained. 6.29 It is further submitted that the rules were, therefore, framed in order to prescribe forms in which records were to be maintained and the manner in which order and material referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 19 was to be maintained. The term arresting officer was defined for the purpose of those rules only and definition of “Arresting Officer” in these rules cannot be held to control provisions of Section 19 of the Act or require that the Central Government has to issue notification under those rules for authorising an assistant director to effect arrest. 6.30 It is further submitted that the non-communication of grounds of arrest is not the question because the same has been communicated to the petitioner as described in above paragraphs. 6.31 It is further submitted that the impugned provisions and the actions or inactions of the Respondents cannot be upheld as legal and proper and in consonance with the fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution of India. 7. Mr. Sunit Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 4672 of 2014 adopted the arguments canvassed by learned Senior Advocate Shri Vikram Chaudhary appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 4496 of 2014. He further relied on debate in the Rajya Sabha [Council of States] when the Prevention of Money Laundering Bill, 1999 was presented after it was passed by Lok Sabha [House of Representatives]. He further submitted that under Section 24 of the Act burden of proof is shifted upon accused, and therefore, it is virtually impossible for an accused of scheduled offence under Money Laundering Act to secure his freedom. 8. He further submitted that under Section 24 of the Act burden of proof is shifted upon accused, and therefore, it is virtually impossible for an accused of scheduled offence under Money Laundering Act to secure his freedom. 8. Before dealing with the rival contentions and submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 and The Prevention of Money-laundering [The Forms and the Manner of Forwarding a copy of Order of Arrest of a Person Along With The Material to the Adjudicating Authority and its period of Retention] Rules, 2005, are reproduced, as under: THE PREVENTION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 [A] The enacting history of the Act including International commitment and convention, resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the statement of objects and reasons accompanying the Bill which was eventually enacted by the Parliament; the preamble of the Act; and its several provisions disclosing a policy to address the scourge of Laundering of Money which destabilizes National and International economies, the sovereignty of several States and has adverse impact on law and order maintenance. The provisions of the Act must therefore be interpreted consistently with the evil the provisions are intended to address; [B] Money-laundering while facially appears to comprise one or more clear and simple financial transactions, involves and comprises and complex web of financial and other transactions. A money laundering transaction usually involves three stage: [i] The placement stage: The malfeasant places the crime money into the normal financial system; [ii] The Layering state: The money induced into the financial system is layeredspread out into several transactions within the financial system with a view to concealing the origin or original identity of the money and to make this origin/identity virtually disappear; and [iii] The integration stage: The money is thereafter integrated into the financial system in such a way that its original association with crime is totally obliterated and the money could be used by the malfeasant and/or the accomplices to get it as untainted/clean money. [C] Money laundering often involves five different directional fund flows: [i] Domestic money laundering flows: In which domestic funds are laundered within the country and reinvested or otherwise spent within the country; [ii] Returning laundered funds: Funds originate in a country, are laundered abroad and returned back. [C] Money laundering often involves five different directional fund flows: [i] Domestic money laundering flows: In which domestic funds are laundered within the country and reinvested or otherwise spent within the country; [ii] Returning laundered funds: Funds originate in a country, are laundered abroad and returned back. [iii] Inbound funds: Illegal funds earned out of crime committed abroad are either laundered [place] abroad or within the country and are ultimately integrated into the country; [iv] Out bound funds: Typically constitute illicit capital flight from a country and do not return back to the country; and [v] Flow-through: The funds enter a country as part of the laundering process and largely depart for integration elsewhere. [D] The Act is a special Law and a self contained code intended to address the increasing scourge of money laundering and provides for confiscation of property derived from or involved in money laundering. The Act provides a comprehensive scheme for investigation, recording of statements, search and seizure, provisional attachment and its confirmation, confiscation and prosecution. The provisions of the Act [vide Sec.71] are enacted to have an overriding effect [entrenched by a non-obstante provision], notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law fro the time being in force. [E] The provisions of the Act are fair, reasonable and have sufficient safeguards, checks and balances to prevent arbitrary exercise of power and/or abuse by the authorities and provide several layers of scrutiny at various stages of the proceedings. [F] A person accused of money laundering is subject to broadly two parallel actions: [i] prosecution for punishment under section 4, for the offence of money-laundering defined in Section 3; [ii] attachment of the property involved in money-laundering, under Section 5 of the Act. Proceedings under each section is independent. Money-laundering poses a serious threat not only to the financial systems of countries, but also to their integrity and sovereignty. To obviate such threats international community has taken some initiatives. It has been felt that to prevent money-laundering and connected activities a comprehensive legislation is urgently needed. To achieve this objective the Prevention of Money-laundering Bill, 1998 was introduced in the Parliament. The Bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Finance, which presented its report on 4th March, 1999 to the Lok Sabha. It has been felt that to prevent money-laundering and connected activities a comprehensive legislation is urgently needed. To achieve this objective the Prevention of Money-laundering Bill, 1998 was introduced in the Parliament. The Bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Finance, which presented its report on 4th March, 1999 to the Lok Sabha. The Central Government broadly accepted the recommendation of the Standing Committee and incorporated them in the said Bill along with some other desired changes. STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS It is being realized, would over, that money-laundering poses a serious threat not only to the financial systems of countries, but also to their integrity and sovereignty. Some of the initiatives taken by the international community to obviate such threat are outline below: [a] the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, to which India is a party, calls for prevention of laundering of proceeds of drug crimes and other connected activities and confiscation of proceeds derived from such offence. [b] the Basic Statement of Principles, enunciated in 1989, outlined basic policies and procedures that banks should follow in order to assist the law enforcement agencies in tackling the problem on money-laundering. [c] the Financial Action Task Force established at the summit of seven major industrial nations, held in Paris from 14th to 16th July, 1989, to examine the problem of money-laundering has made forty recommendations, which provide the foundation material for comprehensive legislation to combat the problem of money-laundering. The recommendations were classified under various heads. Some of the important heads are – [i] declaration of laundering of monies carried through serious crimes a criminal offence; [ii] to work out modalities of disclosure by financial institutions regarding reportable transactions; [iii] confiscation of the proceeds of crime; [iv] declaring money-laundering to be an extraditable offence; and [v] promoting international cooperation in investigation of money-laundering. [d] the Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action adopted by United Nations General Assembly but its Resolution No.S17/2 of 23rd February, 1990, inter alia, calls upon the member States to develop mechanism to prevent financial institutions from being used for laundering of drug related money and enactment of legislation to prevent such laundering. [e] the United Nations in the Special Sessions on countering World Drug Problem Together concluded on the 8th to the 10th June, 1998 has made another declaration regarding the need to combat money-laundering. [e] the United Nations in the Special Sessions on countering World Drug Problem Together concluded on the 8th to the 10th June, 1998 has made another declaration regarding the need to combat money-laundering. India is a signatory to this declaration. 2. In view of an urgent need for the enactment or a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering and connected activities confiscation of proceeds of crime, setting u of agencies and mechanisms for co-ordinating measures for combating money-laundering, etc., the Prevention of Money-laundering Bill, 1998 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on the 4th August, 1998. The Bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Finance, which presented its report on the 4th March, 1999 to the Lok Sabha. The Bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Finance, which presented its report on the 4th March, 1999 to the Lok Sabha. The recommendations of the Standing committee accepted by the Central Government are that (a) the expressions “banking company” and “person” may be defined; (b) in Part I of the Schedule under Indian Penal Code the work offence under section 477 A relating to falsification of accounts should be omitted; (c) 'knowingly' be inserted in clause 3 (b) relating to the definition of money-laundering; (d) the banking companies financial institutions and intermediaries should be required to furnish information of transactions to the Director instead of Commissioner of Income-tax (e) the banking companies should also be brought within the ambit of clause II relating to obligations of financial institutions and intermediaries; (f) a definite time-limit of 24 hours should be provided for producing a person about to be searched or arrested person before the Gazetted Officer or Magistrate; (g) the words “unless otherwise proved to the satisfaction of the authority concerned” may be inserted in clause 22 relating to presumption on interconnected transactions; (h) vacancy in the office of the Chairperson of an Appellate Tribunal, by reason of his death, resignation or otherwise, the seniormost member shall act as the Chairperson till the date on which a new Chairperson appointed in accordance with the provisions of this Act to fill the vacancy, enters upon his office; (i) the appellant before the Appellate Tribunal may be authorized to engage any authorized representative as defined under section 288 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (j) the punishment for vexatious search and for false information may be enhanced from three months imprisonment to two years imprisonment, or fine or rupees ten thousand to fine of rupees fifty thousand or both; (k) the word 'good faith' may be incorporated in the clause relating to Bar of legal proceedings. The Central Government have broadly accepted the above recommendations and made provisions of the said recommendations in the Bill. 3. In addition to above recommendations of the standing committee the Central Government proposes to (a) relax the conditions prescribed for grant of bail so that the Court may grant bail to a person who is below sixteen years of age, or woman, or sick or infirm, (b) levy of fine for default of noncompliance of the issue of summons, etc. In addition to above recommendations of the standing committee the Central Government proposes to (a) relax the conditions prescribed for grant of bail so that the Court may grant bail to a person who is below sixteen years of age, or woman, or sick or infirm, (b) levy of fine for default of noncompliance of the issue of summons, etc. (c) make provisions for having reciprocal arrangement for assistance in certain matters and procedure for attachment and confiscation of property so as to facilitate the transfer of funds involved in money-laundering kept outside the country and extradition of the accused persons from abroad. 