Order Heard Sri Vinay Koujalgi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of Sri Bahubali N. Kanabargi for petitioners and Sri Ravi V Hosmani, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of respondents –1 to 4. Perused case papers. 2. Petitioners are seeking for quashing of the order dated 03.11.2004 passed by Land Tribunal, Chokodi vide Annexure-C. 3. There is a delay of 9 years in filing present writ petition. There is not even a whisper in the writ petition as to why there has been delay of 9 years in filing present writ petition. This Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would refrain from exercising said jurisdiction when delay is inordinate and unexplained. 4. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and is to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of each case. It will depend upon the facts as pleaded in a given case. It is no doubt true that there is no limitation prescribed for the Courts to exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is also not in dispute that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of certain length of time if the delay is explained with sufficient cause. There may be cases where facts would indicate that demand for justice is so compelling that this Court would be inclined to interfere despite there being delay. Thus, it would ultimately be the discretion of the Court which will have to exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. There cannot be any hard and fast rule insofar as either condonation of delay or refusal to condone the delay. Merely because, no third party rights have been created is hardly a ground for condonation of delay. The discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be exercised to grant relief only to a person whose conduct does not disentitle him to obtain such discretionary relief and from the conduct of his/her act, if it is explicit that for such relief, the petitioners would not be entitled then condonation of delay would not be called for and this Court while exercising the power under Article 226 would be slow in condoning such delay. Lapse of time and delay are important factors which requires to be considered while exercising the power under Article 226 and such defence when raised must be examined by taking into consideration the length of delay and the nature of the acts done during this interregnum period namely during such intervals. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the following cases has considered the delay aspect in various perspective and held that while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if delay is raised as a defence and if it is found on facts and circumstances of each case, then such delay is not to be condoned or the defence of delay is to be accepted and as such, relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be refused in the following cases. (i) AFLATOON VS. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI reported in AIR 1974 SC 2077 : “11. Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the, notification even after the publication of the declaration under s. 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the, public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under s. 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the, acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under s. 4 and the declaration under s. 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be, putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Motichand and Others v. H. B. Munshi and Another(1); and Rabindranath Bose and Others v. Union of India & Others(2). 12. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Motichand and Others v. H. B. Munshi and Another(1); and Rabindranath Bose and Others v. Union of India & Others(2). 12. From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it is clear that the Government have allotted a large portion of the land after the acquisition proceedings were finalised to Cooperative lousing societies. To quash the notification at this stage would disturb the rights of third parties who are not before the Court.” (ii) SWAIKA PROPERTIES (P) LTD., AND ANOTHER VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS reported in (2008) 4 SCC 695 “15. Insofar as the contention regarding the possession having not been taken is concerned, the respondents submit that the possession of the land in dispute has already been taken. Be that as it may, the award in respect of the land having become final, the State Government is vested with the powers to take possession of the land concerned and, therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the claim of the State Government that the possession had been taken before the filing of the writ petition. Moreover, the appellants sought enhancement of compensation by filing reference application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Simultaneously, the appellants filed writ petition before the High Court of Rajasthan after passing of the award. 16. This Court has repeatedly held that a writ petition challenging the notification for acquisition of land, if filed after the possession having been taken, is not maintainable. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd., where K. Ramaswamy, J. speaking for a Bench consisting of His Lordship and S.B. Majmudar, J. held : (SCC p.520, para 29.) “29. It is thus wellsettled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.” In the concurring judgment, S.B. Majmudar, J. held as under : (Industrial Development Investment case, SCC pp.522523 para 35) “35...... Such a belated writ petition, therefore, was rightly rejected by the learned Single Judge on the ground of gross delay and laches. The respondent writ petitioners can be said to have waived their objections to the acquisition on the ground of extinction of public purpose by their own inaction, lethargy and indolent conduct. The Division Bench of the High Court had taken the view that because of their inaction no vested rights of third parties are created. That finding is obviously incorrect for the simple reason that because of the indolent conduct of the writ petitioners land got acquired, award was passed, compensation was handed over to various claimants including the landlord. Reference applications came to be filed for larger compensation by claimants including writ petitioners themselves. The acquired land got vested in the State Government and the Municipal Corporation free from all encumbrances as enjoined by Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus right to get more compensation got vested in diverse claimants by passing of the award, as well as vested right was created in favour of the Bombay Municipal Corporation by virtue of the vesting of the land in the State Government for being handed over to the Corporation. All these events could not be wished away by observing that no third party rights were created by them. The writ petition came to be filed after all these events had taken place. Such a writ petition was clearly stillborn due to gross delay and laches.” 17. All these events could not be wished away by observing that no third party rights were created by them. The writ petition came to be filed after all these events had taken place. Such a writ petition was clearly stillborn due to gross delay and laches.” 17. Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. D.R. Laxmi following the decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra) it was held :( D.R.Laxmi Case, SCC p.452, para 9) “9. .... When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.” 18. To the similar effect is the judgment of this Court in the case of Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig & Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 48 this Court, following the decision of this Court in the case of C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. held : (Shah Hyder Case, SCC p.55, para 17) “17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N.)" 5. Keeping the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in mind, when facts on hand are examined, at the cost of repetition, it requires to be noticed that petitioner has failed to explain delay of 9 years in filing present writ petition. In the absence of delay being explained and order of Land Tribunal indicating that petitioners herein had also appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Land Tribunal and had suffered an order against them and still they did not pursue it, then, petitioners would be disentitled to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence, on the ground of delay and latches, present writ petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is hereby dismissed.