4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. Act 15 of 2003 The Prevention of Money-laundering Bill having been passed by both the Houses of Parliament received the assent of the President on 17th January, 2003. It came on the Statute Book as THE PREVENTION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 (15 of 2003). Section 2 contains definitions. [c] "Assistant Director" means an Assistant Director appointed under sub-section (1) of section 49; [d] "attachment" means prohibition of transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property by an order issued under Chapter III; [da] “authorised person” means an authorized person as defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Foreign exchange Management Act, 1999 [42 of (1991)] [j] "Deputy Director" means a Deputy Director appointed under sub-section (1) of section 49; [k] "Director" or "Additional Director" or "Joint Director" means a Director or Additional Director or Joint Director, as the case may be, appointed under sub-section (1) of section 49; [na] “Investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Act conducted by the Director or by an authority authorized by the Central Government under this Act for the collection of evidence. [p] "money-laundering" has the meaning assigned to it in section 3. [p] "money-laundering" has the meaning assigned to it in section 3. [r] "notification" means a notification published in the Official Gazette; [s] "person" includes – i] an individual, ii] a Hindu undivided family, iii] a company, iv] a firm, v] an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, [vi] every artificial juridical person not falling within any of the preceding sub-clauses, and [vii] any agency, office or branch owned or controlled by any of the above persons mentioned in the preceding sub-clauses; [u] "proceeds of crime" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property; [v] “property” means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located; [y] "scheduled offence" means – [i] the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or [ii] the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is thirty lakh rupees or more [iii] the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule [z] “Special Court” means a Court of Sessions designated as Special Court under sub-section (1) of Section 43; [za] “transfer” includes sale, purchase, mortgage, pledge, gift, loan or any other form of transfer of right, title, possessions or lien; [zb] “value” means the fair market value of any property on the date of its acquisition by an persons, or if such date cannot be determined, the date on which such property is possessed by such person. 3. Offence of money-laundering – Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected proceeds of crime including it is concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. 4. Punishment for money-laundering. 3. Offence of money-laundering – Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected proceeds of crime including it is concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. 4. Punishment for money-laundering. – Whoever commits the offence of money-laundering shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to five lakh rupees: Provided that where the proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering relates to any offence specified under paragraph 2 of Part A of the Schedule, the provisions of this section shall have effect as if for the words "which may extend to seven years", the words "which may extend to ten years" had been substituted. 19. Power to arrest. – [1] If the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by general or special order, has on the basis of material in his possession, reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of an offence punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. 2. The Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer shall, immediately after arrest of such person under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order along with the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope, in the manner, as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order and material for such period, as may be prescribed. 3. Every person arrested under sub-section (1) shall, within twenty-four hours, be taken to a Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction: Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court. 23. 3. Every person arrested under sub-section (1) shall, within twenty-four hours, be taken to a Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction: Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court. 23. Presumption in interconnected transactions – Where money laundering involves two or more interconnected transactions and one or more such transactions is or are proved to be involved in money-laundering, then for the purposes of adjudication or confiscation under section 8f or for the trial of the money-laundering offence, it shall unless otherwise provided to the satisfaction of the Adjudicating authority or the Special Court, be presumed that the remaining transactions form part of such interconnected transactions. 24. Burden of Proof – In any proceeding relating to proceedings of crime under this Act, [a] in the case of a person charged with the offence of money-laundering under section 3, the Authority or Court shall, unless the contrary is provided, presume that such proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering; and [b] in the case of any other person the Authority or Court, may presume that such proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering. 44. Offences triable by Special Courts. 45 Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – [1] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than three years under Part A of the Schedule shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless – [i] the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and [ii] where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years, or is a woman or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs: Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 4 except upon a complaint in writing made by – [i] the Director; or [ii] any officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government by a general or special order made in this behalf by that Government. [1A] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, [1973 (2 of 1974)], or any other provision of this Act, no police officer shall investigate into an offence under this Act unless specifically authorized, by the Central Government by a general or special order, and, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. [2] The limitation on granting of bail specified in sub-section (1) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. 48. Authorities under Act – There shall be the following classes of authorities for the purposes of this Act, namely:- [a] Director or Additional Director or Joint Director, [b] Deputy Director, [c] Assistant Director, and [d] such other class of officers as may be appointed for the purposes of this Act. 49. Appointment and powers of authorities and other officers. – [1] The Central Government may appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be authorities for the purposes of this Act. [2] Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the Central Government may authorise the Director or an Additional Director or a Joint Director or a Deputy Director or an Assistant Director appointed under that sub-section to appoint other authorities below the rank of an Assistant Director. [3] Subject to such conditions and limitations as the Central Government may impose, an authority may exercise the powers and discharge the duties conferred or imposed on it under this Act. 50. Powers of authorities regarding summons, production of documents and to give evidence, etc. 51. [3] Subject to such conditions and limitations as the Central Government may impose, an authority may exercise the powers and discharge the duties conferred or imposed on it under this Act. 50. Powers of authorities regarding summons, production of documents and to give evidence, etc. 51. Jurisdiction of authorities - [1] The authorities shall exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the functions conferred on, or, assigned, as the case may be, to such authorities by or under this Act or the rules framed there under I accordance with such directions as the Central Government may issue for the exercise of powers and performance of the functions by all or any of the authorities. [2] In issuing the directions or orders referred to in sub-section (1), the Central Government may have regard to any one or more of the following criteria, namely:- [a] territorial area; [b] classes of persons; [c] classes of cases; and [d] any other criterion specified by the Central Government in this behalf. 52. Power of Central Government to issue directions, etc. – The Central Government may, from time to time, issue such orders, instructions and directions to the authorities as it may deem fit for the proper administration of this Act and such authorities and all other persons employed in execution of this Act shall observe and follow such orders, instructions and directions of the Central Government: Provided that no such orders, instructions or directions shall be issued so as to – [a] require any authority to decide a particular case in a particular manner; or [b] interfere with the discretion of the Adjudicating Authority in exercise of his functions. 53. Empowerment of certain officers. – The Central Government may, by a special or general order, empower an officer not below the rank of Director of the Central Government or of a State Government to act as an authority under this Act: Provided that the Central Government may empower an officer below the rank of Director if the officer of the rank of the Director or above are not available in a particular area. 54. Certain officers to assist in inquiry, etc. 54. Certain officers to assist in inquiry, etc. – The following officers are hereby empowered and required to assist the authorities in the enforcement of this Act, namely:- [a] to [f] xxx [g] officers of enforcement appointed under sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (40 of 1999); 73. Power to make rules.- [1] The Central Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act. [2] In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- [p] the manner in which the order and the material referred to in sub-section (2) of section 19 shall be maintained. The Prevention of Money-laundering [The Forms and the Manner of Forwarding a copy of Order of Arrest of a Person Along With The Material to the Adjudicating Authority and its period of Retention] Rules, 2005 2[c] “Arresting Officer” means the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer, authorized in this behalf by the Central Government by general or special order to exercise the power to arrest any person under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act. 6. Forms of records – The Arresting Officer while exercising powers under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act shall sign the Arrest Order in Form III appended to these Rules. The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 The Director of Enforcement holding office immediately before the 1st day of July, 2005 under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 [42 of 1999] shall be entitled to exercise the exclusive powers conferred under the following provisions: [1] Under section 5 i.e. attachment of property involved in money-laundering. [2] Under section 8 i.e. power of adjudication. [3] Under section 16 i.e. power of survey. [4] Under section 17 i.e. power to search and seizure. [5] Under section 18 i.e. power to search persons. [6] Under section 19 i.e. power to arrest. [7] Under section 20 i.e. retention of property. [8] Under section 21 i.e. retention of records. [9] Under sub-section (1) of 26 i.e. to prefer appeals before the Appellate Tribunal. [10] Under section 45 i.e. to file complaints before the Special Court. [11] Under section 50 i.e. power regarding summons, production of documents and to give evidence. [7] Under section 20 i.e. retention of property. [8] Under section 21 i.e. retention of records. [9] Under sub-section (1) of 26 i.e. to prefer appeals before the Appellate Tribunal. [10] Under section 45 i.e. to file complaints before the Special Court. [11] Under section 50 i.e. power regarding summons, production of documents and to give evidence. [12] Under section 57 i.e. to apply for letter of request to a contracting state. [13] Under section 60 i.e. power of attachment, seizure and confiscation in contracting State or in India. [14] Under section 63 i.e. to impose penalty in respect of failure to give information. 36. Directorate of Enforcement – [1] The Central Government shall establish a Directorate of Enforcement with a Director and such other officers or class of officers as it think fit, who shall be called officers of Enforcement, for the purposes of this Act. [2] Without prejudice to provisions of sub-section (1), the Central Government may authorise the Director of Enforcement or an Additional Director of Enforcement or a Special Director of Enforcement or a Deputy Director of Enforcement to appoint officers of Enforcement below the rank of an Assistant Director of Enforcement. [3] Subject to such conditions and limitations as the Central Government may impose, an officer of enforcement may exercise the powers and discharge the duties conferred or imposed on him under this Act. Relevant notifications/Orders/Circular, are reproduced herein-below: “Notification New Delhi, the 1st July, 2005 G.S.R.440[E] – In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 [15 of 2003], the Central Government hereby appoints, with effect from the 1st day of July, 2005, the Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India, under the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, as the Director to exercise the exclusive powers conferred under clause [b] of sub-section (1) of section 12 and its proviso, section 13, sub-section (2) of section 26 and sub-section (1) of section 50 of the said Act and the said Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India, shall also concurrently exercise powers conferred by sub-section (3) and sub-section (5) of section 26, section 39, section 40, section 41, section 42, section 48, sub-section (2) of section 49, section 66 and section 69 of the aforesaid Act. [Notification No.5/2005/F.No.6/2/2005-E.S.] V.P.ARORA, Under Secy. [Notification No.5/2005/F.No.6/2/2005-E.S.] V.P.ARORA, Under Secy. “Notification New Delhi, the 1st July, 2005 G.S.R.441[E] – In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 [15 of 2003], the Central Government hereby appoints, with effect from the 1st day of July, 2005, the Director of Enforcement holding office immediately before the said ate under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 [42 of 1999], as the Director to exercise the exclusive powers conferred under section 5, section 8, section 16, section 17, section 18, section 19, section 20, section 21, sub-section (1) of section 26, section 45, section 50, section 57, section 60, section 62 and section 63 of the said Act and the said Director shall also concurrently exercise powers conferred by sub-section (3), sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 26, section 39, section 40, section 41, section 42, section 48, section 49, section 66 and section 69 of the aforesaid-said Act. [Notification No.6/2005/F.No.6/2/2005-E.S.] V.P. ARORA, Under Secy.” ORDER NO. S.O. 906[E] DATED 21.04.2010, ISSUED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE [DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE] In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 49 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), the Central Government hereby appoints the Enforcement Officer in the Directorate of Enforcement appointed under sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act as Assistant Director for the purpose of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002. MINISTRY OF FINANCE (Department of Revenue) ORDER New Delhi, the 13th September, 2005 S.O. 1273(E) – In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), the Central Government hereby appoints, with effect from the 1st day of July, 2005, the Special Director holding office immediately before the said date under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999), as the Additional Director for the purpose of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002. [F. No. 6/2/2005-E.S.] ANUJ SARANGI, Director ORDER New Delhi, the 13th September, 2005 S.O.1274[E] – In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003) the Central Government hereby appoints, with effect from the 1st day of July, 2005, the Deputy Director holding office immediately before the said date under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999), as the Deputy Director for the purpose of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002. [F.No.6/2/2005-E.S.] ANUJ SARANGI, Director ORDER New Delhi, the 13th September, 2005 S.O.1275[E] – In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003) the Central Government hereby appoints, with effect from the 1st day of July, 2005, the Assistant Director holding office immediately before the said date under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999), as the Assistant Director for the purpose of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002. [F.No.6/2/2005-E.S.] ANUJ SARANGI, Director Ref.No.A-3/1/2011 Date: 27/08/2011 CIRCULAR ORDER (TECH) NO.03/2011 The cadre restructuring of the Directorate and redesignation of posts of Deputy Director, Assistant Director Grade I and Assistant Director Grade II in the Directorate as Joint Director, Deputy Director and Assistant Director respectively vide Circular Order (Admn.) No.54/2011 dated 28/09/2011 has necessitated revision in the statutory authorities in the Directorate. In view of the above, there shall be following statutory authorities under PMLA and FEMA for the enforcement of the provisions of the said two enactments:- (I) Statutory Authorities under PMLA: Sections Nature of function Officer Authorized Conditions of Authorization 5 Provisional Attachment of Property Joint Director Nil 8(4) Taking possession of attached property Deputy Director Subject to approval of Joint Director 16 Survey Assistant Director Subject to approval of Joint Director 17 Search and Seizure Assistant Director/Deputy Director Subject to approval of Joint Director 18 Search of persons Assistant Director Subject to approval of Joint Director 19 Power of arrest Assistant Director Subject to approval of Special Director 45 Filing of Prosecution complaint Deputy Director Subject to approval of Special Director (II) Statutory Authorities under FEMA: The Assistant Director shall continue to act as Investigating Officer. The authorities and functions presently being discharged by the officers shall continue to be so discharged. The authorities and functions presently being discharged by the officers shall continue to be so discharged. (III) Legal cadre: The legal cadre shall be consulted in all matters relating to legal issues as well as before the Courts/Tribunals/Adjudicating authorities. The above mentioned authorities shall also perform other works/functions, as may be specifically assigned to them from time to time by the Director of Enforcement/their supervisory officers. 9. The Apex Court in the case of Ram Jethmalani & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2011)8 SCC 1 , extensively considered unaccounted/black money generated in India by Indians and transferred and accumulated in foreign banks and about prevention of money-laundering and Part-I of the above order begins as under: “1 "Follow the money" was the short and simple advice given by the secret informant, within the American Government, to Bob Woodward, the journalist from Washington Post, in aid of his investigations of the Watergate Hotel break in. Money has often been claimed, by economists, to only be a veil that covers the real value and the economy. As a medium of exchange, money is vital for the smooth functioning of exchange in the market place. However, increasing monetization of most social transactions has been viewed as potentially problematic for the social order, in as much as it signifies a move to evaluating value, and ethical desirability, of most areas of social interaction only in terms of price obtained in the market place. 9.1 That other paragraphs before Part-II of the order speak volume about state of affairs about incidence of crime, petty and grand, like any other social phenomena is often linked to transfers of monies, small or large, the Apex Court clearly notices that money, in the sense, can both power and also reward crime. In paras 11 and 14, the Apex Court further held as under: “11. Unaccounted for monies, especially large sums held by nationals and entities with a legal presence in the nation, in banks abroad, especially in tax havens or in jurisdictions with a known history of silence about sources of monies, clearly indicate a compromise of the ability of the State to manage its affairs in consonance with what is required from a constitutional perspective. This is so in two respects. This is so in two respects. The quantum of such monies by itself, along with the numbers of individuals or other legal entities who hold such monies, may indicate in the first instance that a large volume of activities, in the social and the economic spheres within the country are unlawful and causing great social damage, both at the individual and the collective levels. Secondly, large quanta of monies stashed abroad, would also indicate a substantial weakness in the capacity of the State in collection of taxes on incomes generated by individuals and other legal entities within the country. The generation of such revenues is essential for the State to undertake the various public goods and services that it is constitutionally mandated, and normatively expected by its citizenry, to provide. A substantial degree of incapacity, in the above respect, would be an indicia of the degree of failure of the State; and beyond a particular point, the State may spin into a vicious cycle of declining moral authority, thereby causing the incidence of unlawful activities in which wealth is sought to be generated, as well as instances of tax evasion, to increase in volume and in intensity. 14. When a catchall word like "crimes" is used, it is common for people, and the popular culture to assume that it is "petty crime," or crimes of passion committed by individuals. That would be a gross mischaracterization of the seriousness of the issues involved. Far more dangerous are the crimes that threaten national security, and national interest. For instance, with globalization, nation states are also confronted by the dark worlds of international arms dealers, drug peddlers, and various kinds of criminal networks, including networks of terror. International criminal networks that extend support to homegrown terror or extremist groups, or those that have been nurtured and sustained in hostile countries, depend on networks of formal and informal, lawful and unlawful mechanisms of transfer of monies across boundaries of nationstates. They work in the interstices of the microstructures of financial transfers across the globe, and thrive in the lacunae, the gaps in law and of effort. They work in the interstices of the microstructures of financial transfers across the globe, and thrive in the lacunae, the gaps in law and of effort. The loosening of control over those mechanisms of transfers, guided by an extreme neoliberal thirst to create a global market that is free of the friction of law and its enforcement, by nationstates, may have also contributed to an increase in the volume, extent and intensity of activities by criminal and terror networks across the globe”. 9.2 Though Part-I of the order prefaces issues of large sums of unaccounted for monies, modus operandi of transfers of such money generated in activities that have been deemed unlawful, nature of governance, impact on economy of the State, cross-border funding for terrorist activities, etc. shows concern of the Apex Court on such issues, including money-laundering in general is to be born in mind in the context of subject petition for which investigation is carried out “Follow the Money” by the Directorate of Enforcement upon registering on offence under Section 3 of the PML Act to the tune of Rs.5395.75 crores is to be considered. 10 It is to be noted that no specific challenge is made to omission of Part B containing paras 1 to 25 by amendment Act 2 of 2013 with effect from 15.02.2013 and also substitution of Part A by the very Act. That only effect and consequence of the above omission of Part B and substitution of Part A by amendment Act 2 of 2013 with effect from 15.02.2013 qua Section 45 of the PML Act is under challenge on the ground that it is violative of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. 10.1 It is trite that any provision of any statute if operate harshly or effect of such operation result into any hardships or difficulty by itself is no ground to declare such provision as ultra vires to the Constitution of India if legality, validity and constitutionality of the enactment is otherwise not ultra vires meaning thereby such an enactment is enacted in exercise of powers conferred upon the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be, keeping in mind various entries in Schedule VII read with Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India. There is no dispute about legality, validity and constitutionality of the PML Act, 2002 and subsequent amendments except Section 45 of the Act, which is subject matter of the petition. 10.2 That for interpretation of a penal statute and provisions include imposition of penalties for infringement, it is trite that all such penal provisions contain in penal statutes are to be construed strictly so as to see that thing charges as an offence is within plain meaning of words used and such words are not to be stretched on any notion by supplying casus omissus. 10.3 Maxwell in the Interpretation of Statutes [12th Edn.] says : “the strict construction of penal statutes seems to manifest itself in four ways : in the requirement of express language for the creation of an offence; in interpreting strictly words settling out the elements of an offence; in requiring the fulfillment to the letter of statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of punishment; and in insisting on the strict observance of technical provisions concerning criminal procedure and jurisdiction. 10.4 In Craies and Statute Law [7th Edn. At P.529] it is said that penal statutes must be construed strictly. At page 530 of the said treatise, referring to [U.S. v. Wiltberger [1820]2 Wheat [US] 76], it is observed, thus : the distinction between a strict construction and a more free one has, no doubt in modern times almost disappeared, and the question now is, what is the true construction of the statute? I should say that in a criminal statute you must be quite sure that the offence charged is within the letter of the law. This Rule is said to be founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals, and on the plain principles that the power of punishment is vested in the Legislature, and not in the juridical department, for it is the Legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment”. 10.5 Even the Apex Court interpreted provisions of Penal statute containing strict provisions. 10.5 Even the Apex Court interpreted provisions of Penal statute containing strict provisions. In the case of Kartar Singh vs. state of Punjab reported in (1994)3 SCC 569 , the Apex Court held that “The conditions imposed under section 20(8)(b), as rightly pointed out by the Additional Solicitor General, are in consonance with the conditions prescribed under clauses [I] and [iii] of sub-section (1) of Section 437 and clause [b] of sub-section [3] of that section. Similar to the conditions in clause [b] of sub-section [8], there are provisions in various other enactments such as Section 35(1) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and Section 104(1) of the Customs Act to the effect that any authorized or empowered officer under the respective Acts, if, has got reason to believe that any person in India or within the Indian Customs water has been guilty of an offence punishable under the respective Act, may arrest such person. Therefore, the condition that “there are grounds for believing that he is not guilty of an offence”, which condition in different form is incorporated in other Acts such as clause [I] of Section 437(1) of the Code and Section 35(1) of FERA and 104(1) of the Customs Act, cannot be said to be an unreasonable condition infringing the principle of Article 21 of the Constitution. IN view of the detailed discussion made above, we set aside the conclusion of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bimal Kumar holding. “Therefore, the last portion of clause [b] of sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the Act, which reads : `and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, alone is ultra vires”. On the same analogy, the limitations contained in S.37(1)(b) and (2) are constitutionally valid”. 10.6 The Apex Court interpreted the identical provisions regarding granting of bail while dealing with section 21[4] of Maharashtra Control or Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) and held that the said wordings does not lead to the conclusion that the Court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant has not committed offence under the Act. It must be so construed that the Court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. It must be so construed that the Court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. The Court will be required to maintain finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in future must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the Court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, is propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence. 10.7 That Section 2 of Chapter I contains various definitions and money laundering is defined under Section 2(p) makes a reference that `money laundering' means the meaning assigned to it in section 3 of Chapter II under the head Offences of Money-laundering is wide and extensive. 10.8 It is worth noting that Section 3 is again amended and earlier words “with the proceeds of crime and projecting” came to be substituted by Act 2 of 2013 with effect from 15.02.2013 vide S.O. 343(E), dated 8.2.2013, with the words “proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money laundering”. 10.9 Therefore, Section 3 in its width and amplitude include whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to include or knowingly assist or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any proceeds or activity connected proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering read with definitions of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2[u], “property' under Section 2[v] and “value” under Section [zb] of the PML Act. In the present case, not only direct or indirect attempt to indulge, but the petitioners have knowingly assisted various persons and companies viz. legal entities and actually involved in process and also activity connected with proceeds of crime, which include its concealment and projecting and claiming as untainted property in possessing and transferring untainted money by creating forged record of department of Customs, RTGS and import and export of diamonds and payment thereof. legal entities and actually involved in process and also activity connected with proceeds of crime, which include its concealment and projecting and claiming as untainted property in possessing and transferring untainted money by creating forged record of department of Customs, RTGS and import and export of diamonds and payment thereof. 10.10 That the “proceeds of crime” is defined in Section 2[u], which means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property as defined under Section 2[v] of the PML Act and activity relating to schedule offence or value of any property and scheduled offence is defined under Section 2[y] which after amendment Act 2 of 2013 remained all those offences specified under part A of the schedule since part B is omitted and part A is substituted accordingly by shifting offences in Part B enblock to Part A. 10.11 That reference to criminal activity relating to a schedule offence is again a wider connotation and even may extend to a person, who is connected with criminal activity relating to schedule offence but may not be offender of scheduled offence. Thus, money laundering itself is an offence standalone under Section 3 of PML Act having a distinct character, with many facets with wider implications and, therefore, twofold dragnet is laid down by the Legislature by providing a mechanism of punishment as defined under Section 4 for such offender under Section 3 read with Sections 44 and 45 of PML Act and to take care of attachment, confiscation of such tainted property under sections 5, 8, etc. subject to outcome at the end of trial before the special court. In the above context, section 24 of PML Act cast burden of proof upon an accused person to prove that proceeds of crime are untainted property. subject to outcome at the end of trial before the special court. In the above context, section 24 of PML Act cast burden of proof upon an accused person to prove that proceeds of crime are untainted property. 10.12 A bare perusal of section 45 of the PML Act reveals that it is pertaining to offences to be cognizable and non-bailable and begins with non-obstinate clause “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973” and mandates that no person accused of offence punishable for term of imprisonment for more than 3 years under Part A of the Schedule shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless; [i] the Public Prosecutor has been given opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and [ii] Where the Public Prosecutor opposes such application, the court has to satisfy about existence of reasonable grounds for believing that such accused person is not guilty of such offences and that he is not likely to commit such offences while on bail. The above two conditions are of course subject to two unnumbered provisos viz. that a person under the age of sixteen years or is a women or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the special court so directs and further that Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 4 except upon a complaint in writing made by authorized person. Thus, when the situation arises about legality and validity of the complaint whether filed by the authorized officers/authorities or not can be considered at the time of taking cognizance of offence under PML Act by the Special Court. However, limitations of granting of bail specified in sub-section (1) is in addition to the limitation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law time being in force for grant of bail. 10.13 Thus, if the accused person succeeds in satisfying the designated court/special court for believing that reasonable grounds exist that the accused person is not guilty of such offence and while on bail he is not likely to commit any offence in spite of opposition by the public prosecutor, no restriction is put upon orders of Special Court to release such accused person on bail. When money laundering is a distinct offence under Section 3 of PML Act read with Section 2[p], 2[u], 2[v] and 2[zb], which comprise one or more clear and simple financial transactions, which may involve and comprise a complex web of financial and other transactions and is carried out mainly at three states viz. placement, the layering and integration and its further five different directional fund flows; viz. [i] domestic money laundering flow; [ii] returning laundered funds; [iii] inbound funds; [iv] out bound funds and [v] flow-through assume graver magnitude of crime. That omission of Part-B and substituting Part-A of the schedule by amendment Act 2 of 2013 relegating the offender of Section 3 of PML Act having connected with “proceeds of crime” meaning thereby as defined in Section 2[u] and “property” as per Section 2[v] derived as a criminal activity relating to erstwhile part B offences prior to omission and subjecting to rigor of Section 45 of PML Act is adequate remedy to secure bail by a person accused of Section 3 of PML Act before designate court. That offences under penal statue or statutes included in Part B prior to omission having lesser or negligible consequences or infraction on liberty of an individual after omission of Part B and inclusion by way of substitution of Part A of the schedule under Section 2[y] of the PML Act resulting into a stricter procedure if considered in view of aforementioned facet of money laundering read with object and reasons of the Act, we are of the view that such an amendment Act 2 of 2013 with effect from 15.02.2013 consequently resulting into such offender under section 3 of the PML Act to undergo rigor of Section 45 is not ultra vires to the Constitution of India. That such offences of lesser gravity having negligible consequences if related or connected with criminal activities of offenders of Section 3 of PML Act viz. money laundering transactions having interstate and/or cross border implications become menace to humankind. Even to trace out its source, transfer and ultimate use even by terrorists group or outlaws jeopardize integrity and sovereignty of nations and having far reaching consequences on financial system/economies of such sovereign state along with security of the citizens cannot be viewed only on the touchstone of cognizable or non-cognizable and bailable and non-bailable offences as contended by the learned Senior Counsel. Since in a given case the magnitude of crime of money laundering affect the humanity as a whole. 10.15 That contention based on Article 22 of the Constitution of India about safeguards provided by Constitution of India, no doubt are of paramount importance but complete mechanism is provided in Section 19 of the PML Act which takes care of clauses 1 and 2 of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and facts stated on oath by the deponent respondent No.3 about following the above safeguards are discerning from the record that the accused person was informed about the grounds for such arrest as signed by him and was also produced within a period of 24 hours of such arrest before the nearest Magistrate. That other provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution of India are about preventive detention as stated in clauses, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and by no stretch of imagination case of the petitioners accused can be considered on the above mentioned clauses. Therefore, the arrest of the petitioners is not violative of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. That careful perusal of guidelines contained in the case of D.K. Basu [supra] and paras 35 and 36 of the above decision no doubt applies to enforcement directorate also, but again for the reasons recorded herein that proper procedure was followed by respondent No.3 and other officers while arresting the petitioners it cannot be said that the arrest is violative of Article 22 of the Constitution of India or guidelines/directions of D.K. Basu [supra] warranting any interference of this court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India issuing writ of habeas corpus. 10.16 The next contention is based on Section 19 read with Sections 48 and 49 of the PML Act that the respondent No.3 is not authorized officer, and therefore, competent to order arrest of the petitioners, is also based on misconceived application of Rule 2(1) of The Prevention of Money-laundering [The Form and the Manner of Forwarding a Copy of Order of Arrest of a Person Along With the material to the Adjudicating Authority and its Period of Retention] Rules, 2005 [for short, Order of Arrest Rules, 2005'] vis-a-vis Section 19 of the Act we may also deal with contention of nonexistence of “coma[`]”, in sub-section (1) of Section 19 after the words “any other officer”. Section 48 defines authority under the Act and Section 49 is about appointment and powers of authorities and other officers, Section 50 is about powers of authorities regarding summons, production of documents and to give evidence etc. Section 51 is for jurisdiction of authorities. Section 52 is for powers of Central Government to issue directions and Section 53 is for empowerment of certain officers and Section 54 is for certain officers to arrest in inquiry. Section 73 empowers the Central Government to make the rules and sub-section (1) of section 73 specifically provides that the Central Government may, by notification, make rules for carry out the provisions of this Act and sub-section (2) states in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters. Clause [p] includes the manner in which order and the material referred to in section 2 and Section 19 shall be maintained and precisely for this purpose. Clause [a] provides for form in which records referred to in the Act to be maintained. 10.14 The Rules, 2005 defines “Arresting Officer” as per definition under rule 2(c) and contains, “,” [coma] after “Any other officer”, which is missing in Section 19 of the Act, and therefore, contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that unless there is special notification empowering Assistant director of Enforcement Directorate to order arrest could not have exercised power for the purpose of Section 19 of the PML Act and therefore arrest of the petitioners is illegal. Reliance is placed on various notifications containing specific orders empowering Special Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director, vide notification dated 13.09.2005 in exercise of powers conferred in sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Act and such officer empowered for the purpose of PML Act ought to have held office immediately before 01.07.2005. That reference is also made to GSR 440(E) and GSR 441(E) both dated 01.07.2005 issued in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the PML Act, which specifically conferred exclusive power upon designated officers for the purpose of sections mentioned therein. That reference is also made to GSR 440(E) and GSR 441(E) both dated 01.07.2005 issued in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the PML Act, which specifically conferred exclusive power upon designated officers for the purpose of sections mentioned therein. It is contended that vide GSR 440 [E], no power is conferred upon the Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, under the Ministry of India, Department of Revenue though designated as the Director to exercise powers under various Sections but not under Section 19 of the PML Act, but GSR 441 (E) confers such power upon the Directorate of Enforcement holding office immediately before 01.07.2005 under FEMA Act, 1999 to exercise powers as the Director under various sections of PML Act including Section 19 of the PML Act. Therefore, when no specific notification is issued empowering the Assistant Director-respondent No.3 in the present case ordering arrest of the petitioners, such exercise of power is illegal and unconstitutional and accordingly arrest order is to be set aside. 10.15 That Section 19 postulates the following preconditions viz. that the competent authority under the Act empowered to arrest must have material in possession before exercising such powers and rule 2[g] of Order of Arrest Rules, 2005 define the term “material”. 10.16 That on the basis of such material in possession, the competent authority must have reason to belief recorded in writing that any person has been guilty of offences punishable PML Act and upon arrest of such person as soon as may be, he is to be informed of the grounds for such arrest. 10.17 That sub-section (2) of section 19 further imposes duty upon such competent authority to forward a copy of such arrest with the material in his possession to the adjudicating authority in a sealed envelop as per the procedure prescribed and sub-section (3) of Section 19 mandates that every person arrested under that section shall have to be produced before the learned Magistrate or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction, within a period of 24 hours. The above provisions are in consonance with Article 22(1) of the constitution of India. The above provisions are in consonance with Article 22(1) of the constitution of India. 10.18 That the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue has appointed the Enforcement Officer in the Directorate of Enforcement appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 36 of FEMA as Assistant Director for the purpose of PML Act and such order is issued in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the PML Act. When the above notification is in force and subsequent orders are issued on the same line by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Government and definition of Assistant Director as contained in Section 2(1)(c) of PML Act means the Assistant Director appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 49, it cannot be said that Assistant Director of Enforcement Department is incompetent to arrest the petitioners in exercise of powers under Section 19(1) of the PML Act. That sub-section (2) of Section 49 will come into play only when Director, Deputy Director or Assistant Director, as the case may be, would like to appoint any other officer for the purpose of exercising powers and discharge the duties conferred or imposed under the PML Act. However, that does not preclude the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue to issue order appointing Assistant Director of FEMA to function under PML Act. 10.19 Under Rule 2(1)(c) of the Rules, 2005, again cannot have overriding effect over Section 19 of the PML Act when the Act itself provides that Assistant director shall have power to order arrest subject to fulfillment of conditions enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. It only shows that GSR 441 [E] dated 01.07.2005 confers the Director exclusive power but not to the exclusion of other officers empowered under the PML Act. Therefore, a conjoint reading of Sections 19, 49, 73(1)(2)(a)(p) and definition clause 2(1)(c) makes it clear that as far as the Directors, Deputy Directors or Assistant Directors are concerned, no specific or general authorization of the Central Government is necessary and such authorization will be required only when any other officer viz. officers other than the above are to be appointed to carry out purpose of the Act, a notification by the Central Government may be necessary. officers other than the above are to be appointed to carry out purpose of the Act, a notification by the Central Government may be necessary. Therefore, contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that Assistant Director – respondent No.3 who ordered arrest of the petitioners lacked competence and authority to arrest, is devoid of merit, and therefore also, there is no violation of any procedural safeguards, as envisaged in Article 22 of the Constitution of India or under the provisions of PML Act. 10.20 It is profitable to refer to order dated 04.02.2013 passed by learned single Judge [Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.C. Chavan] passed in Criminal Bail Application No.71 of 2013, where a person who was arrested by the enforcement directorate for his involvement in offence under Section 3 of PML Act, 2002 came to be decided where similar contention was raised by the applicant therein that the Assistant Director was not authorized to affect arrest under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, in which reliance was placed on Scheme of the Act viz. Sections 19, 45, 49, 73, etc came into consideration along with SR 441(E) dated 01.07.2005 and other such notifications. The learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in paras 13 to 17 held as under:- “13. I have considered these arguments. First the rules which have been relied on have been framed in exercise of powers under clauses (1) and (p) of sub-section (2) of Section 73 of the Act. These clauses (a) and (p) of Section 73(2) read as under:- “73.(2)(a) the form in which records referred to in this act may be maintained; (p) the manner in which the order and the material referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 19 shall be maintained. 14. The rules were, thus, framed in order to prescribe forms in which records were to be maintained and the manner in which order and material referred to in sub-section (2) of section 19 was to be maintained. The term “Arresting Officer” was defined for the purpose of those rules only. Inserting in clause (c) (1) of Rule (2) of those Rules, a subsequent comma, [,] after the words, “or any other officer”, may be an error of the draftsman. The term “Arresting Officer” was defined for the purpose of those rules only. Inserting in clause (c) (1) of Rule (2) of those Rules, a subsequent comma, [,] after the words, “or any other officer”, may be an error of the draftsman. In any case it is not necessary to go into that question since definition is only for the purpose of rules which have been framed for the restricted purpose of clauses (a) & (p) of sub-section (2) of section 73 of the Act. Therefore, definition of “arresting officer” in these rules cannot be held to control the provisions of Section 19 of the Act or to require that the Central Government has to issue notification under those rules for authorizing an officer to defect arrest. The definition would have to be read in conformity with the provisions of Section 19 of the Act and the most appropriate interpretation may be that as far as Directors, Deputy Directors, or Assistance Directors are concerned, no authorization of the Central Government is required, and while any other officer could also be authorised by the Central Government, if such other officers has to be authorised, a notification by the Central Government would be required. Thus, there is no substance in the contention that the Assistant Director who effected arrest lacked the authority to arrest. Therefore, there is no violation of any procedural safeguards which the application had and he cannot be said to have suffered by any eclipse of his rights by not following the procedure established by law in effecting his arrest. 15. The observations of the Supreme Court in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and ors. vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1980)2 SCC 565 , do not help the applicant since there is no breach of procedural safeguards provided in the Act. Since there is no violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, in effecting the arrest of the applicant, even judgment of this Court in Suaibo Ibow Casamma vs. Union of India, reported in 1995 (80) E.L.T. 762 (Bom.), does not help the applicant. 16. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant next submitted that the power to arrest has been conferred by the Government exclusively upon the Director of the Enforcement Directorate. He drew my attention tot he notification dated 1st July, 2005, which has been extensively reproduced in ground (a)(v) of the application. 16. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant next submitted that the power to arrest has been conferred by the Government exclusively upon the Director of the Enforcement Directorate. He drew my attention tot he notification dated 1st July, 2005, which has been extensively reproduced in ground (a)(v) of the application. “{SR 441 (E) DT. 1`.7.2005}. In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), the Central Government hereby appoints, with effect from the 1ast day of July, 2005, the Director of Enforcement holding office immediately before the said date under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999), as director to exercise the exclusive powers conferred under Section 5, section 8, section 17, section 18, section 19, section 20, section 21, sub-section (1) of section 26, section 45, section 50, section 57, section 60, section 62, and section 63, of the said Act and the said Director shall also concurrently exercise powers conferred by sub-section (3) sub-section (4) and sub-section (5), of section 26, section 39, section 40, section 41, section 42, section 48, section 49, section 66 and section 69 of the aforesaid Act”. 17. As rightly submitted by the learned Advocate General, the words used in the notification do not show that the Director was to have powers under Section 5, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 28 of the Act, to the exclusion of all other offences. It only shows that the Director has the exclusive power but not necessarily to the exclusion of others, who have been empowered under the Act. Since the act itself does not provide for any power in the Central Government to issue notification abridging the powers statutorily conferred on the authorities under the Act, there can be no question of the Central Government issuing notification the Assistant director from the authorities who are exercising power of arrest. Therefore, this notification too does not help the applicant in contending that he has been arrested by the officer who had no authority.” 10.21 Thus, with amended Section 3 and Schedule under Section 2[y] by Amendment Act 2 of 2013 the above reasonings persuade us to take similar view upon due deliberations and Scheme of the Act read with relevant notification. Accordingly, we are unable to agree with submissions made by learned Counsels for the petitioners that reasonings of learned Single Judge of High Court of Bombay in the above case ignored true import of Notification GSR 441(E) dated 01.07.2005 and Section 73(1) of the Act. That it is trite that by the above notifications dated 01.07.2005 powers were conferred upon the authority so defined under Section 48 of the PML Act and in view of Section 49 the Central Government appoints such persons as it thinks fit to be authorized for the purposes of this Act. Therefore, the appointment of Director, Department of Enforcement is not exclusion of other authorities viz. Additional Director, Joint Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director, who are otherwise empowered by PML Act, 2002. 10.22 Thus, what emerges from the discussion and findings as above, our conclusions are as under: That Section 45 of PML Act, 2002 [as substituted by amendment Act 2005] is not illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and accordingly no case is made out to read down, lay down, expound, interpret and deliberate upon the scope and perspective of Section 45 of the PML Act so as to harmonize the same in juxtaposition with various scheduled offences [under amended Part A of Schedule]. In the process of undertaking lawful investigation, Ministry of Finance has issued 3 different orders viz. [i] S.O. 1273[E], [ii] S.O. 1274[E] and [iii] S.O. 1275/E all dated 13.09.2005 in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 49 of PML Act whereby the Special Director, Deputy Director and Assistant Director, who held office immediately before 01.07.2005 under The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 as Additional Director, Deputy Director and Assistant Director for exercise of powers under PML Act. This is further evident from the fact that in continuation of order No. S.O. 906[E] dated 21.04.2010 issued by Ministry of Finance in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the PML Act, the Central Government has appointed enforcement officer in the Directorate of Enforcement appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 36 of The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 as Assistant Director for the purpose of PML Act, 2002. Circular Order No.03/2011 dated 27.08.2011 further designated the posts of Deputy Director, Assistant Director Grade-I and Assistant Director, Grade-II and conferred power of arrest upon Assistant Director, subject to approval of Special Director. Therefore, harmonious reading of Sections 48 to 54 and definition of Assistant Director contained in Section 2[c] of PML Act reveal the Assistant Director-respondent No.3 in this case is duly empowered to order arrest under Section 19 of the PML Act. 10.23 That in view of our holding that the Assistant Director of Directorate of Enforcement-respondent No.3 is competent and authorized officer under PML Act to order arrest under Section 19(1) of PML Act, and therefore, again there is no scope to read down, lay down, expound, interpret and deliberate upon the scope and perspective of Section 19 of PML Act in light of Section 49(3) read with the Rules notified under Notification GSR 446(E) dated 01.07.2005. 10.24 That not mentioning name of the petitioners in FIR dated 11.04.2014 and 13.04.2014 is of no consequence since in the present case nexus is established between the criminal activity relating to schedule offence and the proceedings thereof for the offences of money laundering as defined under Section 3 read with Section 2(1)(u) of the PML Act. That during the process and investigation carried out by the Directorate of Enforcement, the petitioners are found to have been involved in money laundering racket and not naming the petitioners in the offences registered initially by investigating agency is now being prosecuted for the involvement under Section 3 of the PML Act by Directorate of Enforcement. Even, prosecution complaint dated 18.07.2014 is filed before the designated court under PML Act and after further investigation a supplementary complaint is filed on 29.10.2014. 10.25 The grounds of arrest was communicated to the accused after due medical check up as undertaken and he was also produced within the stipulated time before the designated Judge under PML Act at Ahmedabad and no complaint or grievance was ever made by the petitioners about any kind of ill-treatment or coercion by the offices of Directorate of Enforcement. That in execution of arrest, all procedural requirements were complied with and the accused has signed receipt of grounds for arrest and even a friend of the accused viz. Mr. Amit Solanki, C.A. Was handed over the belongings and signed the inventory annexed to the arrest memo. That in execution of arrest, all procedural requirements were complied with and the accused has signed receipt of grounds for arrest and even a friend of the accused viz. Mr. Amit Solanki, C.A. Was handed over the belongings and signed the inventory annexed to the arrest memo. That learned Designated Judge was pleased to grant custody of the petitioners for a period of 4 days and in a pro in a procedure to remand etc. and rejection of prayer of temporary bail on 09.09.2014 by the designated court and filing of prosecution complaint dated 29.10.2014 against the petitioner and competency of the Assistant Director – respondent No.3 to order arrest in compliance of Section 19(1) of PML Act surface on record, which is again in consonance with the safeguards enshrined under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and we find no breach of any procedural enumerated either under Article 19(1)of the PML Act or under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Further, since the subject matter is pending before the competent designated court and upon registering complaint, we do not further deliberate on the import of the nature of involvement of the petitioners for the offences under Section 3 of the PML Act, but the fact remains that affidavit filed by the respondent No.3 placing his version on the record remains undisputed till the matter was heard and kept for judgment. 10.26 Thus, it cannot be said that order of arrest suffers from vice of any illegality on the ground that it is ordered by the incompetent or unauthorized and there is no failure in adhering procedure laid down under Seton 19(1) of the PML Act and further no breach to the guidelines laid down in the case of D.K. Basu [supra] and it cannot be said that the petitioners are detained or confined illegally warranting issuance of writ of Habeas Corpus. At the same time respondent No.3 – Assistant Director of Enforcement is competent and authorized to issue order of arrest under Section 19(1) of the PML Act and no case is made out to issue writ of quo warranto as prayed for. At the same time respondent No.3 – Assistant Director of Enforcement is competent and authorized to issue order of arrest under Section 19(1) of the PML Act and no case is made out to issue writ of quo warranto as prayed for. 10.27 That offence under Section 3 of PML Act is distinct and different, and therefore, omission of Part B from Schedule under Section 2[y] and substitution of Part A do not make any difference to the case of the petitioners, who are accused of offences under Section 3 of the PML Act, irrespective of absence of monetary ceiling. 11. The Apex Court has taken note of the above aspect that offence under Section 3 of the PML Act is distinct in the case of Binod Kumar vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. reported in (2011)11 SCC 463 . 12. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of B. Rama Raju v. Union of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, represented by its Secretary [Revenue], New Delhi & Ors. reported in 2011(3) ALT 443 has formulated various issues, including the issues [E] and [F] with regard to Section 24 of the PML Act and we are in complete agreement with the reasons and conclusions qua sections 23 and 24 of the PML Act and we reject the contention of Shri Sunit Shah, leaned counsel for the petitioner that burden of proof is shifted at the stage of time of bail but not at the stage of trial. The relevant portion of issues [E] and [F] of the judgment in the case of B. Rama Raju, reads as under: ISSUE-E The challenge to Section 23 is projected on the ground that the presumption enjoined by this provision in respect of interconnected transactions is unduly restrictive of the right to property; is a disproportionate burden, not commensurate with legitimate Governmental interests in targeting proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering, for eventual confiscation. Money-laundering, it is pleaded in the counter affidavit by the Enforcement Directorate, while apparently comprising one or more apparently clear and simple financial transactions or dealings with property, in reality involve a complex web of transactions that are processed through three stages the placement, layering and integration stage. When laundering operations are pursued across State boundaries, flows of funds would involve several routes. When laundering operations are pursued across State boundaries, flows of funds would involve several routes. Since the object of the Act is to seize or attach proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering for eventual confiscation to the State, the enforcement strategy must be commensurate with, correspond to and complement the degree of camouflage, deceit, layering and integration normally associated with a money-laundering operation, to be effective and successful, is the contention on behalf of the respondents. Section 23 enjoins a presumption in respect of interconnected transactions. Money-laundering is defined in Section 2(p) (with reference to Section 3). Though Section 3 defines the offence of money-laundering, the ingredients of the offence enumerated in this provision define money-laundering in its generic sense as applied by the Act to attachment and confiscation processes as well. Such duality is achieved by the drafting technique of defining money-laundering in Section 2(p) by ascription of the definition of the offence of money-laundering in Section 3. This technique, though specific, is not unique. As observed in LIC of India Vs. Crown Life Insurance Co., the object of a definition clause in a statute is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in describing all the subject matter to which the word or expression so defined is intended to apply. A definition section may borrow definitions from an earlier or an existing statute; not necessarily in the definition section but in some other provision, of that Act; and may equally borrow the definition from some other section of the same Act where a word or an expression is defined for a distinct purpose, occasion, or in a specific context. Section 2(1)(p), thus, defines the expression money-laundering by borrowing the definition expressed in Section 3, where this expression is defined for the purpose of delineating the offence. In Section 2(1)(p), however, the expression money-laundering is defined for the generic purpose of describing the contours of the conduct; wherever the expression is employed in the several provisions of the Act, including in Chapter-III for attachment and confiscation. It is also well settled that the legislature has the power to define a word or an expression artificially Kishanlal Vs. State of Rajasthan. The definition of a word or an expression in the definition section may thus be restrictive or extensive of its ordinary meaning. It is also well settled that the legislature has the power to define a word or an expression artificially Kishanlal Vs. State of Rajasthan. The definition of a word or an expression in the definition section may thus be restrictive or extensive of its ordinary meaning. When a word is defined to mean so and so, the definition is prima facie exhaustive and restrictive Inland Revenue Commissioner Vs. Joiner; Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Frazer & Ross; and Feroze N. Dotiwala Vs. P.M. Wadhwani. Conduct of directly or indirectly attempting to indulge, knowingly assist or being a party to or actual involvement in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime and projecting such proceeds of crime as untainted property, constitutes money-laundering. The expression proceeds of crime means property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property {Section 2(u)}. Thus, a property acquires a taint on account of being a derivative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence and includes the value of such property. Since placement, layering and integration are among the essential features of money-laundering, the proceeds of crime may not necessarily continue in the hands of the original malfeasant(s). Where proceeds of crime are layered through plural transactions, the intent to camouflage the source of the property as a derivative of criminality renders it difficult to identify the succeeding transactions as relatable to the initial proceeds of crime. It is for this reason and to effectuate the purposes of the Act that Section 23 incorporates the presumption that where money-laundering involves two or more connected transactions and one or more such transactions is/are proved to be involved in money-laundering, then for the purposes of adjudication or confiscation under Section 8, it shall, unless otherwise proved to the satisfaction of the adjudicating authority, be presumed that the remaining transactions form part of such interconnected transactions i.e., involved in money-laundering as well. The presumption enjoined by Section 23 is clearly a rebuttable presumption i.e., presumption pro tantum. The presumption enjoined by Section 23 is clearly a rebuttable presumption i.e., presumption pro tantum. In Izhar Ahmad v. Union of India, Gajendragadkar, J. [as his Lordship then was] observed (in the majority opinion of the Constitution Bench) that: The term Presumption in its largest and most comprehensive signification, may be defined to be an inference, affirmative or dis-affirmative of the truth of falsehood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted. Quoting with approval the statement of principle set out in the Principles of the Law of Evidence by Best, his Lordship observed that when the rules of evidence provide for the raising of a rebuttable or irrebuttable presumption, they are merely attempting to assist the judicial mind in the matter of weighing the probative or persuasive force of certain facts proved in relation to other facts presumed or inferred. Wills observes that the expression Presumption inherently imports an act of reasoning a conclusion of the judgment; and it is applied to denote such facts or moral phenomena, as from experience we know to be invariably, or commonly, connected with some other related facts. In M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., Thomas, J. [writing the opinion for the Court] observed that presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn from other proved facts. While inferring the existence of a fact from another, the Court is only applying a process of intelligent reasoning which the mind of a prudent man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption is not the final conclusion to be drawn from other facts, but it could as well be final, if it remains undisturbed later. Presumption in the law of evidence is a rule indicating the stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts the Court can draw an inference and that would remain until such inference is either disproved or dispelled. Presumption in the law of evidence is a rule indicating the stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts the Court can draw an inference and that would remain until such inference is either disproved or dispelled. Having regard to the fact that money-laundering is indulgence, informed assistance or being a party to or actual involvement in any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property, inherently assuming a degree of deceit and camouflage in the process of layering the proceeds of crime through a series of transactions, in the considered legislative wisdom a presumption in interconnected transactions is enjoined by Section 23 of the Act, contingent upon one or more of interconnected transactions having to be proved to be involved in money-laundering. The legislatively enjoined presumption shifts the burden of proof to the person in the ownership, control or possession of a property comprising the interconnected transactions to rebut the statutory presumption that this property is not involved in money-laundering. Section 23 enacts a rule prescribing a rebuttable presumption and is a rule of evidence. The rule purports to regulate and structure the judicial process of appreciating evidence relating to adjudication of money-laundering for the purposes of confirmation of attachment/seizure and confiscation and provides that the said appreciation will draw an inference from the fact of one or more transactions forming part of interconnected transactions having been proved to be involved in money-laundering, that the other transactions are also to be presumed so, unless the contrary is established. As observed in Izhar Ahmad (supra), the rule of presumption enjoined by Section 23 takes away judicial discretion either to attach or not due probative value to the fact that one or more of the interconnected transactions have been proved to be involved money-laundering; and requires prima facie due probative value to be attached and mandates an inference that the other transactions form part of the raft of interconnected transactions involved in money-laundering, subject of course to the said presumption being rebutted by proof to the contrary. On the aforesaid analysis, since Section 23 enjoins a rule of evidence and a rebuttable presumption considered essential and integral to effectuation of the purposes of the Act in the legislative wisdom; a rebuttable and not an irrebuttable presumption, we are not persuaded to conclude that the provision is unduly harsh, oppressive or arbitrary. Afterall a legislative remedy must correspond to the social pathology it professes to regulate. Issue-E is answered accordingly. “ISSUE-F Section 24 shifts the burden of proving that proceeds of crime are untainted property onto person(s) accused of having committed the offence under Section 3. This provision is challenged as arbitrary; is contended to be applicable only to the trial of an offence under Section 3 and not the proceedings for attachment and confiscation of property under Chapter-III; and alternatively as not applicable to proceedings for attachment and confiscation of property of a person not accused of an offence under Section 3. On its textual and grammatical construction, the provision shifts the burden of proving that proceeds of crime are untainted property on person(s) accused of having committed the offence under Section 3. We have noticed while on the analysis of Issues C to E that the provisions of Sections 3, 5, 8, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 23; the definitions of money-laundering {Section 2(p); proceeds of crime (Section 2(u); property (Section 2(v) and value (Section 2(zb)} are intertwined, delineate the provisions of each other and in tandem operate to effectuate one of the two substantial purposes of the Act viz., attachment for the purposes of eventual confiscation, of proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering, whether in the ownership, control or possession of a person accused of the offence under Section 3 or not. The offence of money-laundering as defined in Section 3 comprises direct or indirect attempt to indulge, knowingly assist, and knowingly be a party to or actual involvement in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property. Proceeds of crime is any property derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of a criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property (Section 2(u). Proceeds of crime is any property derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of a criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property (Section 2(u). Qua the provisions in Chapter-III of the Act, the process of provisional attachment, confirmation of such attachment by the adjudicating authority and confiscation of the property attached is operative against property constituting the proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering whether in the ownership, control or possession of a person who has committed an offence under Section 3 or otherwise. Section 8(1) while enjoining the adjudicating authority to issue a notice to a person in possession of proceeds of a crime, whether in his own right or on behalf of any other person, calling upon the notice to indicate the sources of his income, earning or assets for the purposes of establishing that the acquisition of ownership, control or possession of the property by the notice is bona fide and out of legitimate sources; of his income, earning or assets, does not enact a presumption that where the notice is a person accused of the offence under Section 3, the provisionally attached property is proceeds of crime. Since camouflage and deceit are strategies inherent and integral to money-laundering operations and may involve successive transactions relating to proceeds of crime and intent to project the layered proceeds as untainted property, effectuation of the legislative purposes is achieved only where the burden is imposed on the accused to establish that proceeds of crime are untainted property. This is the legislative purpose and the justification for Section 24 of the Act. In response to a notice issued under Section 8 (1) and qua the legislative prescription in Section 24 of the Act the person accused of having committed the offence under Section 3 must show with supporting evidence and material that he has the requisite means by way of income, earning or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired the property alleged to be proceeds of crime. Only on such showing would the accused be able to rebut the statutorily enjoined presumption that the alleged proceeds of crime are untainted property. This being the purpose, we are not satisfied that the provisions of Section 24 are arbitrary or unconstitutional. Only on such showing would the accused be able to rebut the statutorily enjoined presumption that the alleged proceeds of crime are untainted property. This being the purpose, we are not satisfied that the provisions of Section 24 are arbitrary or unconstitutional. Section 24 is not confined to the trial of an offence under Section 3 but operates to attachment and confiscation proceedings under Chapter-III, as well. The legislative prescription that the burden of proof inheres on a person accused of having committed the offence under Section 3 is only to confine the inherence of the expressed burden to an accused. Where the property is in the ownership, control or possession of a person not accused of having committed an offence under Section 3 and where such property/proceeds of crime is part of interconnected transactions involved in money-laundering, then and in such an event the presumption enjoined in Section 23 comes into operation and not the inherence of burden of proof under Section 24. This is in our considered view the true and fair construction of the provisions of Section 24. Clearly, therefore a person other than one accused of having committed the offence under Section 3 is not imposed the burden of proof enjoined by Section 24. On a person accused of an offence under Section 3 however, the burden applies, also for attachment and confiscation proceedings. Issue F is answered accordingly.” 12.1 We are in complete agreement with declaration of law with regard to Sections 23 and 24 of the PML Act by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the above decision, which gives complete answer to additional contentions raised by Shri Sunit Shah, learned counsel in cognate petition. It is trite that debate in the Parliament while enacting any legislation no doubt gives insight about what was passing in the minds of parliamentarians, but when the statute is enacted and it comes into force, the Court interpreting the provisions of such statute will go by clear wordings of the provisions as per golden rule of interpretation. 13. In the case of D.K. Basu [supra], the Apex Court upheld the basic human rights of an individual in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution of India vis-a-vis custodial violence and deprecated naked violation of human dignity by custodial violence and found third degree methods are totally impermissible. 13. In the case of D.K. Basu [supra], the Apex Court upheld the basic human rights of an individual in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution of India vis-a-vis custodial violence and deprecated naked violation of human dignity by custodial violence and found third degree methods are totally impermissible. While laying down mandatory guidelines in paras 35 and 36 of the said judgment mandated police authorities and likewise to follow such guidelines strictly and breach thereof would entail serious consequences, including proceedings to be taken up by the Court concerned in accordance with law, including punishment for contempt of court. However, as we have noticed, discussed and upheld that arrest of the petitioners by a competent officer viz. The Assistant Director-respondent No.3 herein duly empowered to do so and further envisaged procedure under Section 19 of the PML Act, which galore on the record of the case. Therefore, judgment in the case of D.K. Basu [supra] is not applicable to the facts of the present petitioners. 13.1 The decision in the case of Harikishan [supra] was in the context of order of detention passed under Section 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Preventive Detention Act in which no opportunity was given to the appellant – detenue to have sufficient knowledge of all the grounds on which the detention order was based and thus depriving him of making representation. The case of Harikishan [supra] again will not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case when the petitioners are arrested during the course of investigation by following procedure laid down under Section 19 of the PML Act. 13.2 In the case of K. Kuppusamy [supra], the Apex Court held the where the rules framed under Article 309 had not been amended, the Government could not act contrary to such rules merely because it had taken a decision to amend such Rules. It is, therefore, held that administrative instructions, circulars, orders could not override statutory Rules. Therefore, case of K. Kuppusamy [supra] is not applicable to the facts of the present cases. 13.3 The case of Sunil Fulchand Shah [supra] was again arising out of Sections 10 and 12 of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 where the distinction was made of preventive detention and punitive detention. Therefore, case of K. Kuppusamy [supra] is not applicable to the facts of the present cases. 13.3 The case of Sunil Fulchand Shah [supra] was again arising out of Sections 10 and 12 of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 where the distinction was made of preventive detention and punitive detention. 13.4 In the case of Madhu Limaye [supra] detention was ordered without informing grounds of arrest which was held to be violative of Article 22(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India. Neither the detention of the petitioners is unlawful nor it is in violation of Provisions of Section 19 of the PML Act and the appellant is not only informed the grounds of arrest duly signed by him, as reflected from his arrest memo and produced on record of the petition and even the above fact was recorded by learned Special Judge while considering application for bail. The above decision, therefore, is of no help to the petitioners. 13.5 The next decision in the case of Hussein Ghadially [supra] was in the context of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and the Apex Court held that the Apex Court in the context of Designated Authority [SP] under Section 20A had not given approval, but such approval was given by superior officer and it was held that such invalidity cannot be cured by Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners have no bearing on the facts of the present case and law involved in the subject petitions. 14 In the result, both these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. Rule issued in each of the petitions stand discharged. However, there shall be no order as to costs.